To: | Hollander Brand Strategy, LLC (harris@schiplaw.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88400967 - CLOUD 9 - Hollander-Cl |
Sent: | May 07, 2020 05:40:30 PM |
Sent As: | ecom120@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 Attachment - 24 Attachment - 25 Attachment - 26 Attachment - 27 Attachment - 28 Attachment - 29 Attachment - 30 Attachment - 31 Attachment - 32 Attachment - 33 Attachment - 34 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88400967
Mark: CLOUD 9
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Correspondence Address: |
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Applicant: Hollander Brand Strategy, LLC
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Reference/Docket No. Hollander-Cl
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: May 07, 2020
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
Summary of Issues:
Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 4068062 (CLOUD9) and 5619848 (CLOUD9). Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registrations.
In any likelihood of confusion determination, two key considerations are similarity of the marks and similarity or relatedness of the goods. In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d 1122, 1126 (TTAB 2015) (citing Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976)); In re Iolo Techs., LLC, 95 USPQ2d 1498, 1499 (TTAB 2010); see TMEP §1207.01. That is, the marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). Additionally, the goods are compared to determine whether they are similar or commercially related or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §1207.01, (a)(vi).
Comparison of Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
The registered marks are CLOUD9. Applicant’s mark is CLOUD 9. The compared marks are identical except for a slight difference in appearance between registrants’ marks, which appear as a compound word with no space separating the words, that is, CLOUD9; and applicant’s mark, which appears as multiple words with space separating the words, that is, CLOUD 9. As such, the marks are identical in sound and virtually identical in appearance, and are thus confusingly similar for the purposes of determining likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., Seaguard Corp. v. Seaward Int’l, Inc., 223 USPQ 48, 51 (TTAB 1984) (“[T]he marks ‘SEAGUARD’ and ‘SEA GUARD’ are, in contemplation of law, identical [internal citation omitted].”); In re Best W. Family Steak House, Inc., 222 USPQ 827, 827 (TTAB 1984) (“There can be little doubt that the marks [BEEFMASTER and BEEF MASTER] are practically identical”); Stock Pot, Inc., v. Stockpot Rest., Inc., 220 USPQ 52, 52 (TTAB 1983), aff’d 737 F.2d 1576, 222 USPQ 665 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“There is no question that the marks of the parties [STOCKPOT and STOCK POT] are confusingly similar. The word marks are phonetically identical and visually almost identical.”).
For the above reason, applicant’s and registrants’ marks have a similar overall commercial impression, and as such, are confusingly similar.
Comparison of Goods
Registrants’ goods are,
Registration No. 4068062: cigarillos; cigars
Registration No. 5619848: hookah; hookah accessories, namely, sleeves, and wind protectors; hookah tobacco; hookah charcoal; and hookah parts, namely, hoses, bowls, mouthpieces, bases, and stems
Applicant’s goods are, “herbs for smoking.”
The goods of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
The respective goods need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Because applicant’s and registrants’ marks are confusingly similar and their goods are closely related, applicant’s mark must be refused due to a likelihood of confusion.
Please note the following refusal.
Section 2(e)(1) Refusal - Merely Descriptive
As the attached pages from Leafly, I Love Growing Marijuana, Weedmaps, and Bonza Blog show, CLOUD 9 is a particular strain of cannabis that is high in THC. As such, CLOUD 9 describes the strain of applicant’s smoking herbs.
Given this, applicant’s mark must be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1) for being merely descriptive.
Please note the following refusal.
Sections 1 and 45 Refusal – No Bona Fide Intent for Lawful Use in Commerce – CSA Refusal
Registration is also refused because applicant did not have a bona fide intent to lawfully use the applied-for mark in commerce as of the filing date of the application. Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; see TMEP §907.
To qualify for federal trademark registration, the use of a mark in commerce must be lawful. Gray v. Daffy Dan’s Bargaintown, 823 F.2d 522, 526, 3 USPQ2d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that “[a] valid application cannot be filed at all for registration of a mark without ‘lawful use in commerce’”); TMEP §907; see In re Stellar Int’l, Inc., 159 USPQ 48, 50-51 (TTAB 1968); Coahoma Chemical Co., Inc. v. Smith, 113 USPQ 413 (Com’r Pat. & Trademarks 1957) (concluding that “use of a mark in connection with unlawful shipments in interstate commerce is not use of a mark in commerce which the [Office] may recognize.”). Thus, the goods to which the mark is applied must comply with all applicable federal laws. See In re Brown, 119 USPQ2d 1350, 1351 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Midwest Tennis & Track Co., 29 USPQ2d 1386, 1386 n.2 (TTAB 1993) (noting that “[i]t is settled that the Trademark Act’s requirement of ‘use in commerce,’ means a ‘lawful use in commerce’”)); In re Pepcom Indus., Inc., 192 USPQ 400, 401 (TTAB 1976); TMEP §907.
Here, the evidence of record indicates that the items or activities to which the proposed mark will be applied are or were unlawful under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. §§801-971, as of April 24, 2019, the date on which the application was filed. Specifically, the evidence presented above that CLOUD 9 is the name of a high THC cannabis strain.
The CSA prohibits, among other things, manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or possessing certain controlled substances, including marijuana and any material or preparation containing marijuana. 21 U.S.C. §§812, 841(a)(1), 844(a); see also 21 U.S.C. §802(16) (defining “[marijuana]” as “all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or resin” (subject to certain exceptions)).
In this case, the wording of the applied-for mark plainly indicates that applicant’s identified goods include items that are prohibited by the CSA, namely, marijuana herbs for smoking.
In order for an application to have a valid basis that could properly result in a registration, the use of the mark has to be lawful. See In re Pepcom Indus., Inc., 192 USPQ 400, 401 (TTAB 1976) Because use of the applied-for mark in connection with such goods and/or services was not lawful as of the filing date, applicant did not have a bona fide intent to lawfully use the applied-for mark in commerce in connection with such goods and/or services. See In re JJ206, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1568, 1569 (TTAB 2016)(“where the identified goods are illegal under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA), the applicant cannot use its mark in lawful commerce, and ‘it is a legal impossibility’ for the applicant to have the requisite bona fide intent to use the mark.”); TMEP §907.
Please note the following advisory.
Prior-Filed Application
In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the mark in the referenced application. Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusals by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. However, if applicant responds to the refusals, applicant must also respond to the requirement set forth below.
Attorney Information Required
To provide bar information. Applicant’s attorney should respond to this Office action by using the appropriate TEAS response form and provide his or her bar information in the “Attorney Information” page of the form, within the bar information section. See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(1)(ii). Bar information provided in any other area of the form will be viewable by the public in USPTO records.
Attorney statement required. Applicant’s attorney must provide the following statement: “I am an attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of a U.S. state (including the District of Columbia and any U.S. Commonwealth or territory).” See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(3). This is required for all U.S.-licensed attorneys who are representing trademark applicants at the USPTO. Id.
Responding to this Action
The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
/Leslee A. Friedman/
Leslee A. Friedman
Trademark Examining Attorney
Office 120
leslee.friedman@uspto.gov
(571) 272 - 5278
RESPONSE GUIDANCE