UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.  A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.

 

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 6/21/2019

 

 

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

·        SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

• SECTION 2(e)(2) REFUSAL – PRIMARILY GEOGRAPHICALLY DESCRIPTIVE
• REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
• DISCLAIMER REQUIRED

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4226102.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations.

 

The applicant has applied for the standard character mark PATAGONIA PROVISIONS for goods identified as “beer.”

 

Registration No. 4226102 is for the standard character mark PATAGONIA for goods identified as “beer.”

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

COMPARISON OF MARKS

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The applied-for mark is similar in sound, appearance and meaning to the registered mark because it includes the entirety of the registered mark and merely adds wording the registered mark.  Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).

 

Adding a term to a registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER and design confusingly similar); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1269 (TTAB 2009) (finding TITAN and VANTAGE TITAN confusingly similar); In re El Torito Rests., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002, 2004 (TTAB 1988) (finding MACHO and MACHO COMBOS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part.

 

Indeed, the applied-for mark entirely incorporates the registered mark.  Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part.

 

Consumers would retain a similar overall commercial impression between the respective marks because of the very similar wording PATAGONIA in the respective marks and the additional matter PROVISIONS is not sufficient to overcome the overall similarity in commercial impression created by the marks. 

 

Thus the applied for mark is similar to the registered mark.

 

COMPARISON OF GOODS

 

When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods and/or services in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

In this case, the goods in the application and registration are identical.  Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and class(es) of purchasers are the same for these goods.  See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 27 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.  

 

Thus as the applicant’s mark is similar to the registrant’s mark, and as the goods are related, there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source of the applicant’s goods.  The applied for mark is thus not entitled to registration under Section 2(d).

 

SECTION 2(e)(2) REFUSAL – PRIMARILY GEOGRAPHICALLY DESCRIPTIVE

 

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark is primarily geographically descriptive of the origin of applicant’s goods and/or services.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(2), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(2); see TMEP §§1210, 1210.01(a).

 

Applicant’s mark is “PATAGONIA PROVISIONS” in standard characters for goods identified as “beer.”

 

A mark is primarily geographically descriptive when the following is demonstrated:

 

(1) The primary significance of the mark is a generally known geographic place or location;

 

(2) The goods and/or services for which applicant seeks registration originate in the geographic place identified in the mark; and

 

(3) Purchasers would be likely to make a goods-place or services-place association; that is, purchasers would be likely to believe that the goods and/or services originate in the geographic place identified in the mark.

 

TMEP §1210.01(a); see In re Societe Generale des Eaux Minerales de Vittel S.A., 824 F.2d 957, 959, 3 USPQ2d 1450, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re Hollywood Lawyers Online, 110 USPQ2d 1852, 1853 (TTAB 2014).

 

In this case, the primary significance of the applied-for mark PATAGONIA PROVISIONS is that of the geographic area of Patagonia.  Patagonia is defined as:  region of South America in southern Argentina and southern Chile, a barren tableland between the Andes Mountains and the Atlantic Ocean south of about 40° south latitude and sometimes considered to include Tierra del Fuego.  See attached definition from Merriam-Webster as well as information from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patagonia. 

 

The additional matter PROVISIONS does not overcome the primary significance of the applied-for mark from being that of the geographic origin of the applicant’s goods.  Adding matter to a geographic term does not necessarily diminish its primary geographic significance.  See In re Wada, 194 F.3d 1297, 1300, 52 USPQ2d 1539, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re S. Park Cigar, Inc., 82 USPQ2d 1507, 1513 (TTAB 2007).  In some cases, additional matter may even serve to enhance the geographic significance.  See In re Premiere Distillery, LLC, 103 USPQ2d 1483, 1485 (TTAB 2012) (holding REAL RUSSIAN primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive of vodka); In re Bacardi & Co., 48 USPQ2d 1031, 1034 (TTAB 1997) (holding HAVANA SELECT, HABANA CLASICO, OLD HAVANA, HAVANA PRIMO, and HAVANA CLIPPER primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive of rum and other alcoholic products).

 

Thus, it has been demonstrated that the primary significance of the applied-for mark is a generally known geographic place. 

 

Goods are considered to originate from a geographic location when the record shows that the goods are sold there, manufactured or produced there, packaged and shipped from there, and/or contain a main ingredient or component derived from there.  See In re Jacques Bernier Inc., 894 F.2d 389, 391-92, 13 USPQ2d 1725, 1727 (Fed. Cir. 1990), opposition sustained sub nom. Fred Hayman Beverly Hills, Inc. v. Jacques Bernier Inc., 38 USPQ2d 1691 (TTAB 1996) (holding applicant’s perfume did not originate from RODEO DRIVE because, although goods did not have to be manufactured or produced at the geographic site and could “be sold there” to originate from the geographic location, there was insufficient evidence to show that perfume was sold on RODEO DRIVE); In re Joint-Stock Co. “Baik,” 80 USPQ2d 1305, 1310 (TTAB 2006) (holding applicant’s vodka originated from BAIKALSKAYA, a Russian word meaning “from Baikal,” because it was made from the water of Lake Baikal and applicant produced various vodkas from a location near Lake Baikal); In re JT Tobacconists, 59 USPQ2d 1080, 1083 (TTAB 2001) (holding applicant’s cigars, cigar cases, and humidors originated from MINNESOTA because they were packaged and shipped from MINNESOTA, and applicant’s business was located in MINNESOTA); In re Nantucket Allserve Inc., 28 USPQ2d 1144, 1145-46 (TTAB 1993) (holding applicant’s beverages originated from NANTUCKET because labels for applicant’s goods suggested a connection with NANTUCKET, additional evidence suggested that some ingredients came from NANTUCKET and that applicant’s goods were sold at applicant’s store located in NANTUCKET, and applicant’s corporate headquarters and research and development center were located in NANTUCKET); TMEP §1210.03.

 

In the present case, given that Patagonia is a generally known geographic location it is reasonable to presume that the goods for which applicant seeks registration originate in the geographic place identified in the mark.  Although the record is silent on this issue, applicant should note the request for information below regarding this part of the analysis.  Thus, based on this presumption, it has been demonstrated that the goods for which applicant seeks registration originate in the geographic place named in the applied-for mark.

 

When there is no genuine issue that the geographical significance of a term is its primary significance, and the geographical place is neither obscure nor remote, a public association of the goods with the place is presumed if an applicant’s goods originate in the place named in the mark.  TMEP §1210.04; see, e.g., In re Cal. Pizza Kitchen Inc., 10 USPQ2d 1704, 1706 (TTAB 1988) (holding CALIFORNIA PIZZA KITCHEN primarily geographically descriptive of restaurant services rendered in California); In re Handler Fenton Ws., Inc., 214 USPQ 848, 849-50 (TTAB 1982) (holding DENVER WESTERNS primarily geographically descriptive of western-style shirts originating in Denver). 

 

In the present case, Patagonia is neither obscure nor remote.  Given that it is reasonable to assume the goods originate in the place named in the applied-for mark, a public association of the goods has been established.  Therefore, it has been demonstrated that purchasers would be likely to make a goods-place association; that is purchasers would be likely to believe that the goods originate in the geographic place identified in the mark.

 

Thus the applied-for mark is primarily geographically descriptive, and registration is refused under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(2) because the applied-for mark is primarily geographically descriptive of the origin of applicant's goods. 

 

Although applicant's mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

ADVISORY – SUPPLEMENTAL REGISTER NOT YET AVAILABLE

 

Although an amendment to the Supplemental Register would normally be an appropriate response to the Section 2(e)(2) primarily geographically descriptive refusal(s), such a response is not appropriate in the present case.  The instant application was filed under Trademark Act Section 1(b) and is not eligible for registration on the Supplemental Register until an acceptable amendment to allege use meeting the requirements of 37 C.F.R. §2.76 has been timely filed.  37 C.F.R. §2.47(d); TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03.

 

If applicant files an acceptable allegation of use and also amends to the Supplemental Register, the application effective filing date will be the date applicant met the minimum filing requirements under 37 C.F.R. §2.76(c) for an amendment to allege use.  TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03; see 37 C.F.R. §2.75(b).  In addition, the undersigned trademark examining attorney will conduct a new search of the USPTO records for conflicting marks based on the later application filing date.  TMEP §§206.01, 1102.03.

 

An amendment to allege use may be filed online via the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  Filing an amendment to allege use is not considered a response to an Office action.  37 C.F.R. §2.76(h); TMEP §1104.  An applicant must file a separate response to any outstanding Office action.  TMEP §1104; see 37 C.F.R. §2.76(h).

 

If applicant responds to the refusal(s), applicant must also respond to the requirement(s) set forth below.

 

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

 

To permit proper examination of the application, applicant must submit additional information about applicant’s goods and/or services.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §§814, 1402.01(e).  Applicant must directly answer the following questions or provide the necessary information or explanation requested.  In order for the examining attorney to discern the answers to these questions, applicant should answer the questions in sequential order in a clear and concise manner. 

 

1. Applicant must provide a written statement specifying where the goods will come from or will originate.
2. Applicant must provide a written statement explaining whether the goods will be manufactured, packaged, shipped from, sold in or will have any other connection with the geographic location named in the mark. 

 

Please note that failure to comply with a request pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b) is an independent bases for refusal and may result in the refusal of the entire application.  In re Harley, 119 USPQ2d 1755, 1757-58 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §814.  Merely stating that information about the goods or services is available on applicant’s website is an insufficient response and will not make the relevant information of record.  See In re Planalytics, Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1453, 1457-58 (TTAB 2004).

 

Please note that the same type of notice and explanation should be given when requesting any information from an applicant, e.g., promotional materials, patent applications, etc.  Moreover, the examining attorney should repeatedly warn applicant of the consequences for failing to comply with the request for information pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b) in any subsequent action.  The use of the notice, explanation, and repeated warning should ensure that your information request will receive strict enforcement by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.

 

If applicant makes a good faith attempt to directly respond to the information request, the examining attorney should not make the requirement final.  If applicant argues that the request is not reasonably necessary, the examining attorney may make the request for information final, assuming that the request for information clearly aids in the examining attorney in the examination of the application.

 

DISCLAIMER REQUIRED

 

Applicant must provide a disclaimer of the unregistrable part(s) of the applied-for mark even though the mark as a whole appears to be registrable.  See 15 U.S.C. §1056(a); TMEP §§1213, 1213.03(a).  A disclaimer of an unregistrable part of a mark will not affect the mark’s appearance.  See Schwarzkopf v. John H. Breck, Inc., 340 F.2d 978, 979-80, 144 USPQ 433, 433 (C.C.P.A. 1965).

 

In this case, applicant must disclaim the word “PROVISIONS” because it is not inherently distinctive.  These unregistrable term(s) at best are merely descriptive of an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of applicant’s goods.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1251, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1755 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §§1213, 1213.03(a). 

 

The attached evidence from Lexico.com and Vocabulary.com shows that PROVISIONS means “Supplies of food, drink, or equipment, especially for a journey.”  See attached evidence from Lexico.com and Vocabulary.com stating “[i]f you are going camping, you want to be sure to pack some provisions, meaning food and drink or any other necessary supplies.”  Additionally, the attached evidence from http://jumping-off-point.business.site/, http://www.thekalalochlodge.com/dine-and-shop/shop/camping-supplies, http://lakeofthewoodsresort.com/general-store/ and http://corinnesheltren.com/twinlakes/general-store-gift-shop/ shows that it is very common for entities that provide beer to refer to them under the broader category of PROVISIONS.   Thus this wording merely describes that the applicant’s goods are in the nature of supplies of drink.

 

Applicant may respond to this issue by submitting a disclaimer in the following format: 

 

No claim is made to the exclusive right to use “PROVISIONS” apart from the mark as shown. 

 

For an overview of disclaimers and instructions on how to satisfy this issue using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), see the Disclaimer webpage. 

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action.  For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above.  For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements.  Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

 

/Natalie L. Kenealy/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 104

571-272-7817

Natalie.Kenealy@uspto.gov

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 6/21/2019 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 88378542

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed.  The trademark examining attorney assigned by the USPTO to your application has written an official letter to which you must respond.  Please follow these steps:

 

(1)  Read the LETTER by clicking on this link or going to http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/, entering your U.S. application serial number, and clicking on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification. 

 

(2)  Respond within 6 months (or sooner if specified in the Office action), calculated from 6/21/2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) response form located at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  A response transmitted through TEAS must be received before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise e-mail your response because the USPTO does NOT accept e-mails as responses to Office actions. 

 

(3)  Questions about the contents of the Office action itself should be directed to the trademark examining attorney who reviewed your application, identified below. 

 

/Natalie L. Kenealy/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 104

571-272-7817

Natalie.Kenealy@uspto.gov

 

WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable response deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.  For more information regarding abandonment, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/basics/abandon.jsp. 

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.