To: | DaVinci CSJ, LLC (rmaldonado@cooperdunham.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88418607 - POLICE - 5190-90911TM |
Sent: | October 22, 2019 08:00:23 AM |
Sent As: | ecom127@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 Attachment - 24 Attachment - 25 Attachment - 26 Attachment - 27 Attachment - 28 Attachment - 29 Attachment - 30 Attachment - 31 Attachment - 32 Attachment - 33 Attachment - 34 Attachment - 35 Attachment - 36 Attachment - 37 Attachment - 38 Attachment - 39 Attachment - 40 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88418607
Mark: POLICE
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Correspondence Address: 30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA, 20TH FLOOR
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Applicant: DaVinci CSJ, LLC
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Reference/Docket No. 5190-90911TM
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: October 22, 2019
This Office action is supplemental to and supersedes the previous Office action issued on June 19, 2019 in connection with this application. The assigned trademark examining attorney inadvertently omitted a requirement relevant to the mark in the subject application. See TMEP §§706, 711.02. Specifically, several of applicant’s goods and/or services are indefinite and/or over broad.
The trademark examining attorney apologizes for any inconvenience caused by the delay in raising this issue(s).
Applicant must address all issue(s) raised in this Office action, in addition to the issues raised in the Office action dated June 19, 2019. The issue(s) raised in the previous June 19, 2019 Office action is/are as follow and is/are maintained: the Section 2(d) likelihood of confusion refusal and the identification of goods and services requirement.
The following is a SUMMARY OF ISSUES that applicant must address:
Applicant must respond to all issues raised in this Office action and the previous June 19, 2019 Office action, within six (6) months of the date of issuance of this Office action. 37 C.F.R. §2.62(a); see TMEP §711.02. If applicant does not respond within this time limit, the application will be abandoned. 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).
NEW ISSUE: IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS REQUIREMENT
Additionally, particular wording in the proposed amendment to the identification is not acceptable because it exceeds the scope of the identification in the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.32(a)(6), 2.71(a); TMEP §§805, 1402.06 et seq., 1402.07. Applicant’s goods and/or services may be clarified or limited, but may not be expanded beyond those originally itemized in the application or as acceptably amended. See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06. Therefore, the original identification in the application, and any previously accepted amendments, remain operative for purposes of future amendment. See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.07(d).
In this case, the application originally identified the goods as follows: “scoops.”
However, the proposed amendment identifies the following goods: “measuring cups for cleaning.”
This portion of the proposed amendment is beyond the scope of the original identification because measuring cups and scoops are two different types of goods. Measuring cups are not a type of scoop.
The wording “scoops; brushes for bottles, brushes for parquet floors, brushes for tile, brushes for vegetables; grill brushes for barbecue grills; roofing brushes; bowl brushes; Squeegees for household use, squeegees for commercial use, squeegees for floor use; dust cloths; utility brushes; soap dispensing brushes namely, scrub brushes, dust brushes and utility brushes; cleaning solution cartridges for cleaning floors; Cleaning services, namely, residential and commercial cleaning services” is indefinite and/or too broad. See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §§1402.01, 1402.03. For example, “squeegees for floor use” includes “Squeegee blades specially adapted for use with floor cleaning machines” in International Class 7, and “squeegees for household use” in International Class 21.
Applicant may substitute the following wording, if accurate:
Class 3: All-purpose cleaners for household, commercial, industrial and institutional use; household cleaning preparations; cleaning preparations for household use; cleaning preparations for toilets, bathtubs, sinks and floors; disposable wipes impregnated with cleaning compounds for use in bathrooms and kitchens; furniture polishers and cleaners; laundry detergents; fabric softener; anti-static dryer sheets; stain removal preparations; cleaners for washing machines; dish-cleaning sponges with soap-filled dispensers; cleaning solution cartridges for cleaning floors sold containing cleaning solution
Class 7: Steam cleaning machines in the nature of steam mops; battery-powered spraying device, namely, sprayer for dispensing hard surface cleaning solution for use with wet mops for cleaning floors
Class 16: Disposable paper wipes for household cleaning not impregnated with chemicals or compounds; fluffed, feather-like disposable paper wipes for household cleaning not impregnated with chemicals or compounds
Class 21: Mop refills in the nature of mop heads, dust mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, floor mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, microfiber mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, roller mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, sponge mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, dry or dust mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, sponge mops featuring scrub brushes and their refills in the nature of mop heads, spray mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, strip mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, twist mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, flat mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, wet mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, deck mops and their refills in the nature of mop heads, yarn mopheads, floor wax applicators mountable on a mop handle and refills therefor in the nature of pads for floor wax applicators mountable on mop handles, not impregnated with a cleaner; brooms, corn brooms, hard brooms, plastic brooms, push brooms, whisk brooms, sweep brooms; brushes, namely, bath and shower brushes, brushes for cleaning bottles, brushes for cleaning parquet floors, brushes for cleaning tile, brushes for cleaning vegetables, cleaning brushes for household use, dishwashing brushes, dusting brushes, floor brushes, grill brushes for cleaning barbecue grills, lint brushes, pot cleaning brushes, roofing scrub brushes, scraping brushes, scrubbing brushes, toilet brushes, toilet bowl brushes, tub scrub brushes, nail and hand cleaning brushes, wire brushes not being machine parts; dusters, feather dusters, microfiber cleaning dusters; cleaning sponges, microfiber cleaning sponges, scouring sponges, scrub sponges, sponges for household purposes, and refills for cleaning sponges in the nature of {indicate the nature of refills}, dish-cleaning sponges; cleaning cloths, cloth for wiping or dusting, dusting cloths, microfiber cleaning cloths, scrubbing pads made of metal and plastic filaments, cleaning pads, grill cleaning pads; buckets, plastic buckets, buckets for commercial and household use, squeegee buckets; pails, plastic pails; mop wringers; dust pans, dust bins; dusting gloves; lint rollers and refills for lint rollers; metal wool for cleaning; scoops for household purposes; soap dispensers and soap holders; squeegees being cleaning instruments for household use, squeegees being cleaning instruments for commercial use, squeegees being cleaning instruments for floor use; toilet brush holders; plungers for clearing blocked drains, toilet plungers with caddies; Cleaning tools, namely, buckets, brooms, push brooms, dust pans, debris collectors, namely, mop buckets and trash cans; squeegees being cleaning instruments, cleaning sponges, dusters, dusting cloths, soap dispensing brushes sold empty namely, scrub brushes, dust brushes and utility cleaning brushes for household use; gloves for household use; work gloves; light duty utility gloves; cloth for washing floors; furniture and appliance dusters; crumb-sweepers; cleaning solution cartridges for cleaning floors sold empty
Class 37: Cleaning services, namely, cleaning of residential houses and commercial premises
For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual. See TMEP §1402.04.
