Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  May 18, 2020

 

INTRODUCTION

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on April 14, 2020.

 

In a previous Office action dated January 27, 2020, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:  Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark, and Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1) for being merely descriptive. 

 

The trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL these refusals in the summary of issues below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

 

• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
• Partial Section 2(e)(1) Refusal – Merely Descriptive

 

 

SECTION 2(D) REFUSAL - LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the following mark:

 

U.S. Registration No. 5790506 (“TOUCHVUE” for “computer monitors” in class 9.) 

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the previously attached registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

 

In the present case, the applicant’s mark is TOUCHVIEW in standard characters and the mark in the registration is TOUCHVUE.   Applicant argues that these marks are sufficiently different in appearance as to avoid confusion.  However, the marks are essentially phonetic equivalents and thus sound similar.  Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).

 

Therefore, the marks are considered similar for likelihood of confusion purposes.

 

            Relatedness of the Goods

 

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

In this case, the applicant’s goods are various display panels, touch screen displays, and associated circuitry.  The registrant’s goods are “computer monitors.”  These goods are highly related, as computer monitors generally consist of display panels and associated circuitry, as the previously attached evidence from Dell, Samsung, and Microsoft indicates.  This same Internet evidence, consisting of screenshots from Dell, Samsung, and Microsoft, further establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures/produces/provides the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark, through the same trade channels and that these are used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use and are similar or complementary in terms of purpose or function.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

Therefore, the goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.

 

            Applicant’s Arguments

 

Applicant compares the instant registration upon which refusal is based to another which was originally the basis for a refusal:

 

Notably, in its Response to the Non-Final Office Action filed Nov. 20, 2019, Applicant overcame a likelihood of confusion rejection based on registration no. 5116597. This previously cited registration was for the mark TOUCHVUE for software in international class 09, the identical mark, goods and class of the registration now being cited in support of refusal. (emphasis in original)

And:

 

The weakness of Registrant's mark is particularly apparent in view of previously cited third-party registration no. 5116597 for "TOUCHVUE" in international class 09 for use in connection with "human machine interface (HMI) software and remote control software." Previously cited registration no. 5116597 registered on January 10, 2017. The now-cited Registration for TOUCHVUE is identical to the mark that is the subject of registration no. 5116597 and both marks are registered in internal class 009 for software. (emphasis in original)

 

 

The examining attorney notes that the registration now being cited, 5790506, has been cited for its recitation of computer monitors, and computer monitors are not among the goods listed in registration no. 5116597, which only lists software.  Thus, it is not correct to characterize the 5790506 registration and 5116597 registration as being for “the identical . . . goods.”  They are not.

 

Applicant further argues that the registered mark is diluted, based on a listing of third-party registrations provided by applicant.   Applicant has submitted a list of third-party registrations.  However, the mere submission of a list of registrations or a copy of a private company search report does not make such registrations part of the record.  See In re Peace Love World Live, LLC, 127 USPQ2d 1400, 1405 n.17 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1583 (TTAB 2007); In re Duofold Inc., 184 USPQ 638, 640 (TTAB 1974)); TBMP §1208.02; TMEP §710.03.

 

To make third party registrations part of the record, an applicant must submit copies of the registrations, or the complete electronic equivalent from the USPTO’s automated systems, prior to appeal.  In re Star Belly Stitcher, Inc., 107 USPQ2d 2059, 2064 (TTAB 2013); TBMP §1208.02; TMEP §710.03.  Accordingly, these registrations will not be considered.

 

Applicant further argues that the goods in the registration are really software as part of a suite of goods that registrant uses in the field of medical care, and that this is to be contrasted with applicant’s hardware goods:

 

The Registrant's goods are, in part, for medical software, and more specifically, highly sophisticated medical imaging software for displaying ultrasound imaging. As explained by Registrant in its advertising of the goods sold in connection with the cited registration, "TouchVue is an easier, more intuitive method of volume 3D volume manipulation than found on traditional ultrasounds." Exhibit C. Moreover, it is evident from Registrant's advertising that the TouchVue software operates in conjunction with several other products sold by Registrant, including "TrueVue" and "GlassVue" and the "EPIQ touch panel."

 

In contrast, Applicant' s goods are hardware alone and as previously explained, software cannot be purchased from Applicant. Moreover, Applicant's goods are not used for medical diagnostics. Applicant's goods are instead interactive displays and panels that are used for annotation, writing, and drawing in a similar manner to how a physical whiteboard might be used. Applicant's goods are advertised to companies, schools and academic institutions as classroom/visual aids.

 

However, determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

 

Additionally, the goods (registrant’s computer monitors and applicant’s similar hardware goods – this refusal does not draw upon the software in the registration) of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.

 

Considering all of the above, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is maintained and hereby made FINAL.

 

Applicant should also take note of the following refusal:

 

SECTION 2(e)(1) REFUSAL – MERELY DESCRIPTIVE

 

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark merely describes a feature or function of applicant’s goods.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); see TMEP §§1209.01(b), 1209.03 et seq.

 

The determination of whether a mark is merely descriptive is made in relation to an applicant’s goods and/or services, not in the abstract.  DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1254, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1757 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re The Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §1209.01(b).  “Whether consumers could guess what the product [or service] is from consideration of the mark alone is not the test.”  In re Am. Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985).

 

A mark is merely descriptive if “it immediately conveys information concerning a feature, quality, or characteristic of [an applicant’s] goods or services.”  In re N.C. Lottery, 866 F.3d 1363, 1367, 123 USPQ2d 1707, 1709 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 488 F.3d 960, 963, 82 USPQ2d 1828, 1831 (Fed. Cir. 2007)); TMEP §1209.01(b); see DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1251, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1755 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 814, 200 USPQ 215, 218 (C.C.P.A. 1978)). 

 

In this case, applicant’s mark “TOUCHVIEW” immediately conveys information concerning a feature or characteristic of applicant’s goods.  Applicant’s various screen displays are of course meant to be viewed as that is their purpose.  Applicant’s displays are also intended to be “touched”, as is clear from applicant’s goods, which include “interactive touch screen displays.”  Hence, both “touch” and “view” describe a feature of applicant’s goods as is demonstrated by applicant’s own description of those goods (e.g., “interactive touch screen displays”).

 

It is noted that applicant’s mark, “TOUCHVIEW,” is a compounding of the words “touch” and “view.”  Generally, if the individual components of a mark retain their descriptive meaning in relation to the goods and/or services, the combination results in a composite mark that is itself descriptive and not registrable.  In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1516 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Tower Tech, Inc., 64 USPQ2d 1314, 1317-18 (TTAB (2002)); TMEP §1209.03(d); see, e.g., Apollo Med. Extrusion Techs., Inc. v. Med. Extrusion Techs., Inc., 123 USPQ2d 1844, 1851 (TTAB 2017) (holding MEDICAL EXTRUSION TECHNOLOGIES merely descriptive of medical extrusion goods produced by employing medical extrusion technologies); In re Cannon Safe, Inc., 116 USPQ2d 1348, 1351 (TTAB 2015) (holding SMART SERIES merely descriptive of metal gun safes); In re King Koil Licensing Co., 79 USPQ2d 1048, 1052 (TTAB 2006) (holding THE BREATHABLE MATTRESS merely descriptive of beds, mattresses, box springs, and pillows). 

 

Only where the combination of descriptive terms creates a unitary mark with a unique, incongruous, or otherwise nondescriptive meaning in relation to the goods and/or services is the combined mark registrable.  See In re Colonial Stores, Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 551, 157 USPQ 382, 384 (C.C.P.A. 1968); In re Positec Grp. Ltd., 108 USPQ2d 1161, 1162-63 (TTAB 2013).

 

In this case, both the individual components and the composite result are descriptive of applicant’s goods and/or services and do not create a unique, incongruous, or nondescriptive meaning in relation to the goods and/or services.  Specifically, TOUCHVIEW is simply a compounding of “touch” and “view”, and immediately conveys to consumers that the goods are to be both seen and touched, as is clear from the wording in the identification of goods in class 9.

 

Moreover, the previously attached evidence, consisting of screenshots of Guide to Trinity Music Workstation, Back Stage, and Scandvik (as available on Amazon.com), demonstrates that it is quite common for interactive screens or displays having a touch feature (which presumably includes various modules and circuitry to that end) to be referred to as “Touch View” displays or screens. 

 

Considering all of the above, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1) is maintained and hereby made FINAL.

 

Advisory – Supplemental Register

 

Although an amendment to the Supplemental Register would normally be an appropriate response to this refusal, such a response is not appropriate in the present case.  The instant application was filed under Trademark Act Section 1(b) and is not eligible for registration on the Supplemental Register until an acceptable amendment to allege use meeting the requirements of 37 C.F.R. §2.76 has been timely filed.  37 C.F.R. §2.47(d); TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03.

 

If applicant files an acceptable allegation of use and also amends to the Supplemental Register, the application effective filing date will be the date applicant met the minimum filing requirements under 37 C.F.R. §2.76(c) for an amendment to allege use.  TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03; see 37 C.F.R. §2.75(b).  In addition, the undersigned trademark examining attorney will conduct a new search of the USPTO records for conflicting marks based on the later application filing date.  TMEP §§206.01, 1102.03.

 

            Applicant’s Arguments

 

Applicant had not provided any, but indicates that “upon overcoming all other reasons for refusal, Applicant will submit an allegation of use and amend to the Supplemental Register.”

 

For at least the foregoing reasons, the Section 2(e)(1) refusal is maintained and made FINAL.

 

How to respond.  Click to file a request for reconsideration of this final Office action that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals and/or click to file a timely appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) with the required filing fee(s).

 

 

/James Prizant/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 128

(571) 270-3068

James.Prizant@USPTO.GOV

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on May 18, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88390003

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/James Prizant/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 128

(571) 270-3068

James.Prizant@USPTO.GOV

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from May 18, 2020, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”