Suspension Letter

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

SUSPENSION NOTICE

No Response Required

 

 

Issue date:  February 18, 2020

 

 

The application is suspended for the reason(s) specified below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.67; TMEP §§716 et seq. 

 

The pending application(s) below has an earlier filing date or effective filing date than applicant’s application.  If the mark in the application(s) below registers, the USPTO may refuse registration of applicant’s mark under Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion with the registered mark(s). 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208.02(c). Action on this application is suspended until the prior-filed application(s) below either registers or abandons.  37 C.F.R. §2.83(c).  Information relevant to the application(s) below was sent previously.

 

            - U.S. Application Serial No(s). 87797588

 

Refusal maintained and continued. 

 

The following refusal is maintained and continued: 

 

            • Section 2(d) Partial Refusal—Likelihood of Confusion—U.S. Registration No. 3465384

 

APPLICANT’S ARGUMENTS

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

Applicant argues that the marks are sufficiently dissimilar so as to avoid a likelihood of confusion.  Applicant argues that the stylization and design element in the registrant’s mark differentiate the marks.  However, a mark in typed or standard characters, like the applied-for mark in the present case, may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii).  Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display.  See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).  As such, the stylization and design element in the registrant’s mark does not differentiate the mark in terms of appearance; rather, the focus on this case is the literal elements in the marks.

 

As noted in the previously issued Office action, the wording “STUDIOS” is less significant in the registered mark’s overall commercial impression because it is disclaimed and descriptive of the registrant’s services.  As such, the wording “TOOLBOX” is the dominant distinctive element in the registrant’s mark.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).

 

Applicant analogizes the facts in the present case with those in In re Covalinski, 113 USPQ2d 116, 1167 (TTAB 2014).  In that case, the Board found REDNECK RACEGIRL (and design) to not be confusingly similar to the mark RACEGIRL in standard characters. In that case, the Board found the marks to be distinguishable, finding that the prominent RR design, and the difficulty in noticing the “A-C-E” portion of the mark made the marks sufficiently dissimilar.  In this case, however, the “T” in the registrant’s mark is not so visually dominant to obfuscate or overtake any portion of the common “TOOLBOX” wording.  As such, applicant’s argument that this case is analogous to In re Covalinski is unconvincing.

 

Applicant argues that the examining attorney improperly dissected the registrant’s mark in determining a likelihood of confusion.  Although it is true that marks must be compared in their entireties and should not be dissected, a trademark examining attorney may weigh the individual components of a mark to determine its overall commercial impression.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[Regarding the issue of confusion,] there is nothing improper in stating that . . . more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties.” (quoting In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 

 

In the present case, the only source-indicating element in the registrant’s mark is identical to the entirety of the applicant’s mark. Although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.

 

Applicant has submitted a list of registrations purportedly establishing the weakness or dilution of the wording “TOOLBOX.”  However, the mere submission of a list of does not make such registrations part of the record.  See In re Peace Love World Live, LLC, 127 USPQ2d 1400, 1405 n.17 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1583 (TTAB 2007); In re Duofold Inc., 184 USPQ 638, 640 (TTAB 1974)); TBMP §1208.02; TMEP §710.03.

 

To make third party registrations part of the record, an applicant must submit copies of the registrations, or the complete electronic equivalent from the USPTO’s automated systems, prior to appeal.  In re Star Belly Stitcher, Inc., 107 USPQ2d 2059, 2064 (TTAB 2013); TBMP §1208.02; TMEP §710.03.  Accordingly, these registrations will not be considered.

 

As such, applicant’s argument that the marks are dissimilar is unpersuasive.

 

Similarity of the Services

 

Applicant argues that the services are dissimilar and that applicant’s “interactive computer software development” services are for a particular type of “designing services that is dissimilar with Applicant’s services.”  The examining attorney notes, however, that the presumption under Trademark Act Section 7(b) is that the registrant is the owner of the mark and that their use of the mark extends to all goods and/or services identified in the registration.  15 U.S.C. §1057(b).  In the absence of limitations as to channels of trade or classes of purchasers in the goods and/or services in the registration, the presumption is that the goods and/or services move in all trade channels normal for such goods and/or services and are available to all potential classes of ordinary consumers of such goods and/or services.  See In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1737 (TTAB 2018); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).

 

Although argues that the registrant’s software development services are specialized and not encompassing of applicant’s services, it provided no evidence that interactive software development does not encompass applicant’s software development services, or vice versa.

 

The attached evidence from http://www.computerhope.com/jargon/i/inteprog.htm establishes that

 

An interactive program is a computer software program that requires user interaction to operate. This interaction could include inputting information, modifying information, managing information or otherwise manipulating data. Most software programs are interactive. A good example of software that is not interactive is a computer screen saver, where no interaction is required by the user while running.

As such, without evidence to the contrary, it appears that applicant’s and registrant’s services are encompassing, as even if registrant’s interactive software development services are not encompassing of applicant’s services, applicant’s “Development of cloud computing software; development of software components for end-user devices, namely, television, mobile phones and personal computers” could clearly include development of software programs that require user interaction to operate.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s software development services are encompassing and/or overlapping.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).   As such, applicant’s and registrant’s services are considered legally identical for the purposes of determining a likelihood of confusion.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

 Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

 

As such, applicant’s argument that the services are dissimilar is unpersuasive.

 

Trade Channels

 

Applicant argues that the trade channels differ. However, services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s argument that the trade channels differ is unpersuasive.

 

Consumer Sophistication

 

Applicant argues that the consumers are sophisticated and therefore unlikely to be confused as the sources of the parties’ services. The fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii); see, e.g., Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. 1317, 1325, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163-64 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Top Tobacco LP v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1170 (TTAB 2011).  Further, where the purchasers consist of both professionals and the public, the standard of care for purchasing the goods is that of the least sophisticated potential purchaser.  In re FCA US LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1214, 1222 (TTAB 2018) (citing Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. at 1325, 110 USPQ2d at 1163), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 375518 (Fed. Cir. 2019).

 

Accordingly, applicant’s arguments have been considered and found unpersuasive.

 

 

 

See id.  This refusal will be made final once this application is removed from suspension, unless a new issue arises.  See TMEP §716.01.

 

Suspension process.  The USPTO will periodically check this application to determine if it should remain suspended.  See TMEP §716.04.  As needed, the trademark examining attorney will issue a letter to applicant to inquire about the status of the reason for the suspension.  TMEP §716.05. 

 

No response required.  Applicant may file a response, but is not required to do so. 

 

 

/Michael FitzSimons/

Michael FitzSimons

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 103

(571) 272-0619

michael.fitzsimons@uspto.gov

 

 

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on February 18, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88411348

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.  No response is necessary.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

/Michael FitzSimons/

Michael FitzSimons

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 103

(571) 272-0619

michael.fitzsimons@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”