Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  July 09, 2019

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

 

• Prior Filed Applications
• Section 2(d) Refusal- Likelihood of Confusion
• Specimen Refusal
• Request for Information

 

PRIOR-FILED APPLICATIONS

 

The effective filing dates of pending U.S. Application Serial Nos. 87326597, 88154914, 88309712, 88329795 and  88343243 precede applicant’s filing date.  See attached referenced applications.  If one or more of the marks in the referenced applications register, applicant’s mark may be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion with the registered mark(s).  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208 et seq.  Therefore, upon receipt of applicant’s response to this Office action, action on this application may be suspended pending final disposition of the earlier-filed referenced applications.

 

In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the marks in the referenced applications.  Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks at U.S. Registration Nos.  4275421, 4311097, 4656711, 4794546, 4982622, 5092254, 5159825, 5376387,  5459967, 5459967 and 5457514.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

 

Applicant has applied to register:

 

“BEE” (Standard Characters) for, “Jewelry” in International Class 14.

 

The registered marks are:

 

“BEE AMOUR” (U.S. Reg. No. 4982622) (Standard Characters) for, “jewelry” in International Class 14.

 

And

 

“BEE GODDESS” (U.S. Reg. No.  4794546) (Words Plus Design) for, “Jewellery; imitation jewellery; gold; precious stones and jewellery made thereof; cufflinks; tie pins; statuettes and figurines of precious metal; clocks, watches and chronometrical instruments; chronometers and their parts; watch straps” in International Class 14.

 

And

 

“BEE GODDESS” (U.S. Reg. No. 5459967) (Standard Characters) for, “Jewellery; Imitation jewellery; Gold; Precious stones; Jewellery incorporating precious stones; Jewellery made of precious stones; Articles of jewellery with precious stones; Cufflinks; Tie pins; Statuettes of precious metal; Figurines of precious metal; Clocks; watches; Chronometrical instruments; Chronometers; watch parts; watch straps” in International Class 14.

 

And

“BEE MAGNETIC” (U.S. Reg. No. 4709367) (Standard Characters) for, “jewelry” in International Class 14.

 

And

“CRAZY BEE” (U.S. Reg. No. 5457514) (Standard Characters) for, in relevant part “Jewelry; Rings; Sports watches; Stopwatches; Wristwatches” in International Class 14.

 

And

“EMMA BEE” (U.S. Reg. No.  4656711) (Words Plus Design) for, “Jewelry” in International Class 14.

 

And

“SHE BEE” (U.S. Reg. No. 5159825) (Words Plus Design) for, “Jewelry; Jewelry and imitation jewelry; Necklaces; Body jewelry; Bracelets; Costume jewelry; Gemstone jewelry; Rings; Rings being jewelry; Women's jewelry” in International Class 14.

 

And

“SHE BEE” (U.S. Reg. No. 4275421) (Standard Characters) for, “Fine and costume jewelry” in International Class 14.

 

And

Bee Design (U.S. Reg. No. 5092254) (Design) for, “Jewelry” in International Class 14.

 

And

Bee Design (U.S. Reg. No. 5376387) (Design) for, “cuff links, tie bars, watches” in International Class 14.

 

And

Bee Design (U.S. Reg. No. 4311097) (Design) for, in relevant part “Jewellery, in particular pins and brooches, wristwatches, cuff links, clocks and alarm clocks” in International Class 14.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant(s).  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Determining likelihood of confusion is made on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  However, “[n]ot all of the [du Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1366, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601. F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir 2010)).  The USPTO may focus its analysis “on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods [and/or services].”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see TMEP §1207.01.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the services.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

 

 

 

SIMILARITY OF THE MARKS

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F. 3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Here, the marks are nearly identical in appearance, sound, commercial impression and connotation. Specifically, they share the similar, fundamental element of “BEE” for related goods. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

 

Any comparative differences between applicant’s mark and registered marks remains relatively minor and does not substantially mitigate the confusing similarity between them.  The additional wording and design elements in the registered marks does not remove confusion as the dominant, source identifying element remains “BEE”.

 

Specifically, while applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.

 

 

 

Further, with respect to the additional wording of “MAGNETIC” in U.S. Reg. No. 4709367, the wording is merely descriptive of or generic for applicant’s services, as has thus been disclaimed. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  See In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d at 1060, 224 USPQ at 752; TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Thus, this wording is less significant in terms of affecting the mark’s commercial impression.

 

As for the design element in U.S. Reg. Nos.  4656711, 4794546 and 5159825, when evaluating a composite mark containing both words and designs, the word portion is more likely to indicate the origin of the services because it is that portion of the mark that consumers use when referring to or requesting the services.  Bond v. Taylor, 119 USPQ2d 1049, 1055 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908, 1911 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 

 

Lastly, with respect to U.S. Reg. Nos. 4311097, 5092254, 5376387, the marks consists of designs of bees. Under the doctrine of legal equivalents, a design mark may be found confusingly similar to a word mark consisting of the design’s literal equivalent because they create a similar mental impression.  TMEP §1207.01(c)(i); see, e.g., In re Rolf Nilsson AB, 230 USPQ 141, 142-43 (TTAB 1986) (holding a mark comprising the silhouette of a lion’s head and the letter “L” confusingly similar to the word mark LION); Puma-Sportschuhfabriken Rudolf Dassler KG v. Garan, Inc., 224 USPQ 1064, 1066-67 (TTAB 1984) (holding a mark comprising designs of a mountain lion confusingly similar to the word mark PUMA). Here, the marks are similar as they both convey the same commercial impression as the registered marks are not so stylized that a consumers would not be able to recognize the images as bees. The bee design comprising these registered mark is the only thing consumers see when exposed to registrants’ goods and when viewed in conjunction with the applicant’s marks, there is a likelihood of confusion.

 

In this instance, the applicant’s mark and are registered marks are extremely similar. The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

Generally, the greater degree of similarity between the applied-for mark and the registered marks, the lesser the degree of similarity between the goods of the parties is required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.  In re C.H. Hanson Co., 116 USPQ2d 1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001)); In re Thor Tech, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1636 (TTAB 2009). 

 

SIMILARITY OF THE GOODS

 

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

 

In this case, the goods in the application and in U.S. Reg. Nos. 4982622, 4709367, 4656711, and 5092254 are identical.  Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and class of purchasers are the same for these goods.  See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 27 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are related.  

 

Additionally, the application uses broad wording to describe jewelry, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including those in U.S. Reg. Nos.  4794546, 5459967, 5457514, 5159825, 4275421, 5376387 and 4311097, which describe various types of jewelry, including rings, costume jewelry, etc.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are related.

 

SPECIMEN REFUSAL

 

Registration is refused because the specimen in International Class 14 appears to consist of a digitally altered image or a mock-up of the mark on the goods or their packaging and does not show the applied-for mark in actual use in commerce.  Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a). 

 

An application based on Trademark Act Section 1(a) must include a specimen showing the applied-for mark in use in commerce for each international class of goods identified in the application or amendment to allege use.  15 U.S.C. §1051(a)(1); 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a).  “Use in commerce” means (1) a bona fide use of the applied-for mark in the ordinary course of trade (and not merely to reserve a right in the mark), (2) the mark is placed in any manner on the goods, packaging, tags or labels affixed to the goods, or displays that directly associate the mark with the goods and have a point-of-sale nature, and (3) the goods are actually sold or transported in commerce.  See 15 U.S.C. §1127.

 

An image of a product or packaging that has been digitally created or otherwise altered to include the mark does not show actual use of the mark in commerce.  See 15 U.S.C. §1127; TMEP §§904.04(a), 904.07(a); cf. In re Chica, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1845, 1848 (TTAB 2007) (holding that “a mere drawing of the goods with an illustration of how the mark may be displayed” was not an acceptable specimen because it did not show actual use in commerce); In re The Signal Cos., 228 USPQ 956, 957-58 n.4 (TTAB 1986) (noting that a printer’s proof of an advertisement would not be an acceptable specimen because it does not show actual use in commerce).

 

In this case, the specimen appears to be a mock up as the tags on the items do not appear to be displayed in a manner that is common for jewelry to be sold. Specifically, the earrings, bracelets and charms appear to be laid over a string and paper tag, which is not how these goods are typically packaged or sold in commerce.  Therefore, the submitted specimen cannot be accepted.

 

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

 

To permit proper examination of the application for compliance with use in commerce requirements as of the filing date, applicant must respond to the following requests for information and documentation about the specimen(s).  See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §814.  Answer for each specimen/photograph/image previously provided.  For any website source submitted as supporting evidence, provide a digital copy of the entire webpage from top to bottom, as rendered in an Internet browser, that includes the URL and access or print date.  TMEP §710.01(b) (citing In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1733 (TTAB 2018)).

 

(1)       Identify the particular good(s) listed in the application for which the specimen(s) was submitted to show use of the mark.

 

(2)       Was the specimen created for submission with this application?  If so, specify the date each specimen was created.  If applicant obtained the image(s) of the goods shown in the specimen(s) from a third-party website, provide the URL of the website and a digital copy of relevant webpage(s) for each image.

 

(3)       Provide information about and examples of how applicant’s goods appear in the actual sales environment.

(a)       If sold in stores, provide a representative sample of the name(s) of the stores and of photographs showing the goods for sale in the named stores, such as photographs of the sales displays or goods on shelves with the mark. 

(b)       If sold online, provide a representative sample of the name(s) of the online retailers, the website URL(s) for each named retailer, and a digital copy of the webpages showing the goods for sale on the named website.

(c)       If sold in another type of sales environment (e.g., catalogs, trade shows), identify the environment and provide photographs and/or documentation showing the goods for sale in that environment. 

 

(4)       If the information in question (3) about how the goods appear in the actual sales environment is not available to applicant, please describe how applicant’s goods are sold or transported and provide photographs and other documentation showing how applicant’s mark appears on the goods and/or its packaging when the goods are sold or transported to or within the United States.

 

(5)       For each category of sales environment specified in response to questions (3) and (4), specify when the goods bearing the mark were first available for purchase within the United States, the date of the first sale of the goods to or within the United States, and whether the goods are still for sale to or within the United States in that environment.

 

(6)       For the goods identified in response to question (1), specify the dollar amount of sales with or within the United States and provide at least three invoices or other supporting documentation that show payments or other consideration made, redacting personal or private information of buyers as necessary.

 

RESPONSE OPTIONS

 

Applicant may respond to the refusal of registration due to the specimen’s failure to show actual use in commerce by amending the filing basis to allege intent to use the mark in commerce, for which no specimen is required now.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.34.  This option will later necessitate additional fee(s) and filing requirements such as providing a specimen. 

 

Alternatively, applicant may also respond to the refusal by submitting a different specimen (a “verified substitute specimen”) that (a) was in actual use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of an amendment to allege use and (b) shows the mark in actual use in commerce for the goods identified in the application or amendment to allege use.  A “verified substitute specimen” is a specimen that is accompanied by the following statement made in a signed affidavit or supported by a declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20:  “The substitute (or new, or originally submitted, if appropriate) specimen(s) was/were in use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of the amendment to allege use.”  The substitute specimen cannot be accepted without this statement. 

 

For an overview of these response options and instructions on how to satisfy either option online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, see the Specimen webpage.

 

If applicant submits a verified substitute specimen, applicant must also fully respond to all the requirements for information and documentation.  Failure to comply with a requirement to furnish information is grounds for refusing registration.  In re Harley, 119 USPQ2d 1755, 1757-58 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §814.  Merely stating that evidence is available on applicant’s or a third party website or providing a hyperlink of such a website is an insufficient response and will not make the additional information or materials of record.  See In re Planalytics, Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1453, 1457-58 (TTAB 2004).  However, amending the application filing basis to intent-to-use under Section 1(b) will resolve the requirements for information and documentation.

 

 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action  

 

 

/Claudia Garcia/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 111

(571) 272-6939

claudia.garcia@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on July 09, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88404030

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Claudia Garcia/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 111

(571) 272-6939

claudia.garcia@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from July 09, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond.

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”