United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
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U.S. Application Serial No. 88450432
Mark: RIDE 603
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Correspondence Address: |
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Applicant: Brian Labrie
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Reference/Docket No. 19-077-BL
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: August 28, 2019
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5532716 (“SIX HUNDRED THREE”). Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registration.
Applicant has requested registration for the mark "RIDE 603" with design for "On-line retail store services featuring clothing, flags, hats, koozies, mugs, cups, bags, decals, stickers, and tumblers" in Class 35.
Registrant's mark is "SIX HUNDRED THREE" for "Bottoms for babies, adults, children, women and men;Tops for babies, adults, children, women and men" in Class 25.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods and services, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods and services. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
COMPARISON OF THE MARKS
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Here, the applicant's design mark "RIDE 603" is confusingly similar to the registrant’s standard character mark “SIX HUNDRED THREE”.
The meaning of this mark as used in both parties’ marks is also identical, and thus evokes the same commercial impressions in the minds of consumers. The number “603” or “SIX HUNDRED THREE” identifies the sole telephone area code for the state of New Hampshire, where both parties are located. See attached evidence from Area-codes.com. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).
Applicant’s addition of the term “RIDE” to the mark is also insufficient to overcome a finding of likely consumer confusion. Adding a term to a registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER and design confusingly similar); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1269 (TTAB 2009) (finding TITAN and VANTAGE TITAN confusingly similar); In re El Torito Rests., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002, 2004 (TTAB 1988) (finding MACHO and MACHO COMBOS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). In the present case, the marks are identical in part.
While the applicant's mark also includes the design element of the outline of the state of New Hampshire, this addition is insufficient to obviate the similarities between the marks. Specifically, the design is not so distinctive that consumers are likely to call for the applicant’s services by referencing the design, nor does the design otherwise alter the commercial impression that the mark conveys. Indeed, the design’s inclusion merely serves to cement commercial impression that the number “603”, phonetically identical to the whole of registrant’s mark, refers to the same area code evoked by the registration. When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
Furthermore, this design is geographically descriptive of the source of applicant’s services, and thus possesses a diminished capacity to distinguish the mark from that within the registration. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant in relation to other wording in a mark. See Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1816, 1824-25 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1342-43, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
In the present case, the attached evidence shows that the design of the state of New Hampshire is geographically descriptive of the source of applicant’s services. Thus, this design is less significant in terms of affecting the mark’s commercial impression, and renders the wording of the mark the more dominant element of the mark.
For these reasons, when consumers encounter the parties' services using marks with these similarities, they are likely to be confused as to the source of the services. Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
COMPARISON OF THE GOODS AND SERVICES
In the present case, the applicant's retail store services offering clothing and other products are closely related to the registrant's clothing goods.
The use of similar marks on or in connection with both products and retail-store services has been held likely to cause confusion where the evidence showed that the retail-store services featured the same type of products. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding the use of similar marks for various clothing items, including athletic uniforms, and for retail shops featuring sports team related clothing and apparel likely to cause confusion); In re House Beer, LLC, 114 USPQ2d 1073, 1078 (TTAB 2015) (holding the use of identical marks for beer and for retail store services featuring beer likely to cause confusion); In re Thomas, 79 USPQ2d 1021, 1023 (TTAB 2006) (holding the use of similar marks for jewelry and for retail-jewelry and mineral-store services likely to cause confusion); TMEP §1207.01(a)(ii).
Furthermore, the attached Internet evidence, consisting of retailers that offer the types of products listed in applicant’s identification that also manufacture clothing, establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures and provides the relevant goods and services and markets the goods and services under the same mark. See attached websites Urbandoutfitters.com, Llbean.com, Asos.com, Bando.com, Pinkarmadillo.com. This evidence also demonstrates that the relevant goods and services are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use and suggests that the goods and/or services are similar or complementary in terms of purpose or function. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
For these reasons, consumers are likely to mistakenly conclude that the goods and services emanate from the same source. Therefore, the goods and services are closely related.
Because the marks are confusingly similar and the goods and services are closely related, consumers are likely to be confused as to the source of the goods and services. Thus, registration is refused pursuant to Trademark Act Section 2(d).
RESPONSE TO REFUSAL
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
REQUIREMENT
If the applicant responds to the refusal, then the applicant must also respond to the below requirements.
DISCLAIMER REQUIRED
Applicant must provide a disclaimer of the unregistrable part(s) of the applied-for mark even though the mark as a whole appears to be registrable. See 15 U.S.C. §1056(a); TMEP §§1213, 1213.03(a). A disclaimer of an unregistrable part of a mark will not affect the mark’s appearance. See Schwarzkopf v. John H. Breck, Inc., 340 F.2d 978, 979-80, 144 USPQ 433, 433 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
In this case, applicant must disclaim the design of the state of New Hampshire because it is not inherently distinctive. This unregistrable design at best is primarily geographically descriptive of the origin of applicant’s services. See 15 U.S.C. §§1052(e)(2); In re Societe Generale des Eaux Minerales de Vittel S.A., 824 F.2d 957, 959, 3 USPQ2d 1450, 1451-52 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re Joint-Stock Co. “Baik”, 80 USPQ2d 1305, 1309 (TTAB 2006); TMEP §§1210.01(a), 1213, 1213.03(a), (c).
An accurate design of geographically descriptive matter and the word or words which describe the design are legal equivalents; therefore, a design must be disclaimed the same as the primarily geographically descriptive wording See In re Can. Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 86 F.2d 830, 832, 32 USPQ 49, 50 (C.C.P.A. 1936); TMEP §1210.02(a).
Applicant must also disclaim the wording “603” because it is not inherently distinctive. This unregistrable term is at best primarily geographically descriptive of the origin of applicant’s services. See 15 U.S.C. §§1052(e)(2); In re Societe Generale des Eaux Minerales de Vittel S.A., 824 F.2d 957, 959, 3 USPQ2d 1450, 1451-52 (Fed. Cir. 1987); TMEP §§1210.01(a), 1210.06(a), 1213.03(a).
The design of New Hampshire is the legal equivalent of the geographic place or location of the state of New Hampshire. TMEP §1210.02(a). The attached evidence from Columbiagazetteer.org shows that this is a generally known geographic place or location. See TMEP §§1210.02 et seq.; see also attached website results from Columbiagazetteer.org. Also attached is evidence that the number “603” identifies the only area code for the state of New Hampshire, and thus identifies the location. See attached website evidence from Area-codes.com. The services for which applicant seeks registration originate in this geographic place or location as shown by applicant’s address of record. See TMEP §1210.03. Because the services originate in this place or location, a public association of the services with the place is presumed. See In re Hollywood Lawyers Online, 110 USPQ2d 1852, 1858 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re Spirits of New Merced, LLC, 85 USPQ2d 1614, 1621 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §§1210.02(a) 1210.04.
Applicant may respond to this issue by submitting a disclaimer in the following format:
No claim is made to the exclusive right to use the design of the state of New Hampshire and "603" apart from the mark as shown.
For an overview of disclaimers and instructions on how to satisfy this issue using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), see the Disclaimer webpage.
A disclaimer is a statement in the application record that an applicant does not claim exclusive rights to an unregistrable component of the mark. See Schwarzkopf v. John H. Breck, Inc., 340 F.2d 978, 979-80, 144 USPQ 433, 433 (C.C.P.A. 1965); TMEP §1213. A disclaimer does not physically remove the disclaimed matter from the mark or otherwise affect the appearance of the mark. See Schwarzkopf v. John H. Breck, Inc., 340 F.2d at 979, 144 USPQ2d at 433; TMEP §1213.
IDENTIFICATION OF SERVICES AMENDMENT REQUIRED
Identifications of goods and/or services should generally be comprised of generic everyday wording for the goods and/or services, and exclude proprietary or potentially-proprietary wording. See TMEP §§1402.01, 1402.09. A registered mark indicates origin in one particular party and so may not be used to identify goods or services that originate in a party other than that registrant. TMEP §1402.09 (citing Camloc Fastener Corp. v. Grant, 119 USPQ at 264 n.1).
Applicant may replace such wording with the following, if appropriate (suggested changes featured in bold, underline, and strikethrough). Please note that if applicant wishes to adopt the suggested deletions, featured in strikethrough below, applicant MUST MANUALLY DELETE the struck through matter within electronic USPTO response forms. Copying and pasting the below language will NOT result in the deletion of the language from the identification.
Class 35: On-line retail store services featuring clothing, flags, hats, koozies insulated sleeves for beverage
containers, mugs, cups, bags, decals, stickers, and tumblers
SCOPE ADVISORY
Applicant’s goods and/or services may be clarified or limited, but may not be expanded beyond those originally itemized in the application or as acceptably amended. See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06. Applicant may clarify or limit the identification by inserting qualifying language or deleting items to result in a more specific identification; however, applicant may not substitute different goods and/or services or add goods and/or services not found or encompassed by those in the original application or as acceptably amended. See TMEP §1402.06(a)-(b). The scope of the goods and/or services sets the outer limit for any changes to the identification and is generally determined by the ordinary meaning of the wording in the identification. TMEP §§1402.06(b), 1402.07(a)-(b). Any acceptable changes to the goods and/or services will further limit scope, and once goods and/or services are deleted, they are not permitted to be reinserted. TMEP §1402.07(e).
For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual. See TMEP §1402.04.
ATTORNEY INFORMATION REQUIRED
The application record indicates that applicant is represented by Brendan M. Shortell, Esq., however the record is unclear about whether this individual is qualified to practice law at the USPTO. See 37 C.F.R. §11.14(a); TMEP §§602 et seq. Only authorized attorneys may practice law at the USPTO in trademark matters. 37 C.F.R. §2.17(a); TMEP §§602.01-.03. Accordingly, applicant must provide documentation showing the attorney’s active bar membership in good standing in the designated bar, such as a certificate of good standing, a letter from the bar, or if the bar lists a member’s standing and admission details, a printout from the website of the specified bar showing the URL and print date. 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(b)(3), 2.61(b). If the originally submitted attorney bar information is incorrect, applicant’s attorney must specify the correct bar information and provide supporting documentation showing the attorney’s active bar membership in good standing. 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(b)(3), 2.61(b). Otherwise, applicant may appoint or designate a different attorney who is qualified to practice law before the USPTO under 37 C.F.R. §11.14. See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(a).
Failure to comply with this requirement is grounds for refusing registration. In re Harley, 119 USPQ2d 1755, 1757-58 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §814. Merely stating that the attorney’s bar information is available on a state bar’s website is an insufficient response and will not make the relevant information of record. See In re Planalytics, Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1453, 1457-58 (TTAB 2004).
To provide attorney bar credentials. Open the correct TEAS response form and enter the serial number, answer “yes” to wizard question #3, and on the “Additional Statement(s)” page in the “Miscellaneous Statement” field (1) explain the documentation provided and (2) click the button below the text box to attach evidence.
RESPONSE GUIDELINES
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action
Kathleen Schwarz
Kathleen H. Schwarz
/Kathleen H. Schwarz/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 123
571-272-2460
kathleen.schwarz@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE
