Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  July 17, 2019

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

• Section 2(d) Likelihood of Confusion Refusal
• Disclaimer
• Identification of Goods
• Description of the Mark

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4799524.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

 

Applicant’s mark LIMITED EDITION EST. VINTAGE AGED TO PERFECTION is for “Bottles, sold empty; Containers for household use; Drinking glasses, namely, tumblers; Household containers for foods; Jugs; Mugs; Portable beverage coolers; Wine aerators; Wine jugs; Wine pourers; Wine strainers; Wine tasters; Cups; Dinnerware; Drinking bottles for sports; Drinking straws; Jugs; Kitchen containers; Oven mitts; Rags for cleaning; Thermal insulated bags for food or beverages; Trays for domestic purposes; Water bottles sold empty; Washing brushes; coasters not of paper and not being table linen; Insulating sleeve holders for beverage cans; Cocktail shakers; flasks; ice buckets; shot glasses” in International Class 21.

 

Registrant’s mark AGED TO PERFECTION is for “Hats; Hooded sweatshirts; Infant and toddler one piece clothing; Jackets; Jerseys; Pullovers; Sweatshirts; T-shirts; Tank tops” in International Class 25.

 

Standard of Analysis for 2(d) Refusal

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours& Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In this case, the marks at issue feature common wording, rendering the marks similar in appearance and overall commercial impression. Namely, the applied-for and registered marks feature the identical wording “AGED TO PERFECTION.” Adding a first name or initials to a registered mark consisting of a surname does not obviate the similarity between the marks, but rather, as in this case, would likely cause a consumer to believe that the applied-for mark and the registered mark refer to the same person.  See In re C.H. Hanson Co., 116 USPQ2d 1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015) (holding C.H. HANSON for various hand tools confusingly similar to HANSON for related hand tools) (citing In re Chatham Int’l, Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1343, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding JOSE GASPAR GOLD for tequila confusingly similar to GASPAR’S ALE for beer and ale); Harry Winston, Inc. v. Bruce Winston Gem Corp., 111 USPQ2d 1419, 1446-47 (TTAB 2014) (holding BRUCE WINSTON for gemstones and jewelry confusingly similar to WINSTON for polished diamonds and jewelry); In re SL&E Training Stable Inc., 88 USPQ2d 1216, 1219 (TTAB 2008) (holding SAM EDELMAN for luggage, wallets, and various bags confusingly similar to EDELMAN for identical goods in part); Somerset Distilling Inc. v. Speymalt Whisky Distribs. Ltd., 14 USPQ2d 1539, 1542 (TTAB 1989) (holding JAS. GORDON and design for scotch whiskey confusingly similar to GORDON’S for distilled alcoholic beverages, including gin and vodka)).

 

The distinctions in appearance and sound between the marks at issue do not obviate the comparison between the marks. Firstly, the registered mark is wholly incorporated within that of the applied-for wording. Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part. As such, the marks create similar overall commercial impressions, as to give rise to a likelihood of consumer confusion as to whether the goods of the parties emanate from a common source.

 

Further, although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods is typically less significant or less dominant in relation to other wording in a mark.  See Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1816, 1824-25 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1342-43, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).

 

As set forth in greater detail in the “Disclaimer Required” section below, the wording “LIMITED EDITION EST. VINTAGE” in the applied-for mark is merely descriptive of or generic for applicant’s goods.  Thus, this wording is less significant in terms of affecting the mark’s commercial impression, and renders the wording “AGED TO PERFECTION” the more dominant element of the mark.

 

Given that the dominant element of the applied-for mark is identical to that of the registered wording, the marks create similar overall commercial impressions. The marks at issue thus bear a likelihood of consumer confusion as to whether the goods of the parties emanate from a common source.

 

Applicant’s inclusion of design elements does not overcome the similarity to the registered, standard character mark. A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii).  Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display.  See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).

 

Moreover, when evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, such as the applied-for mark, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

 

For these reasons, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Relatedness of the Goods

 

The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

The compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

In this case, applicant’s “bottles, sold empty,” “drinking glasses, namely, tumblers,” “mugs,” “cups,” “water bottles sold empty,” “oven mitts,” and “flasks” are related to the “jackets,” “t-shirts,” and “tank tops” offered in connection with the registered mark. The attached Internet evidence, consisting of excerpts from the websites of third parties offering the recited good at issue, establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark. The attached evidence further establishes that the relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use. See attached evidence from Charming Charlie, David’s Bridal, Claire’s, and Kate Spade.  Thus, applicant’s and registrants’ goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

To the extent the evidence may not address all of the items in applicant’s identification, relatedness does not have to be established for every good.  It is sufficient for a finding of likelihood of confusion if relatedness is established for any or some items encompassed by the identification within a particular class in an application. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981).  In this case, relatedness has been established for some of the identified items, which is enough to show a likelihood of confusion.

 

For the reasons stated above, registration of the applied-for mark is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  However, if applicant responds to the refusal, applicant must also respond to the requirements set forth below.

 

DISCLAIMER REQUIRED

 

Applicant must provide a disclaimer of the unregistrable parts of the applied-for mark even though the mark as a whole appears to be registrable.  See 15 U.S.C. §1056(a); TMEP §§1213, 1213.03(a).  A disclaimer of an unregistrable part of a mark will not affect the mark’s appearance.  See Schwarzkopf v. John H. Breck, Inc., 340 F.2d 978, 979-80, 144 USPQ 433, 433 (C.C.P.A. 1965).

 

In this case, applicant must disclaim the wordings “LIMITED EDITION” and “VINTAGE” because they are not inherently distinctive.  These unregistrable terms at best are merely descriptive of a quality or characteristic of applicant’s goods.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1251, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1755 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §§1213, 1213.03(a). 

 

The attached evidence from Merriam-Webster shows that the wording “LIMITED EDITION” means “an issue of something collectible (such as books, prints, or medals) that is advertised to be limited to a relatively small number of copies.”  The attached evidence from Merriam-Webster shows that the wording “VINTAGE” means “of old and continuing interest, importance, or quality.” Thus, these wordings merely describe a quality or characteristic of applicant’s goods, namely, that such goods are collectibles limited to a small number of copies and/or are of old and continuing interest, importance, or quality.

 

Further, applicant must disclaim the wording “EST.” because it is not inherently distinctive.  This unregistrable term at best is merely informational about the goods and are commonly used in business; thus the term does not function as a mark.  See 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1053, 1127; In re Boston Beer Co., 198 F.3d 1370, 1372-74, 53 USPQ2d 1056, 1058-59 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Aerospace Optics, Inc., 78 USPQ2d 1861, 1864 (TTAB 2006); TMEP §§807.14(a), 1202.04, 1213.03(a), (b).

 

Determining whether a term functions as a trademark or service mark depends on how such matter would be perceived by the relevant public.  In re Eagle Crest, Inc., 96 USPQ2d 1227, 1229 (TTAB 2010); In re Aerospace Optics, Inc., 78 USPQ2d at 1862; TMEP §1202.04.  “The more commonly a [term] is used, the less likely that the public will use it to identify only one source and the less likely that it will be recognized by purchasers as a trademark [or service mark].”  In re Hulting, 107 USPQ2d 1175, 1177 (TTAB 2013) (quoting In re Eagle Crest, Inc., 96 USPQ2d at 1229); TMEP §1202.04.

 

This term is commonly used by businesses as a promotional phrase.  Because consumers are accustomed to seeing this term commonly used by many businesses to impart information to consumers, they will perceive this term or slogan only as informational matter rather than as a trademark or service mark that identifies the source of applicant’s goods.

 

Applicant may respond to this issue by submitting a disclaimer in the following format: 

 

No claim is made to the exclusive right to use “LIMITED EDITION EST. VINTAGE” apart from the mark as shown. 

 

For an overview of disclaimers and instructions on how to satisfy this issue using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), see the Disclaimer webpage. 

 

IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS

 

The wording “portable beverage coolers” and “coasters not of paper not being table linen” in the identification of goods is indefinite and must be clarified because the specific nature of the goods is unclear on the basis of the wording provided.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01.

 

Applicant is advised to delete or modify the duplicate entry in the identification of goods in International Class 21 for “jugs.”  See generally TMEP §§1402.01, 1402.01(a).  If applicant does not respond to this issue, be advised that the USPTO will remove duplicate entries from the identification prior to registration.

 

If modifying one of the duplicate entries, applicant may amend it to clarify or limit the goods, but not to broaden or expand the goods beyond those in the original application or as acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Also, generally, any deleted goods may not later be reinserted.  TMEP §1402.07(e).

 

Applicant may substitute the following wording, if accurate: 

 

International Class 21:

 

Bottles, sold empty; Containers for household use; Drinking glasses, namely, tumblers; Household containers for foods; Jugs; Mugs; Non-electric portable beverage coolers; Wine aerators; Wine jugs; Wine pourers; Wine strainers; Wine tasters; Cups; Dinnerware; Drinking bottles for sports; Drinking straws; Jugs; Kitchen containers; Oven mitts; Rags for cleaning; Thermal insulated bags for food or beverages; Trays for domestic purposes; Water bottles sold empty; Washing brushes; coasters not of paper and not being textile in the nature of table linen; Insulating sleeve holders for beverage cans; Cocktail shakers; flasks; ice buckets; shot glasses

 

Applicant’s goods may be clarified or limited, but may not be expanded beyond those originally itemized in the application or as acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Applicant may clarify or limit the identification by inserting qualifying language or deleting items to result in a more specific identification; however, applicant may not substitute different goods or add goods not found or encompassed by those in the original application or as acceptably amended.  See TMEP §1402.06(a)-(b).  The scope of the goods sets the outer limit for any changes to the identification and is generally determined by the ordinary meaning of the wording in the identification.  TMEP §§1402.06(b), 1402.07(a)-(b).  Any acceptable changes to the goods will further limit scope, and once goods are deleted, they are not permitted to be reinserted.  TMEP §1402.07(e).

 

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual.  See TMEP §1402.04.

 

DESCRIPTION OF THE MARK

 

Applicant must submit an amended description of the mark because the current one is incomplete and does not describe all the significant aspects of the mark.  37 C.F.R. §2.37; see TMEP §§808.01, 808.02.  Descriptions must be accurate and identify all the literal and design elements in the mark.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.37; TMEP §§808 et seq. 

 

Applicant must also delete from the description any text that does not reference things appearing in the mark, such as interpretation, assessment, or analysis of the mark elements, or indications of how the mark is or is not used or intended to be used.  A description must identify only the literal and design elements shown in the drawing.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.37; TMEP §808.02.

 

The following description is suggested, if accurate:  The mark consists of the stylized wordings "LIMITED" and "EDITION" on either side of a stylized wreath design. Inside of the wreath is a single line circle, inside of which is a crown design above the stylized lettering “EST.” To the lower left of the wreath is an abstract design comprised of overlapping, curved bands. To the lower right of the wreath is an abstract design comprised of overlapping, curved bands. Below the curved band designs is the stylized wording “VINTAGE” underlined by a horizontal line with abstract, stylized designs on the left and right ends of the horizontal line, flaring above and below the horizontal line. Below the line is the stylized wording “AGED TO PERFECTION.”

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES:

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action  

 

 

/Amanda Galbo/

Amanda Galbo

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 125

(571) 272-5391

amanda.galbo@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on July 17, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88406040

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Amanda Galbo/

Amanda Galbo

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 125

(571) 272-5391

amanda.galbo@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from July 17, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond.

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”