Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 no persons are required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control number. PTO Form 1957 (Rev 10/2011) |
OMB No. 0651-0050 (Exp 09/20/2020) |
Input Field |
Entered |
---|---|
SERIAL NUMBER | 88421296 |
LAW OFFICE ASSIGNED | LAW OFFICE 101 |
MARK SECTION | |
MARK | http://uspto.report/TM/88421296/mark.png |
LITERAL ELEMENT | COVERALLS |
STANDARD CHARACTERS | YES |
USPTO-GENERATED IMAGE | YES |
MARK STATEMENT | The mark consists of standard characters, without claim to any particular font style, size or color. |
ARGUMENT(S) | |
IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
----------------------------------- In the Matter of the Application of: Wiesman Holdings, LLC Serial No.: 88/421296 Filed: 05/08/2019 Mark: COVERALLS Attorney Docket No.: 56125-973 -----------------------------------
RESPONSE
This Response is to the Office Action issued July 24, 2019, with respect to the above-referenced trademark application that has a statutory period for response set to expire on January 24, 2020. The Applicant wishes to respond to the issues set forth in the Office Action and, where appropriate, seeks to amend the application as follows:
I. GOODS AND/OR SERVICES AND BASIS INFORMATION The Applicant hereby amends its description of goods and services, to read as follows: Class 10: Fitted covers for medical equipment, namely, c-Arms, laser arms, cameras, microscopes, fluoroscopes, light handles, lights, tables, and stands, and not including face shields.
II. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION The Examining Attorney has refused registration of Applicant’s Mark COVERALLS (Word Mark) under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), because Applicant’s Mark so resembles U.S. Registration Nos. 1908303 (hereinafter referred to, collectively, as the “Cited Mark”), when used on or in connection with the identified goods and services, as to be likely to cause confusion or to cause mistake or to deceive. A. Legal Standard The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“C.C.P.A”) has set forth thirteen factors for the Patent and Trademark Office to consider in determining a likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d). In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1360-2 (C.C.P.A. 1973). These factors include: the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression; the similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services; the similarity or dissimilarity of established trade channels; the conditions under which and the buyers to whom sales are made; the number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods or services; the length of time during which there has been concurrent use without actual confusion; and whether a house mark is used. Id. at 1361. Using these factors as a guide, each case must be decided on its own facts. Id. Although the amount of weight given to each factor may vary, all the evidence must be considered in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion. Id. at 1362. B. APPLICANT’S MARK AND THE CITED MARK ARE NOT SIMILAR The first DuPont factor requires that the marks be compared in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Id. at 1361. The marks are to be compared in their entireties, because the marks must be considered “in the way in which they are perceived by the relevant public.” In re Shell Oil Co., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993). A difference in only one element of the marks can preclude a finding of likelihood of confusion. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Bel Canto Fancy Foods, Ltd., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1980, 1982 (T.T.A.B. 1987). The C.C.P.A. and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“T.T.A.B.”) have consistently found no likelihood of confusion notwithstanding the fact that a mark incorporates a portion of or the entirety of another mark even though the marks are used in connection with related goods or services when the marks do not look or sound alike. See, e.g., Lever Bros. Co. v. Barcolene Co., 463 F.2d 1107, 1109 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (finding applicant’s ALL CLEAR! used in connection with household cleaner not to be confusingly similar to registrant’s ALL used with household cleansing products even though the two marks shared the common term ALL and were used on virtually identical products); In re P. Ferrero, 479 F.2d 1395, 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (finding applicant’s TIC TAC used in connection with candy not to be confusingly similar to registrant’s TIC TAC TOE used in connection with ice cream and sherbet even though one mark incorporated two-thirds of the other and both marks were used in connection with