To: | Kelly, Tonicia L. (tonicia@justblackapparel.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88393342 - BLACK - N/A |
Sent: | July 11, 2019 09:47:09 AM |
Sent As: | ecom125@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88393342
Mark: BLACK
|
|
Correspondence Address:
|
|
Applicant: Kelly, Tonicia L.
|
|
Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
|
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: July 11, 2019
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
COMPARISON OF THE MARKS
The literal portion of the applied-for mark is BLACK in stylized lettering.
The literal portions of the registered marks are BLACK (Reg. No. 4116826) with design elements and BLACK (Reg. No. 4757749) in standard characters.
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In this case, the applied-for and registered marks each share the identical wording “BLACK”. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).
The stylized lettering in the applied-for mark and design elements in the registered mark BLACK (Reg. No. 4116826) do not obviate the similarity of the marks. When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
Nor does the stylized lettering in the applied-for mark obviate the similarity between it and the registered mark BLACK (Reg. No. 4757749) because the registered mark is in standard characters. A mark in standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display. See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).
As a result, the marks share the same overall commercial impression.
COMPARISON OF GOODS
The applicant’s goods are identified as “T-shirts; Athletic apparel, namely, shirts, pants, jackets, footwear, hats and caps, athletic uniforms; Athletic shirts; Baby tops; Bathing suits; Beachwear; Blouses; Flip flops; Graphic T-shirts; Hats; Headwear; Hooded pullovers; Hooded sweat shirts; Infant wear; Jackets; Jogging pants; Men's and women's jackets, coats, trousers, vests; Nightwear; Sport coats; Sweat pants; Sweat shirts; Sweat suits; Sweaters; Sweatpants; Sweatshirts; Sweatsuits; Swim wear; Swimsuits; Swimwear; Track suits; Warm up suits; Warm-up suits; Yoga pants; Yoga shirts” in Class 25.
When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
The registrant’s relevant goods for the registered mark BLACK (Reg. No. 4116826) are identified as “Clothing adapted for motorcyclists, namely, motor cycle gloves, motor cycle muffs, motor cycle jackets, motor cycle trousers, braces for use with motor cycle trousers; waterproof clothing adapted for motorcyclists, headgear for use on motorcycles, namely, bandanas, caps, hats, balaclavas, facemasks, necktubes; and footwear for use on motorcycles; parts and fittings for the aforesaid exclusively for motorcycle use” in Class 25.
In this case, the application uses broad wording to describe among its goods jackets, footwear, hats, caps, and trousers, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including registrant’s narrower identifications for jackets, footwear, hats, caps, and trousers adapted for motorcyclists or for use on motorcycles. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.
With regard to the registered mark BLACK (Reg. No. 4757749), the registrant’s relevant goods are identified as “Clothing, namely, tops and bottoms; shirts; caps; pants; footwear; jackets; headwear; gloves” in Class 25.
In this case, the application and registration contain identical goods, namely, shirts, pants, caps, footwear, jackets, and headwear. Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and class of purchasers are the same for these goods. See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 27 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). In addition, the registration uses broad wording to describe among its goods which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including applicant’s narrower identifications for particular types of tops and bottoms, including t-shirts, baby tops, bathing suits, blouses, sweat shirts, jogging pants, coats, trousers, vests, and yoga pants and shirts. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.
In summary, applicant’s and registrants’ marks create the same commercial impression and their respective goods are sufficiently related such that consumers are likely to be confused by the use of similar marks on or in connection with these goods. Accordingly, registration must be refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.
SECTION 2(e)(1) REFUSAL - MERELY DESCRIPTIVE
In this case, applicant has applied for the mark BLACK in connection with its goods identified as “T-shirts; Athletic apparel, namely, shirts, pants, jackets, footwear, hats and caps, athletic uniforms; Athletic shirts; Baby tops; Bathing suits; Beachwear; Blouses; Flip flops; Graphic T-shirts; Hats; Headwear; Hooded pullovers; Hooded sweat shirts; Infant wear; Jackets; Jogging pants; Men's and women's jackets, coats, trousers, vests; Nightwear; Sport coats; Sweat pants; Sweat shirts; Sweat suits; Sweaters; Sweatpants; Sweatshirts; Sweatsuits; Swim wear; Swimsuits; Swimwear; Track suits; Warm up suits; Warm-up suits; Yoga pants; Yoga shirts.”
The attached dictionary evidence shows the wording “BLACK” in the applied-for mark means “[o]f the very darkest colour owing to the absence of or complete absorption of light; the opposite of white.” Moreover, the attached internet evidence from applicant’s website, justblackapparel.com, shows that applicant’s apparel and clothing items are predominately black in color. Thus, the wording “BLACK” in the applied-for mark is merely descriptive of applicant’s apparel and clothing items as being primarily black in color.
The stylized letter of the applied-for mark does not change the overall descriptiveness of the wording “BLACK” in the applied-for mark. Stylized descriptive or generic wording is registrable only if the stylization creates a commercial impression separate and apart from the impression made by the wording itself. See In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594, 606, 118 USPQ2d 1632, 1639-40 (Fed. Cir. 2016); In re Northland Aluminum Prods., Inc., 777 F.2d 1556, 1561, 227 USPQ 961, 964 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1209.03(w). Common and ordinary lettering with minimal stylization, as in this case, is generally not sufficiently striking, unique, or distinctive as to make an impression on purchasers separate from the wording. See In re Sadoru Grp., Ltd., 105 USPQ2d 1484, 1487 (TTAB 2012). In this case, the applied-for mark has only minimal stylization and is thus insufficient to create a separate and distinct commercial impression apart from the descriptive wording.
As a result, registration must be refused under Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act.
RESPONSE GUIDELINES
For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
DOMESTIC PRO SE APPLICANT – COUNSEL SUGGESTED
Because of the legal technicalities and strict deadlines involved in the USPTO application process, applicant may wish to hire a private attorney specializing in trademark matters to represent applicant in this process and provide legal advice. Although the undersigned trademark examining attorney is permitted to help an applicant understand the contents of an Office action as well as the application process in general, no USPTO attorney or staff is permitted to give an applicant legal advice or statements about an applicant’s legal rights. TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.
For attorney referral information, applicant may consult the American Bar Association’s Consumers’ Guide to Legal Help; an online directory of legal professionals, such as FindLaw®; or a local telephone directory. The USPTO, however, may not assist an applicant in the selection of a private attorney. 37 C.F.R. §2.11.
ASSISTANCE
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action
Justin Miller
/Justin Miller/
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 125
(571) 272-6040
justin.miller@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE