Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  August 16, 2019

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

 

·       Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

·       Specimen Refusal – Digitally Altered

·       Additional Information Required

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 3017413 and 3196120.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations.

 

Applicant’s proposed mark is ULTRAMAX for use with “antennas” in International Class 9.

 

The registered marks are:

 

U.S. Registration No. 3017413 – ULTRAMAX for use with “Lighting ballasts, excluding lighting ballasts for tanning lamps” in International Class 9.

 

U.S. Registration No. 3196120 – ULTRAMAX RECEIVER for use with “Receivers for electronic animal containment systems” in International Class 9.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Regarding U.S. Registration No. 3017413

 

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1323, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). 

 

In the present case, applicant’s mark is the standard character mark ULTRAMAX and registrant’s mark is the standard character mark ULTRAMAX.  These marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods.  Id.

 

Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar. 

 

Regarding U.S. Registration No. 3196120

 

In this case, applicant’s mark is the standard character mark ULTRAMAX. The registrant’s mark is the standard character mark ULTRAMAX RECEIVER Applicant’s mark is highly similar to the registered marks in appearance, sound, and commercial impression.

 

The compared marks contain the identical dominant source-identifying term “ULTRAMAX”. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). In this case, the term “RECEIVER” is disclaimed in registrant’s mark. Thus, this wording is less significant in terms of affecting the mark’s commercial impression, and renders the wording “ULTRAMAX” the more dominant element of the mark. Because the term “ULTRAMAX” is the only source-identifying wording in applicant’s mark the marks are likely to evoke a similar commercial impression.

 

Further, the identical term “ULTRAMAX” is also the first element in both applicant’s and registrant’s marks. Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”). Thus, consumers are more likely to focus on the wording “ULTRAMAX” when calling for both applicant’s and registrant’s goods.

 

For the reasons mentioned above, when consumers encounter the parties’ goods using marks with these similarities, they are likely to be confused as to the source of the goods. Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Comparison of the Goods

 

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Regarding U.S. Registration No. 3017413

 

In this case, applicant’s goods are closely related to registrant’s goods because the same entity commonly offers both antennas and lighting ballasts under the same mark, and thus purchasers are likely to believe that the goods emanate from the same source.

 

The attached Internet evidence, consisting of screenshots from USA Philips, Signify, Home Depot, Current Powered by GE, Samsung Parts, Shop Jimmy, and Samsung, establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures the relevant goods, markets the goods under the same mark, and the relevant goods are sold through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

The above mentioned evidence shows that purchasers are accustomed to encountering the goods of the applicant and registrant offered under the same mark. Therefore, purchasers are likely to believe the goods emanate from the same source.

 

Regarding U.S. Registration No. 3196120

 

In this case, applicant’s goods are closely related to registrant’s goods because both are offering devices that transmit and receive data and the same entity commonly manufactures antennas and receivers under the same mark, and thus purchasers are likely to believe that the goods emanate from the same source.

 

The attached Internet evidence, consisting of screenshots from Canine Company, Hickory Ridge Farms, Dog Watch, and Hidden Boundaries, establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures the relevant goods, markets the goods under the same mark, and the relevant goods are sold through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use. For example, the attached evidence shows that animal containment systems are comprised of antennas and receivers and that the same entity commonly offers both antennas and receivers under the same mark. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

The above mentioned evidence shows that purchasers are accustomed to encountering the goods of the applicant and registrant offered under the same mark. Therefore, purchasers are likely to believe the goods emanate from the same source.

 

Furthermore, where the marks of the respective parties are identical or virtually identical, as in this case, the degree of similarity or relatedness between the goods needed to support a finding of likelihood of confusion declines.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993)), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017); TMEP §1207.01(a).

 

Accordingly, the goods of applicant and the registrants are considered related for purposes of the likelihood of confusion analysis.

 

Conclusion

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

Because the marks are highly similar and the goods are closely related, there is a likelihood of purchaser confusion as to the source of the goods. Therefore, registration is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act. 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).

 

Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.

 

SPECIMEN REFUSAL – DIGITALLY ALTERED

 

Registration is refused because the specimen in International Class 9 appears to consist of a digitally altered image or a mock-up of the mark on the goods or their packaging and does not show the applied-for mark in actual use in commerce.  Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a). 

 

An application based on Trademark Act Section 1(a) must include a specimen showing the applied-for mark in use in commerce for each international class of goods identified in the application or amendment to allege use.  15 U.S.C. §1051(a)(1); 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a).  “Use in commerce” means (1) a bona fide use of the applied-for mark in the ordinary course of trade (and not merely to reserve a right in the mark), (2) the mark is placed in any manner on the goods, packaging, tags or labels affixed to the goods, or displays that directly associate the mark with the goods and have a point-of-sale nature, and (3) the goods are actually sold or transported in commerce.  See 15 U.S.C. §1127.

 

An image of a product or packaging that has been digitally created or otherwise altered to include the mark does not show actual use of the mark in commerce.  See 15 U.S.C. §1127; TMEP §§904.04(a), 904.07(a); cf. In re Chica, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1845, 1848 (TTAB 2007) (holding that “a mere drawing of the goods with an illustration of how the mark may be displayed” was not an acceptable specimen because it did not show actual use in commerce); In re The Signal Cos., 228 USPQ 956, 957-58 n.4 (TTAB 1986) (noting that a printer’s proof of an advertisement would not be an acceptable specimen because it does not show actual use in commerce).

 

In this case, the specimen consists of an image of the packaging of applicant’s goods. Here, the applied-for mark as appearing on the packaging appears to be digitally altered because of the pixilation around the applied-for mark. Therefore, the submitted specimen cannot be accepted.

 

Response options.  Applicant may respond to the refusal of registration due to the specimen’s failure to show actual use in commerce by amending the filing basis to allege intent to use the mark in commerce, for which no specimen is required now.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.34.  This option will later necessitate additional fee(s) and filing requirements such as providing a specimen. 

 

Alternatively, applicant may also respond to the refusal by submitting a different specimen (a “verified substitute specimen”) that (a) was in actual use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of an amendment to allege use and (b) shows the mark in actual use in commerce for the goods identified in the application or amendment to allege use.  A “verified substitute specimen” is a specimen that is accompanied by the following statement made in a signed affidavit or supported by a declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20:  “The substitute (or new, or originally submitted, if appropriate) specimen(s) was/were in use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of the amendment to allege use.”  The substitute specimen cannot be accepted without this statement. 

 

For an overview of these response options and instructions on how to satisfy either option online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, see the Specimen webpage.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  However, if applicant responds to the refusal(s), applicant must also respond to the requirement(s) set forth below.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED

 

To permit proper examination of the application record for compliance with use in commerce requirements, applicant must respond to the following requests for information and documentation about the specimen(s).  See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §814.  A specimen must show the mark as used in commerce, which means use in the ordinary course of trade, and not merely to reserve a right in the trademark.  15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1052, 1127.  Because the specimen of record appears to be digitally created or altered, or is otherwise a mock-up, further information is necessary to determine whether the specimen is in actual use in commerce. 

 

Answer for each specimen/photograph/image provided.  For any website source, provide a digital copy of the entire webpage from top to bottom, as rendered in an Internet browser, that includes the URL and access or print date.  TMEP §710.01(b) (citing In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1733 (TTAB 2018)). 

 

(1)       Identify the particular good(s) listed in the application for which the specimen(s) was submitted to show use of the mark.

 

(2)       Was the specimen created for submission with this application?  If so, specify the date each specimen was created.  If applicant obtained the image(s) of the goods shown in the specimen(s) from a third-party website, provide the URL of the website and a digital copy of relevant webpage(s) for each image.

 

(3)       Provide information about and examples of how applicant’s goods appear in the actual sales environment.

(a)       If sold in stores, provide a representative sample of the name(s) of the stores and of photographs showing the goods for sale in the named stores, such as photographs of the sales displays or goods on shelves with the mark. 

(b)       If sold online, provide a representative sample of the name(s) of the online retailers, the website URL(s) for each named retailer, and a digital copy of the webpages showing the goods for sale on the named website.

(c)       If sold in another type of sales environment (e.g., catalogs, trade shows), identify the environment and provide photographs and/or documentation showing the goods for sale in that environment. 

 

(4)       If the information in question (3) about how the goods appear in the actual sales environment is not available to applicant, please describe how applicant’s goods are sold or transported and provide photographs and other documentation showing how applicant’s mark appears on the goods and/or its packaging when the goods are sold or transported to or within the United States.

 

(5)       For each category of sales environment specified in response to questions (3) and (4), specify when the goods bearing the mark were first available for purchase within the United States, the date of the first sale of the goods to or within the United States, and whether the goods are still for sale to or within the United States in that environment.

 

(6)       For the goods identified in response to question (1), specify the dollar amount of sales with or within the United States and provide at least three invoices or other supporting documentation that show payments or other consideration made, redacting personal or private information of buyers as necessary.

 

If applicant submits a verified substitute specimen, applicant must also fully respond to all the requirements for information and documentation.  Failure to comply with a requirement to furnish information is grounds for refusing registration.  In re Harley, 119 USPQ2d 1755, 1757-58 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §814.  Merely stating that evidence is available on applicant’s or a third party website or providing a hyperlink of such a website is an insufficient response and will not make the additional information or materials of record.  See In re Planalytics, Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1453, 1457-58 (TTAB 2004).  However, amending the application filing basis to intent-to-use under Section 1(b) will resolve the requirements for information and documentation.

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action.  For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above.  For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements.  Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action  

 

 

/Geraldine Ingold/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 121

(571) 272-5076

geraldine.ingold@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on August 16, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88449863

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Geraldine Ingold/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 121

(571) 272-5076

geraldine.ingold@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from August 16, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond.

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”