To: | Christian Staack (cstaack@getnoisy.io) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88411761 - NOISY - N/A |
Sent: | July 25, 2019 04:36:12 PM |
Sent As: | ecom103@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 Attachment - 24 Attachment - 25 Attachment - 26 Attachment - 27 Attachment - 28 Attachment - 29 Attachment - 30 Attachment - 31 Attachment - 32 Attachment - 33 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88411761
Mark: NOISY
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Correspondence Address: 105 E SUNSET DR S, REDLANDS, CA 92373
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Applicant: Christian Staack
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: July 25, 2019
Introduction:
Summary of Issues:
Prior-Filed Applications:
In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the marks in the referenced applications. Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.
However, applicant must timely respond to the following issues.
Section 2(d) Partial Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion:
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
The applied-for mark is “NOISY” (standard characters) for “Computer hardware and peripherals” in International Class 009 and “Developing computer software” in International Class 042.
The mark under Registration No. 4610621 is “NOIZY” (and design) for “Wireless headphones, mini-speakers, and wireless USB dongles” in International Class 009.
The mark under Registration No. 4313393 is “NOISE” (standard characters) for, in relevant part, “Design of homepages and websites; design, creation, hosting, maintenance of websites for others; designing websites for advertising purposes; computer services, namely, designing and implementing network web pages for others providing online non-downloadable software for creating and managing pay-per-click keyword accounts whereby advertisers, publishers and advertising agencies can have advertisements displayed on online search engine result pages; and creation and provision of web pages to and for third parties” in International Class 042.
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Registration No. 4610621 – NOIZY (and design): In this case, applicant’s mark is “NOISY” (standard characters) and registrant’s mark is “NOIZY” (and design). Thus, applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark share the highly similar wording NOISY / NOIZY. These terms only differ by a few letters and are otherwise phonetic equivalents. There is no correct pronunciation of a mark because it is impossible to predict how the public will pronounce a particular mark. See Embarcadero Techs., Inc. v. RStudio, Inc., 105 USPQ2d 1825, 1835 (TTAB 2013) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1367, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1912 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re The Belgrade Shoe Co., 411 F.2d 1352, 1353, 162 USPQ 227, 227 (C.C.P.A. 1969)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv). The marks in question could clearly be pronounced the same; such similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).
Here, the additional design in registrant’s mark does not obviate confusion because the terms NOISY / NOIZY are more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
Thus, the marks are similar.
Registration No. 4313393 – NOISE (standard characters): In this case, applicant’s mark is “NOISY” (standard characters) and registrant’s mark is “NOISE” (standard characters). Thus, applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark share the highly similar wording NOISY / NOISE and differ by only one letter. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance despite the addition, deletion, or substitution of letters or words. See, e.g., In re Lamson Oil Co., 6 USPQ2d 1041 (TTAB 1987) (finding TRUCOOL and TURCOOL confusingly similar in appearance). Further, slight differences in the sound of similar marks will not avoid a likelihood of confusion. In re Energy Telecomm. & Elec. Ass’n, 222 USPQ 350, 351 (TTAB 1983); see In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1367, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1912 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Thus, the marks are similar.
Relatedness of the Goods:
Further, determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., __ F.3d __, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
Registration No. 4610621 – NOIZY (and design): In this case, the applicant’s goods for “Computer hardware and peripherals” in International Class 009 are related to the registrant’s goods for “Wireless headphones, mini-speakers, and wireless USB dongles” in International Class 009 because applicant uses broad wording to describe its goods, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including registrant’s more narrow goods. For example, applicant’s broad identification of “Computer hardware and peripherals” in its list of goods encompasses the following goods listed in applicant’s identification of goods: “Wireless headphones, mini-speakers, and wireless USB dongles” See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, these goods of applicant and registrant are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001
Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.
Registration No. 4313393 – NOISE (standard characters): In this case, the applicant’s services for “Developing computer software” in International Class 042 are similar to registrant’s services for, in relevant part, Design of homepages and websites; design, creation, hosting, maintenance of websites for others; designing websites for advertising purposes; computer services, namely, designing and implementing network web pages for others providing online non-downloadable software for creating and managing pay-per-click keyword accounts whereby advertisers, publishers and advertising agencies can have advertisements displayed on online search engine result pages; and creation and provision of web pages to and for third parties” in International Class 042.
The attached Internet evidence, consisting of third-party services providers offering software development and website design services, establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant services and markets the services under the same mark. See attached Internet evidence at: http://www.bigdropinc.com/; http://www.indianic.com/; http://mangosoft.tech. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
Conclusion:
In summary, the marks are confusingly similar and the goods are related. Accordingly, purchasers are likely to be confused as to the source of the goods. Thus, registration is refused, in part, pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusals by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusals.
Sections 1(a) and 45 Refusal – Premature Use:
THIS PARTIAL REFUSAL APPLIES TO INTERNATIONAL CLASS 009 ONLY
The use or display of a mark in the sale or advertising of goods and/or services before the goods are actually created or provided or the services rendered does not show use in commerce. See Couture v. Playdom, Inc., 778 F.3d 1379, 1380-82, 113 USPQ2d 2042, 2043-44 (Fed. Cir. 2015); In re Cedar Point, Inc., 220 USPQ 533 (TTAB 1983); TMEP §§904, 1301.03(a).
If applicant’s goods were being sold or transported or the services were being rendered in commerce as of the application filing date, applicant must submit the following:
(1) A substitute specimen showing the applied-for mark in use in commerce for the goods specified in the application.
(2) The following statement, verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20: “The substitute specimen was in use in commerce at least as early as the application filing date.” 37 C.F.R. §2.59(a); TMEP §904.05; see 37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(1). If submitting a substitute specimen requires an amendment to the dates of use, applicant must also verify the amended dates. 37 C.F.R. §2.71(c); TMEP §904.05.
