Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  November 19, 2019

 

This Final Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on October 20, 2019.

 

In a previous Office action dated May 13, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following: Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 4705960 and 5319188. In addition, applicant was required to satisfy the following requirements: amend the identification of goods and services and satisfy the multiple class application requirements.

 

Based on applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney notes that the following requirements have been satisfied: amended the identification of goods and services and satisfied the multiple class application requirements.  See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04. 

 

In addition, the following refusal has been withdrawn: Section 2(d) refusal for a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4705960.  See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04. 

 

Further, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal in the summary of issues below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:

• Section 2(d) Refusal – Likelihood of Confusion - Limited
• Advisory – Partial Abandonment

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION – LIMITED – MADE FINAL

 

THIS PARTIAL REFUSAL APPLIES ONLY TO THE SERVICES SPECIFIED THEREIN

 

The stated refusal refers to the following services and does not bar registration for the other goods and services:  “Entertainment, namely, production of live musical, theatrical, dramatic, and dance performances.”

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5319188.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the previously attached registration.

 

Applicant’s mark is OLA (in standard character form) for the relevant services: “Entertainment, namely, production of live musical, theatrical, dramatic, and dance performances.”

 

Registrant’s mark is OLA ZAY ZOSS (in standard character form) for “Musical entertainment services in the nature of live musical performances; entertainment services provided by a musical recording artist, namely, musical composition for others and production of musical sound recordings; entertainment services by stage production of live performances of concerts in the field of music by an individual and cabarets; entertainment services in the nature of presentation, production and performance of live shows, live musical performances and live musical concerts; production of videos in the field of music and radio and television programmes; entertainment services, namely, providing non-downloadable pre-recorded music, information in the field of music and articles about music, all on-line via a global computer network; production of music video and sound recordings; providing recording, film, video and television studio services; multimedia entertainment services in the nature of recording services in the fields of audio, film, video and television; providing on-line non-downloadable electronic publications in the nature of books, magazines and journals in the field of music; publication of electronic books and journals on-line; music publishing; production and distribution of motion picture films and digital videos.”

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

SIMILARITY OF THE MARKS

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In the present case, applicant’s mark OLA is similar to the registered mark OLA ZAY ZOSS in sound, appearance, and connotation.

 

Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34).

 

Here, the word OLA is the dominant portion of registrant’s mark, because it is the first word and is more likely to be remembered by consumers. Generally, consumers are more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).

 

In this case, applicant’s mark is OLA and the dominant portion of registrant’s mark is “OLA”. The only difference between the marks is that registrant’s mark has the additional wording “ZAY ZOSS”. Although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.

 

In fact, registrant’s mark incorporates the entirety of applicant’s mark within its own. Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part.

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b). In this case, the marks are confusingly similar because they both have the identical wording “OLA”. Although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark. Thus, the wording “OLA” creates a similar overall commercial impression such that confusion as to the source of the services offered under the respective marks is likely to result.

 

Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the marks are confusingly similar for purposes of a Section 2(d) analysis.

 

SIMILARITY AND RELATEDNESS OF THE SERVICES

 

The services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

The compared services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Applicant identifies its relevant services as “Entertainment, namely, production of live musical, theatrical, dramatic, and dance performances.”

 

Registrant identifies its services as “Musical entertainment services in the nature of live musical performances; entertainment services provided by a musical recording artist, namely, musical composition for others and production of musical sound recordings; entertainment services by stage production of live performances of concerts in the field of music by an individual and cabarets; entertainment services in the nature of presentation, production and performance of live shows, live musical performances and live musical concerts; production of videos in the field of music and radio and television programmes; entertainment services, namely, providing non-downloadable pre-recorded music, information in the field of music and articles about music, all on-line via a global computer network; production of music video and sound recordings; providing recording, film, video and television studio services; multimedia entertainment services in the nature of recording services in the fields of audio, film, video and television; providing on-line non-downloadable electronic publications in the nature of books, magazines and journals in the field of music; publication of electronic books and journals on-line; music publishing; production and distribution of motion picture films and digital videos.”

 

In this case, applicant’s and registrant’s services are identical in part, because both produce live musical performances. Further, the services closely related because it is common for entities that produce live musical performances to also produce other live performances such as theatrical, dramatic, and dance performances. The attached Internet evidence consists of webpages from Arts + Cultural Programming, Area Stage Company, Lifehouse Theater, Mainstage Center for the Arts, Pacific Northwest Ballet, Porchlight, Riverside Theatre, and Theatre & Dance at Wayne. In addition to the previously attached evidence from Disney and the Hellenic American Union, this evidence establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant services and markets the services under the same mark, that the relevant services are sold through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use, and that the services are similar or complementary in terms of purpose or function. Specifically, the evidence shows that it is common for entities to provide live musical, theatrical, dramatic, and dance performances and market these services under the same mark such that consumers encountering these services under similar marks are likely to believe they emanate from the same source. In fact, the evidence shows that these performances commonly combine musical, theatrical, dramatic, and dance elements in a single show. Therefore, applicant’s and registrant’s services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

The relatedness of applicant’s and registrant’s goods establishes a likelihood of confusion. Therefore, registration must be refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

APPLICANT’S ARGUMENTS

 

Applicant argues that the marks have a different connotation and meaning, because OLA ZAY ZOSS appears to be the name of an individual, while OLA by itself is an acronym for Onassis Los Angeles. Applicant argues that the cited mark would not be confused for the short mark “OLA”. The trademark examining attorney does not find this argument persuasive. Although applicant may intend for the wording “OLA” to be an acronym, consumers are likely to believe that the word “OLA” is a shortened version of the name “OLA ZAY ZOSS” in the context of these services, because the dominant portion of registrant’s mark is identical to applicant’s mark. Further, where the services of an applicant and registrant are “similar in kind and/or closely related,” the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as in the case of diverse services.  In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987); see Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1242, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TMEP §1207.01(b). As previously discussed, applicant’s and registrant’s services are identical in part and otherwise closely related. Thus, the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great.

 

Applicant argues that the goods and services are sufficiently different to coexist. The trademark examining attorney does not find this argument persuasive. Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)). Here, applicant describes its relevant services as “Entertainment, namely, production of live musical, theatrical, dramatic, and dance performances,” while registrant’s services include “Musical entertainment services in the nature of live musical performances” and “entertainment services in the nature of presentation, production and performance of live shows, live musical performances and live musical concerts.” Thus, the services are identical in part, because both applicant and registrant provide live music. Further, the attached evidence from Arts + Cultural Programming, Area Stage Company, Lifehouse Theater, Mainstage Center for the Arts, Pacific Northwest Ballet, Porchlight, Riverside Theatre, and Theatre & Dance at Wayne show that it is common for entities that produce live musical productions to also produce live theater, dramatic, and dance performances and that these performances commonly incorporate dance and music. Thus, these services are closely related.

 

Applicant argues that the mark “OLA” is diluted, because there are over 100 marks with the term “OLA”. The trademark examining attorney does not find this argument persuasive. As a general matter, third-party registrations are entitled to little weight on the issue of confusing similarity because the registrations are “not evidence that the registered marks are actually in use or that the public is familiar with them.”  In re Midwest Gaming & Entm’t LLC, 106 USPQ2d 1163, 1167 n.5 (TTAB 2013) (citing In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2010)); see TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).  Moreover, the existence on the register of other seemingly similar marks does not provide a basis for registrability for the applied-for mark.  AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Total Quality Grp., Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1474, 1477 (TTAB 1999).

 

Here, applicant has submitted a list of registrations.  However, the mere submission of a list of registrations or a copy of a private company search report does not make such registrations part of the record.  See In re Peace Love World Live, LLC, 127 USPQ2d 1400, 1405 n.17 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1583 (TTAB 2007); In re Duofold Inc., 184 USPQ 638, 640 (TTAB 1974)); TBMP §1208.02; TMEP §710.03.

 

To make third party registrations part of the record, an applicant must submit copies of the registrations, or the complete electronic equivalent from the USPTO’s automated systems, prior to appeal.  In re Star Belly Stitcher, Inc., 107 USPQ2d 2059, 2064 (TTAB 2013); TBMP §1208.02; TMEP §710.03.  Accordingly, these registrations will not be considered.

 

However, even if these third party registrations were to be considered, they do not show that the marks are diluted. Specifically, the marks listed include marks that have additional matter and are for completely different goods and services. For example, this list includes “LAS OLAS” for “retail clothing stores,” “SHAKA OLA” for “cases for eyeglasses and sunglasses,” and “OLAPAY” for goods such as “point-of-sale terminals.” These registrations have limited probative value, because they do not appear related to applicant’s and registrant’s live performance services. Thus, this evidence does not demonstrate that the marks are diluted.

 

Even if the marks were to be considered weak, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board have recognized that marks deemed “weak” are still entitled to protection under Section 2(d) against the registration by a subsequent user of a similar mark for closely related services.  TMEP §1207.01(b)(ix); see King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 1401, 182 USPQ 108, 109 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Max Capital Grp. Ltd., 93 USPQ2d 1243, 1246 (TTAB 2010). 

 

For these reasons, the trademark examining attorney does not find these arguments persuasive.

 

CONCLUSION

 

In this case, applicant’s and registrant’s marks are similar in sound, appearance, and connotation. Additionally, applicant’s and registrant’s services are related because the same entities provide both applicant’s and registrant’s services.

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

In view of the foregoing, the refusal to register under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is continued and made FINAL.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

 

 

ADVISORY – PARTIAL ABANDONMENT

 

If applicant does not respond to this Office action within the six-month period for response, the following services in International Class 041 will be deleted from the application:  “Entertainment, namely, production of live musical, theatrical, dramatic, and dance performances.”  The application will then proceed with the following goods and/or services in International Classes 009, 035, 036, and 041 only: 

 

International Class 009: Downloadable podcasts and downloadable video recordings in the nature of documentaries in the fields of Hellenic and world culture, arts, politics, technology, philosophy and current events

 

International Class 035: Association services, namely, promoting public awareness of Hellenic and world culture, arts, politics, technology, philosophy and current events

 

International Class 036: Financial sponsorship of live musical, theatrical, dramatic and dance performances

 

International Class 041: Educational and entertainment services promoting Hellenic and world culture, values and ideas, namely, providing non-downloadable podcasts and on-line non-downloadable videos in the nature of documentaries, and conducting live events in the nature of educational seminars featuring discussions and interviews in the fields of culture, arts, politics, technology, philosophy, and current events

 

See 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a)-(a)(1); TMEP §718.02(a).

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this final Office action and/or appeal it to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB)

 

 

/Peter Dang/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 121

(571) 270-1998

peter.dang@uspto.gov

 

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

            United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on November 19, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88320749

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Peter Dang/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 121

(571) 270-1998

peter.dang@uspto.gov

 

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from November 19, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond.

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”