similar goods); Bell Lab., Inc. v. Colonial Prod., Inc. 644 F. Supp. 542, 550 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (finding applicant’s FINAL used in connection with rat poison not to be confusingly similar to registrant’s FINAL FLIP also used with rat poison even though both marks shared the common term FINAL and were used on identical products). The marks must also be compared in their entireties as to connotation and commercial impression. In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 361. The meaning or connotation of a mark must be determined in relation to the named goods or services, because the average purchaser normally retains a general, rather than specific, impression of the mark. TMEP § 1207.01(b)(v). “Even marks that are identical in sound and/or appearance may create sufficiently different commercial impressions when applied to the respective parties’ goods or services so that there is no likelihood of confusion.” Id. The C.C.P.A. and the T.T.A.B. have consistently found no likelihood of confusion even though two marks had a similar appearance or sound because they conveyed a different commercial impression when applied to the goods or services. See, e.g., In re British Bulldog, Ltd., 224 U.S.P.Q. 854 (T.T.A.B. 1984) (holding PLAYERS for men’s underwear not likely to be confused with PLAYERS for shoes, because the term PLAYERS implies a fit, style, color and durability adapted to outdoor activities when applied to shoes, but “implies something else, primarily indoors in nature” when applied to men’s underwear); In re Sydel Lingerie Co., Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. 629 (T.T.A.B. 1977) (finding BOTTOMS UP for ladies’ and children’s underwear not likely to be confused with BOTTOMS UP for men’s clothing, because the term connotes the drinking phrase “Drink Up” when applied to men’s suits, coats and trousers, but does not have this connotation when applied to ladies’ and children’s underwear). The Applicant’s Mark is COVERALLS, while the Cited Mark is COVERALL. When the Applicant’s Mark is compared in its entirety to the Cited Mark, it is evident that the marks have a different appearance. As is clearly evident by the above cited examples, a difference in only one element (i.e. letter) of the marks can preclude a finding of likelihood of confusion. When compared as a whole, the Applicant’s Mark and the Cited Mark not only have a different appearance, but also the Applicant’s Mark and the Cited Mark have a different sound and connotation. The marks look and sound different to the extent that Applicant’s Mark includes the letter “S”, while the Cited Mark does not. Considering the aforementioned differences, the Examining Attorney should find that fundamental difference between each mark, such that the Cited Mark should not be a basis for finding of a likelihood of confusion. Because both the C.C.P.A. and the T.T.A.B. have consistently found no likelihood of confusion when marks taken in their entireties do not look alike, the Applicant’s Mark and the Cited Mark are clearly not likely to cause confusion. C. APPLICANT’S MARK AND THE CITED MARKS ARE USED ON DIFFERENT GOODS AND ARE SOLD IN DIFFERENT TRADE CHANNELS TO DIFFERENT TYPES OF CONSUMERS Other DuPont factors require the Examining Attorney to compare the similarity or dissimilarity of the goods or services, their established channels of trade, and the degree of sophistication of their purchasers. In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361. “If the goods or services in question are not related or marketed in such a way that they would be encountered by the same persons in situations that would create the incorrect assumption that they originate from the same source, then, even if the marks are identical, confusion is not likely.” TMEP § 1207.01(a)(i); see, e.g., Shen Manufacturing Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 73 USPQ2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (cooking classes and kitchen textiles not related); Local Trademarks, Inc. v. Handy Boys Inc., 16 USPQ2d 1156 (TTAB 1990) (LITTLE PLUMBER for liquid drain opener held not confusingly similar to LITTLE PLUMBER and design for advertising services, namely the formulation and preparation of advertising copy and literature in the plumbing field); Quartz Radiation Corp. v. Comm/Scope Co., 1 USPQ2d 1668 (TTAB 1986) (QR for coaxial cable held not confusingly similar to QR for various products (e.g., lamps, tubes) related to the photocopying field). The comparison of the goods or services is limited to those listed in the Cited Marks. In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361. The Applicant’s Mark designates that through an amended description that the goods and services are associated with: Class 10 - Fitted covers for medical equipment, namely, c-Arms, laser arms, cameras, microscopes, fluoroscopes, light handles, lights, tables, and stands, and not including face shields. Based solely on the respective amended identifications, it is evident that Applicant’s goods and services in class 10 are clearly different from the goods and services of the Cited Marks, especially since the Cited Marks are directed and sold in different trade channels and some have been categorized in different international classes used for authoritative classification between differing goods and services. Based solely on the respective identifications, it is evident that Applicant’s goods and services are clearly different from the goods and services of the Cited Marks, especially when viewed in light of the marks, and are directed and sold in different trade channels. As such, Applicant’s goods and the services of the Applicant’s Mark neither flow in the same channels of trade nor are directed toward the same purchasers. Furthermore, the USPTO did not find a likelihood of confusion between any registered mark of the Cited Marks that are associated in similar classes of goods and services. Therefore the USPTO should arrive at the same result for the applied for mark. When used in conjunction with Applicant’s amended goods and services, the Applicant’s Mark therefore conveys the commercial impression that Applicant’s amended goods and services are associated with a specific class of medical equipment that clearly differ from the Cited Mark. Specifically, the Applicant wants to market specific goods to medical personnel looking to protect valuable medical equipment, namely, c-Arms, laser arms, cameras, microscopes, fluoroscopes, light handles, lights, tables, and stands. In contrast, the Cited Mark is associated with human wearing face shields, which are clearly different than the Applicant’s amended goods and services, which further exclude face shields. A sophisticated consumer would know the differences between the goods under the Cited Mark, considering these amended goods and services are not the type of goods and services that would be offered off the shelf per se. Based solely on the respective identifications, it is evident that Applicant’s amended goods and services are clearly different from than the services of the Cited Mark. Since the Cited Mark is directed and sold in different trade channels to different types of consumers, namely equipment versus clothing, a consumer would readily distinguish between goods offered under the Cited Mark and Applicant’s Mark without any possibility of confusion. It is unlikely that the Applicant’s services would be marketed in such a way that either the Applicant’s mark or the Cited Marks would be encountered by the same persons in situations that would create the incorrect assumption that they originate from the same source. Therefore, the Applicant’s Mark and the Cited Marks would not cause a likelihood of confusion. C. Conclusion In order to determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists under Trademark Act Section 2(d), the Examining Attorney is required to consider all relevant evidence. In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d. at 1362. Specifically, in a very crowded field, the goods and services of Applicant’s Mark and the Cited Marks are different and would not be marketed in such a way to create a likelihood of confusion. Removal of the refusal to register Applicant’s Mark in view of the Cited Marks is therefore respectfully requested. The Applicant submits that this application is in condition for publication. Prompt notification of the same is respectfully requested. Please charge any additional fees associated with this application to Deposit Order Account No. 501581. Respectfully submitted,
Date: January 23, 2020 By: /Joseph Falcon/ Joseph R. Falcon III, Esq. Barley Snyder 2 Great Valley Parkway Suite 110 Malvern, PA 19355 Patent Bar No: 55,166 PA Bar ID No: 94658
|
|
GOODS AND/OR SERVICES SECTION (current) | |
INTERNATIONAL CLASS | 010 |
DESCRIPTION | |
Surgical drapes; surgical shoe coverings; Fitted covers for medical equipment; Fitted coverings for medical exam tables; Draw-sheets for sick beds; Patient examination gowns; surgical cap; bibs for dental use | |
FILING BASIS | Section 1(b) |
GOODS AND/OR SERVICES SECTION (proposed) | |
INTERNATIONAL CLASS | 010 |
TRACKED TEXT DESCRIPTION | |
FINAL DESCRIPTION | |
Fitted covers for medical equipment, namely, c-Arms, laser arms, cameras, microscopes, fluoroscopes, light handles, lights, tables, and stands, and not including face shields | |
FILING BASIS | Section 1(b) |
ATTORNEY SECTION (current) | |
NAME | Joseph R. Falcon III |
ATTORNEY BAR MEMBERSHIP NUMBER | NOT SPECIFIED |
YEAR OF ADMISSION | NOT SPECIFIED |
U.S. STATE/ COMMONWEALTH/ TERRITORY | NOT SPECIFIED |
FIRM NAME | BARLEY SNYDER |
INTERNAL ADDRESS | SUITE 110 |
STREET | 2 GREAT VALLEY PARKWAY |
CITY | MALVERN |
STATE | Pennsylvania |
POSTAL CODE | 19355 |
COUNTRY | US |
PHONE | 610-889-3699 |
FAX | 610-889-3699 |
berwynipdocket@barley.com | |
AUTHORIZED TO COMMUNICATE VIA EMAIL | Yes |
DOCKET/REFERENCE NUMBER | 56125-973 |
ATTORNEY SECTION (proposed) | |
NAME | Joseph R. Falcon III |
ATTORNEY BAR MEMBERSHIP NUMBER | XXX |
YEAR OF ADMISSION | XXXX |
U.S. STATE/ COMMONWEALTH/ TERRITORY | XX |
FIRM NAME | BARLEY SNYDER |
INTERNAL ADDRESS | SUITE 110 |
STREET | 2 GREAT VALLEY PARKWAY |
CITY | MALVERN |
STATE | Pennsylvania |
POSTAL CODE | 19355 |
COUNTRY | United States |
PHONE | 610-889-3699 |
FAX | 610-889-3699 |
berwynipdocket@barley.com | |
AUTHORIZED TO COMMUNICATE VIA EMAIL | Yes |
DOCKET/REFERENCE NUMBER | 56125-973 |
CORRESPONDENCE SECTION (current) | |
NAME | JOSEPH R. FALCON III |
FIRM NAME | BARLEY SNYDER |
INTERNAL ADDRESS | SUITE 110 |
STREET | 2 GREAT VALLEY PARKWAY |
CITY | MALVERN |
STATE | Pennsylvania |
POSTAL CODE | 19355 |
COUNTRY | US |
PHONE | 610-889-3699 |
FAX | 610-889-3699 |
berwynipdocket@barley.com | |
AUTHORIZED TO COMMUNICATE VIA EMAIL | Yes |
DOCKET/REFERENCE NUMBER | 56125-973 |
CORRESPONDENCE SECTION (proposed) | |
NAME | Joseph R. Falcon III |
FIRM NAME | BARLEY SNYDER |
INTERNAL ADDRESS | SUITE 110 |
STREET | 2 GREAT VALLEY PARKWAY |
CITY | MALVERN |
STATE | Pennsylvania |
POSTAL CODE | 19355 |
COUNTRY | United States |
PHONE | 610-889-3699 |
FAX | 610-889-3699 |
berwynipdocket@barley.com | |
AUTHORIZED TO COMMUNICATE VIA EMAIL | Yes |
DOCKET/REFERENCE NUMBER | 56125-973 |
SIGNATURE SECTION | |
RESPONSE SIGNATURE | /JOSEPH FALCON/ |
SIGNATORY'S NAME | Joseph R Falcon |
SIGNATORY'S POSITION | Patent Attorney - PA Bar Member |
SIGNATORY'S PHONE NUMBER | 610-889-3699 |
DATE SIGNED | 01/23/2020 |
AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY | YES |
FILING INFORMATION SECTION | |
SUBMIT DATE | Thu Jan 23 16:37:01 EST 2020 |
TEAS STAMP | USPTO/ROA-XX.XX.XX.XXX-20 200123163701585819-884212 96-700131925fb2be025f91e7 ae54ee425f86569a7bc245d64 29d57d6a736c3d9f5410-N/A- N/A-20200123163540332674 |
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 no persons are required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control number. PTO Form 1957 (Rev 10/2011) |
OMB No. 0651-0050 (Exp 09/20/2020) |
IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
-----------------------------------
In the Matter of the Application of: Wiesman Holdings, LLC
Serial No.: 88/421296
Filed: 05/08/2019
Mark: COVERALLS
Attorney Docket No.: 56125-973
-----------------------------------
RESPONSE
This Response is to the Office Action issued July 24, 2019, with respect to the above-referenced trademark application that has a statutory period for response set to expire on January 24, 2020. The Applicant wishes to respond to the issues set forth in the Office Action and, where appropriate, seeks to amend the application as follows:
I. GOODS AND/OR SERVICES AND BASIS INFORMATION
The Applicant hereby amends its description of goods and services, to read as follows:
Class 10: Fitted covers for medical equipment, namely, c-Arms, laser arms, cameras, microscopes, fluoroscopes, light handles, lights, tables, and stands, and not including face shields.
II. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
The Examining Attorney has refused registration of Applicant’s Mark COVERALLS (Word Mark) under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), because Applicant’s Mark so resembles U.S. Registration Nos. 1908303 (hereinafter referred to, collectively, as the “Cited Mark”), when used on or in connection with the identified goods and services, as to be likely to cause confusion or to cause mistake or to deceive.
A. Legal Standard
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“C.C.P.A”) has set forth thirteen factors for the Patent and Trademark Office to consider in determining a likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d). In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1360-2 (C.C.P.A. 1973). These factors include: the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression; the similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services; the similarity or dissimilarity of established trade channels; the conditions under which and the buyers to whom sales are made; the number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods or services; the length of time during which there has been concurrent use without actual confusion; and whether a house mark is used. Id. at 1361. Using these factors as a guide, each case must be decided on its own facts. Id. Although the amount of weight given to each factor may vary, all the evidence must be considered in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion. Id. at 1362.
B. APPLICANT’S MARK AND THE CITED MARK ARE NOT SIMILAR
The first DuPont factor requires that the marks be compared in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Id. at 1361. The marks are to be compared in their entireties, because the marks must be considered “in the way in which they are perceived by the relevant public.” In re Shell Oil Co., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993). A difference in only one element of the marks can preclude a finding of likelihood of confusion. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Bel Canto Fancy Foods, Ltd., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1980, 1982 (T.T.A.B. 1987). The C.C.P.A. and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“T.T.A.B.”) have consistently found no likelihood of confusion notwithstanding the fact that a mark incorporates a portion of or the entirety of another mark even though the marks are used in connection with related goods or services when the marks do not look or sound alike. See, e.g., Lever Bros. Co. v. Barcolene Co., 463 F.2d 1107, 1109 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (finding applicant’s ALL CLEAR! used in connection with household cleaner not to be confusingly similar to registrant’s ALL used with household cleansing products even though the two marks shared the common term ALL and were used on virtually identical products); In re P. Ferrero, 479 F.2d 1395, 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (finding applicant’s TIC TAC used in connection with candy not to be confusingly similar to registrant’s TIC TAC TOE used in connection with ice cream and sherbet even though one mark incorporated two-thirds of the other and both marks were used in connection with similar goods); Bell Lab., Inc. v. Colonial Prod., Inc. 644 F. Supp. 542, 550 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (finding applicant’s FINAL used in connection with rat poison not to be confusingly similar to registrant’s FINAL FLIP also used with rat poison even though both marks shared the common term FINAL and were used on identical products).
The marks must also be compared in their entireties as to connotation and commercial impression. In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 361. The meaning or connotation of a mark must be determined in relation to the named goods or services, because the average purchaser normally retains a general, rather than specific, impression of the mark. TMEP § 1207.01(b)(v). “Even marks that are identical in sound and/or appearance may create sufficiently different commercial impressions when applied to the respective parties’ goods or services so that there is no likelihood of confusion.” Id. The C.C.P.A. and the T.T.A.B. have consistently found no likelihood of confusion even though two marks had a similar appearance or sound because they conveyed a different commercial impression when applied to the goods or services. See, e.g., In re British Bulldog, Ltd., 224 U.S.P.Q. 854 (T.T.A.B. 1984) (holding PLAYERS for men’s underwear not likely to be confused with PLAYERS for shoes, because the term PLAYERS implies a fit, style, color and durability adapted to outdoor activities when applied to shoes, but “implies something else, primarily indoors in nature” when applied to men’s underwear); In re Sydel Lingerie Co., Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. 629 (T.T.A.B. 1977) (finding BOTTOMS UP for ladies’ and children’s underwear not likely to be confused with BOTTOMS UP for men’s clothing, because the term connotes the drinking phrase “Drink Up” when applied to men’s suits, coats and trousers, but does not have this connotation when applied to ladies’ and children’s underwear).
The Applicant’s Mark is COVERALLS, while the Cited Mark is COVERALL. When the Applicant’s Mark is compared in its entirety to the Cited Mark, it is evident that the marks have a different appearance. As is clearly evident by the above cited examples, a difference in only one element (i.e. letter) of the marks can preclude a finding of likelihood of confusion. When compared as a whole, the Applicant’s Mark and the Cited Mark not only have a different appearance, but also the Applicant’s Mark and the Cited Mark have a different sound and connotation. The marks look and sound different to the extent that Applicant’s Mark includes the letter “S”, while the Cited Mark does not.
Considering the aforementioned differences, the Examining Attorney should find that fundamental difference between each mark, such that the Cited Mark should not be a basis for finding of a likelihood of confusion. Because both the C.C.P.A. and the T.T.A.B. have consistently found no likelihood of confusion when marks taken in their entireties do not look alike, the Applicant’s Mark and the Cited Mark are clearly not likely to cause confusion.
C. APPLICANT’S MARK AND THE CITED MARKS ARE USED ON DIFFERENT GOODS AND ARE SOLD IN DIFFERENT TRADE CHANNELS TO DIFFERENT TYPES OF CONSUMERS
Other DuPont factors require the Examining Attorney to compare the similarity or dissimilarity of the goods or services, their established channels of trade, and the degree of sophistication of their purchasers. In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361. “If the goods or services in question are not related or marketed in such a way that they would be encountered by the same persons in situations that would create the incorrect assumption that they originate from the same source, then, even if the marks are identical, confusion is not likely.” TMEP § 1207.01(a)(i); see, e.g., Shen Manufacturing Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 73 USPQ2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (cooking classes and kitchen textiles not related); Local Trademarks, Inc. v. Handy Boys Inc., 16 USPQ2d 1156 (TTAB 1990) (LITTLE PLUMBER for liquid drain opener held not confusingly similar to LITTLE PLUMBER and design for advertising services, namely the formulation and preparation of advertising copy and literature in the plumbing field); Quartz Radiation Corp. v. Comm/Scope Co., 1 USPQ2d 1668 (TTAB 1986) (QR for coaxial cable held not confusingly similar to QR for various products (e.g., lamps, tubes) related to the photocopying field). The comparison of the goods or services is limited to those listed in the Cited Marks. In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361.
The Applicant’s Mark designates that through an amended description that the goods and services are associated with:
Class 10 - Fitted covers for medical equipment, namely, c-Arms, laser arms, cameras, microscopes, fluoroscopes, light handles, lights, tables, and stands, and not including face shields.
Based solely on the respective amended identifications, it is evident that Applicant’s goods and services in class 10 are clearly different from the goods and services of the Cited Marks, especially since the Cited Marks are directed and sold in different trade channels and some have been categorized in different international classes used for authoritative classification between differing goods and services.
Based solely on the respective identifications, it is evident that Applicant’s goods and services are clearly different from the goods and services of the Cited Marks, especially when viewed in light of the marks, and are directed and sold in different trade channels.
As such, Applicant’s goods and the services of the Applicant’s Mark neither flow in the same channels of trade nor are directed toward the same purchasers. Furthermore, the USPTO did not find a likelihood of confusion between any registered mark of the Cited Marks that are associated in similar classes of goods and services. Therefore the USPTO should arrive at the same result for the applied for mark.
When used in conjunction with Applicant’s amended goods and services, the Applicant’s Mark therefore conveys the commercial impression that Applicant’s amended goods and services are associated with a specific class of medical equipment that clearly differ from the Cited Mark. Specifically, the Applicant wants to market specific goods to medical personnel looking to protect valuable medical equipment, namely, c-Arms, laser arms, cameras, microscopes, fluoroscopes, light handles, lights, tables, and stands. In contrast, the Cited Mark is associated with human wearing face shields, which are clearly different than the Applicant’s amended goods and services, which further exclude face shields. A sophisticated consumer would know the differences between the goods under the Cited Mark, considering these amended goods and services are not the type of goods and services that would be offered off the shelf per se. Based solely on the respective identifications, it is evident that Applicant’s amended goods and services are clearly different from than the services of the Cited Mark. Since the Cited Mark is directed and sold in different trade channels to different types of consumers, namely equipment versus clothing, a consumer would readily distinguish between goods offered under the Cited Mark and Applicant’s Mark without any possibility of confusion.
It is unlikely that the Applicant’s services would be marketed in such a way that either the Applicant’s mark or the Cited Marks would be encountered by the same persons in situations that would create the incorrect assumption that they originate from the same source. Therefore, the Applicant’s Mark and the Cited Marks would not cause a likelihood of confusion.
C. Conclusion
In order to determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists under Trademark Act Section 2(d), the Examining Attorney is required to consider all relevant evidence. In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d. at 1362. Specifically, in a very crowded field, the goods and services of Applicant’s Mark and the Cited Marks are different and would not be marketed in such a way to create a likelihood of confusion. Removal of the refusal to register Applicant’s Mark in view of the Cited Marks is therefore respectfully requested.
The Applicant submits that this application is in condition for publication. Prompt notification of the same is respectfully requested.
Please charge any additional fees associated with this application to Deposit Order Account No. 501581.
Respectfully submitted,
Date: January 23, 2020 By: /Joseph Falcon/
Joseph R. Falcon III, Esq.
Barley Snyder
2 Great Valley Parkway
Suite 110
Malvern, PA 19355
Patent Bar No: 55,166
PA Bar ID No: 94658