Suspension Letter

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

SUSPENSION NOTICE

No Response Required

 

 

Issue date:  January 08, 2020

 

 

The application is suspended for the reason(s) specified below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.67; TMEP §§716 et seq. 

 

The pending application(s) below has an earlier filing date or effective filing date than applicant’s application.  If the mark in the application(s) below registers, the USPTO may refuse registration of applicant’s mark under Section 2(d) because of a likelihood of confusion with the registered mark(s). 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see 37 C.F.R. §2.83; TMEP §§1208.02(c). Action on this application is suspended until the prior-filed application(s) below either registers or abandons.  37 C.F.R. §2.83(c).  Information relevant to the application(s) below was sent previously.

 

            - U.S. Application Serial No(s). 8207168, 88207138, and 88188844

 

Refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) resolved and maintained and continued.  The following requirement is satisfied: 

 

            •  Identification of Goods

 

See TMEP §713.02.

 

The following refusal is maintained and continued: 

 

•  Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

 

See id.  These refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) will be made final once this application is removed from suspension, unless a new issue arises.  See TMEP §716.01.

 

APPLICANT’S RESPONSE REGARDING THE SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL IS UNPERSUASIVE

 

Applicant’s arguments have been considered and found unpersuasive for the reasons set forth below.

 

The Marks Are Similar

 

In the present case, the cited registrations appear entirely within the applied-for mark. Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part.

 

Further, the inclusion of applicant’s distinctive house mark RAGER does not obviate the likelihood of confusion. Adding a house mark to an otherwise confusingly similar mark will not obviate a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See In re Fiesta Palms LLC, 85 USPQ2d 1360, 1366-67 (TTAB 2007) (finding CLUB PALMS MVP and MVP confusingly similar); In re Christian Dior, S.A., 225 USPQ 533, 534 (TTAB 1985) (finding LE CACHET DE DIOR and CACHET confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  It is likely that goods sold under these marks would be attributed to the same source.  See In re Chica, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1845, 1848-49 (TTAB 2007).  Accordingly, in the present case, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Third Party Registrations Are Not Dispositive

 

Applicant has submitted printed or electronic copies of third-party registrations for marks containing the wording BODYFUEL, BODY or FUEL to support the argument that this wording is weak, diluted, or so widely used that it should not be afforded a broad scope of protection.  These registrations appear to be for goods that are predominantly different from or unrelated to those identified in applicant’s application, or for marks that have a different commercial impression than applicant’s mark or registrants’ marks.

 

The weakness or dilution of a particular mark is generally determined in the context of the number and nature of similar marks in use in the marketplace in connection with similar goods.  See Nat’l Cable Tel. Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1579-80, 19 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  Evidence of widespread third-party use of similar marks with similar goods “is relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection” in that particular industry or field.  Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373-74, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 1345, 68 USPQ2d 1059, 1062-63 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

 

However, evidence comprising only a small number of third-party registrations for similar marks with similar goods, as in the present case, is generally entitled to little weight in determining the strength of a mark.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1328-29, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1751-52 (Fed. Cir. 2017); AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Products, Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  These few registrations are “not evidence of what happens in the market place or that customers are familiar with them.”  AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d at 1406, 177 USPQ at 269; In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1735 (TTAB 2018).  Thus, the few similar third-party registrations submitted by applicant are insufficient to establish that the wording BODYFUEL or BODY FUEL is weak or diluted. 

 

Further, evidence comprising third-party registrations for similar marks with different or unrelated goods, as in the present case, has “no bearing on the strength of the term in the context relevant to this case.”  See Tao Licensing, LLC v. Bender Consulting Ltd., 125 USPQ2d 1043, 1058 (TTAB 2017) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1328, 123 USPQ2d at 1751).  Thus, these third-party registrations submitted by applicant are insufficient to establish that the wording BODYFUEL or BODY FUEL is weak or diluted.

 

Suspension process.  The USPTO will periodically check this application to determine if it should remain suspended.  See TMEP §716.04.  As needed, the trademark examining attorney will issue a letter to applicant to inquire about the status of the reason for the suspension.  TMEP §716.05. 

 

No response required.  Applicant may file a response, but is not required to do so. 

 

 

/Derek van den Abeelen/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 126

(571) 270-3997

derek.vandenabeelen@uspto.gov

 

 

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on January 08, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88401056

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.  No response is necessary.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

/Derek van den Abeelen/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 126

(571) 270-3997

derek.vandenabeelen@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”