Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  March 31, 2020

 

 INTRODUCTION

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on January 10, 2020.

 

In a previous Office action(s) dated July 10, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:  Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark.  In addition, applicant was required to satisfy the following requirement(s):  amend the identification of goods.

 

Based on applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney notes that the following requirement(s) have been satisfied: definite amended identification provided.  See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04. 

 

For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No. 5091135.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:

 

• SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL—LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

FINAL SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL—LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5091135. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the previously attached registration.

 

Applicant’s mark is HEALTH AND HAPPINESS, in standard characters, for use on:

 

Class 16: advertising mailer, namely a selection of coupons for discounts on a range of health and wellness products and services

 

The registered mark in U.S. Registration No. 5091135 is HEALTH & HAPPINESS, in standard characters, for use on:

 

            Class 35: advertising and marketing services

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. , 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “ du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd. , 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc , 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc. , 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co. , 544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

The marks are similar because they are legally equivalent. The goods and services are related because the same entity commonly provides applicant’s and registrant’s goods and services and markets them under the same mark.

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)) ; TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia , 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In the present case, applicant’s mark is HEALTH AND HAPPINESS and registrant’s mark is HEALTH & HAPPINESS.  These marks are legally identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Additionally, because they are legally identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services.  Id.  The only difference between the marks is the use of an ampersand in registrant’s mark instead of the wording AND. However, the previously attached dictionary evidence demonstrates that & is the symbol meaning “and.” Accordingly, the marks are legal equivalents.

 

Because the marks are highly similar in sound, appearance, meaning, connotation, and overall commercial impression, source confusion is likely.

 

Applicant has submitted a list of registrations. However, the mere submission of a list of registrations or a copy of a private company search report does not make such registrations part of the record.  See In re Peace Love World Live, LLC, 127 USPQ2d 1400, 1405 n.17 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1583 (TTAB 2007); In re Duofold Inc., 184 USPQ 638, 640 (TTAB 1974)); TBMP §1208.02; TMEP §710.03.

 

To make third party registrations part of the record, an applicant must submit copies of the registrations, or the complete electronic equivalent from the USPTO’s automated systems, prior to appeal.  In re Star Belly Stitcher, Inc., 107 USPQ2d 2059, 2064 (TTAB 2013); TBMP §1208.02; TMEP §710.03.  Accordingly, these registrations will not be considered.

 

Even if the third party registrations were properly submitted, these registrations appear to be for goods and/or services that are predominantly different from or unrelated to those identified in applicant’s application. 

 

The weakness or dilution of a particular mark is generally determined in the context of the number and nature of similar marks in use in the marketplace in connection with similar goods and/or services.  See Nat’l Cable Tel. Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1579-80, 19 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Evidence of widespread third-party use of similar marks with similar goods and/or services “is relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection” in that particular industry or field.  Omaha Steaks Int’l, Inc. v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 908 F.3d 1315, 1324, 128 USPQ2d 1686, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).

 

However, evidence comprising only a small number of third-party registrations for similar marks with similar goods and/or services, as in the present case, is generally entitled to little weight in determining the strength of a mark.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1328-29, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1751-52 (Fed. Cir. 2017); AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Products, Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  These few registrations are “not evidence of what happens in the market place or that customers are familiar with them.”  AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d at 1406, 177 USPQ at 269; In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1735 (TTAB 2018).  Thus, the few similar third-party registrations submitted by applicant are insufficient to establish that the wording HEALTH AND HAPPINESS is weak or diluted. 

 

Additionally, evidence comprising third-party registrations for similar marks with different or unrelated goods and/or services, as in the present case, has “no bearing on the strength of the term in the context relevant to this case.”  See Tao Licensing, LLC v. Bender Consulting Ltd., 125 USPQ2d 1043, 1058 (TTAB 2017) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1328, 123 USPQ2d at 1751).  Thus, these third-party registrations submitted by applicant are insufficient to establish that the wording HEALTH AND HAPPINESS is weak or diluted. 

 

Further, where the marks of the respective parties are identical or virtually identical, as in this case, the degree of similarity or relatedness between the goods and/or services needed to support a finding of likelihood of confusion declines.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993)), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017); TMEP §1207.01(a).

 

Based on the foregoing, the applicant’s applied-for and registrant’s marks are sufficiently similar to find a likelihood of confusion.

 

Comparison of the Goods and Services

 

The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC , 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc. , 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc. , 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton , 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC , 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler , 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Consumers are likely to be confused by the use of similar marks on or in connection with goods and with services featuring or related to those goods. TMEP §1207.01(a)(ii); see In re Detroit Athletic Co . , 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding retail shops featuring sports team related clothing and apparel related to various clothing items, including athletic uniforms); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc. , 837 F.2d 463, 6 USPQ2d 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding retail grocery and general merchandise store services related to furniture); In re United Serv. Distribs., Inc. , 229 USPQ 237 (TTAB 1986) (finding distributorship services in the field of health and beauty aids related to skin cream); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp. , 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (finding various items of men’s, boys’, girls’ and women’s clothing related to restaurant services and towels); Steelcase Inc. v. Steelcare Inc. , 219 USPQ 433 (TTAB 1983) (finding refinishing of furniture, office furniture, and machinery related to office furniture and accessories); Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Huskie Freightways, Inc. , 177 USPQ 32 (TTAB 1972) (finding trucking services related to motor trucks and buses).

 

The previously attached Internet evidence, consisting of screenshots from Spectrum, MailShark, and Plum, establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant goods and/or services and markets the goods and/or services under the same mark. The same evidence shows that the relevant goods and/or services are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use and are similar or complementary in terms of purpose or function. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g. , In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd. , 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp. , 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

Applicant argues that, due to applicant’s amendment of its identified goods, the goods and services of applicant and registrant are different. Therefore, applicant argues that the channels of trade and consumers are different, and thus confusion between the two marks is unlikely. Even with applicant’s more narrow identification of goods, the attached Internet evidence from Valpak, GourmetAds, and Clipper Magazine establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant goods and/or services and markets the goods and/or services under the same mark. Specifically, the same entity commonly provides advertising and marketing services as well as coupons and discounts on a variety of goods and services, including applicant’s identified health and wellness products and services. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

Additionally, the goods and/or services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  Therefore, registrant’s advertising and marketing services are presumed to include those related to health and wellness. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are related.

 

Applicant points out that applicant’s goods are in a distinct class from registrant’s services. The fact that the Office classifies goods or services in different classes, however, does not establish that the goods and services are unrelated under Trademark Act Section 2(d).  See TMEP §1207.01(d)(v).  The determination concerning the proper classification of goods or services is a purely administrative determination unrelated to the determination of likelihood of confusion.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Jean Patou, Inc. v. Theon, Inc., 9 F.3d 971, 975, 29 USPQ2d 1771, 1774 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).

 

Applicant also argues that consumers of applicant’s goods and registrant’s services are sophisticated and likely to exercise care. This argument, however, is unpersuasive. The fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii); see, e.g., Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. 1317, 1325, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163-64 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Top Tobacco LP v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1170 (TTAB 2011).  Further, where the purchasers consist of both professionals and the public, the standard of care for purchasing the goods is that of the least sophisticated potential purchaser.  In re FCA US LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1214, 1222 (TTAB 2018) (citing Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. at 1325, 110 USPQ2d at 1163), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 375518 (Fed. Cir. 2019).

 

Finally, applicant argues that the cited registration is not famous throughout the United States and therefore the existence of both marks would not cause confusion. Applicant, however, seeks a geographically unrestricted registration.  The owner of a registration without specified limitations enjoys a presumption of exclusive right to nationwide use of the registered mark under Trademark Act Section 7(b), 15 U.S.C. §1057(b), regardless of its actual extent of use.  Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1568, 218 USPQ 390, 393 (Fed. Cir. 1983).  Therefore, the geographical extent of applicant’s and registrant’s activities, or their relative fame, is not relevant to a likelihood of confusion determination.

 

Based on the analysis above, applicant’s and registrant’s services are related.

 

Because applicant’s and registrant’s marks are similar and the services are related, there is a likelihood of confusion and applicant’s applied-for mark must be refused under Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act.  Based on the foregoing, the refusal based on a likelihood of confusion is maintained and now made FINAL.

 

Assistance

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although an examining attorney cannot provide legal advice, the examining attorney can provide additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. 

 

The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a request for reconsideration of this final Office action that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals and/or click to file a timely appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) with the required filing fee(s).

 

 

/Catherine Caycedo/

Catherine Caycedo

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 101

(571) 272-7066

Catherine.Caycedo@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on March 31, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88409362

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Catherine Caycedo/

Catherine Caycedo

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 101

(571) 272-7066

Catherine.Caycedo@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from March 31, 2020, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”