If applicant did not use the applied-for mark in commerce on or before the filing date, applicant may substitute a different basis for filing if applicant can meet the requirements for the new basis. In this case, applicant may wish to amend the application to assert a Section 1(b) basis. See TMEP §806.03(c). However, if applicant amends the basis to Section 1(b), registration will not be granted until applicant later amends the application back to use in commerce by filing an acceptable allegation of use with a proper specimen. See 15 U.S.C. §1051(c), (d); 37 C.F.R. §§2.76, 2.88; TMEP §1103. If the same specimen is submitted with an allegation of use, the same refusal will issue.
To amend to Section 1(b), applicant must submit the following statement, verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20: “Applicant has a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce and had a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce as of the application filing date.” 37 C.F.R. §2.34(a)(2); TMEP §806.01(b); see 15 U.S.C. §1051(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.35(b)(1), 2.193(e)(1).
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusals by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.
THIS PARTIAL REFUSAL APPLIES TO INTERNATIONAL CLASS 042 ONLY
Registration is refused because the specimen in International Class 042 does not show a direct association between the applied-for mark and the identified services; thus the specimen fails to show the applied-for mark in use in commerce. Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a), 1301.04(f)(ii), (g)(i).
Specimens consisting of advertising or promotional materials must show a direct association between the mark and the services for which registration is sought. In re WAY Media, Inc., 118 USPQ2d 1697, 1698 (TTAB 2016) (quoting In re Universal Oil Prods. Co., 476 F.2d 653, 655, 177 USPQ 456, 457 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); TMEP §1301.04(f)(ii). To show this direct association, the specimen must contain an explicit reference to the services, in addition to the mark being used on the specimen to identify the service and its source. In re WAY Media, Inc., 118 USPQ2d at 1698 (quoting In re Osmotica Holdings, Corp., 95 USPQ2d 1666, 1668 (TTAB 2010)); TMEP §1301.04(f)(ii). While the exact nature of the services does not need to be specified in the specimen, there must be something which creates in the mind of the purchaser an association between the mark and the service. In re Adair, 45 USPQ2d 1211, 1215 (TTAB 1997) (quoting In re Johnson Controls Inc., 33 USPQ2d 1318, 1320 (TTAB 1994)).
In the present case, the specimen does not reference any software development services provided by applicant. Instead, the only reference to software appears to be with respect to software applicant has developed for its own products.
Futhermore, registration is refused as to International Class 042 because the activities recited in the identification of services are not registrable services as contemplated by the Trademark Act. Trademark Act Sections 1, 2, 3, and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1053, 1127; see TMEP §§1301.01 et seq.
The activities set forth as services in an application are reviewed using the following criteria to determine whether the services are registrable:
(1) A service is a real activity, not an idea, concept, process, or system.
(2) A service is performed primarily for the benefit of someone other than the applicant.
(3) A service is an activity that is sufficiently separate and qualitatively different from an applicant’s principal activity, i.e., it cannot be an activity that is merely incidental or necessary to an applicant’s larger business.
TMEP §1301.01(a); see In re Dr Pepper Co., 836 F.2d 508, 509-510, 5 USPQ2d 1207, 1208-1209 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re Canadian Pac. Ltd., 754 F.2d 992, 994-95, 224 USPQ 971, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
In this case, the description set forth in the identification of services is as follows: “Developing computer software.” These activities are not registrable services because applicant’s specimen merely shows that applicant has developed software for the hardware products that applicant plans to sell to others, which is an activity that primarily benefits applicant. Performing research and development, or other routine or expected activities, in the production or sale of one’s own goods, and not for the benefit of others, are not services for purposes of service-mark registration. See In re Dr. Pepper Co., 836 F.2d at 509, 5 USPQ2d at 1208 ("[I]t has become a settled principle that the rendering of a service which is normally ‘expected or routine' in connection with the sale of one's own goods is not a registrable service whether denominated by the same or a different name from the trademark for its product. This interpretation is a refinement of the basic principle that the service for which registration is sought must be rendered to others."). Therefore, registration is refused because the activities recited in the identification of services do not appear to be provided for the benefit of others.
Examples of specimens for services include advertising and marketing materials, brochures, photographs of business signage and billboards, and webpages that show the mark used in the actual sale, rendering, or advertising of the services. See TMEP §1301.04(a), (h)(iv)(C). Specimens comprising advertising and promotional materials must show a direct association between the mark and the services. TMEP §1301.04(f)(ii).
Applicant may respond to this refusal by satisfying one of the following for each applicable international class:
(1) Submit a different specimen (a verified “substitute” specimen) that (a) was in actual use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application and (b) shows the mark in actual use in commerce for the services identified in the application. A “verified substitute specimen” is a specimen that is accompanied by the following statement made in a signed affidavit or supported by a declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20: “The substitute (or new, or originally submitted, if appropriate) specimen(s) was/were in use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application.” The substitute specimen cannot be accepted without this statement.
(2) Amend the filing basis to intent to use under Section 1(b), for which no specimen is required. This option will later necessitate additional fee(s) and filing requirements such as providing a specimen.
For an overview of both response options referenced above and instructions on how to satisfy either option online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, please go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/law/specimen.jsp.
Applicant May Wish to Seek Trademark Counsel:
For attorney referral information, applicant may consult the American Bar Association’s Consumers’ Guide to Legal Help; an online directory of legal professionals, such as FindLaw®; or a local telephone directory. The USPTO, however, may not assist an applicant in the selection of a private attorney. 37 C.F.R. §2.11.
For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
Assistance or Response Options:
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action
/Anna J. Oakes/
Anna J. Oakes
Examining Attorney
Law Office 103
571-272-2569
Anna.Oakes1@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE