To: | Wheeler, Matthew (neelypatents@yahoo.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88407154 - FLEX SUPERGYM - N/A |
Sent: | July 16, 2019 06:07:53 PM |
Sent As: | ecom104@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 Attachment - 24 Attachment - 25 Attachment - 26 Attachment - 27 Attachment - 28 Attachment - 29 Attachment - 30 Attachment - 31 Attachment - 32 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88407154
Mark: FLEX SUPERGYM
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Correspondence Address: LAW OFFICE OF MELISSA B. NEELY
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Applicant: Wheeler, Matthew
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: July 16, 2019
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
In the present case, the applicant seeks registration of FLEX SUPERGYM in standard character form for “Providing fitness and exercise facilities” in Class 41.
The cited registered marks are:
· SUPERGYM in standard character form for, inter alia, “Providing a web site featuring on-line instruction in the field of physical exercise and nutrition; physical fitness training services, namely, tracking progress of workouts for others” in Class 41; and
· WOWY SUPERGYM in standard character form for, inter alia, “providing a web site featuring on-line instruction in the field of physical exercise and nutrition” in Class 41.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the [services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Here, applicant’s mark is FLEX SUPERGYM in standard character form, and registrant’s marks are SUPERGYM in standard character form and WOWY SUPERGYM in standard character form. In this case, the wording SUPERGYM in the applied-for mark and the wording SUPERGYM in the registered marks are essentially identical in sound, appearance, connotation, and commercial impression. Further, marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).
Considering the above, the marks are sufficiently similar to cause a likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d).
Relatedness of the Services
In this case, applicant’s mark is FLEX SUPERGYM in standard character form for “Providing fitness and exercise facilities” in Class 41.
The cited registered marks are:
· SUPERGYM in standard character form for, inter alia, “Providing a web site featuring on-line instruction in the field of physical exercise and nutrition; physical fitness training services, namely, tracking progress of workouts for others” in Class 41; and
· WOWY SUPERGYM in standard character form for, inter alia, “providing a web site featuring on-line instruction in the field of physical exercise and nutrition” in Class 41.
Here, the respective services are closely related because they travel through similar channels of trade to the same class of consumer. The examining attorney has attached Internet website evidence demonstrating that providing exercise and fitness facilities, providing online exercise instruction, and workout tracking services are commonly provided together and commonly originate from the same source. The attached Internet evidence from Goldsgym.com, 24hourfitness.com, and Anytimefitness.com, establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant services and markets the services under the same mark and that the relevant services are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009). See attached evidence from:
Thus, upon encountering FLEX SUPERGYM for fitness and exercise facilities, and SUPERGYM and WOWY SUPERGYM for providing online exercise instruction and workout tracking services, consumers are likely to be confused and mistakenly believe that the respective services emanate from a common source. As such, registration must be refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d).
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has determined that “if the word ‘super’ is combined with a word [that] names the services, or a principal component, grade or size thereof, then the composite term is considered merely descriptive of the services.” In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 63 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (TTAB 2002) (holding SUPER SILK merely laudatory and descriptive of applicant’s shirts being of an excellent, first-rate, or superior grade of silk fabric), quoted in In re Positec Grp. Ltd., 108 USPQ2d 1161, 1172 (TTAB 2013) (holding SUPERJAWS merely descriptive of applicant’s various machine tools, hand tools, and heavy-duty workbench accessories as superior vice systems for grasping and holding work pieces).
In this case, applicant must disclaim the wording “SUPERGYM” because it is laudatory and not inherently distinctive. This unregistrable term at best is merely descriptive of an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of applicant’s services. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1251, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1755 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §§1213, 1213.03(a).
The attached evidence from American Heritage Dictionary states that the relevant definition of the wording “GYM” is “A building or part of a building with facilities for exercise, bodybuilding, or other kinds of physical training.” See attached evidence from http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=gym.
Further, the attached evidence shows the wording “GYM” is commonly used in connection with similar services to mean facilities for exercise, bodybuilding, or other kinds of physical training. See attached evidence from http://www.crunch.com/; http://www.gympass.com/us/how-it-works; and http://www.worldgym.com/why-world-gym.
Thus, the wording “SUPER” combined with the descriptive wording “GYM” is laudatory of the alleged merit of applicant’s services is merely describes applicant’s services, namely, providing fitness and exercise facilities.
Applicant may respond to this issue by submitting a disclaimer in the following format:
No claim is made to the exclusive right to use “SUPERGYM” apart from the mark as shown.
For an overview of disclaimers and instructions on how to satisfy this issue using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), see the Disclaimer webpage.
QUESTIONS
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action
/Andrew Crowder-Schaefer/
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 104
(571) 272-0087
andrew.crowderschaefer@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE