Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  November 13, 2019

 

 

INTRODUCTION

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on September 26, 2019.

 

The trademark examining attorney notes that the following requirements have been satisfied and entered into the record: Amended Mark Description; Request for Information.  See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04. 

 

The requirement for Refusal – Merely Descriptive is now made FINAL for the reasons set forth below.  37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES APPLICANT MUST ADDRESS:

• Section 2(e)(1) Final Refusal – Merely Descriptive

 

 

SECTION 2(e)(1) FINAL REFUSAL – MERELY DESCRIPTIVE

 

In the Office Action dated June 18, 2019, (“Office Action”), registration of the applied-for mark SMARTBOX was refused under Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act for being merely descriptive. 

 

More specifically, applicant seeks registration of “SMARTBOX” for “digital taxi top advertising display units.”  The applicant’s display units are pieces of equipment, or “boxes,” with “smart” capabilities.  A “BOX” is “a usually self-contained piece of electronic equipment.” Third parties commonly provide smart devices in the nature of boxes such as Novisign’s “TV Signage Player” and Sungale’s Digital Signage System.  See Internet evidence attached to the Office Action.  A “smart” device is one “operating by automation” or by “using a built-in microprocessor for automatic operation, for processing data, or for achieving greater versatility.”  See dictionary definitions attached to the Office Action.

 

Generally, if the individual components of a mark retain their descriptive meaning in relation to the goods and/or services, the combination results in a composite mark that is itself descriptive and not registrable.  In re Phoseon Tech., Inc., 103 USPQ2d 1822, 1823 (TTAB 2012); TMEP §1209.03(d); see, e.g., In re King Koil Licensing Co., 79 USPQ2d 1048, 1052 (TTAB 2006) (holding THE BREATHABLE MATTRESS merely descriptive of beds, mattresses, box springs, and pillows where the evidence showed that the term “BREATHABLE” retained its ordinary dictionary meaning when combined with the term “MATTRESS” and the resulting combination was used in the relevant industry in a descriptive sense).  Only where the combination of descriptive terms creates a unitary mark with a unique, incongruous, or otherwise nondescriptive meaning in relation to the goods and/or services is the combined mark registrable. See In re Colonial Stores, Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 551, 157 USPQ 382, 384 (C.C.P.A. 1968).

 

In this case, both the individual components and the composite result are descriptive of applicant’s goods and do not create a unique, incongruous, or nondescriptive meaning in relation to the goods and/or services. Specifically, the applicant’s taxi-top boxes offer “smart” features, and therefore SMARTBOX is descriptive of a feature of the goods.

 

Therefore, the proposed mark merely describes a feature of the applicant’s goods and registration on the Principal Register was refused under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1).

 

APPLICANT’S RESPONSE TO OFFICE ACTION

 

The crux of applicant’s Response to Office Action dated September 26, 2019, (“Response”), is that applicant’s mark is suggestive and not descriptive because “imagination is required” to arrive at the determination that the wording “SMARTBOX”, in the context of applicant’s goods, means something other than a “smart box.”  Response at p. 3.

 

Applicant Misapplies a Five-Factor Test to Determine Suggestiveness

 

To arrive at its conclusion that the applied-for mark is suggestive, applicant begins by citing to a five-factor test addressed by the court in Jews for Jesus for the proposition that the five-factors listed are the definitive test on whether a mark is descriptive or suggestive.  Response at p. 2 (citing Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 46 USPQ.2d 1652, 1654 (DNJ 1998)).  However, applicant fails to disclose the context in which this particular “test” was applied by the court – a context entirely inapposite to the facts of this case.   More specifically, the court in Jews for Jesus was required to determine, under a trademark infringement claim, whether a domain name was descriptive and of a nature that, if registered, leaves only a finite set of equivalent alternatives for competitors.   Id.   A two-step test was required to determine the registrability of the subject mark that had been in use for some time: Is the mark descriptive and, if so, has it acquired secondary meaning?  Id. 

 

The court, after applying the five-factor test and finding the subject mark descriptive, explains that a descriptive mark can be protected “but only if it has acquired secondary meaning.”  Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 46 USPQ.2d 1652, 1664 (DNJ 1998).  The court continues with an analysis on the elements for secondary meaning eventually finding the subject mark was entitled to protection based on extensive use, advertising and sales under the mark.  Id.  

 

Oddly, applicant does not apply the five-factor test to its own mark but simply offers conclusory statements that its mark SMARTBOX does not describe its goods.  Response at p. 2.  Applicant’s failure to properly and sufficiently evaluate the descriptiveness (or suggestiveness) of its mark against the goods to be offered under the mark, even against the five-factor test addressed in Jews for Jesus, shows the underlying flaw in applicant’s arguments. 

 

Moreover, applicant’s mark was filed on an intent-to-use basis.  There is no use of the mark to support registration of the mark under the Jews for Jesus five-factor test, nor under any of the secondary meaning cases applicant cites to in support of registration.

 

Incongruously, applicant also cites to a second test for determining a mark’s descriptiveness.

 

Applicant Erroneously Claims That its Mark Does Not Immediately Convey the Purpose of its Goods

 

Applicant acknowledges that, “[a] mark is ‘merely descriptive’ if it ‘describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, or feature [of the goods or services] or if it directly conveys information regarding the nature, function, purpose or use of the goods or services.  Response at p. 3 (citing In re On Tech. Corp., 41 USPQ2d. 1475, 1476 (TTAB 1996)).  Applicant also acknowledges that Section 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act prohibits registration of a mark that “when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is merely descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them.”  Response at p. 3 (citing 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1)). 

 

“Whether a particular term is merely descriptive is determined in relation to the goods or services for which registration is sought and the context in which the term is used.”  In re Abcor Development Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 200 USPQ 215, 218 (CCPA 1978); and In re Remacle, 66 USPQ2d 1222, 1224 (TTAB 2002).

 

Applicant’s claim that its mark does not immediately convey the “purpose” of its goods addresses only one alternative part of the standard for evaluating descriptiveness, and ignores the fact that a mark can also be descriptive if it describes an ingredient, a quality, a characteristic, or a feature of the goods.  Id. [Emphasis added.] 

 

“Box” is defined as “a container typically constructed with four sides perpendicular to the base and often having a lid or cover,” and/or “an insulating, enclosing, or protective casing or part in a machine.”  See attached dictionary evidence from www.ahdictionary.com.  In this instance, the term “box” clearly describes a characteristic of applicant’s taxi top digital advertising displays – that they are containers with four sides, and they protect applicant’s “smart” technology as recognized by many industries, including applicant’s competitors.  In fact, the term “light box” is a common name for the display units found on taxi tops.  See attached article, “Taxi top advertising: the brand new advertising tool your boss wants to know” at http://www.linkedin.com/pulse/taxi-top-advertising-brand-new-tool-your-boss-wants-know-kris-lee. 

 

Also, applicant’s competitors commonly use the term “box” to describe the products they sell such as  “Taxi Top Light Box LED Advertising Signs,” Taxi Top Promotion Advertising Signs Light Box[es],” and “Taxi Light Box” roof Signage.  See attached webpages from www.made-in-china.com, and from www.globalsources.com. The attached images show the products are boxes to be place on the top of a taxi – similar to applicant’s products as shown on the attached webpages from applicant’s website at www.smartboxdisplay.com. 

 

Also, the term “smart” is so commonly used with technology it is now a “marketing buzzword.”  “If a product is ‘smart’ the implication is that it will make life better for the user than its ‘dumber’ counterpart.”  “The term ‘smart’ originally comes from the acronym ‘Self-Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Technology’ but became widely known as ‘smart’ because of the notion of allowing previously inanimate objects – from cars to basketballs to clothes – to talk back to us and even guide our behavior.”  See the attached article “What is Smart Technology?” from www.petra.com. 

 

A “smart device” is an item that can “provide some level of automation and can be programmed for some specific use.  Most smart devices have some local computer with intuitive user interface.”  See attached webpages from www.medium.com. 

 

Smart technology is commonly used for goods similar to applicant’s taxi advertising displays.  RSH Tech offers a “taxi video advertising” “smart box.”  See webpages from www.alibaba.com.  Companies such as Samsung offer “smart” boxes used for advertising signage displays.  See attached webpages from http://displaysolutions.samsung.com.  In fact, the terms “smart” and “box” are commonly used together to describe a wide array of technology products found in box form encompassing smart technology.  See attached webpages from www.amazon.com. 

 

In this instance, the term “smart” clearly and directly describes a feature of applicant’s taxi top ditigal advertising displays – that they are inanimate objects incorporating computer technology allowing users to communicate with the displays. 

 

Hence the terms “SMART” and “BOX” immediately convey characteristics and features of applicant’s goods.

 

Applicant Erroneously Applies the “Imagination” Test

 

Applicant contends that because it can identify two meanings for its mark – “one possibly descriptive, and the other suggestive of some association” - the mark is not “merely” descriptive.  Response at p. 3 (citing Manpower Inc. v. Driving  Force, Inc. 212 USPQ 961, 963 (TTAB 1981) (finding the mark DRIVING FORCE not descriptive for supplying leased drivers and goods)).  While applicant contends that the terms “smart” and “box” have many meanings, some are “clearly not relevant to applicant's field of business.”  In re Abcor Development Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 200 USPQ 215, 218 (CCPA 1978); In re Remacle, 66 USPQ2d 1222, 1224 (TTAB 2002).

 

“The question of whether a particular term is merely descriptive must be determined in relation to the goods or services for which registration is sought and the context in which the term is used, not in the abstract or on the basis of guesswork.” Id. [emphasis added].   “We give little consideration to dictionary definitions that clearly - have no relevance to applicant's line of business.”  Id.

 

Here, applicant’s contention that its mark is suggestive because, based on dictionary definitions, the mark could reference sharp witted people, or “the limitations of conventionality” such that it would take consumer imagination to link the mark SMARTBOX to applicant’s goods, is misguided.  The descriptiveness of the terms “smart” and “box” must be evaluated against applicant’s goods which are digital taxi top advertising display units.  In re Boot Royalty Company, L.P., 2002 TTAB LEXIS 214, *6 (March 14, 2002) (Our response to applicant's contention is quite simple. . . .as applied to orthopedic insoles in general, the word "pressure" has no such double meaning). 

 

More simply stated, is there a definition of “box” that describes applicant’s goods?  The answer is an emphatic “yes.”   “Box” as shown by the attached evidence, is a container typically constructed with four sides perpendicular to the base and/or an insulating, enclosing, or protective casing or part in a machine.   As shown by the surfeit of attached evidence, taxi top advertising display units, are unequivocally containers or “boxes.”  Importantly, and as shown by the attached webpages from applicant’s website at www.smartboxdisplay.com, applicant’s taxi-top display units are highly similar to units described as “taxi-top light boxes.”  See attached evidence from www.made-in-china.com.

 

Further, one must ask if applicant’s goods can be defined as “smart.”  Again, the answer is “yes.” 

 

Comparing the attached evidence defining “smart” technology and devices with the taxi-top display units the applicant intends to offer under its mark, together with information provided on applicant’s website that these units are for “geo-targeting” and “cost-effective” advertising, and because they are described as the “Next Generation” devices, applicant’s goods unequivocally meet the definition of “smart.”  See webpages from applicant’s website at www.smartboxdisplay.com. 

 

In a nutshell, applicant’s goods are boxes that are “smart” and the mark SMARTBOX is descriptive of applicant’s goods

 

Descriptiveness is Based on Consumer Understanding of the Mark and Not on What the Applicant Purports the Mark to Mean

 

The determination of the descriptiveness of a mark is not based on what the applicant, through creative reasoning, supposes or purports to be the meaning of its mark but from a consumer’s viewpoint.  The test is “whether someone who knows what the services or products are will understand the mark immediately to convey information about them.”  In re MBNA America Bank N.A., 340 F.3d 1328, 67 USPQ2d 1778, 1780 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  In other words, the appropriate question is whether consumers, looking at applicant’s taxi top display units then being told that applicant’s mark for the units is “SMARTBOX”, would understand that what they are looking at are, in fact, smart boxes.  The answer is a clear and definitive “yes.” 

 

Courts have explained that, “[t]he principle that a mark must be considered in relation to the services for which registration is sought is based upon the expectation that potential customers will use what they know about the commercial context to form their perceptions and interpretations of the mark.”  In re Abcor Development Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 200 USPQ 215, 218 (CCPA 1978). ("Evidence of the context in which a mark is used... is probative of the reaction of prospective purchasers to the mark. ... To hold otherwise would be to separate the concept of the average prospective purchaser from the world of reality.")

 

Courts disagree with applicant's suggestion “that the test is whether a blindfolded person could guess correctly exactly what applicant's services are after being prompted only with applicant's proposed mark.”  Id.  “We accordingly expect customers to apply a reasonable interpretation to the mark, if possible, rather than to strain for an interpretation that is incongruous, redundant, or devoid of meaning.”  Id. 

 

Applicant’s goods are for DooH (Digital out of Home) advertising.  See attached webpages from applicant’s website at www.smartboxdisplay.com.  Taxi top advertising is a common application of DooH advertising.  For example, EnRoute View Media offers a DooH taxi advertising platform using “smart wireless advertising technology.”  See attached webpages from www.enroutemedia.com.  Similarly, Curb offers digital taxi top advertising displays using DooH technology.  See attached webpages from www.gocurb.com.  Finally, Firefly uses “taxi top advertising” using DooH technology.  See attached webpages from www.fireflyon.com. 

 

In this instance, the average customer, viewing the mark SMARTBOX in the DooH commercial context of the applicant’s “taxi top advertising display units,” would be more inclined to interpret the two words of the mark to mean, in essence, “smart box” “rather than the significance proposed by applicant, which has less inherent meaning and less relevance to the context of the goods.”  Id. 

 

Third Parties Unequivocally Need and Use the Terms “Smart” and/or “Box” to Describe Their Products

 

Applicant argues that if “the descriptive information conveyed by a mark is so remote and subtle that it is really not likely to be needed by competitive sellers to describe their goods or services, then the mark is merely suggestive, and not descriptive.”  Response at p. 4 (citing Sperry Rand Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp., 58 CCPA 1259, 442 F.2d 979, 170 USPQ 37 (1981)).  Applicant also acknowledges that “if the message conveyed by the mark about the goods or services is so direct and clear that competing sellers would be likely to need to use the term in describing their goods in advertising and promotion, then this indicates that the mark is descriptive.”  Response at p. 4 (citing Miss World (UK) Ltd. V. Mrs. America Pageants, Inc., 856 F.2d 1445, 1447, 8 USPQ.2d 1237, 1240 (9^th Cir. 1988)). 

 

Applicant cites to a 1973 case to support its contention that applicant’s competitors do not need to use the terms “smart” and “box” to describe their products.  Response at p. 4 (citing Application of Reynolds Metals Co., 480 F.2d 902, 178 USPQ 296 (CCPA 1973)).  In Reynolds, the court found that applicant’s mark BROWN-IN-BAG was not descriptive because the goods identified in the record, including in the application and in applicant’s advertising and pamphlets, showed the mark was for cooking-related goods and not simply just for browning foods.  Id. at 904.  As such, the court found the mark was not descriptive and that competitors were free to use the terms “brown,” “in” and “bag.”  Id.  This instant case is distinguishable from Reynolds because here the record shows no advertising or use of applicant’s mark, only an intent-to-use for one specific product. 

 

The bottom line is that the message conveyed by applicant’s mark SMARTBOX is direct and clear and, as the attached evidence shows, competing sellers need to use the terms “smart” and “box” to describe their goods that comprise of boxes with smart technology.  In addition to the above-reference evidence of third party use of the terms “smart” and “box, FireFly uses the terms to describe its taxi top advertising screens used for the sharing of “smart city data; smart screens; and smart media.”  See attached webpages from www.fireflyon.com.  Also, LG-MRI offers digital taxi top displays for use with smart technology.  See attached webpages from http://lg-mri.com. 

 

Moreover, Samsung uses the terms to describe its “Signage Player Boxes” used for “Smart Signage.”  See attached webpages from http://displaysolutions.samsung.com.  Sungale uses the terms to describe its “Digital Signage Display Box.”  See attached webpages from www.amazon.com.  DSA Signage uses the terms to describe its “Light Boxes” for advertising purposes. See attached webpages from www.lightboxes.com.  G5 Smarter Marketing uses the terms to describe the features of its “Smart Digital Advertising.”  See attached webpages from www.getg5.com.  Xuniplay uses the terms to describe how its products provide an innovative tool for “Smart Advertising.”  See attached webpages from www.xuniplay.com.  IAdea uses the terms to describe its “Smart Signboards” for ditigal signage.  See attached webpages from www.iadea.com.  Displays2Go uses the terms to describe its “Light Boxes” and other products used for advertising displays.  See attached webpages from www.displays2go.com.  Taxitronic uses the terms to describe its “smart” technology for the taxi sector.  See attached webpages from www.taxitronic.com. 

 

Applicant’s competitors need and use the terms “smart” and “box” to describe their products to consumers, or more specifically, that their goods are in the ordinarily recognizable form of “boxes” which incorporate commonly understood “smart” technology.

 

Applicant’s Recitation to Third Party Registrations is Irrelevant to This Instant Case and Has No Probative Value

 

Applicant attached copies of third party registrations and applications for SMARTBOX and similar marks to its Response to support its contention that because the Office has permitted these third party marks to register or publish, applicant’s mark must be found suggestive and permitted registration also. 

 

However, applicant ignores a key tenet that “each case must be decided on its own merits.”  In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 57 USPQ2d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  As shown above, applicant’s mark is descriptive and without use to support secondary meaning such that the mark is unregistrable. 

 

As for the pending applications that applicant cites to, they are evidence only that these applications have been filed, nothing more.  They have no probative value.  Glamorene Products Corp. v. Earl Grissmer Co., Inc., 203 USPQ 1090 n.5 (TTAB 1979) (They are evidence only of the filing of the application).

 

With regard to the cited registrations, they are not evidence that the marks are actually in use.  They may be given some weight to show the meaning of a term, or mark, “in the same way that dictionaries are used.”  In re Box Solutions Corp., 79 USPQ2d 1952, 1955 (TTAB 2006).  Evaluating the instant case on its own merits and according to the dictionary definitions of the terms “smart” and “box” as applied to applicant’s goods, SMARTBOX describes characteristics and features of applicants goods making the individual terms, and the mark as a whole, descriptive.

 

Finally, applicant offers no basis for being allowed to piggy-back on the coattails of the already registered marks.  Applicant has not submitted any evidence that the registrations cited in its Response, have any relevance to the goods it intends to offer under the mark, or that the registered marks are directed to the same segment of the public to which applicant intends to offer its goods.  In re Overwatch Prods., LLC, 2019 TTAB LEXIS 203 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. March 27, 2019).

 

“[I]n any event, the Board is not bound by the actions of prior examining attorneys.  See In re Nett Designs Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 57 USPQ2d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 2001). ("Even if some prior registrations had some characteristics similar to [applicant's] application, the PTO's allowance of such prior registrations does not bind the board or this court.") 

 

The fact that the Office has permitted registration of marks similar to the applicant’s mark has no probative value on the application at hand. 

 

There is No Doubt That Applicant’s Mark is Descriptive

 

Applicant’s final contention is that to the extent there is any doubt as to whether applicant’s mark is descriptive or suggestive, that doubt should be resolved in favor of the applicant.  Response at p. 16 (citing In re Gourmet Bakers, Inc., 173 USPQ 565 (TTAB 1972)). 

 

There is no doubt that the terms “smart” and “box” in applicant’s mark SMARTBOX are descriptive for the “smart boxes” applicant intends to sell under its mark.

 

Therefore, registration is refused and made FINAL under Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act.

PROPER RESPONSE TO A FINAL ACTION

Applicant must respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action or the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond by providing one or both of the following:

 

(1)            A response filed using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) that fully satisfies all outstanding      requirements and/or resolves all outstanding refusals; and/or

 

(2)       An appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board filed using the Electronic        System for Trademark Trials and Appeals     (ESTTA) with the required filing fee       of $200 per class.

 

37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.

 

In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues.  TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters).  There is a fee required for filing a petition.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

ASSISTANCE

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this final Office action and/or appeal it to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB)

 

 

/Laraine Burrell/

Laraine M. I. Burrell

Examining Attorney

Law Office 111

(571) 272-8220

laraine.burrell@uspto.gov

 

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on November 13, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88362279

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Laraine Burrell/

Laraine M. I. Burrell

Examining Attorney

Law Office 111

(571) 272-8220

laraine.burrell@uspto.gov

 

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from November 13, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond.

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”