To: | Jiangsu Swan Musical Instrument Co., Ltd ETC. (youchuangxinnuo@126.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88333457 - SWAN - N/A |
Sent: | July 24, 2019 10:17:07 AM |
Sent As: | ecom104@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88333457
Mark: SWAN
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Correspondence Address: 10685-B HAZELHURST DR. # 21045
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Applicant: Jiangsu Swan Musical Instrument Co., Ltd ETC.
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: July 24, 2019
The previously referenced prior pending application has now registered. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
The applicant’s additional filing basis is accepted and made of record.
SUMMARY OF ISSUES:
· Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5786535. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the enclosed registration.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Here, the applicant’s mark is “SWAN” and design for “Accordions; Electronic musical instruments; Flutes; Harmonicas; Harps; Musical instruments; Reeds for use in woodwind mouthpieces; Tuners for musical instruments; Violins; Wind pipes for organs” and the registrant’s mark is “SWAN” in standard characters for “Accordions; Harmonicas; Melodicas; Musical instruments.”
Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F. 3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
The applicant’s mark is “SWAN” and design and the registrant’s mark is “SWAN” in standard characters.
When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
In addition, a mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display. See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”). In this case, the registrant’s mark is in standard characters and may be presented or displayed in any style, including a similar stylization of that of the applicant.
As such, applicant’s mark is confusingly similar to the cited registration.
Relatedness of the Goods
The goods of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
The respective goods need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
The applicant’s goods are broadly defined as “musical instruments”, including “Accordions; Electronic musical instruments; Flutes; Harmonicas; Harps; Musical instruments; Reeds for use in woodwind mouthpieces; Tuners for musical instruments; Violins; Wind pipes for organs.” The registrant’s goods are also broadly defined as “musical instruments”, but also specifically include Accordions; Harmonicas; Melodicas.”
In this case, the applicant and registration uses broad wording to describe its goods as “musical instruments”, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including applicant’s and registrant’s more narrow list of specific instruments. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.
Accordingly, the goods of applicant and the registrant(s) are considered related for purposes of the likelihood of confusion analysis.
Collateral Attack on Registration Improper in Ex Parte Proceeding
The applicant should note, Section 7(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1057(b), provides that a certificate of registration on the Principal Register shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration, of the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark in commerce in connection with the goods or services specified in the certificate. During ex parte prosecution, an applicant will not be heard on matters that constitute a collateral attack on the cited registration (e.g., a registrant’s nonuse of the mark). See In re Detroit Athletic Co., ___ F3d ___, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (noting that applicant’s objection to the breadth of the goods or trade channels described in the cited registration "amounts to an attack on the registration's validity" and that "the present ex parte proceeding is not the proper forum from which to launch such an attack," which is "better suited for resolution in a cancellation proceeding"); In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1408, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1534-35 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Fiesta Palms, LLC, 85 USPQ2d 1360, 1363 (TTAB 2007) ; In re Peebles Inc. 23 USPQ2d 1795, 1797 n.5 (TTAB 1992) ; In re Pollio Dairy Prods. Corp., 8 USPQ2d 2012, 2014-15 (TTAB 1988) .
Conclusion
Thus, based on the foregoing, registration of the applied-for mark is refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) as being likely to cause confusion with the registrant’s mark.
ADVISORY: SECTION 1(a) AND 44(e) DUAL BASIS – OPTION TO DELETE BASIS
Alternatively, inasmuch as applicant has not yet submitted the foreign registration or otherwise perfected the Section 44(e) basis, applicant can amend the application to rely solely on the Section 1(a) basis and request deletion of the Section 44(e) basis.
Unless applicant indicates otherwise, the USPTO will presume that applicant is relying on both Sections 1(a) and 44(e).
RESPONSE GUIDELINES
For this application to proceed toward registration, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement raised in this Office action. If the action includes a refusal, applicant may provide arguments and/or evidence as to why the refusal should be withdrawn and the mark should register. Applicant may also have other options for responding to a refusal and should consider such options carefully. To respond to requirements and certain refusal response options, applicant should set forth in writing the required changes or statements.
In addition, applicant filed a TEAS Plus application and therefore must respond online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp to avoid incurring an additional fee. See 37 C.F.R. §2.22(b)(1), (c).
If applicant does not respond to this Office action within six months of the issue/mailing date, or responds by expressly abandoning the application, the application process will end, the trademark will fail to register, and the application fee will not be refunded. See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.65(a), 2.68(a), 2.209(a); TMEP §§405.04, 718.01, 718.02. Where the application has been abandoned for failure to respond to an Office action, applicant’s only option would be to file a timely petition to revive the application, which, if granted, would allow the application to return to active status. See 37 C.F.R. §2.66; TMEP §1714. There is a $100 fee for such petitions. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6, 2.66(b)(1).
APPLICANT MAY WISH TO HIRE TRADEMARK COUNSEL
Because of the legal technicalities and strict deadlines involved in the USPTO application process, applicant may wish to hire a private attorney specializing in trademark matters to represent applicant in this process and provide legal advice. Although the undersigned trademark examining attorney is permitted to help an applicant understand the contents of an Office action as well as the application process in general, no USPTO attorney or staff is permitted to give an applicant legal advice or statements about an applicant’s legal rights. TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.
For attorney referral information, applicant may consult the American Bar Association’s Consumers’ Guide to Legal Help at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/findlegalhelp/home.cfm, an attorney referral service of a state or local bar association, or a local telephone directory. The USPTO may not assist an applicant in the selection of a private attorney. 37 C.F.R. §2.11.
In addition, foreign attorneys, other than authorized Canadian attorneys, are not permitted to represent applicants before the USPTO (e.g., file written communications, authorize an amendment to an application, or submit legal arguments in response to a requirement or refusal). See 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(e), 11.14(c), (e); TMEP §602.03-.03(c).
The only attorneys who may practice before the USPTO in trademark matters are as follows:
(1) Attorneys in good standing with a bar of the highest court of any U.S. state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other federal territories and possessions of the United States
(2) Canadian agents/attorneys who represent applicants located in Canada and (a) are registered with the USPTO and in good standing as patent agents or (b) have been granted reciprocal recognition by the USPTO
See 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(a), (e), 11.1, 11.14(a), (c); TMEP §602.
ASSISTANCE
If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney. All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action
/Seth Willig Chadab/
Seth Willig Chadab
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 104
(571) 270-1875
seth.chadab@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE