UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION
U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 88398517
MARK: IBUMP
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp
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APPLICANT: Therasyn Sensors, Inc.
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
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OFFICE ACTION
TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW. A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.
ISSUE/MAILING DATE: July 02, 2019
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SUMMARY OF ISSUES:
I. SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
The Marks
The applied-for mark is IBUMP, in standard characters, for “medical apparatus; medical apparatus, particularly to monitor fertility and pregnancy; medical apparatus, particularly pregnancy testing devices” in International Class 10.
The registered mark is BUMPS, in standard characters, for “electrodes for medical use” in International Class 10.
Likelihood of Confusion Analysis
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. Each of these factors is addressed in the sections below.
Similarity of the Marks
The applied-for mark IBUMP is confusingly similar to the registered mark BUMPS, which weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion.
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
The applied-for mark IBUMP is similar to the registered mark BUMPS because they both contain a form of the word BUMP. The applied-for mark differs from the registered mark in that it omits the pluralizing suffix S in the registered mark, however this omission does little to distinguish the marks because singular and plural forms of BUMP are essentially identical in sound, appearance, meaning, and commercial impression. Cf. Swiss Grill Ltd., v. Wolf Steel Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 2001, 2011 n.17 (TTAB 2015) (holding “it is obvious that the virtually identical marks [the singular and plural of SWISS GRILL] are confusingly similar”); Weider Publ’ns, LLC v. D & D Beauty Care Co., 109 USPQ2d 1347, 1355 (TTAB 2014) (finding the singular and plural forms of SHAPE to be essentially the same mark) (citing Wilson v. Delaunay, 245 F.2d 877, 878, 114 USPQ 339, 341 (C.C.P.A. 1957) (finding no material difference between the singular and plural forms of ZOMBIE such that the marks were considered the same mark).
The additional prefix I in the applied-for mark similarly fails to significantly distinguish it from the registered mark in this case, because the term BUMP is dominant portion of the applied-for mark. The term BUMP is the dominant portion of the applied-for mark, because the prefix I is merely describes a feature of applicant’s goods. Marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods is typically less significant or less dominant in relation to other wording in a mark. See Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1816, 1824-25 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1342-43, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
The attached evidence from AcronymFinder.com, Wikipedia.org, and Apple.com shows that the letter I used as a prefix would be understood by the purchasing public to refer to the Internet when used in relation to Internet-related products or services. Cf. RxD Media, LLC v. IP Application Dev. LLC, 125 USPQ2d 1801, 1810-14 (TTAB 2018) (holding IPAD merely descriptive of web-based software for mobile-access database management in which users can store and access their personal information); In re Zanova, Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1300, 1304 (TTAB 2000) (holding ITOOL merely descriptive of computer software for use in creating web pages, and custom designing websites for others); TMEP §1209.03(d). Applicant’s goods are “medical apparatus”, “medical apparatus, particularly to monitor fertility and pregnancy”, and “medical apparatus, particularly pregnancy testing devices”, which presumably include all goods of those types, including such goods that are Internet-enabled. The prefix I in the applied-for mark therefore merely describes a feature of applicant’s goods, and is less significant to the mark’s overall commercial impression than the term BUMP.
The marks IBUMP and BUMPS are similar, and consumers who encounter the marks used in connection with similar or related goods are likely to be confused as to the source of those goods. The amount of mark similarity required to support a likelihood of confusion determination is also lower when the parties’ goods are “similar in kind and/or closely related” than when they are diverse. In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987); see Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1242, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Relatedness of the Goods
Applicant’s “medical apparatus”, “medical apparatus, particularly to monitor fertility and pregnancy”, and “medical apparatus, particularly pregnancy testing devices” are related to registrant’s “electrodes for medical use”, which weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion.
The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi). Likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
The application in this case uses broad wording to describe “medical apparatus”, which presumably encompasses all goods of that type, including registrant’s narrower “electrodes for medical use.” See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Applicant’s and registrant’s goods are thus legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)). The parties’ goods have, moreover, no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Applicant’s and registrant’s goods are thus related.
Applicant’s “medical apparatus”, “medical apparatus, particularly to monitor fertility and pregnancy”, and “medical apparatus, particularly pregnancy testing devices” are also related to registrant’s “electrodes for medical use” because of the way these goods are marketed and sold. Goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
The attached evidence from the American Heritage dictionary shows an “ultrasound” is a device that uses “ultrasonic waves for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes, specifically to image an internal body structure, monitor a developing fetus, or generate localized deep heat to the tissues.” The attached evidence from WhattoExpect.com, Healthline.com, and AmericanPregnancy.org shows further that ultrasounds are “a routine part of prenatal care at 6 to 9 weeks”, and that they are commonly used to both test for, and monitor, pregnancy. Ultrasounds are therefore a type “medical apparatus” used both to “monitor…pregnancy” and as a “pregnancy testing device.” The attached evidence from GE.com, Phillips.com, and MedicalDeviceDepot.com shows that ultrasounds are also commonly marketed and sold from the same sources, under the same brands or marks, as “electrodes for medical use.” General Electric, for example, markets and sells both ultrasounds and “electrodes for medical use”, all under the GE brand name.
Applicant’s “medical apparatus”, “medical apparatus, particularly to monitor fertility and pregnancy”, and “medical apparatus, particularly pregnancy testing devices” are, in light of the foregoing, related to registrant’s “electrodes for medical use” for likelihood of confusion purposes.
Conclusion
The marks IBUMP and BUMPS are confusingly similar, when those marks are considered in their entireties, despite an additional letter in the applied-for mark, and pluralization in the registered mark. Applicant’s goods are also related to the goods identified in the registration. Registration for the applied-for mark is therefore refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4608296.
II. INFORMATION REQUIRED – SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MARK
(1) Explain whether the wording in the mark “IBUMP” has any meaning or significance in the trade or industry in which applicant’s goods are manufactured or provided, any meaning or significance as applied to applicant’s goods, or if such wording is a term of art within applicant’s industry.
(2) Respond to the following questions:
Are any of applicant’s goods electronic?
Are any of applicant’s goods Internet-enabled?
Are any of applicant’s goods capable of connecting to the Internet, or interacting with persons or devices via the internet?
Can any of applicant’s goods be used, controlled, or monitored via the Internet?
Will any of applicant’s goods be electronic?
Will any of applicant’s goods be Internet-enabled?
Will any of applicant’s goods be capable of connecting to the Internet, or interacting with persons or devices via the internet?
Will any of applicant’s goods be used, controlled, or monitored via the Internet?
See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §814.
Failure to comply with a request for information is grounds for refusing registration. In re Harley, 119 USPQ2d 1755, 1757-58 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §814.
III. AMENDMENT REQUIRED – IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS
Indefinite and Overbroad Wording in Identification
The wording “medical apparatus, particularly pregnancy testing devices” in the identification of goods is indefinite and must be clarified because it does not clearly specify the nature of the goods, e.g. “medical diagnostic apparatus…”. See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01.
Suggested Wording for Identification
Applicant may substitute the following wording, if accurate. Please note that added text is indicated with bold type, deleted text is indicated with a strike through, and suggested text is indicated with braces. Please also note that any suggested changes to goods not discussed above have been offered to provide additional clarification.
“Medical apparatus for {specify particular goods in the class, e.g. “treating congestive heart
failure”}; medical apparatus, particularly to for monitoring fertility and pregnancy; medical diagnostic apparatus,
particularly that tests for pregnancy testing devices” in International Class 10.
Advisories – ID Manual and Scope of Amendments
For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual. See TMEP §1402.04.
RESPONSE GUIDELINES
For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
/Carl A. Konschak/
Carl A. Konschak, Esq.
Examining Attorney
Law Office 126
(571) 270-3878
carl.konschak@uspto.gov
TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application. For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney. E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.
All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.
WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE: It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants). If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response.
PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION: To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/. Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen. If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199. For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.
TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS: Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.