To: | Encore Repair Services, LLC (NashvilleIPDocketing@bradley.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88385696 - CRISP - 216534401001 |
Sent: | January 15, 2020 12:17:45 PM |
Sent As: | ecom108@uspto.gov |
Attachments: |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88385696
Mark: CRISP
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Correspondence Address: BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS, LLP 1600 DIVISION STREET, SUITE 700
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Applicant: Encore Repair Services, LLC
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Reference/Docket No. 216534401001
Correspondence Email Address: |
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FINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: January 15, 2020
This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on December 3, 2019.
In a previous Office action dated June 26, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following: Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark. The trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes this refusal FINAL. See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04. This is the only outstanding refusal or requirement against the application.
TRADEMARK ACT SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4698553. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the copy of the registration attached to the previous Office action.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Registrant’s mark is “CRISP AUDIO AND VIDEO” in standard characters.
Applicant’s applied-for mark is “CRISP” in standard characters.
Overall “‘commercial impression’ is occasionally used as a proxy for the ultimate conclusion of similarity or dissimilarity of marks resulting from a comparison of their appearance, sound, and meaning.” Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding the marks VEUVE ROYALE and VEUVE CLICQUOT PONSARDIN confusingly similar); see also Money Station Inc. v. Cash Station Inc., 70 F.3d 1290, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d 1150, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that MONEY STATION and CASH STATION are confusingly similar as applied to the services specified in its application). Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34).
As a primary matter, the marks are confusingly similar because they share a nearly identical dominant element. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). Here, the marks share the word “CRISP”. This supports a finding of confusing similarity. Applicant argues that the word “crisp” has a connotation of a “flawless, like-new touchscreen”. See applicant’s response, p.4. The examining attorney disagrees that there is a difference in commercial impression here, particularly as registrant’s services also include maintenance of items with screens, such as televisions. Regardless of what the commercial impression of “CRISP” is, applicant’s and registrant’s marks both have this impression due to the use of this same word in each of their respective marks.
Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Here, registrant has disclaimed the wording “AUDIO AND VIDEO”. This supports the determination that CRISP is the dominant element of registrant’s mark and supports the determination that the marks are confusingly similar.
Therefore, as the marks share nearly identical dominant elements and because overall, the marks have a highly similar commercial impression, the marks are highly similar in the context of the likelihood of confusion analysis.
Comparison of the Services
Applicant’s services are identified as “installation, maintenance and repair of cell phone related hardware; repair of smart phones, cellular phones, tablets, and smart watches; maintenance and/or repair of smart phones, cellular phones, tablets, and smart watches”.
The Internet evidence attached to the June 26, 2019 Office action, consisting of screenshots from bestbuy.com, dish.com, and puls.com, establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant services and markets the services under the same mark. Specifically, the same parties offer repair of smartphones and tablets as well as installations and maintenance of televisions and home theaters.
Applicant argues that the evidence does not show that the services are related because those brands also offer unrelated services. See applicant’s response, p. 4, citing Hi-Country Foods Corporation vs. Hi Country Beef Jerky 4 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1169 (TTAB 1987). The examining attorney disagrees with this assessment. These brands offer specified repair and maintenance services for personal and home electronics as well as other related home repair services. This can be distinguished from Hi-Country Foods where the Board found that the beef jerky and fruit juices were not related simply because they are sold in grocery stores. Here, the channels of trade are more narrow. As the evidence shows, repair of smart phone and maintenance of personal electronics are commonly offered by the same parties.
Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
Trademark Act Section 2(d) Refusal – Conclusion
The marks are similar in sound and appearance, and the goods and/or services are highly related. It is likely that a consumer could mistakenly believe applicant’s services are offered by registrant or vice versa. For these reasons, as detailed supra, registration is refused pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act. THIS REFUSAL IS MADE FINAL.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) Refusal – Response Options
ASSISTANCE
Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action. Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06. Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a request for reconsideration of this final Office action that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals and/or click to file a timely appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) with the required filing fee(s).
/Laura Fionda/
Laura E. Fionda
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 108
Phone: 571-272-7897
Email: laura.fionda@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE