United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88411125
Mark: ONWARD
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: THE ONWARD GROUP, LLC
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Reference/Docket No. 3344.0010
Correspondence Email Address: |
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FINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: February 17, 2020
This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on January 21, 2020.
In a previous Office action dated July 20, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following: Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark.
Based on applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney notes that the following refusals have been withdrawn: claimed ownership of ONWARD (Reg. Nos. 5121885 and 5652366) cited in a Section 2(d) refusal. See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04.
After careful consideration of applicant’s evidence and arguments, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal in the summary of issues below. See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.
SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:
SECTION 2(D) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
All previous evidence and arguments are incorporated by reference.
Applicant’s mark is ONWARD (in standard character form) for “Athletic shirts; Athletic pants; Athletic jackets; Athletic footwear; athletic headwear; Hats; Caps being headwear; Athletic uniforms; Baseball caps; Baseball uniforms; Boxing shoes; Boxing shorts; Rugby shirts; Rugby shorts; Rugby tops; Sports socks; Sports shirts; Martial arts uniforms; Mixed martial arts uniforms; Combat sports uniforms” in International Class 25.
The cited registered marks are:
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered marks that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. , 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “ du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd. , 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc , 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc. , 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co. , 544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, relatedness of the goods, and similarity of trade channels of the goods. See In re Opus One, Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 2001); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593 (TTAB 1999); In re Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc. , 50 USPQ2d 1209 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
ONWARD (Reg. No. 3038903):
Similarity of the Marks
In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. In re i.am.symbolic, llc , 866 F.3d 1315, 1323, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).
In the present case, applicant’s mark is ONWARD and registrant’s mark is ONWARD. The literal marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Additionally, because the literal marks are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods. Id.
Although the applied-for mark is in standard characters and the registered mark is stylized, a mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display. See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
Relatedness of the Goods
As to the second half of the test, the goods are in part identical and otherwise legally identical. When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
In this case, the “hats” in the application and registration are identical. Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and class(es) of purchasers are the same for these goods. See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 27 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
Moreover, the registration uses broad wording to describe “jackets, shirts”, “pants, shorts”, “uniforms”, “shoes”, “socks”, and “caps”, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including applicant’s more narrow “athletic shirts, athletic pants, athletic jackets, athletic footwear, athletic headwear” and “caps being headwear, athletic uniforms, baseball caps, baseball uniforms, boxing shoes, boxing shorts, rugby shirts, rugby shorts, rugby tops, sports socks, sports shirts, martial arts uniforms, mixed martial arts uniforms, combat sports uniforms”. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, some of applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc. , 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.
Additionally, the following attached Internet evidence consists of third parties providing both applicant’s athletic shirts, athletic pants, athletic jackets, athletic footwear, athletic headwear, hats, caps being headwear, athletic uniforms, baseball caps, baseball uniforms, boxing shoes, boxing shorts, rugby shirts, rugby shorts, rugby tops, sports socks, sports shirts, martial arts uniforms, mixed martial arts uniforms, and combat sports uniforms and registrant’s clothing, namely, suits, coats, jackets, shirts, t-shirts, dresses, skirts, blouses, trousers, pants, shorts, jumpers, sweaters, cardigans, and vests; clothing, namely, underclothing, pajamas, bath robes, swimsuits, golf wear, namely, golf shirts, golf pants, golf shoes, golf sweaters, golf jackets, golf vests, and golf shorts, ski wear, anoraks, uniforms, and wristbands; shoes, boots, slippers, sandals, rain shoes, sport shoes, sneakers, wooden shoes, socks, and stockings; hats caps, bath caps, and bathing caps; and scarves, muffs, neckerchiefs, gloves for keeping warm and for clothing, neckties, belts for clothing, aprons, suspenders:
· Nike
This evidence establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
Consequently, upon encountering ONWARD used on clothing, and ONWARD used on clothing, consumers are likely to be confused and mistakenly believe that the respective goods emanate from a common source.
APPLICANT’S ARGUMENTS
Applicant contends that applicant’s athletic wear is not closely related to registrant’s “department store apparel.” The examining attorney does not find this argument persuasive.
Generally, the greater degree of similarity between the applied-for mark and the registered mark, the lesser the degree of similarity between the goods of the parties is required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion. In re C.H. Hanson Co., 116 USPQ2d 1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001)); In re Thor Tech, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1636 (TTAB 2009). In this case, the relevant literal marks are identical; therefore, the degree of similarity between the relevant goods required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is diminished.
Moreover, determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). The goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
The evidence of record establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009), In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.
Therefore, because the marks are substantially similar and the goods are closely related, there is a likelihood of confusion and registration must be refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d).
ONWARD (Reg. No. 3573119):
Similarity of the Marks
In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. In re i.am.symbolic, llc , 866 F.3d 1315, 1323, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).
In the present case, applicant’s mark is ONWARD and registrant’s mark is ONWARD. The literal marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Additionally, because the literal marks are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods. Id.
Although the applied-for mark is in standard characters and the registered mark is stylized, a mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display. See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
Relatedness of the Goods
As to the second half of the test, the goods are closely related. The compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7- Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
The following previously attached Internet evidence consists of third parties providing both applicant’s athletic shirts, athletic pants, athletic jackets, athletic footwear, athletic headwear, hats, caps being headwear, athletic uniforms, baseball caps, baseball uniforms, boxing shoes, boxing shorts, rugby shirts, rugby shorts, rugby tops, sports socks, sports shirts, martial arts uniforms, mixed martial arts uniforms, and combat sports uniforms and registrant’s golf clubs, golf balls, golf bags, head covers for golf clubs, golf ball markers, golf tees, and golf gloves:
Additionally, the following attached Internet evidence consists of third parties providing both applicant’s athletic clothing and registrant’s golf accessories:
· Nike
This evidence establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009), In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
Thus, upon encountering ONWARD used on athletic clothing, and ONWARD used on golf equipment, consumers are likely to be confused and mistakenly believe that the respective goods emanate from a common source.
APPLICANT’S ARGUMENTS
Applicant contends that relevant goods are not closely related. The examining attorney does not find this argument persuasive.
Generally, the greater degree of similarity between the applied-for mark and the registered mark, the lesser the degree of similarity between the goods of the parties is required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion. In re C.H. Hanson Co., 116 USPQ2d 1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001)); In re Thor Tech, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1636 (TTAB 2009). In this case, the relevant literal marks are identical; therefore, the degree of similarity between the relevant goods required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is diminished.
The compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
Moreover, determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). The goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
The evidence of record establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009), In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.
Therefore, because the marks are substantially similar and the goods are closely related, there is a likelihood of confusion and registration must be refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d).
This refusal is now made FINAL.
How to respond. Click to file a request for reconsideration of this final Office action that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals and/or click to file a timely appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) with the required filing fee(s).
/Kerry A. Nicholson/
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 120
Phone: (571) 272-5159
kerry.nicholson@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE