UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.  A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.

 

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 3/4/2019

 

 

 

 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

 

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

 

• Refusal: Section 2(d) likelihood of confusion
• Requirement: Disclaimer of descriptive wording
• Requirement: Definite identification of goods and services
• Requirement: Complete and accurate mark description and color claim

 

 

 

REFUSAL: SECTION 2(d) LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 5003638 and 4886237.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations. Please note that one registrant owns both marks.

 

Introduction to Section 2(d) Analysis

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant(s).  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Determining likelihood of confusion is made on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  However, “[n]ot all of the [du Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1366, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601. F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir 2010)).  The USPTO may focus its analysis “on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods [and/or services].”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see TMEP §1207.01.

 

In any likelihood of confusion determination, two key considerations are similarity of the marks and similarity or relatedness of the goods and/or services.  In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1516 (TTAB 2016) (citing Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976)); see TMEP §1207.01.  That is, the marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  Additionally, the goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or commercially related or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §1207.01, (a)(vi).

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the goods and services, and similarity of the trade channels of the goods and services.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F. 3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In comparing the marks, the question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but whether the marks will confuse people into believing that the goods they identify come from the same source. In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 468 F.2d 200, 201, 175 USPQ 558, 558-59 (C.C.P.A. 1972); TMEP §1207.01(b). For that reason, when comparing marks, the test is not whether the marks can be distinguished in a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their overall commercial impression that confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services offered under the respective marks is likely to result.  Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d 1046, 1053, 103 USPQ2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d 1958, 1960 (TTAB 2016) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d at 1960 (citing Spoons Rests. Inc. v. Morrison Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1735, 1741 (TTAB 1991), aff’d per curiam, 972 F.2d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); In re C.H. Hanson Co., 116 USPQ2d 1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015) (citing Joel Gott Wines LLC v. Rehoboth Von Gott Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (TTAB 2013)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In this particular case, applicant’s mark is “SQORR” claimed in standard characters.

 

Registrant’s marks are “SQOR” claimed in standard characters and special form.

 

The first step in comparing the marks requires an evaluation of the commercial impression of the marks.  While marks are compared in their entireties, a trademark examining attorney may weigh the individual components of a mark to determine its overall commercial impression.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[Regarding the issue of confusion,] there is nothing improper in stating that . . . more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties.” (quoting In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).  One feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34).

 

Various factors are considered in determining this dominant element of a compound mark. For example, consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”). Additionally, for a composite mark containing both words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 

 

In applying these precepts to both the applicant’s and registrant’s marks, it is clear that applicant’s mark is similar in commercial impression to the registrant’s marks. In this case, the first elements in the parties’ marks are identical, their only difference lies in a doubled terminal letter. Applicant’s mark is merely the registrant’s marks with its terminal letter doubled. Because the additional letter in applicant’s mark is already present in the registrant’s marks, its addition does not affect the commercial impression established by the preceding letters in the marks. For this reason, the marks establish highly similar commercial impressions.

 

Applicant’s mark is also considered similar in sound to the registrant’s marks.  There is no correct pronunciation of a mark because it is impossible to predict how the public will pronounce a particular mark.  See Embarcadero Techs., Inc. v. RStudio, Inc., 105 USPQ2d 1825, 1835 (TTAB 2013) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1367, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1912 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re The Belgrade Shoe Co., 411 F.2d 1352, 1353, 162 USPQ 227, 227 (C.C.P.A. 1969)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).  The marks in question could clearly be pronounced the same, as “R” and “RR” are pronounced identically; such similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).

 

Moreover, applicant’s mark is also considered confusingly similar in appearance to the registrant’s marks.  Marks can be confusingly similar in appearance where there are similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appearing in both applicant’s and registrant’s mark.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH); In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp., 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (21 CLUB and “21” CLUB (stylized)); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS); In re Collegian Sportswear Inc., 224 USPQ 174 (TTAB 1984) (COLLEGIAN OF CALIFORNIA and COLLEGIENNE); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983) (MILTRON and MILLTRONICS); In re BASF A.G., 189 USPQ 424 (TTAB 1975) (LUTEXAL and LUTEX); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, the entirety of registrant’s marks are encompassed within applicant’s mark. Therefore, as identical elements appear in both applicant’s and registrant’s marks, applicant’s mark is also considered confusingly similar in appearance to the registrant’s marks.

 

Finally, it must be noted that one of registrant’s marks (Reg. No. 4886237) is presented in standard characters while applicant’s marks is presented in special form.  A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii).  Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the marks could be presented in the same manner of display.  See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”). Therefore, as registrant’s mark may be presented in the same manner of display as applicant’s mark, the marks are considered similar in appearance for this additional reason.

 

Comparison of the Goods & Services

 

Applicant’s and registrant’s goods and services are compared to determine whether they are similar or commercially related or travel in the same trade channels.  It is important to note that the goods and services of the parties need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[E]ven if the goods in question are different from, and thus not related to, one another in kind, the same goods and services can be related in the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the goods.”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).   The respective goods need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

In this case, applicant’s identified goods and services are, “Electronic game software; interactive game software; downloadable software application for games of skill related to sports” and “Entertainment services, namely, providing online computer and electronic games; provision of non-downloadable games on mobile and online platforms.”

 

Registrant’s identified services are, “Computer services provided over the global communications network, mobile devices, wireless Internet networks or systems and other computer and electronic communication networks, namely, providing online forums for communication on topics of sports and general interest; providing online communications links which transfer web site users to third party web sites relating to specific athletes; audio, text and video broadcasting services over computer or other communication networks, namely, broadcasting of electronically uploaded, posted, displayed, tagged and transmitted data, information, audio and video images” and “Providing a website for registered users featuring information, video and audio content relating to specific athletes for entertainment purposes; providing an Internet sports news portal featuring links to sports news stories and articles of others in the field of sports.”

 

Applicant’s and registrant’s goods and services are related in that they share the same subject matter- sports. Additionally, as the attached internet evidence demonstrates, these goods and services are not only related, but are found in similar trade channels and commonly emanate from a single source. For example, NFL Fantasy Football and Yahoo Fantasy Sports provide electronic game software in the field of sports, content relating to specific athletes for entertainment purposes, online computer and electronic games, Internet sports news portal featuring links to sports news stories and articles of others in the field of sports. See, http://fantasy.nfl.com/, http://military.fantasy.nfl.com/, http://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.nfl.fantasy.core.android&hl=en_US, http://weeklypickem.fantasy.nfl.com/; http://sports.yahoo.com/fantasy/, http://basketball.fantasysports.yahoo.com/, http://itunes.apple.com/us/app/yahoo-fantasy-football-more/id328415391?mt=8. This attached Internet evidence establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant goods and services and markets the goods and services under the same mark and that they are used by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use. Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

The trademark examining attorney has attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of a number of third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar goods and services as those of both applicant and registrant in this case.  This evidence shows that the goods and services listed therein- namely, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and services as identified, above – are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark.  See In re Aquamar, Inc., 115 USPQ2d 1122, 1126 n.5 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).

 

As the attached internet evidence and third-party registrations demonstrate, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and services are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009). Thus, as applicant’s and registrant’s goods and services are commercially related and travel in the same trade channels, the goods and services would be encountered by the same consumers under circumstances such that offering them under similar marks would lead to the mistaken belief that they come from, or are in some way associated with, the same source.

 

Therefore, in light of the foregoing, applicant’s mark is similar in sound, appearance and commercial impression to the registrant’s mark, and applicant’s goods and services are related to the registrant’s services. As such, a likelihood of confusion exists between the applicant’s and registrant’s marks.  Consequently, registration is denied for the applied for mark. 

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

 

Applicant must respond to the requirement(s) set forth below.

 

 

 

REQUIREMENT: DISCLAIMER OF DESCRIPTIVE WORDING

 

Applicant must provide a disclaimer of the unregistrable part(s) of the applied-for mark even though the mark as a whole appears to be registrable.  See 15 U.S.C. §1056(a); TMEP §§1213, 1213.03(a).  A disclaimer of an unregistrable part of a mark will not affect the mark’s appearance.  See Schwarzkopf v. John H. Breck, Inc., 340 F.2d 978, 979-80, 144 USPQ 433, 433 (C.C.P.A. 1965). This unregistrable term merely descriptive of an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of applicant’s goods and/or services.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1251, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1755 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §§1213, 1213.03(a). 

 

In this case, applicant must disclaim SQORR. A novel spelling or an intentional misspelling that is the phonetic equivalent of a merely descriptive word or term is also merely descriptive if purchasers would perceive the different spelling as the equivalent of the descriptive word or term.  See In re Quik-Print Copy Shop, Inc., 616 F.2d 523, 526 & n.9, 205 USPQ 505, 507 & n.9 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (holding “QUIK-PRINT,” phonetic spelling of “quick-print,” merely descriptive of printing and photocopying services); In re Calphalon Corp., 122 USPQ2d 1153, 1163 (TTAB 2017) (holding “SHARPIN”, phonetic spelling of “sharpen,” merely descriptive of cutlery knife blocks with built-in sharpeners); In re Carlson, 91 USPQ2d 1198, 1203 (TTAB 2009) (holding “URBANHOUZING,” phonetic spelling of “urban” and “housing,” merely descriptive of real estate services); TMEP §1209.03(j). In this case, applicant’s mark is the phonetic equivalent of the term “score,” as “SQ” and “SC” can be pronounced  identically and “or” and “ore” are also pronounced identically. See, “(skwâr)” and “(skôr)” http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=square, http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=score; “(ôr)” http://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=ore, http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=or. Thus, purchasers would perceive SQORR as the equivalent of “score.”  “Score” is defined as, “The number of points attributed to a competitor or team.” http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=score. In this case, applicant’s game awards points to players thereby giving them a score. See, http://sqorr.co/Rules%20&%20Scoring/Rules%20&%20Scoring.html,  http://sqorr.co/FAQs/FAQs.html. Thus, as applicant’s game attributes scores to competitors, the term “score” is merely descriptive of a feature and characteristic of applicant’s goods and services, and its phonetic equivalent, SQORR, is also merely descriptive of a feature and characteristic of applicant’s goods and services and must be disclaimed.

 

Please note that the wording “SQORR” must appear in its correct spelling, i.e., “SCORE” in the disclaimer.  See In re Omaha Nat’l Corp., 819 F.2d 1117, 1119, 2 USPQ2d 1859, 1861 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re Carlson, 91 USPQ2d 1198, 1203 (TTAB 2009); TMEP §1213.08(c).

 

Applicant may respond to this issue by submitting a disclaimer in the following format: 

 

No claim is made to the exclusive right to use “SCORE” apart from the mark as shown. 

 

For an overview of disclaimers and instructions on how to satisfy this issue using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), see the Disclaimer webpage. 

 

 

 

REQUIREMENT: DEFINITE IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS & SERVICES

 

Class 9

 

The wording “    Electronic game software; interactive game software” in the identification of goods must be clarified because it is too broad and could include goods in other international classes.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §§1402.01, 1402.03.  The filing date of this application is post 01-01-2019. Under Nice 11-2019, which came into effect on 01-01-2019, computer software must be specified as “downloadable” and/or “recorded” in order for the goods to remain in International Class 9. Otherwise, the game software will be likely be classified in International Class 41 as online, non-downloadable software. Therefore, applicant must clarify whether its “Electronic game software; interactive game software” are recorded or downloaded in for this wording for this wording to remain in Class 9. Applicant may adopt the following substitute wording in Class 9, if accurate: “Downloadable electronic game software; downloadable interactive game software.”

 

Class 41

 

The wording “entertainment services, namely, providing entertainment videos related to sports and entertainment events and games of skill” in the identification of services is indefinite and must be clarified to indicate that the videos are non-downloadable and for temporary use and the nature of the “entertainment events” of which videos are provided.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01.  Applicant may substitute the following wording, if accurate:  entertainment services, namely, providing temporary use of online non-downloadable entertainment videos related to sports and entertainment events in the field of games of skill

 

 

In light of the foregoing, applicant may adopt the following substitute identification of goods and services in its entirety, if accurate:

 

International Class 9: Downloadable electronic game software; downloadable interactive game software; downloadable software application for games of skill related to sports

 

International Class 41: Entertainment services, namely, providing online computer and electronic games; provision of non-downloadable games on mobile and online platforms; entertainment services, namely, providing temporary use of online non-downloadable entertainment videos related to sports and entertainment events in the field of games of skill

 

 

Applicant may amend the identification to clarify or limit the goods and/or services, but not to broaden or expand the goods and/or services beyond those in the original application or as acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Generally, any deleted goods and/or services may not later be reinserted.  See TMEP §1402.07(e).

 

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual.  See TMEP §1402.04.

 

 

 

REQUIREMENT: COMPLETE AND ACCURATE MARK DESCRIPTION AND COLOR CLAIM

 

Applicant must amend the color claim and description to identify all the colors in the drawing of the mark.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.52(b)(1); TMEP §807.07(a)-(a)(ii).  The following colors have been omitted from the color claim and description:  gray. 

 

A complete color claim must reference all the colors appearing in the drawing of the mark.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.52(b)(1); TMEP §§807.07(a) et seq.  Similarly, a complete description of a mark depicted in color must specify where the colors appear in the literal and design elements of the mark.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.37, 2.52(b)(1); TMEP §§807.07(a) et seq.  If black, white, and/or gray represent background, outlining, shading, and/or transparent areas and are not part of the mark, applicant must so specify in the description.  See TMEP §807.07(d).

 

The following color claim and description are suggested, if accurate:

 

Color claim:  The colors black, gray, blue and red are claimed as a feature of the mark.

 

Description:  The mark consists of the stylized black word “SQORR” wherein a red and blue checkmark comprises part of the “Q”. The stylized gray wording “OUR GAME YOUR SKILL” is located below “ORR”.

 

 

 

RESPONSE/CORRESPONDENCE INFORMATION & GUIDELINES

 

For consideration of arguments regarding any substantive refusal to be considered, they must be filed in a formal response.  TMEP §709.05.

 

Informal communications with the examining attorney “may not be used to request advisory opinions as to the likelihood of overcoming a substantive refusal.” TMEP §709.05.

 

“USPTO employees cannot give advice on trademark law.  It is inappropriate for USPTO personnel to give legal advice, to act as a counselor for individuals…. 37 C.F.R. §2.11.” TMEP §709.06.

 

Examining attorneys cannot provide any statements about applicants’ rights; “the examining attorney’s responsibility is limited to evaluating the registrability of the mark presented in the application. See In re Am. Physical Fitness Research Inst. Inc., 181 USPQ 127, 127–28 (TTAB 1974); see also TMEP §1801.” TMEP §705.02

 

The trademark examining attorney may only provide additional clarification pertaining to the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  To this end, applicant may telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney. 

 

An e-mail communication will not be accepted as a response to this Office action and will not extend the deadline for filing a proper response; all relevant e-mail communications will be placed in the official application record. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62 (c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.

 

Response guidelines.  For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action.  For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above.  For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements.  Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.

 

To expedite prosecution of the application, applicant is encouraged to file its response to this Office action online via the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), which is available at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/index.jsp.  If applicant has technical questions about the TEAS response to Office action form, applicant can review the electronic filing tips available online at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/e_filing_tips.jsp and e-mail technical questions to TEAS@uspto.gov.  Additional instructions for responding to this Office action are located below the signature block.

 

If applicant does not respond to this Office action within six months of the issue/mailing date, or responds by expressly abandoning the application, the application process will end and the trademark will fail to register.  See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.65(a), 2.68(a); TMEP §§718.01, 718.02.  Additionally, the USPTO will not refund the application filing fee, which is a required processing fee.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(i)-(iv), 2.209(a); TMEP §405.04.

 

 

 

 

/N. Gretchen Ulrich/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 113

U.S. Patent & Trademark Office

phone: (571) 272-1951

gretchen.ulrich@uspto.gov

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 3/4/2019 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 88283175

 

Please follow the instructions below:

 

(1)  TO READ THE LETTER:  Click on this link or go to http://tsdr.uspto.gov,enter the U.S. application serial number, and click on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification.

 

(2)  TIMELY RESPONSE IS REQUIRED:  Please carefully review the Office action to determine (1) how to respond, and (2) the applicable response time period.  Your response deadline will be calculated from 3/4/2019 (or sooner if specified in the Office action).  A response transmitted through the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) must be received before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  For information regarding response time periods, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/responsetime.jsp.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise e-mail your response because the USPTO does NOT accept e-mails as responses to Office actions.  Instead, the USPTO recommends that you respond online using the TEAS response form located at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.

 

(3)  QUESTIONS:  For questions about the contents of the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  For technical assistance in accessing or viewing the Office action in the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system, please e-mail TSDR@uspto.gov.

 

WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable response deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.  For more information regarding abandonment, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/basics/abandon.jsp.

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.