NEW ISSUE: MULTIPLE-CLASS APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS
(1) List the goods and/or services by their international class number in consecutive numerical order, starting with the lowest numbered class.
(2) Submit a filing fee for each international class not covered by the fee(s) already paid (view the USPTO’s current fee schedule). The application identifies goods and/or services that are classified in at least 6 classes; however, applicant submitted a fee(s) sufficient for only 5 class(es). Applicant must either submit the filing fees for the classes not covered by the submitted fees or restrict the application to the number of classes covered by the fees already paid.
See 15 U.S.C. §§1051(b), 1112, 1126(e); 37 C.F.R. §§2.32(a)(6)-(7), 2.34(a)(2)-(3), 2.86(a); TMEP §§1403.01, 1403.02(c).
See an overview of the requirements for a Section 1(b)/Section 44/Sections 1(b) and 44> multiple-class application and how to satisfy the requirements online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form.
CONTINUED AND MAINTAINED: SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION – PARTIAL REFUSAL
THIS REFUSAL APPLIES TO THE GOODS IN CLASS 3 ONLY
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 2190205 and 3782882. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the previously attached registrations.
Applicant’s mark is POLICE, in standard characters, for relevant use as amended on:
Class 3: All purpose cleaners for household, commercial, industrial and institutional use; household cleaning preparations; cleaning preparations for household use; cleaning preparations for toilets, bathtubs, sinks and floors; disposable wipes impregnated with cleaning compounds for use in bathrooms and kitchens; furniture polishers and cleaners; laundry detergents; fabric softener; anti-static dryer sheets; stain removal preparations; cleaners for washing machines
The mark in U.S. Registration number 2190205 is POLICE, in standard characters, for use on:
Class 3: soaps, namely, bath soaps, soaps for hands, face and body, perfumery, body creams, skin creams, skin emollients
The mark in U.S. Registration number 3782882 is POLICE OFFICER LOS ANGELES POLICE, with a design element, for use on:
Class 3: Non-medicated skin care preparations, soaps, cosmetic creams
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “ du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Applicant argues that confusion is not likely “due to the differences in the marks and the distinct goods.” See applicant’s response. Applicant’s argument has been considered and found unpersuasive for the reason(s) set forth below.
Similarity of the Marks
In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1323, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).
In the present case, applicant’s mark is POLICE and ‘205 registrant’s mark is POLICE. These marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods. Id.
Additionally, marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
The wording is the dominant portion of the ‘882 registration. When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
Further, POLICE, which is identical to the applied-for mark, is the dominant portion of the wording in the ‘882 registration because it is the first word. Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).
The applied-for mark is in standard characters which allows the mark to be displayed in any stylization or design. A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display. See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).
Moreover, the applied-for mark is entirely incorporated in the ‘882 registration. Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). In the present case, the marks are identical in part.
Since the marks are highly similar in sound, appearance, and connotation, source confusion is likely.
Relatedness of the Goods
The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc.v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).
The compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
Applicant argues that the removal of “antibacterial soaps” from the identification of goods “further differentiates the applied-for goods from the registered goods.” See applicant’s response. However, the attached Internet evidence, in addition to the previously attached evidence, consisting of third-party websites, establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark, the relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use, and the goods are similar or complementary in terms of purpose or function. See Better Life, Meloria, and Dr. Bronner’s websites attached. For example, Better Life provides hand soap, body soap, body lotion, all-purpose cleaner, wipes impregnated with cleaning compounds, dryer sheets, and laundry detergent under the same mark. Thus, applicant’s and registrants’ goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
Since the marks are similar and the goods are related, there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source of applicant’s goods. Therefore, the Section 2(d) refusal is CONTINUED AND MAINTAINED.
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/Laila Sabagh/
Laila Sabagh
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 127
(571) 272-8230
Laila.Sabagh@uspto.gov
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