To: | LAYER ONE CO., LTD. (twang@thewangiplaw.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88446612 - ATOM - N/A |
Sent: | March 13, 2020 06:32:40 PM |
Sent As: | ecom115@uspto.gov |
Attachments: |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88446612
Mark: ATOM
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Correspondence Address: |
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Applicant: LAYER ONE CO., LTD.
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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SUSPENSION NOTICE
No Response Required
Issue date: March 13, 2020
The application is suspended for the reasons specified below. See 37 C.F.R. §2.67; TMEP §§716 et seq.
The pending applications below have an earlier filing date or effective filing date than applicant’s application. If the mark in the applications below register, the USPTO may refuse registration of applicant’s mark under Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion with the registered marks. 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208.02(c). Action on this application is suspended until the prior-filed applications below either registers or abandons. 37 C.F.R. §2.83(c). Information relevant to the applications below was sent previously.
- U.S. Application Serial Nos. 88363094 and 88363118
Requirement resolved. The following requirement is satisfied:
• Amended Description of Mark Required
See TMEP §713.02.
Refusal maintained and continued. The following refusal is maintained and continued for the reasons stated below:
• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
See id. The refusal will be made final once this application is removed from suspension, unless a new issue arises. See TMEP §716.01.
Applicant’s Arguments
Applicant’s arguments against the Section 2(d) refusal and the advisory regarding the prior-filed applications have been considered and found unpersuasive for the reasons briefly set forth below. These arguments will be addressed in further detail in the event a subsequent Office action issues.
First, applicant argues that applicant’s goods differ from registrant’s goods because applicant’s goods are 3D printers, printing pens, laser etching and engraving machines while registrant’s goods are plating machines and cutting and clicking presses. However, the fact that the goods of the parties differ is not controlling in determining likelihood of confusion. The issue is not likelihood of confusion between particular goods, but likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of those goods. In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1316, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003); In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01.
Second, applicant argues that applicant’s consumers are sophisticated. However, the fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion. TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii); see, e.g., Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. 1317, 1325, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163-64 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Top Tobacco LP v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1170 (TTAB 2011). Further, where the purchasers consist of both professionals and the public, the standard of care for purchasing the goods is that of the least sophisticated potential purchaser. In re FCA US LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1214, 1222 (TTAB 2018) (citing Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. at 1325, 110 USPQ2d at 1163), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 375518 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Third, applicant argues that the evidence attached to the Office action is not relevant because the goods shown therein are not sold by applicant or registrant. However, applicant is reminded that determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
Fourth, applicant argues that the marks have a different appearance because of the design and/or stylization in applicant’s mark, registrant’s marks, and the marks of the prior-filed applicant. However, when evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
Fifth, applicant argues that the marks have a different pronunciation because of applicant’s mark is “ATOM” while the marks of the prior-filed applicant is “ATUM 3D”. However, the wording “3D” in the marks of the prior-filed applicant has been disclaimed. Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Further, although the prior-filed applications use the wording “ATUM”, this wording could clearly be pronounced the same as “ATOM”. Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).
Sixth, applicant has submitted a list of allegedly similar registrations. However, the mere submission of a list of registrations does not make such registrations part of the record. See In re Peace Love World Live, LLC, 127 USPQ2d 1400, 1405 n.17 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1583 (TTAB 2007); In re Duofold Inc., 184 USPQ 638, 640 (TTAB 1974)); TBMP §1208.02; TMEP §710.03. To make third party registrations part of the record, an applicant must submit copies of the registrations, or the complete electronic equivalent from the USPTO’s automated systems, prior to appeal. In re Star Belly Stitcher, Inc., 107 USPQ2d 2059, 2064 (TTAB 2013); TBMP §1208.02; TMEP §710.03. Accordingly, these registrations will not be considered. In any case, prior decisions and actions of other trademark examining attorneys in registering other marks have little evidentiary value and are not binding upon the USPTO or the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. TMEP §1207.01(d)(vi); see In re USA Warriors Ice Hockey Program, Inc., 122 USPQ2d 1790, 1793 n.10 (TTAB 2017). Each case is decided on its own facts, and each mark stands on its own merits. In re USA Warriors Ice Hockey Program, Inc., 122 USPQ2d at 1793 n.10 (quoting In re Boulevard Entm’t, 334 F.3d 1336, 1343, 67 USPQ2d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
Finally, the overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Suspension process. The USPTO will periodically check this application to determine if it should remain suspended. See TMEP §716.04. As needed, the trademark examining attorney will issue a letter to applicant to inquire about the status of the reason for the suspension. TMEP §716.05.
No response required. Applicant may file a response, but is not required to do so.
/Pauline Ha/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 115
(571) 272-5005
pauline.ha@uspto.gov