To: | Sycamore Brewing, LLC (michael@carolinacraftlegal.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88391260 - LUAU LEMONADE - N/A |
Sent: | January 22, 2020 04:27:34 PM |
Sent As: | ecom127@uspto.gov |
Attachments: |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88391260
Mark: LUAU LEMONADE
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: Sycamore Brewing, LLC
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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FINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: January 22, 2020
This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on December 31, 2019.
In a previous Office action dated July 1, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following: Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark, and Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45 for a failure to show the applied-for mark in use in commerce with any of the specified goods. In addition, applicant was required to satisfy the following requirement: disclaim descriptive wording in the mark.
Based on applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney notes that the aforementioned requirement has been satisfied. See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04.
The following refusal(s) have also been obviated: Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45 for a failure to show the applied-for mark in use in commerce by amended from 1(a) to 1(b) filing status. See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04.
Further, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal in the summary of issues below. See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.
SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Refusal to register is hereby made FINAL because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5219377. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the previously attached registration.
Applicant’s mark is LUAU LEMONADE in standard character form for “Beer; Craft beers” in International Class 32.
Registrant’s mark is LEMONGRASS LUAU in standard character form for “beer” in International Class 32.
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity of the goods, and similarity of trade channels of the goods. See In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Similarity of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Applicant argues that the marks are distinguishable and may coexist for four reasons. First, applicant argues that the marks differ in appearance and commercial impression. Second, applicant argues the marks differ in sound. Third, applicant addresses arguments set forth in the original Office action. Fourth, applicant presents evidence of third party use to argue dilution.
The Marks are Confusingly Similar in Appearance, Commercial Impression, and Sound
In this case, the respective marks share highly similar shared wording, LUAU. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34).
Further, the use of the shared wording LUAU in each mark is accompanied by descriptive wording. The registrant has disclaimed the wording LEMONGRASS from the mark. Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).
In the present case, the previously attached evidence from Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary and Wikipedia shows that the wording LEMONADE in the applied-for mark is merely descriptive of or generic for applicant’s goods. Thus, this wording is less significant in terms of affecting the mark’s commercial impression, and renders the wording LUAU the more dominant element of the mark.
Moreover, marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared
marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub
nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly
similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560
(TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). The term LUAU in applicant’s mark and LUAU in the registration create a similar overall
commercial impression.
In addition, consumers are often known to use shortened forms of names, and it is highly likely that registrant and its mark would be referred to as simply LUAU. Cf. In re Abcor
Development Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 200 USPQ 215, 219 (CCPA 1978) (Rich, J., concurring: “the users of language have a universal habit of shortening full names – from haste or laziness or
just economy of words”).
Further, even if potential purchasers realize the apparent differences between the marks created by the wording LEMONGRASS versus LEMONADE, they could still reasonably assume, due to the overall
similarities in sound, appearance, connotation, and commercial impression in the wording shared by the respective marks, that registrant’s goods sold under the “LEMONGRASS LUAU” mark constitute a new
or additional product line from the same source as the services sold under applicant’s “LUAU LEMONADE” mark, and that registrant’s mark is merely a variation of applicant’s mark. See, e.g., SMS, Inc. v. Byn-Mar Inc., 228 USPQ 219, 220 (TTAB 1985) (applicant’s marks ALSO ANDREA and ANDREA SPORT were “likely to evoke an association by consumers with opposer's
preexisting mark [ANDREA SIMONE] for its established line of clothing.”).
Moreover, the descriptive words at issue here also share a common component, the prefix LEMON. Applicant’s mark uses the term LEMONADE, and the registrant uses the mark LEMONGRASS. In sum, each component word is either highly similar, as is the case with LUAU, or features a common component, that being the prefix LEMON.
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b). Here, the respective marks share multiple components, LUAU and the prefix LEMON, in the field for beer. While the applicant has correctly shown that there are distinctions in the ordering of the words and the descriptive language that was chosen for each mark, on the whole that which makes the marks similar overrides that which makes these marks different. Ultimately, those similarities create a share commercial impression.
Moreover, the goods are legally identical, as discussed forthwith. Where the goods of an applicant and registrant are “similar in kind and/or closely related,” the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as in the case of diverse goods and/or services. In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987); see Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1242, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Applicant also argues that the use of the applied-for mark in commerce will distinguish the application from the registration due to use with the applicant’s house mark, SYCAMORE. The marks are compared as they appear in the drawing of the application and in the registration; the USPTO does not consider how an applicant and registrant actually use their marks in the marketplace. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1186 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1324, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Therefore, applicant’s argument that the house mark would or could cure consumer confusion is not dispositive.
Dilution is Not at Issue
The weakness or dilution of a particular mark is generally determined in the context of the number and nature of similar marks in use in the marketplace in connection with similar goods. See Nat’l Cable Tel. Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1579-80, 19 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973). Evidence of widespread third-party use of similar marks with similar goods “is relevant to show that a mark is relatively weak and entitled to only a narrow scope of protection” in that particular industry or field. Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1373-74, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1693 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see In re Coors Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 1345, 68 USPQ2d 1059, 1062-63 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
However, evidence comprising only a small number of third-party registrations for similar marks with similar goods, as in the present case, is generally entitled to little weight in determining the strength of a mark. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1328-29, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1751-52 (Fed. Cir. 2017); AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Products, Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973). These few registrations are “not evidence of what happens in the market place or that customers are familiar with them.” AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d at 1406, 177 USPQ at 269; In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1735 (TTAB 2018). Thus, the few similar third-party registrations submitted by applicant are insufficient to establish that the wording LUAU is weak or diluted.
As previously argued, the respective marks at issue here are the only marks for beer that feature the word LUAU and descriptive language. The word LEMONADE is descriptive of an ingredient for the beer just as LEMONGRASS is descriptive for the registrant’s beer. This places is additional burden on the word LUAU to establish a registrable commercial impression, and renders the marks at issue here confusingly similar.
Applicant has also submitted a website excerpt purporting to establish that LUAU is commonly used and therefore diluted for goods beyond the Principal Register. Applicant’s internet materials have not been properly made of record and are objected to. Although applicant has discussed the contents of webpages as evidence against the refusal, applicant provided only their web addresses and an image, which is not sufficient to introduce the underlying webpages into the record. In re Olin, 124 USPQ2d 1327, 1331 n.15 (TTAB 2017) (citing In re Powermat Inc., 105 USPQ2d 1789, 1791 (TTAB 2013); In re HSB Solomon Assocs., LLC, 102 USPQ2d 1269, 1274 (TTAB 2012)); TBMP §1208.03; TMEP §710.01(b).
To properly introduce Internet evidence into the record, an applicant must provide (1) an image file or printout of the downloaded webpage, (2) the date the evidence was downloaded or accessed, and (3) the complete URL address of the webpage. See In re I-Coat Co., LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1733 (TTAB 2018); TBMP §1208.03; TMEP §710.01(b). Accordingly, the underlying webpages associated with the web addresses and/or links will not be considered.
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar
Comparison of the Goods
Applicant has not addressed the relatedness of the goods, and they are no longer in dispute in this case.
In this case, the registration uses broad wording to describe beer, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including applicant’s more narrow “beers; craft beers.” See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.
Conclusion
In this case, the respective marks feature highly similar shared wording. Registration must be refused because applicant’s mark cannot coexist because of the highly similar shared wording, the similar nature of the descriptive additional wording, and the legally identical goods. Therefore, a consumer familiar with registrant’s mark LEMONGRASS LUAU, used on beer, upon encountering the mark LUAU LEMONADE on beer and craft beers, would be likely to mistakenly believe that the goods emanate from a common source.
In view of the foregoing, the refusal to register under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is continued and made final.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a request for reconsideration of this final Office action that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals and/or click to file a timely appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) with the required filing fee(s).
/Joseph P. McCarthy/
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 127
Phone: (571) 272-0458
joseph.mccarthy@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE