To: | Harris Weinstein (Jonathan.Goins@lewisbrisbois.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88428020 - PITBULL - 43217-04 |
Sent: | April 07, 2020 10:35:36 AM |
Sent As: | ecom108@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88428020
Mark: PITBULL
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Correspondence Address: |
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Applicant: Harris Weinstein
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Reference/Docket No. 43217-04
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: April 07, 2020
On July 19, 2019, action on this application was suspended pending the disposition of U.S. Application Serial No. 88301389. The referenced prior-pending application has since registered. Therefore, registration is refused as follows.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5839664. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registration.
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the services. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Applicant has applied to register:
“PITBULL” (Standard Characters) for, “Legal services; Legal advisory services; Legal consultation services; Legal consulting services in the field of auto accidents and personal injury; Attorney services, namely, representation of clients in auto accidents and personal injury matters,” in International Class 45.
The registered mark is:
“PITBULL IN A SKIRT” (Standard Characters) for, “Legal services; Legal services in relation to the negotiation of contracts for others; Legal services relating to company formation and registration; Legal services relating to the exploitation of broadcasting rights; Legal services relating to the exploitation of copyright for printed matter; Legal services relating to the exploitation of film copyright; Legal services, namely, service of actual legal notice; Legal services, namely, preparation of applications for trademark registration; Legal services, namely, providing legal consultation in the area of health issues by a legal nurse; Legal services, namely, providing customized legal information, counseling, advice, and litigation services in all areas of law to people and families of modest incomes; Legal services, namely, providing customized documentation, information, counseling, advice and consultation services in all areas of family law, business law, entertainment law and trademarks; Legal services, namely, trademark maintenance services; Legal services, namely, trademark searching and clearance services; Legal advisory services; Legal consultation services; Legal consulting services in the field of family law, business law, entertainment law and trademarks; Legal document preparation services; Legal document preparation and research services for attorneys; Attorney services, namely, representation of clients in family law, business law, entertainment law and trademarks matters; Licensing of trademarks; News reporting and expert legal commentary services in the field of legal news; On-site legal services; Providing legal services in the field of family law, business law, entertainment law and trademarks; Providing legal services to disadvantaged persons through public advocacy programs; Providing information about legal services via a website; Providing information in the field of intellectual property legal services,” in International Class 45.
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F. 3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In the instant case, applicant’s mark “PITBULL” is confusingly similar to the registered mark “PITBULL IN A SKIRT” because the marks contain the identical dominant element “PITBULL IN A SKIRT”. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar. See In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1058, 224 USPQ at 751.
Here, the wording “PITBULL” is the first wording in the registered mark and the only wording in applicant’s mark. As such, it is likely that the consuming public will look at this wording as the dominant element and view this as the source of the identified legal services. Further, it is likely that the consuming public will view the wording “PITBULL” on its own as a shortened version of the registered mark, and be confused as to the source of the legal services.
In this case, the goods and/or services in the application and registration(s) are identical in part. Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and class(es) of purchasers are the same for these goods and/or services. See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1372, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are related.
Specifically, the identifications set forth in the application and registration are identical as to “Legal service” in International Class 45, and have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers.
Therefore, it is presumed that these services travel in all normal channels of trade, and are available to the same class of purchasers. See Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d 1046, 1053, 103 USPQ2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the services of applicant and the registrant are considered related for purposes of the likelihood of confusion analysis.
In summary, the marks are confusing similar because “PITBULL” and “PITBULL IN A SKIRT” have identical dominant elements and convey the same commercial impression, and the services are closely related because of the identical nature of applicant’s and registrant’s goods as to “Legal services”. Thus, registration is refused pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
RESPONSE GUIDELINES
For this application to proceed further, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement raised in this Office action. If the action includes a refusal, applicant may provide arguments and/or evidence as to why the refusal should be withdrawn and the mark should register. Applicant may also have other options specified in this Office action for responding to a refusal and should consider those options carefully. To respond to requirements and certain refusal response options, applicant should set forth in writing the required changes or statements. For more information and general tips on responding to USPTO Office actions, response options, and how to file a response online, see “Responding to Office Actions” on the USPTO’s website.
If applicant does not respond to this Office action within six months of the issue/mailing date, or responds by expressly abandoning the application, the application process will end and the trademark will fail to register. See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.65(a), 2.68(a); TMEP §§718.01, 718.02. Additionally, the USPTO will not refund the application filing fee, which is a required processing fee. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(i)-(iv), 2.209(a); TMEP §405.04.
When an application has abandoned for failure to respond to an Office action, an applicant may timely file a petition to revive the application, which, if granted, would allow the application to return to active status. See 37 C.F.R. §2.66; TMEP §1714. The petition must be filed within two months of the date of issuance of the notice of abandonment and may be filed online via the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) with a $100 fee. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(15)(ii), 2.66(b)(1).
If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney. All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Ryan Lavoie/
Ryan Lavoie
Examining Attorney
Law Office 108
571-272-6774
Ryan.Lavoie@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE