Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  October 28, 2019

 

INTRODUCTION

 

This Office action is supplemental to and supersedes the previous Office action issued on March 26, 2019, in connection with this application.  In that Office action, the applicant was advised that U.S. Application Serial No. 88132042 had an earlier filing date than applicant’s application, and if registered could present a bar to registration.  The referenced prior-pending application has since registered.  Therefore, registration is refused as follows.

 

In a previous Office action dated March 26, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:  Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark  and Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1) Merely Descriptive.  The examining attorney has carefully considered applicant’s arguments regarding these refusals, but has found them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the refusal to register under Trademark Act Sections 2(d) and 2(e)(1) are maintained and continued.

 

The following is a SUMMARY OF ISSUES that applicant must address:

 

•           NEW ISSUE: Refusal: Section 2(d) Likelihood of Confusion

•           Advisory: Prior-Filed Applications

•           Refusal: Section 2(e)(1) Merely Descriptive

 

Applicant must respond to all issues raised in this Office action and the previous March 26, 2019 Office action, within six (6) months of the date of issuance of this Office action.  37 C.F.R. §2.62(a); see TMEP §711.02.  If applicant does not respond within this time limit, the application will be abandoned.  37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark 88285629 (ODOR AERATORS) is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 3437984 (AIRATORS) and 5888639 (AERATOR).  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the enclosed registrations.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).  Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record.  Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Applicant’s mark is ODOR AERATORS in standard characters.

 

Registrant’s mark in Reg. No. 3437984 is AIRATORS in standard characters.

 

Registrant’s mark in Reg. No. 5888639 is AERATOR in standard characters.

 

In the present case, the applicant’s mark is highly similar to the registered marks in sound, appearance, and overall commercial impression. Specifically, applicant’s mark and the registered mark share the highly similar terms “AERATORS”, “AIRATORS”, or “AERATOR”, respectively.  Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

 

In the case of Reg. No. 5888639, the shared term is identical in the compared marks, except that the term in the applied-for mark is in the plural form, “AERATORS”, and the registered term is in the singular, “AERATOR”.  An applied-for mark that is the singular or plural form of a registered mark is essentially identical in sound, appearance, meaning, and commercial impression, and thus the marks are confusingly similar.  Swiss Grill Ltd., v. Wolf Steel Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 2001, 2011 n.17 (TTAB 2015) (holding “it is obvious that the virtually identical marks [the singular and plural of SWISS GRILL] are confusingly similar”); Weider Publ’ns, LLC v. D & D Beauty Care Co., 109 USPQ2d 1347, 1355 (TTAB 2014) (finding the singular and plural forms of SHAPE to be essentially the same mark) (citing Wilson v. Delaunay, 245 F.2d 877, 878, 114 USPQ 339, 341 (C.C.P.A. 1957) (finding no material difference between the singular and plural forms of ZOMBIE such that the marks were considered the same mark).

 

In the case of Reg. No. 3437984, the shared portions of the marks are essentially phonetic equivalents and thus sound similar.  Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).

 

Furthermore, applicant’s addition of the term “ODOR” does not sufficiently distinguish the marks.  Adding a term to a registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER and design confusingly similar); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1269 (TTAB 2009) (finding TITAN and VANTAGE TITAN confusingly similar); In re El Torito Rests., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002, 2004 (TTAB 1988) (finding MACHO and MACHO COMBOS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). 

 

Further, the additional term “ODOR” in the applicant’s mark is descriptive.  See previously attached evidence showing “ODOR” to be descriptive.  Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods is typically less significant or less dominant in relation to other wording in a mark.  See Anheuser-Busch, LLC v. Innvopak Sys. Pty Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1816, 1824-25 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 1342-43, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 

 

Therefore, the applicant’s mark is highly similar to the registered mark in sound, appearance, and overall commercial impression. Accordingly, the marks are considered to be confusingly similar.

 

Comparison of the Goods

 

The goods of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). 

 

The respective goods need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Applicant’s identified goods are: “Insoles and inserts for footwear and shoes to absorb wetness being primarily for orthopedic purposes; insoles and inserts for footwear and shoes for absorbing, neutralizing and preventing odors being primarily for orthopedic purposes; insoles and inserts for footwear and shoes for deodorizing being primarily for orthopedic purposes; insoles and inserts for footwear and shoes for cushioning being primarily for orthopedic purposes; footwear cushions and pads designed and treated to absorb moisture and absorb, neutralize and prevent odors being primarily for orthopedic purposes” in Class 10 and “Insoles and inserts for footwear and shoes to absorb wetness being primarily for non-orthopedic purposes; insoles and inserts for footwear and shoes for absorbing, neutralizing and preventing odors being primarily for non-orthopedic purposes; insoles and inserts for footwear and shoes for deodorizing being primarily for non-orthopedic purposes; insoles and inserts for footwear and shoes for cushioning being primarily for non-orthopedic purposes; footwear cushions and pads designed and treated to absorb moisture and absorb, neutralize and prevent odors being primarily for non-orthopedic purposes” in Class 25.

 

Registrant’s identified goods in Reg. No. 3437984 are: “Footwear” in Class 25.

 

Registrant’s identified goods in Reg. No. 5888639 are: “Garment bags for travel” in Class 18 and “Garment bags for storage” in Class 22.

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).

 

In this case, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).

  

In addition to the previously attached Internet evidence consisting of third party websites showing that entities that provide and sell footwear also provide and sell insoles and inserts under the same mark, see also the attached evidence showing that entities that provide and sell garment bags also provide and sell insoles and inserts under the same mark.  See attached evidence from http://www.merrell.com, http://www.columbia.com/, http://www.ems.com, and http://korkers.com/.

 

The evidence establishes that the same entity commonly manufactures the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark, and that the relevant goods are sold or provided through the same trade channels and used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

Because the marks are highly similar and the goods are closely related, a likelihood of confusion exists and registration is refused.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  However, applicant should note the additional, following refusal below.

 

SECTION 2(e)(1) REFUSAL – MERELY DESCRIPTIVE

 

Registration was previously refused because the applied-for mark merely describes a feature or characteristic of applicant’s goods.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); see TMEP §§1209.01(b), 1209.03 et seq.

 

The examining attorney has considered applicant’s arguments carefully, but has found them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the refusal to register under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1) is maintained and continued.

 

A mark is merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of an applicant’s goods and/or services.  TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re TriVita, Inc., 783 F.3d 872, 874, 114 USPQ2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920)). 

 

The determination of whether a mark is merely descriptive is made in relation to an applicant’s goods and/or services, not in the abstract.  DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1254, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1757 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re The Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re Polo Int’l Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1061, 1062-63 (TTAB 1999) (finding DOC in DOC-CONTROL would refer to the “documents” managed by applicant’s software rather than the term “doctor” shown in a dictionary definition); In re Digital Research Inc., 4 USPQ2d 1242, 1243-44 (TTAB 1987) (finding CONCURRENT PC-DOS and CONCURRENT DOS merely descriptive of “computer programs recorded on disk” where the relevant trade used the denomination “concurrent” as a descriptor of a particular type of operating system). 

 

“Whether consumers could guess what the product [or service] is from consideration of the mark alone is not the test.”  In re Am. Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985).

 

The applied for mark is ODOR AERATORS for “Insoles and inserts for footwear and shoes to absorb wetness being primarily for orthopedic purposes; insoles and inserts for footwear and shoes for absorbing, neutralizing and preventing odors being primarily for orthopedic purposes; insoles and inserts for footwear and shoes for deodorizing being primarily for orthopedic purposes; insoles and inserts for footwear and shoes for cushioning being primarily for orthopedic purposes; footwear cushions and pads designed and treated to absorb moisture and absorb, neutralize and prevent odors being primarily for orthopedic purposes” in Class 10, and “Insoles and inserts for footwear and shoes to absorb wetness being primarily for non-orthopedic purposes; insoles and inserts for footwear and shoes for absorbing, neutralizing and preventing odors being primarily for non-orthopedic purposes; insoles and inserts for footwear and shoes for deodorizing being primarily for non-orthopedic purposes; insoles and inserts for footwear and shoes for cushioning being primarily for non-orthopedic purposes; footwear cushions and pads designed and treated to absorb moisture and absorb, neutralize and prevent odors being primarily for non-orthopedic purposes” in Class 25. In this context, “ODOR” means a scent or smell, and “AERATOR” refers to apparatus for introducing air into a material.  See attached dictionary evidence.

 

Generally, if the individual components of a mark retain their descriptive meaning in relation to the goods and/or services, the combination results in a composite mark that is itself descriptive and not registrable.  In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1516 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Tower Tech, Inc., 64 USPQ2d 1314, 1317-18 (TTAB (2002)); TMEP §1209.03(d); see, e.g., Apollo Med. Extrusion Techs., Inc. v. Med. Extrusion Techs., Inc., 123 USPQ2d 1844, 1851 (TTAB 2017) (holding MEDICAL EXTRUSION TECHNOLOGIES merely descriptive of medical extrusion goods produced by employing medical extrusion technologies); In re Cannon Safe, Inc., 116 USPQ2d 1348, 1351 (TTAB 2015) (holding SMART SERIES merely descriptive of metal gun safes); In re King Koil Licensing Co., 79 USPQ2d 1048, 1052 (TTAB 2006) (holding THE BREATHABLE MATTRESS merely descriptive of beds, mattresses, box springs, and pillows). 

 

Only where the combination of descriptive terms creates a unitary mark with a unique, incongruous, or otherwise nondescriptive meaning in relation to the goods and/or services is the combined mark registrable.  See In re Colonial Stores, Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 551, 157 USPQ 382, 384 (C.C.P.A. 1968); In re Positec Grp. Ltd., 108 USPQ2d 1161, 1162-63 (TTAB 2013).

 

In this case, both the individual components and the composite result are descriptive of applicant’s goods and do not create a unique, incongruous, or nondescriptive meaning in relation to the goods.  Specifically, applicant’s mark immediately conveys that its goods introduce air into smelly shoes or footwear.

 

In addition, the words ODOR and AERATOR are both frequently used by third parties to describe similar goods.  See previously attached evidence.

 

Because the mark merely describes a feature or characteristic of applicant’s goods, registration is refused under section 2(e)(1).

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

For this application to proceed toward registration, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement raised in this Office action. If the action includes a refusal, applicant may provide arguments and/or evidence as to why the refusal should be withdrawn and the mark should register. Applicant may also have other options for responding to a refusal and should consider such options carefully. To respond to requirements and certain refusal response options, applicant should set forth in writing the required changes or statements.

 

If applicant does not respond to this Office action within six months of the issue/mailing date, or responds by expressly abandoning the application, the application process will end, the trademark will fail to register, and the application fee will not be refunded. See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.65(a), 2.68(a), 2.209(a); TMEP §§405.04, 718.01, 718.02. Where the application has been abandoned for failure to respond to an Office action, applicant’s only option would be to file a timely petition to revive the application, which, if granted, would allow the application to return to active status. See 37 C.F.R. §2.66; TMEP §1714. There is a $100 fee for such petitions. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6, 2.66(b)(1).

 

If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney. All relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record; however, an e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response. See 37 C.F.R. §2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. Further, although the trademark examining attorney may provide additional explanation pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action, the trademark examining attorney may not provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights. See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.

 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action  

 

 

/C. Scott Strickland/

C. Scott Strickland

Examining Attorney

Law Office 122

571-272-3277

scott.strickland@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on October 28, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88285629

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/C. Scott Strickland/

C. Scott Strickland

Examining Attorney

Law Office 122

571-272-3277

scott.strickland@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from October 28, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond.

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”