Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  August 05, 2019

 

INTRODUCTION

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on June 26, 2019.

 

In a previous Office action dated May 25, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:  Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark, and failure to show the applied-for mark in use in commerce with any of the specified goods.  In addition, applicant was required to satisfy the following requirements:  address the discrepancy between the mark on the drawing and the mark on the specimen, disclaim descriptive wording in the mark, and clarify the mark and color description

 

Based on applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney notes that the following requirements have been satisfied: discrepancy between the mark on the drawing and the mark on the specimen has been obviated.  See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04. 

 

Further, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusals and requirements in the summary of issues below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:

 

·        Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion

·        Specimen Refusal

·        Mark on the Drawing and Specimen Differ

·        Disclaimer Required

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3765504. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the previously attached registration.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. , 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “ du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd. , 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc , 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc. , 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co. , 544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

COMPARISON OF THE MARKS

 

The applied-for mark is BOSTON B with a design. The registered mark is BOSTON BEES in standard characters.

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The differences in spelling between the applied-for mark BOSTON B and the registered mark BOSTON BEES is insufficient to overcome a likelihood of confusion. The marks are essentially phonetic equivalents and thus sound similar. Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).

 

The applied-for mark BOSTON B is essentially the plural phonetic equivalent of the registered mark BOSTON BEES. An applied-for mark that is the singular or plural form of a registered mark is essentially identical in sound, appearance, meaning, and commercial impression, and thus the marks are confusingly similar. Swiss Grill Ltd., v. Wolf Steel Ltd. , 115 USPQ2d 2001, 2011 n.17 (TTAB 2015) (holding “it is obvious that the virtually identical marks [the singular and plural of SWISS GRILL] are confusingly similar”); Weider Publ’ns, LLC v. D & D Beauty Care Co. , 109 USPQ2d 1347, 1355 (TTAB 2014) (finding the singular and plural forms of SHAPE to be essentially the same mark) (citing Wilson v. Delaunay , 245 F.2d 877, 878, 114 USPQ 339, 341 (C.C.P.A. 1957) (finding no material difference between the singular and plural forms of ZOMBIE such that the marks were considered the same mark).

 

The design incorporated within the applied-for mark is likewise not sufficient to obviate any likelihood of confusion with the registered mark. When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc . , 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

 

For these reasons, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

COMPARISON OF THE GOODS

 

The goods are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

In this case, the applied-for goods are identified as “hats; jackets; pants; shirts; shorts; sweatshirts” in International Class 25. The registered goods are identified as “clothing, namely, t-shirts” in International Class 25.

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).

 

In this case, the application uses broad wording to describe “shirts”, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including registrant’s more narrow “clothing, namely, t-shirts”. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc. , 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

The attached Internet evidence, consisting of screenshots from websites, further establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark. Please see the attached internet evidence from American Eagle, Burberry, Kate Spade, Aeropostale, and Neiman Marcus. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).

 

For these reasons, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.

 

Because the marks are similar, and because the goods are related, there is a strong likelihood of confusion between the applied-for mark and the registered mark. Therefore, registration is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

SPECIMEN REFUSAL

 

Registration is refused because the specimen does not show the applied-for mark in use in commerce in International Class 25.  Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a).  Specifically, it appears the applicant has taken another t-shirt being used in commerce and placed a sticker where the tag would typically be placed as demonstrated by the previously attached evidence.

 

An application based on Trademark Act Section 1(a) must include a specimen showing the applied-for mark in use in commerce for each international class of goods identified in the application or amendment to allege use.  15 U.S.C. §1051(a)(1); 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a). 

 

Examples of specimens for goods include tags, labels, instruction manuals, containers, photographs that show the mark on the actual goods or packaging, and displays associated with the actual goods at their point of sale.  See TMEP §§904.03 et seq.  Webpages may also be specimens for goods when they include a picture or textual description of the goods associated with the mark and the means to order the goods.  TMEP §904.03(i).  However, leaflets, handbills, advertising circulars, and other advertising materials generally are not acceptable specimens for goods.  See TMEP §§904.03 et seq.

 

Applicant may respond to this refusal by satisfying one of the following for each applicable international class:

 

(1)       Submit a different specimen (a verified “substitute” specimen) that (a) was in actual use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of an amendment to allege use and (b) shows the mark in actual use in commerce for the goods identified in the application or amendment to allege use.  A “verified substitute specimen” is a specimen that is accompanied by the following statement made in a signed affidavit or supported by a declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20:  “The substitute (or new, or originally submitted, if appropriate) specimen(s) was/were in use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of the amendment to allege use.”  The substitute specimen cannot be accepted without this statement.

 

(2)       Amend the filing basis to intent to use under Section 1(b), for which no specimen is required.  This option will later necessitate additional fee(s) and filing requirements such as providing a specimen.

 

For an overview of both response options referenced above and instructions on how to satisfy either option online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, please go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/law/specimen.jsp.

 

MARK ON THE DRAWING AND SPECIMEN DIFFER

 

Registration is refused because the specimen does not show the mark in the drawing in use in commerce in International Class 25, which is required in the application or amendment to allege use.  Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a), 1301.04(g)(i).  The mark appearing on the specimen and in the drawing must match; that is, the mark in the drawing “must be a substantially exact representation of the mark” on the specimen.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.51(a)-(b); TMEP §807.12(a). 

 

In the case of the newly submitted drawing, the specimen displays the mark as having a black background.  However, the drawing displays the mark as having a light brown background.  The mark on the specimen does not match the mark in the drawing because the colors are not properly displayed as identified in the drawing.  Applicant has thus failed to provide the required evidence of use of the mark in commerce.  See TMEP §807.12(a).

 

Applicant may respond to this refusal by satisfying one of the following:

 

(1)       Submit a new drawing of the mark that shows the mark on the specimen and, if appropriate, an amendment of the description and/or color claim that agrees with the new drawing.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.72(a)-(b).  Please see the mark description suggestions pursuant to the mark description and color claim discussed below.  Applicant may amend the mark in the drawing to match the mark on the specimen but may not make any other changes or amendments that would materially alter the drawing of the mark.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.72(a)-(b); TMEP §807.14.

 

(2)       Submit a different specimen (a verified “substitute” specimen) for each applicable international class that (a) shows the mark in the drawing in actual use in commerce for the goods and/or services in the application or amendment to allege use, and (b) was in actual use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of an amendment to allege use.

 

Examples of specimens for goods include tags, labels, instruction manuals, containers, photographs that show the mark on the actual goods or packaging, and displays associated with the actual goods at their point of sale.  See TMEP §§904.03 et seq.  Webpages may also be specimens for goods when they include a picture or textual description of the goods associated with the mark and the means to order the goods.  TMEP §904.03(i).  Examples of specimens for services include advertising and marketing materials, brochures, photographs of business signage and billboards, and webpages that show the mark used in the actual sale, rendering, or advertising of the services.  See TMEP §1301.04(a), (h)(iv)(C).

 

For more information about drawings and instructions on how to satisfy these response options online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, see the Drawing webpage.

 

MARK DESCRIPTION AMENDMENT REQUIRED

               

Although applicant submitted a drawing showing the mark in color with a color claim, applicant did not provide the required description that specifies where each color appears in the literal and design elements in the mark.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.37, 2.52(b)(1); TMEP §807.07(a)-(a)(ii).  Therefore, applicant must provide this description.  See TMEP §807.07(a)(ii). 

 

Generic color names must be used to describe the colors in the mark, e.g., red, yellow, blue.  TMEP §807.07(a)(i)-(ii).  If black, white, and/or gray represent background, outlining, shading, and/or transparent areas and are not part of the mark, applicant must so specify in the description.  See TMEP §807.07(d).

 

The following color claim is suggested, if accurate:  “The colors yellow, brown, red, and black are claimed as a feature of the mark.”  TMEP §807.07(a)(i).

 

The following description is suggested, if accurate: 

 

“The mark consists of the letter “B” in yellow comprised of a hockey stick in different shades of brown and two hockey pucks in different shades of brown. Above the letter “B” is the wording “BOSTON’S” in yellow with the letter “B” comprised of a hockey stick in different shades of brown and two hockey pucks in different shades of brown, the letter “O” comprised of a hockey puck in different shades of brown and circles in yellow on top of the hockey puck, the letter “S” with a hockey stick laying diagonally across with the top of the hockey stick being red and the bottom of the hockey stick being light brown, the next “O” comprised of a hockey pucks in different shades of brown and circles in yellow on top of the hockey puck, and the last letter “S” with a hockey stick laying diagonally across with the top of the hockey stick being red and the bottom of the hockey stick being light brown. The letters “B,” “S,” “T,” “N”, and “B” are outlined in black, with all of the letters further outlined in white. The mark is displayed on a light brown background.

 

DISCLAIMER REQUIRED

 

Applicant must provide a disclaimer of the unregistrable part of the applied-for mark even though the mark as a whole appears to be registrable. See 15 U.S.C. §1056(a); TMEP §§1213, 1213.03(a). A disclaimer of an unregistrable part of a mark will not affect the mark’s appearance. See Schwarzkopf v. John H. Breck, Inc., 340 F.2d 978, 979-80, 144 USPQ 433, 433 (C.C.P.A. 1965).

 

Applicant must disclaim the wording “BOSTON” because it is not inherently distinctive. This unregistrable term is at best primarily geographically descriptive of the origin of applicant’s goods. See 15 U.S.C. §§1052(e)(2); In re Societe Generale des Eaux Minerales de Vittel S.A. , 824 F.2d 957, 959, 3 USPQ2d 1450, 1451-52 (Fed. Cir. 1987); TMEP §§1210.01(a), 1210.06(a), 1213.03(a).

 

The previously attached evidence from the Columbia Gazetteer shows that “Boston” is a generally known geographic place or location. See TMEP §§1210.02 et seq. The goods for which applicant seeks registration originate in this geographic place or location as shown by applicant’s address being located in North Weymouth, which is only 17 miles away from Boston. See TMEP §1210.03. Please see the previously attached Google Maps evidence. Because the goods originate in this place or location, a public association of the goods with the place is presumed. See In re Hollywood Lawyers Online, 110 USPQ2d 1852, 1858 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re Spirits of New Merced, LLC, 85 USPQ2d 1614, 1621 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §§1210.02(a) 1210.04.

 

Applicant may respond to this issue by submitting a disclaimer in the following format:

 

No claim is made to the exclusive right to use “BOSTON” apart from the mark as shown.

 

For an overview of disclaimers and instructions on how to satisfy this issue using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), see the Disclaimer webpage. 

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

Because of the legal technicalities and strict deadlines of the trademark application process, applicant may wish to hire a private attorney who specializes in trademark matters to assist in the process.  The assigned trademark examining attorney can provide only limited assistance explaining the content of an Office action and the application process.  USPTO staff cannot provide legal advice or statements about an applicant’s legal rights.  TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this final Office action and/or appeal it to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB).

 

 

/Katherine M. Eissenstat/

Trademark Examining Attorney

USPTO, Law Office 127

Tel: (571) 272-5886

Email: Katherine.Eissenstat@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on August 05, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88331147

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Katherine M. Eissenstat/

Trademark Examining Attorney

USPTO, Law Office 127

Tel: (571) 272-5886

Email: Katherine.Eissenstat@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from August 05, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond.

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”