To: | Ranco Industries, Inc. (mail@emsip.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88427734 - SIT STAND MAT - 1992-69 |
Sent: | July 29, 2019 10:22:56 AM |
Sent As: | ecom113@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 Attachment - 24 Attachment - 25 Attachment - 26 Attachment - 27 Attachment - 28 Attachment - 29 Attachment - 30 Attachment - 31 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88427734
Mark: SIT STAND MAT
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Correspondence Address: EGBERT, MCDANIEL & SWARTZ, PLLC
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Applicant: Ranco Industries, Inc.
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Reference/Docket No. 1992-69
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: July 29, 2019
This Office action supersedes the previous Office action issued on July 29, 2019 in connection with this application. The assigned trademark examining attorney inadvertently omitted a refusal of registration relevant to the mark in the subject application. See TMEP §§706, 711.02. Specifically, a refusal should have issued under Trademark Act Section 2(d). The trademark examining attorney apologizes for any inconvenience caused by the delay in raising this issue.
SECTION 2(d) LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION REFUSAL
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4896569. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registration.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Similarity of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Here, the marks are highly similar because the marks contain the identical dominant wording, which is identical in appearance, sound, and commercial impression.
Additionally, although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods is typically less significant or less dominant in relation to other wording in a mark. See Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1816, 1824-25 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1342-43, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
In the present case, the wording MAT in the applied-for mark and registered mark is merely descriptive of applicant’s and registrant’s goods. Thus, this wording is less significant in terms of affecting the mark’s commercial impression, and renders the wording SIT and STAND the more dominant elements of the mark.
Ultimately, when consumers call for the goods of applicant and registrant using marks that consist of the identical terms, they are likely to be confused as to the source of those goods due to the overall similarity between the marks. Thus, the marks are confusingly similar.
Relatedness of the Goods
The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).
The compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
Other entities commonly use a single mark to provide and market goods that are similar to those of applicant’s and registrant’s, namely, floor mats and chair mats.
The attached evidence establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
For the foregoing reasons, the marks are confusingly similar and the evidence shows that the goods are commercially related and likely to be encountered together in the marketplace by consumers. As a result, consumers are likely to be confused and mistakenly believe that the goods originate from a common source. Therefore, registration is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
RESPONDING TO THE SECTION 2(d)—LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION REFUSAL
Although the examining attorney has refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.
SECTION 2(e)(1) REFUSAL - MERELY DESCRIPTIVE
A mark is merely descriptive if “it immediately conveys information concerning a feature, quality, or characteristic of [an applicant’s] goods or services.” In re N.C. Lottery, 866 F.3d 1363, 1367, 123 USPQ2d 1707, 1709 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 488 F.3d 960, 963, 82 USPQ2d 1828, 1831 (Fed. Cir. 2007)); TMEP §1209.01(b); see DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1251, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1755 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 814, 200 USPQ 215, 218 (C.C.P.A. 1978)).
The term SIT means to be in a position in which one’s weight is supported by one’s buttocks. The term stand means to have or maintain an upright position supported by one’s feet. A mat is a piece of material placed on the floor. Thus, in the context of applicant’s goods, the applied-for mark immediately conveys that applicant’s goods consist of a piece of material that is placed on the floor and allows one to easily transition from sitting and standing and aids in one’s comfort in both positions. Not only do the ordinary dictionary definitions show that the applied-for mark is descriptive, but evidence also exists that establishes the descriptive nature of the mark. Specifically, various other entities use the wording “SIT STAND MAT” to describe such goods and those goods identified by application. See attached evidence.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the wording SIT STAND MAT merely describes a characteristic and feature of applicant’s goods.
Ultimately, when consumers encounter applicant’s goods using the mark SIT STAND MAT, they will immediately understand the mark as an indication of a characteristic and feature of applicant’s goods and not an indication that applicant is the source of the goods. Thus, based on the foregoing, applicant’s mark SIT STAND MAT merely describes a characteristic and feature of applicant’s goods and registration is refused under Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act.
Response to SECTION 2(e)(1) REFUSAL
Although the examining attorney has refused registration, the applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
Responding to this office action
Response guidelines. For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action
Jesse Nelman
/JesseNelman/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 113
(571) 272-0191
jesse.nelman@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE