| To: | BrewDog plc (jbegler@nvlawllp.com) |
| Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88351162 - SONIC - BD SONIC |
| Sent: | April 29, 2020 03:55:10 PM |
| Sent As: | ecom123@uspto.gov |
| Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
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U.S. Application Serial No. 88351162
Mark: SONIC
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Correspondence Address: |
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Applicant: BrewDog plc
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Reference/Docket No. BD SONIC
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: April 29, 2020
The trademark examining attorney apologizes for any inconvenience caused by the delay in raising this issue.
Applicant must address all issues raised in this Office action, in addition to the issues raised in the Office action dated November 18, 2019. The issues raised in the previous November 18, 2019 Office action are as listed below and are maintained. See TMEP §713.02.
The following is a SUMMARY OF ISSUES that applicant must address:
• NEW ISSUE: Section 2(e)(1) Refusal – Merely Descriptive
• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion (MAINTAINED AND CONTINUED)
• Prior-filed Pending Application (MAINTAINED AND CONTINUED)
• Amendment of Classification and Identification of Goods Required (MAINTAINED AND CONTINUED)
• Foreign Registration Certificate Required (MAINTAINED AND CONTINUED)
Applicant must respond to all issues raised in this Office action and the previous November 18, 2019 Office action, within six (6) months of the date of issuance of this Office action. 37 C.F.R. §2.62(a); see TMEP §711.02. If applicant does not respond within this time limit, the application will be abandoned. 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).
NEW ISSUE: SECTION 2(e)(1) REFUSAL – MERELY DESCRIPTIVE
A mark is merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of an applicant’s goods. TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re TriVita, Inc., 783 F.3d 872, 874, 114 USPQ2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920)).
The applicant's mark is SONIC for Alcoholic beverages (except beer); spirits; distilled spirits; whisky, blended whisky; liqueurs; gin; vodka; cider".
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
(MAINTAINED AND CONTINUED)
Registration of the applied-for mark was previously refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5509428 (SONIC ARCHEOLOGY). Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. The registration was previously attached. For the reasons below, this refusal is MAINTAINED AND CONTINUED.
The Applicant’s mark is SONIC for "Alcoholic beverages (except beer); spirits; distilled spirits; whisky, blended whisky; liqueurs; gin; vodka; cider".
The Registrant’s mark is SONIC ARCHEOLOGY for "Alcoholic beverages, except beer, the foregoing not for sale at fast-food restaurants".
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by-case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Applicant’s arguments have been considered and found unpersuasive for the reasons set forth below.
COMPARISON OF THE MARKS
Applicant's mark is SONIC.
Registrant's mark is SONIC ARCHEOLOGY.
As the first or only wording in each mark, the common wording "SONIC" is the dominant feature of each mark. Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).
Moreover, as the entirety of the applied-for mark is encompassed by the registered mark, and the applied-for mark adds no additional wording to distinguish it from the registered mark, consumers are likely to believe the applied-for mark is a shortened form of the registered mark and would attribute the marks to the same source. Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). In the present case, the marks are identical in part. Although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark. See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)). Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion. See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains the common wording “SONIC”, but does not add any wording that would distinguish it from the registered mark.
The applicant points to the analysis taken by the TTAB in its decision in In re FabFitFun, Inc., 127 USPQ2d 1670 (TTAB 2018). However, it is noted that the facts in that case differed from those in the present case. In In re FabFitFun, Inc., the applicant argued that the marks in that case were weak for the goods and provided evidence of the weakness of those marks, including a number of third party registrations containing the wording “SMOKING HOT”, as well as third party Internet use of that wording. See id. at 1673-74. The TTAB noted and considered the weakness of the marks in weighing the various factors in this likelihood of confusion analysis. The applicant in the present case does not make such an argument that the wording “SONIC” is weak for these goods. In fact, it is noted that the registrant’s mark is the only mark on the Trademark Register containing the wording “SONIC” for the goods, and is one of only two registered marks on the Register containing the wording “SONIC” for related goods. The wording “SONIC” does not appear to be weak for the relevant goods. Again, the marks are identical in part here, and the applicant’s mark does not add any additional wording or other elements that would differentiate the commercial impression of its mark from that of the registered mark.
It is noted that trademark examining attorneys are not bound by the actions of past examining attorneys in prior registrations, even if the registrations have some characteristics similar to the application at issue; each case is decided on its own merits. In re Manwin/RK Collateral Trust, 111 USPQ2d 1311, 1315 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1342, 57 USPQ2d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). When determining whether an applied-for mark is eligible for registration, each application must be considered on its own record. In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594, 600, 118 USPQ2d 1632, 1635 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[The Federal Circuit], like the Board, must evaluate the evidence in the present record to determine whether there is sufficient evidence . . . .”); In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 571 F.3d 1171, 1174, 91 USPQ2d 1218, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Applicant’s allegations regarding similar marks are irrelevant because each application must be considered on its own merits.”); see also In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1342, 57 USPQ2d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Even if some prior registrations had some characteristics similar to Nett Designs’ application, the PTO’s allowance of such prior registrations does not bind the [Trademark Trial and Appeal] Board or this court.”).
Moreover, the decisions of the courts in the Second and Fifth Circuits are notably not binding on the USPTO and the TTAB.
Furthermore, where the goods of an applicant and registrant are virtually identical, the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding that confusion is likely declines. See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
COMPARISON OF THE GOODS
The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi). The compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
It is noted that the applicant does not submit any arguments that the goods are not related here.
Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
In this case, the application uses broad wording to describe its alcoholic beverages except beer, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including the registrant's narrower alcoholic beverages except beer not for sale at fast food restaurants. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). In addition, the registration's alcoholic beverages except beer also encompasses the applied-for alcoholic beverages goods, i.e., spirits, whisky, liqeuers, gin, vodka, and cider. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
In light of the similarities between the marks and the relatedness of the goods, it is likely that consumers who encounter the parties' goods will falsely conclude that they originate from the same source.
Although Applicant’s mark has been refused registration, Applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. If Applicant responds to the refusal, Applicant must also respond to the requirements set forth below.
PRIOR-FILED PENDING APPLICATION
(MAINTAINED AND CONTINUED)
In response to this Office action, applicant may present arguments in support of registration by addressing the issue of the potential conflict between applicant’s mark and the mark in the referenced application. Applicant’s election not to submit arguments at this time in no way limits applicant’s right to address this issue later if a refusal under Section 2(d) issues.
AMENDMENT OF CLASSIFICATION AND IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS REQUIRED
(MAINTAINED AND CONTINUED)
The identification of goods was previously found unacceptable because it contains indefinite wording and must be clarified. See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01. The applicant did not respond to this requirement in its Response dated November 15, 2019. Therefore, this requirement is hereby MAINTAINED AND CONTINUED.
The wording “cider” in the identification of goods for International Class 033 must be clarified because it is too broad and could include goods in other international classes. See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §§1402.01, 1402.03. In particular, this wording could encompass non-alcoholic ciders in International Class 032, and alcoholic ciders in International Class 033. If applicant adds one or more international classes to the application, applicant must comply with the multiple-class requirements specified in this Office action.
In addition, the identification of goods contains parentheses. Generally, applicants should not use parentheses and brackets in identifications in their applications so as to avoid confusion with the USPTO’s practice of using parentheses and brackets in registrations to indicate goods that have been deleted from registrations or in an affidavit of incontestability to indicate goods not claimed. See TMEP §1402.12. The only exception is that parenthetical information is permitted in identifications in an application if it serves to explain or translate the matter immediately preceding the parenthetical phrase in such a way that it does not affect the clarity or scope of the identification, e.g., “fried tofu pieces (abura-age).” Id.
Applicant may adopt the following identification, if accurate:
International Class 032: "Cider Non-alcoholic cider"
International Class 033: "Alcoholic beverages except beer (except beer); spirits; distilled spirits; whisky, blended whisky; liqueurs; gin; vodka; hard cider"
For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual. See TMEP §1402.04.
Multiple Class Requirements
The application identifies goods in more than one international class; therefore, applicant must satisfy all the requirements below for each international class based on Trademark Act Section 1(b):
(1) List the goods by their international class number in consecutive numerical order, starting with the lowest numbered class.
(2) Submit a filing fee for each international class not covered by the fee already paid (view the USPTO’s current fee schedule). The application identifies goods that are classified in at least two international classes; however, applicant submitted a fee sufficient for only one international class. Applicant must either submit the filing fees for the classes not covered by the submitted fees or restrict the application to the number of classes covered by the fees already paid.
See 15 U.S.C. §§1051(b), 1112, 1126(e); 37 C.F.R. §§2.32(a)(6)-(7), 2.34(a)(2)-(3), 2.86(a); TMEP §§1403.01, 1403.02(c).
See an overview of the requirements for a Section 1(b) multiple-class application and how to satisfy the requirements online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form.
FOREIGN REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE REQUIRED
(MAINTAINED AND CONTINUED)
The application specifies both an intent to use basis under Trademark Act Section 1(b) and a claim of priority under Section 44(d) based on a foreign application. See 15 U.S.C. §§1051(b), 1126(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.34(a)(2), (a)(4). However, no copy of a foreign registration has been provided even though the application indicates applicant’s intent to rely on Section 44(e) as an additional basis for registration. See 15 U.S.C. §1126(e).
An application with a Section 44(e) basis must include a true copy, photocopy, certification, or certified copy of a foreign registration from an applicant’s country of origin. 15 U.S.C. §1126(e); 37 C.F.R. §2.34(a)(3)(ii); TMEP §§1004, 1004.01, 1016. In addition, an applicant’s country of origin must be a party to a convention or treaty relating to trademarks to which the United States is also a party, or must extend reciprocal registration rights to nationals of the United States by law. 15 U.S.C. §1126(b); TMEP §§1002.01, 1004.
Therefore, applicant must provide a copy of the foreign registration from applicant’s country of origin when it becomes available. TMEP §1003.04(a). A copy of a foreign registration must consist of a document issued to an applicant by, or certified by, the intellectual property office in applicant’s country of origin. TMEP §1004.01. If applicant’s country of origin does not issue registrations or Madrid Protocol certificates of extension of protection, applicant may submit a copy of the Madrid Protocol international registration that shows that protection of the international registration has been extended to applicant’s country of origin. TMEP §1016. In addition, applicant must also provide an English translation if the foreign registration is not written in English. 37 C.F.R. §2.34(a)(3)(ii); TMEP §1004.01(a)-(b). The translation should be signed by the translator. TMEP §1004.01(b).
If the foreign registration has not yet issued, or applicant requires additional time to procure a copy of the foreign registration (and English translation, as appropriate), applicant should so inform the trademark examining attorney and request that the U.S. application be suspended until a copy of the foreign registration is available. TMEP §§716.02(b), 1003.04(b).
If applicant cannot satisfy the requirements of a Section 44(e) basis, applicant may request that the mark be approved for publication based solely on the Section 1(b) basis. See 15 U.S.C. §§1051(b), 1126(e); 37 C.F.R. §2.35(b)(1); TMEP §§806.02(f), 806.04(b), 1003.04(b). Although the mark may be approved for publication on the Section 1(b) basis, it will not register until an acceptable allegation of use has been filed. See 15 U.S.C. §1051(c)-(d); 37 C.F.R. §§2.76, 2.88; TMEP §1103. Please note that, if the U.S. application satisfied the requirements of Section 44(d) as of the U.S. application filing date, applicant may retain the priority filing date under Section 44(d) without perfecting the Section 44(e) basis, provided there is a continuing valid basis for registration. See 37 C.F.R. §2.35(b)(3)-(4); TMEP §§806.02(f), 806.04(b).
Alternatively, applicant has the option to amend the application to rely solely on the Section 44(e) basis and request deletion of the Section 1(b) basis. See 37 C.F.R. §2.35(b)(1); TMEP §806.04. The foreign registration alone may serve as the basis for obtaining a U.S. registration. See 37 C.F.R. §2.34(a)(3); TMEP §806.01(d).
Yi, Crystal
/Crystal H. Yi/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 123
571.270.0763
crystal.yi@uspto.gov
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