Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  December 20, 2019

 

INTRODUCTION

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on November 27, 2019.

 

In a previous Office action dated June 03, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:  Sections 1, 2, and 45 Refusal for Varietal Designation, Information Required Regarding Applied-For Mark, and Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark. 

 

The following refusal has been obviated:  Sections 1, 2, and 45 Refusal for Varietal Designation and the requirement for more information about the mark.  See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04. 

 

Further, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal in the summary of issues below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:

• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No(s). 1760963.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).

 

The applicant has applied to register the mark GAUCHO for “agricultural seeds, namely, grass seed” in class 031. The registrant owns the mark GAUCHO for “insecticidal seed dressings for agricultural use” in class 005.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

A.     Similarity of Marks

 

As noted in the Office action dated June 03, 2019, marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In the initial Office action, Examiner noted that the marks, being GAUCHO and GAUCHO, were identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Additionally, the examiner noted that, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods.  Id.

 

In its response, applicant does not dispute that the marks in question are identical.

Therefore, based on the fact that that these terms are identical, these marks are confusingly similar.

 

2. Relatedness of Goods

 

The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

In the present case, applicant’s mark is for “agricultural seed, namely, grass seed”. Registrant’s mark is for “insecticidal seed dressings for agricultural use”.

 

In its response, applicant asserts that the goods are not the same, noting accurately that the goods are listed in different classes.  Additionally, applicant states that the registrant’s insecticides are regulated by the environmental protection agency and cannot be used with the applicant’s Bermuda grass seeds.  Applicant then claims that because the registrant’s goods cannot be used with Bermuda grass or any other grass that the channels of trade are not related.  See applicant’s response.

 

The examiner agrees with the applicant that the goods are not the same, and are not classified in the same International Class. However, requiring that goods be identical is not the applicable standard in this comparison. As was noted in the initial office action, the compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

The likelihood of confusion is not that the consumer would be confused about the good, but rather the source the good.  Therefore, applicant’s contention that the registrant’s goods cannot be used on applicant’s goods is not convincing, because the ability to use goods together is not the indicator of relatedness nor is it indicative of common source. There are plenty of goods from different sources, for instance tractors and plant seeds, which can be used together but consumers would not anticipate that they would come from the same source; and there are plenty of goods from the same sources that cannot be used together. In this case, the numerous examples from the initial office action demonstrate that grass seed and insecticides or seed dressings are often produced by the same entity and thus emanate from the same entity. Furthermore, the applicant’s current Identification of Goods is broadly written as “Agricultural seeds, namely, grass seed.”  See applicant’s Identification of Goods.  Even, assuming arguendo, that the applicant’s goods were in fact only Bermuda grass seeds, and that the registrant’s goods could not be used on Bermuda grass, the applicant’s current Identification of Goods is not reflective of this potential limitation.  As currently worded, the applicant is applying for all types and varieties of grass seed.  This presumably encompasses all types of grass seeds.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).    Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

Additionally, the applicant’s goods have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are related, because the applicant’s applied-for goods are presumed to encompass all types of grass seeds. Therefore, consumers are likely to be confused as to the origin of the source of these related goods.

 

Additionally, the fact that the Office classifies the goods in different classes does not establish that the goods and services are unrelated under Trademark Act Section 2(d).  See TMEP §1207.01(d)(v).  The determination concerning the proper classification of goods is a purely administrative determination unrelated to the determination of likelihood of confusion.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Jean Patou, Inc. v. Theon, Inc., 9 F.3d 971, 975, 29 USPQ2d 1771, 1774 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).  Thus, the fact that the goods in this comparison are classified in different International Classes does not obviate the likelihood of confusion between the goods.

 

Applicant then cites In re Giocanni Food Co., 97 U.S.P.Q 2d 1990 (T.T.A.B 2011), to assert that examples of some companies providing both of the goods or services is not sufficient and that there must be “something more.”  See applicant’s response. The examiner finds this argument unpersuasive as the cited case compared “catering services” and “barbeque sauce” which are much more loosely related than the present case involving two types of goods both used in gardening and farming. 

 

Moreover, the examiner notes that, generally, the greater degree of similarity between the applied-for mark and the registered mark, the lesser the degree of similarity between the goods and/or services of the parties is required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.  In re C.H. Hanson Co., 116 USPQ2d 1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001)); In re Thor Tech, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1636 (TTAB 2009). 

 

The attached Internet evidence, consisting of screenshots from MIRACLE-GRO, further supports the evidence provided in the previous office action establishing that the same entities that commonly manufactures insecticides and seed treatments also commonly produce seeds and market those goods under the same mark. Additionally, while the applicant asserts that the cited insecticide cannot be used on or with the applicant’s seeds, the additional evidence from DOMYOWN.COM and OUTSIDEPRIDE.COM establish that pesticides and insecticides are commonly used on or with Bermuda grass, and, thus the types of goods are in fact similar or complementary in terms of purpose or function.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

C.     Conclusion

 

In view of the foregoing, based on the relatedness of the concerned goods and the similarity of the marks used thereon, upon encountering GAUCHO for Bermuda grass seeds, and GAUCHO for insecticidal seed dressings, consumers are likely to be confused and mistakenly believe that the respective goods emanate from a common source or are connected in some way. Accordingly, the applied-for mark is found to be confusingly similar to the registered marks and registration of the refusal pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is continued and made final.

 

PROPER RESPONSE TO A FINAL ACTION

 

If applicant does not respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action, the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond to this final Office action by:

 

(1)  Submitting a response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements, if feasible; and/or

 

(2)  Filing an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with an appeal fee of $100 per class.

 

37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(18), 2.64(a); TBMP ch. 1200; TMEP §714.04.

 

In certain rare circumstances, a petition to the Director may be filed pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review a final Office action that is limited to procedural issues.  37 C.F.R. §2.64(a); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters).  The petition fee is $100.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

How to respond.  Click to file a request for reconsideration of this final Office action that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals and/or click to file a timely appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) with the required filing fee(s).

 

 

/Flebbe, Kevin/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 110

United States Patent and Trademark Office

(571)-272-2423

kevin.flebbe@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

oneUnited States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on December 20, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88377451

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Flebbe, Kevin/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 110

United States Patent and Trademark Office

(571)-272-2423

kevin.flebbe@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from December 20, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”