To: | BBE SOUND INC. (sdtrademark@dlapiper.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88328603 - ESPADA - 364946900012 |
Sent: | July 10, 2020 03:49:54 PM |
Sent As: | ecom107@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88328603
Mark: ESPADA
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: BBE SOUND INC.
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Reference/Docket No. 364946900012
Correspondence Email Address: |
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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: July 10, 2020
Action this application was previously suspended on 11/19/19 pending disposition of a prior-filed pending application which posed a potential bar to registration of this application. The cited application has now registered, and applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration(s) No. 5924599. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registration(s).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In the present case, applicant’s mark is ESPADA and registrant’s mark is ESPADA. These marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services. Id.
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
Comparing the Goods
The applicant’s goods are “Musical instruments, namely, guitars and basses,” in Class 15. See application.
The registrant’s goods are “Guitars; Electric and electronic musical instruments; String instruments,” in Class 15. See attached registration(s).
Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
In this case, the registration broad wording to describe string instruments which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including applicant’s more narrow “guitars and basses.” See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
In this case, the marks are identical and the goods of the parties are related as to nature and channels of trade. Therefore, upon encountering these marks and goods in commerce, consumers are likely to be confused and mistakenly believe that the goods emanate from a common source. Accordingly, the applicant’s proposed mark is refused for likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d).
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION – MAINTAINED AND CONTINUED
The likelihood of confusion refusal pertaining to Reg. No. 5471923 is maintained and continued. The fact that applicant has added an E onto the registrant’s mark, SPADA, does not avoid a finding of similarity. Both marks remain highly visually and aurally similar. The marks also have the same meaning. As such, the marks are confusingly similar.
With respect to the similarity of goods, applicant’s arguments are also unpersuasive. Applicant has argued that the goods are “different” and that the marks will not appear on “the same musical instruments.” It is well settled that the compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). The evidence of record establishes that it is common for the same entity to provide goods of the type offered by applicant and registrant under the same mark and in the same channels of trade.
Applicant’s arguments relating to the examination of the prior-filed, now cited mark (ESPADA) are unavailing. When determining whether an applied-for mark is eligible for registration, each application must be considered on its own record. In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 823 F.3d 594, 600, 118 USPQ2d 1632, 1635 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[The Federal Circuit], like the Board, must evaluate the evidence in the present record to determine whether there is sufficient evidence . . . .”); In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop, 571 F.3d 1171, 1174, 91 USPQ2d 1218, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Applicant’s allegations regarding similar marks are irrelevant because each application must be considered on its own merits.”); see also In re Nett Designs, Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 1342, 57 USPQ2d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Even if some prior registrations had some characteristics similar to Nett Designs’ application, the PTO’s allowance of such prior registrations does not bind the [Trademark Trial and Appeal] Board or this court.”).
Applicant’s argument relating to the fame of the prior registrant is at best neutral. See TMEP §1207.01(d)(ix). The examining attorney has not made any claims relating to the fame of either mark, nor is the examining attorney required to do so. Id.
The argument relating to the registrant’s use or nonuse of the mark is not relevant in an ex parte proceeding. A trademark or service mark registration on the Principal Register is prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration and the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark in commerce in connection with the specified goods and/or services. See 15 U.S.C. §1057(b); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iv).
Thus, evidence and arguments that constitute a collateral attack on a cited registration, such as information or statements regarding a registrant’s nonuse of its mark, are not relevant during ex parte prosecution. See In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1408, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1534-35 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Peebles Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1795, 1797 n.5 (TTAB 1992); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iv). Such evidence and arguments may, however, be pertinent to a formal proceeding before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to cancel the cited registration.
Taken together, applicant’s arguments have been found unpersuasive, and the Section 2(d) Refusal of the mark on the basis of a likelihood of confusion with Reg. No. 5471923 is maintained and continued.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
Diane Collopy
/Diane Collopy/
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 107
diane.collopy@uspto.gov
(571) 270-3118 (informal communication only)
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