Response to Office Action

Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 no persons are required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control number. PTO Form 1957 (Rev 10/2011)

OMB No. 0651-0050 (Exp 09/20/2020)

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Under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 no persons are required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control number. PTO Form 1957 (Rev 10/2011)

OMB No. 0651-0050 (Exp 09/20/2020)

Response to Office Action

To the Commissioner for Trademarks:

Application serial no. 88279430 PROBOT(Standard Characters, see http://uspto.report/TM/88279430/mark.png) has been amended as follows:

ARGUMENT(S)
In response to the substantive refusal(s), please note the following:

iClassPro, Inc. (?Applicant?) applied on January 28, 2019, for registration of ?Probot? (the ?Mark?) as a standard character trademark on the Principal Register in connection with ?artificial intelligence assistant used for management of and assistance with registration, support, attendance, scheduling, kiosks, and payments? (Serial No. 88279430). On April 18, 2019, Applicant received an Office Action from the USPTO requiring that Applicant address three issues: (1) Identification of Goods; (2) Multiple Class Requirements; and (3) Likelihood of Confusion. Applicant addresses each issue in turn, below. 1. IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS AND/OR SERVICES In light of the Examining Attorney?s comments, Applicant seeks to adopt the following identification of its goods as follows: ?Artificial intelligence assistant used for classroom management and assistance, namely, registration, support, attendance, scheduling, and payments for use in the field of education.? 2. MULTIPLE CLASS REQUIREMENTS Applicant avers that in light of the modification to its description of goods and services above, the multiple class requirement appears to no longer be necessary. If the Examining Attorney has a different interpretation, please let counsel for Applicant know. 3. THERE IS NO LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION BETWEEN THE MARK AND OTHER MARKS The Examining Attorney contends that Applicant?s Mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with ?PROBOT? (Reg. No. 5472763) and ?PROBOT? (Reg. No. 3653116) (collectively, the ?Registered Marks?). For the reasons outlined below, there is no likelihood of confusion, and registration of Applicant?s Mark should be permitted. In the seminal case involving confusion between trademarks, Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed the factors relevant to a determination of likelihood of confusion. Where the products are different, the prior owner's chance of success is a function of several factors: i. Strength of the prior mark; ii. Degree of similarity between the two marks; iii. Proximity of the products; iv. Likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap; v. Actual confusion; vi. Reciprocal of defendant's good faith in adopting its own mark; vii. Quality of defendant's product; and viii. Sophistication of the buyers. Even this extensive list does not exhaust the possibilities of such factors to consider?the USPTO may have to take still others into account. As clearly demonstrated below, there is no reasonable basis for a finding that a likelihood of confusion exists between Applicant?s Mark and the Registered Marks. The visual similarity between the marks alone is insufficient to support refusal of registration, as trademarks may contain similar elements without being confusing. There is a substantial distinction in the type of product, consumers, and industries relevant to each mark. As discussed below, in totality, the Polaroid factors weigh heavily in favor of no likelihood of confusion between the marks. (i) Strength of the Registered Marks The strength of the prior registrant?s mark is a factor considered in determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists. See El Chico, Inc. v. El Chico Cafe, 214 F.2d 721, 102 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 267 (5th Cir. 1954). The general rule is that the ?strength of the mark? factor favors an ultimate conclusion that confusion is likely when the senior user?s mark is strong. Id. Here, the Registered Marks have no strength in the marketplace. Specifically, a simple internet search reveals that the marketplace is saturated with use of some iteration of ?PROBOT.? Applicant has attached screenshots of these search results?where Applicant?s counsel searched ?probot? and ?ai?? along with this response. This list is what Applicant was able to find as a result of a mere five minute internet search, which upon further investigation would undoubtedly reveal countless other entities that include some iteration of ?ProBot.? Applicant further notes that many of these pertain to various artificial intelligence platforms. Accordingly, use of various iterations of ?ProBot? in the marketplace is diluted such that the Registered Marks have no significant commercial strength. (ii) Similarity of the Marks Applicant acknowledges that there are similarities between the marks. However, the owners of the Registered Marks cannot corner the market with regard to any mark containing the phrases ?pro? and ?bot.? When comparing marks, it is inappropriate to consider their similarity when viewed as independent icons alone?a view of the mark as a whole is necessary. See Western Chemical Pumps, Inc. v. Superior Mfg., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1112 (D. Kan. 1997); Top Tobacco, L.P. v. North Atlantic Operating Co., Inc., 2007 WL 118527 (N.D. Ill. 2007), aff'd, 509 F.3d 380 (7th Cir. 2007). Under In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., marks are compared for similarity or dissimilarity in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973). Marks containing common elements are not likely to be confused if: ?(1) the marks in their entireties convey significantly different commercial impressions or (2) the matter common to the marks is not likely to be perceived by purchasers as distinguishing source because it is merely descriptive or diluted.? For example, in the case of In re Shawnee Milling Co., 225 USPQ 747 (TTAB 1985), GOLDEN CRUST for flour was held not likely to be confused with ADOLPH?S GOLD?N CRUST for coating and seasoning for food items. Similarly, In re Farm Fresh Catfish Co., 231 USPQ 495 (TTAB 1986), held that CATFISH BOBBERS, with ?CATFISH? disclaimed, for fish was not likely to be confused with BOBBER for restaurant services. In this case, the commonality between the marks is iterations of ?pro? and ?bot.? However, Applicant?s Mark is being used to offer an artificial intelligence platform geared specifically towards educators. The owners of the Registered Marks are selling industrial robots and 3-D printers. Thus, Applicant?s goods are marketed to a very specific industry, and the Mark used in tandem with these goods creates a commercial impression that is inherently distinct from that created by the Registered Marks, in that it exclusively appeals to and catches the attention of professionals in the education industry. Moreover, the existence of a term in several third party registrations indicates the weakness of the term. AMF Inc. v. American League Products, Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (CCPA 1973). A search of the Trademark Office website demonstrates that some iteration of ?pro? and ?bot? together appears in at least six (6) applications/registrations, ?pro? appears in 15,400 applications/registrations, and ?bot? appears in 704 applications/registrations?therefore, these are diluted terms. The entirely distinct commercial impressions created by the marks?they offer completely separate goods appealing to completely different groups of people?and the saturation the terms ?pro? and ?bot? in the marketplace clearly demonstrate that, despite some similar elements, the marks are not likely to be confused. Importantly, it also speaks volumes that Probot (Reg. No. 5472763), owned by Cellink AB out of Gothenburg, Sweden, and Probot (Reg. No. 3653116), owned by American Handling Systems, Inc. out of Laurens, Iowa were both permitted to register without issue despite the fact that American Handling Systems?s mark had already been registered for nine years when Cellink?s was permitted to registered. If these marks do not share a likelihood of confusion sufficient to warrant refusal?even where both marks are used in connection with equipment (printers and industrial robots)?then Applicant?s Mark similarly bears no likelihood of confusion warranting refusal. (iii) Similarity of the Products or Services In this instance, the only similarity between the products promoted by the marks is that all marks are used in the most general sense to promote technology. Otherwise, the products themselves could not be more dissimilar. The goods and services relevant to each mark at issue are listed below: Applicant?s Mark, as amended per the Examining Attorney?s instruction: ?Artificial intelligence assistant used for classroom management and assistance, namely, registration, support, attendance, scheduling, and payments for use in the field of education.? ?Probot? (Reg. No. 5472763): computerized printers and 3-D manufacturing machines ?Probot? (Reg. No. 3653116): industrial robots. As indicated by the above, Applicant sells its artificial intelligence assistant?which is wholly software or interface based (i.e., it does not consist of any physical, material form) and is aimed specifically towards the education community. In short, Applicant?s product helps teachers, schools, and other educators with scheduling, tuition or other payments, attendance, and other administrative matters typically involved in running an educational program. In contrast, the owners of the Registered Marks sell industrial equipment, namely, computerized printers, 3-D manufacturing machines, and industrial robots. As such, the level of intricate coding design that goes into the development of Applicant?s goods makes them wholly dissimilar from the products offered by the owners of the Registered Marks. These distinctions make the goods incapable of being confused by the same potential buyers. The buyers are completely different. After all, similarity in itself is not the test; whether the similarity is likely to result in confusion is the crucial question. Vision, Inc. v. Parks, 610 F. Supp. 927, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 924, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Vision USA not confusingly similar to Vision and The Vision Letter; confusion, not similarity, is the issue.); Moore Business Forms, Inc. v. Rite Aid Corp., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2024, 2027, 1991 WL 275499 (W.D.N.Y. 1991), order modified on reconsideration, 1992 WL 125561 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 983 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1992) (virtually identical marks not confusingly similar in view of differences between services); Sun Banks of Florida, Inc. v. Sun Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 311, 317?18, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 844, 850 (5th Cir. 1981); General Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1442, 1445 (8th Cir. 1987)(?The use of identical, even dominant, words in common does not automatically mean that two marks are [confusingly] similar.?). Here, Applicant?s Mark and the Registered Marks may all be used to market various subsets of technology, but the distinctions between the type of technology and the relevant consumers are so completely and absolutely different that there is no chance of confusion to consumers. Applicant?s product is useful to and sold only to education professionals, whereas the owners of the Registered Marks are selling products intended for use in the industrial and manufacturing process. These products would never be found in the same marketplace, despite both marks? classification as technology. Though the classification of goods might be the same (i.e.; technology), this similarity does not meet the required standard because it is not a similarity at all likely to result in confusion. (iv) Likelihood that the Owners of the Registered Marks Will Bridge the Gap ?Bridging the gap? refers to one of the parties becoming a more direct competitor of the other, and is based on the idea that the senior user is entitled to its natural area of expansion, and, therefore, should not be prevented from using its known-mark on such goods or services if it has the capacity to do so. In this instance, as Applicant?s services consist of offering an artificial intelligence assistant for use in the educational system. The owners of the Registered Marks offer industrial equipment?products which strongly suggest that they have no intention of offering artificial intelligence for use in the field of education. Even if the owners of the Registered Marks were to claim that they intended to bridge the gap between the marks, their mere intention to bridge the gap does not support a finding that it is likely to do so. Motown Productions, Inc. v. Cacomm, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 285, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1859, 1864 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd on other gds, 849 F.2d 781, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1320 (2d Cir. 1988); Lang v. Retirement Living Pub. Co., Inc., 949 F.2d 576, 579, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1041 (2d Cir. 1991); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. AJV Computerized Data Management, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 630, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1432, (E.D.N.Y. 1995). Some courts have even required a ?strong possibility? that one party will expand its business to compete with the other as a basis for inferring a likelihood of confusion. AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 354, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 808 (9th Cir. 1979); Bioglan Inc. v. Bioglan Laboratories Ltd., 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1662, 1669, 1997 WL 732340 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Kingsford Products Co. v. Kingsfords, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1013, 1019, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1350 (D. Kan. 1989), aff'd, 931 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1991). There is no likelihood that the Registered Marks will bridge the gap between the marks. The gap between the relevant audiences?educators and manufacturers?is so substantial that it is inconceivable that the Registered Marks would bridge it. In order to bridge the gap between the marks, the owners of the Registered Marks would have to commit an extraordinary amount of time, research, and expense in order to cross the gap from manufacturing to education in order to offer its goods to the field of education, and there is simply no evidence to support that they have any intention of doing so, or more importantly, that they are likely to do so. Thus, there no evidence to support a finding that the owners of the Registered Marks will bridge the gap between the marks. (v) Applicant?s Intent in Adopting the Mark Applicant?s Mark was created through the team work and thought processes of Applicant?s creative team, without any intent to capitalize on any purported recognition (of which Applicant has found no evidence) of the Registered Marks. Applicant has acted solely in good faith in adopting its Mark. (vi) Evidence of Actual Confusion There is absolutely no evidence demonstrating actual confusion between the marks. Moreover, as discussed below, such confusion would be inconceivable considering the sophisticated nature of Applicant?s buyers and those buyers purchasing goods connected to the Registered Marks. (vii) Sophistication of the Buyers An analysis of the sophistication of the buyer looks to ?the level of sophistication of the relevant purchasers? of the parties? services, which is done by considering ?[t]he general impression of the ordinary purchaser, buying under the normally prevalent conditions of the market and giving the attention such purchasers usually give in buying that class of goods.? W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 575, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1593 (2d Cir. 1993). Generally, the more sophisticated and careful the average consumer of a product is, the less likely that similar trademarks will result in confusion concerning the source or sponsorship of the product. 7 Bus. & Com. Litig. Fed. Cts. ? 87:22 (3d ed.). See also Sly Magazine, LLC v. Weider Publications L.L.C., 346 Fed. Appx. 721 (2d Cir. 2009). The pricing for a type of product may influence whether it attracts sophisticated or casual purchasers, and thus may be a consideration for determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion in the marketplace. Audemars Piguet Holding S.A. v. Swiss Watch Intern., Inc., 2014 WL 47465, at *13 (S.D. N.Y. 2014). There is no doubt that consumers in both the education and manufacturing industries constitute sophisticated purchasers. In Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201 (1st Cir. 1983), the court noted that ?the most critical factor that weigh[ed] against Astra . . . [was] the sophistication of the class of prospective purchasers.? Id. at 1206. As such, a finding of no likelihood of confusion is warranted where one mark promotes highly specialized, industry-specific artificial intelligence software and the other promotes manufacturing equipment and robots?products appealing to entirely distinct groups of consumers. In each instance, given that both sets of consumers are, in fact, sophisticated, neither will be confused as to the source of the other?s products. Put simply, no educator is going to confused that his or her artificial intelligence assistance is from the same source as the industrial robot used to build or car, or the 3-D manufacturing machine that built the parts for her car. The substantial difference between the goods offered by Applicant and those offered by the owners of the Registered Marks leaves no room for any confusion as to the source of Applicant?s Mark, especially when the nature of the relevant consumers is considered. Moreover, while the goods sold in connection with Applicant?s mark are certainly not inexpensive, they are no doubt dwarfed in comparison with the costs associated with 3-D printers and industrial robots. This combination of a very specific group of sophisticated purchasers and the prohibitive cost of impulsively buying the goods associated with the Registered Marks, necessitates the conclusion that consumers will not confuse Applicant?s Mark with the Registered Marks. (viii) Quality of TK3?s Products or Services Under some circumstances, ?if the quality of the junior user?s product is low relative to the senior user?s, then this increases the chance of actual injury where there is confusion.? Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F3d 439, 460?61 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 822 (2005). However, many courts have found this factor to weigh in favor of the junior user when its products are of equal or superior quality. W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Gillette Co., 808 F. Supp. 1013, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1619 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), amended, (July 14, 1992), aff'd, 984 F.2d 567, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1593, 1599?1600 (2d Cir. 1993); Giorgio Beverly Hills, Inc. v. Revlon Consumer Products Corp., 869 F. Supp. 176, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1471 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Otokoyama Co. Ltd. v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 372, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1194, 1200 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), vacated on other grounds, 175 F.3d 266, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1626, 51 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1184 (2d Cir. 1999). Applicant declines to provide detailed commentary concerning the quality of the goods and services offered in connection with the Registered Marks, other than to note that they consist of industrial and manufacturing equipment. The products offered by Applicant constitute artificial intelligence software used exclusively by professionals in the education field. Thus, there is virtually no argument to be made that Applicant?s goods and services are in any way inferior to the goods and services offered in connection with the Registered Marks. (ix) Totality of the Polaroid Factors When considered together, the Polaroid factors undeniably weigh in favor of Applicant and demonstrate that there is no likelihood of confusion between the Registered Marks and Applicant?s Mark. Though the marks may have some similar elements, this alone is not dispositive of a likelihood of confusion. The sophistication of Applicant?s goods and consumers far outweighs any visual similarity between the marks. Even though all marks include similar elements, consumers will not confuse goods intended for the education industry with goods intended for use in the industrial and manufacturing process, particularly because the marketplaces are completely distinct. Therefore, there will be no confusion with Applicant?s Mark, and thus no need to refuse registration of Applicant?s Mark on the Principal Register. 4. CONCLUSION Applicant believes that the discussion above sufficiently resolves the issues noted by the Examining Attorney. Applicant avers that its description of goods is better described as listed above. Moreover, Applicant respectfully avers that there is no basis for arguing a likelihood of confusion between Applicant?s Mark and the Registered Marks, as all of the likelihood of confusion factors are heavily weighted in favor of Applicant. The substantial distinctions between the marks ensure that no consumer will confused as to the source of Applicant?s goods. Since there is no likelihood of confusion between the marks, there is no need to refuse registration of Applicant?s mark. Applicant thanks the Examining Attorney for her time and consideration of this response, and for the reasons and revisions stated above, respectfully requests that the USPTO accept the ?Probot? mark for filing on the Principal Register.

EVIDENCE
Evidence in the nature of The attached evidences dilution as indicated in Applicant's response. has been attached. Evidence-1
Evidence-2
Evidence-3

CLASSIFICATION AND LISTING OF GOODS/SERVICES

Applicant proposes to amend the following class of goods/services in the application:
Current: Class 009 for Artificial intelligence assistant used for management of and assistance with registration, support, attendance, scheduling, kiosks, and payments
Original Filing Basis:
Filing Basis: Section 1(b), Intent to Use: For a trademark or service mark application: As of the application filing date, the applicant had a bona fide intention, and was entitled, to use the mark in commerce on or in connection with the identified goods/services in the application. For a collective trademark, collective service mark, or collective membership mark application: As of the application filing date, the applicant had a bona fide intention, and was entitled, to exercise legitimate control over the use of the mark in commerce by members on or in connection with the identified goods/services/collective membership organization. For a certification mark application: As of the application filing date, the applicant had a bona fide intention, and was entitled, to exercise legitimate control over the use of the mark in commerce by authorized users in connection with the identified goods/services, and the applicant will not engage in the production or marketing of the goods/services to which the mark is applied, except to advertise or promote recognition of the certification program or of the goods/services that meet the certification standards of the applicant.

Proposed:
Tracked Text Description: Artificial intelligence assistant used for management of and assistance with registration, support, attendance, scheduling, kiosks, and payments; Artificial intelligence assistant used for classroom management and assistance, namely, registration, support, attendance, scheduling, and payments for use in the field of educationClass 009 for Artificial intelligence assistant used for classroom management and assistance, namely, registration, support, attendance, scheduling, and payments for use in the field of education
Filing Basis: Section 1(b), Intent to Use: For a trademark or service mark application: As of the application filing date, the applicant had a bona fide intention, and was entitled, to use the mark in commerce on or in connection with the identified goods/services in the application. For a collective trademark, collective service mark, or collective membership mark application: As of the application filing date, the applicant had a bona fide intention, and was entitled, to exercise legitimate control over the use of the mark in commerce by members on or in connection with the identified goods/services/collective membership organization. For a certification mark application: As of the application filing date, the applicant had a bona fide intention, and was entitled, to exercise legitimate control over the use of the mark in commerce by authorized users in connection with the identified goods/services, and the applicant will not engage in the production or marketing of the goods/services to which the mark is applied, except to advertise or promote recognition of the certification program or of the goods/services that meet the certification standards of the applicant.

The applicant's current attorney information: Brian A. Cowan. Brian A. Cowan of BRADLEY MURCHISON KELLY & SHEA LLC, is located at

      401 EDWARDS STREET, SUITE 1000
      SHREVEPORT, Louisiana 71101
      US

The phone number is 318-227-1131.

The email address is agable@bradleyfirm.com

The applicants proposed attorney information: Brian A. Cowan. Brian A. Cowan of BRADLEY MURCHISON KELLY & SHEA LLC, is a member of the XX bar, admitted to the bar in XXXX, bar membership no. XXX, is located at

      401 EDWARDS STREET, SUITE 1000
      SHREVEPORT, Louisiana 71101
      United States

The phone number is 318-227-1131.

The email address is agable@bradleyfirm.com

Brian A. Cowan submitted the following statement: The attorney of record is an active member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a U.S. state, the District of Columbia, or any U.S. Commonwealth or territory.
The applicant's current correspondence information: BRIAN A. COWAN. BRIAN A. COWAN of BRADLEY MURCHISON KELLY & SHEA LLC, is located at

      401 EDWARDS STREET, SUITE 1000
      SHREVEPORT, Louisiana 71101
      US

The phone number is 318-227-1131.

The email address is agable@bradleyfirm.com; bcowan@bradleyfirm.com; kburnley@bradleyfirm.com; mlee@bradleyfirm.com

The applicants proposed correspondence information: Brian A. Cowan. Brian A. Cowan of BRADLEY MURCHISON KELLY & SHEA LLC, is located at

      401 EDWARDS STREET, SUITE 1000
      SHREVEPORT, Louisiana 71101
      United States

The phone number is 318-227-1131.

The email address is agable@bradleyfirm.com; bcowan@bradleyfirm.com; kburnley@bradleyfirm.com; mlee@bradleyfirm.com

SIGNATURE(S)
Response Signature
Signature: /Brian A. Cowan/     Date: 10/04/2019
Signatory's Name: Brian A. Cowan
Signatory's Position: Attorney of Record, Louisiana Bar Member

Signatory's Phone Number: 3182271131

The signatory has confirmed that he/she is a U.S.-licensed attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a U.S. state (including the District of Columbia and any U.S. Commonwealth or territory); and he/she is currently the owner's/holder's attorney or an associate thereof; and to the best of his/her knowledge, if prior to his/her appointment another U.S.-licensed attorney not currently associated with his/her company/firm previously represented the owner/holder in this matter: the owner/holder has revoked their power of attorney by a signed revocation or substitute power of attorney with the USPTO; the USPTO has granted that attorney's withdrawal request; the owner/holder has filed a power of attorney appointing him/her in this matter; or the owner's/holder's appointed U.S.-licensed attorney has filed a power of attorney appointing him/her as an associate attorney in this matter.

Mailing Address:    BRIAN A. COWAN
   BRADLEY MURCHISON KELLY & SHEA LLC
   
   401 EDWARDS STREET, SUITE 1000
   SHREVEPORT, Louisiana 71101
Mailing Address:    Brian A. Cowan
   BRADLEY MURCHISON KELLY & SHEA LLC
   401 EDWARDS STREET, SUITE 1000
   SHREVEPORT, Louisiana 71101
        
Serial Number: 88279430
Internet Transmission Date: Fri Oct 04 14:12:18 EDT 2019
TEAS Stamp: USPTO/ROA-XX.XXX.XXX.XX-2019100414121872
0872-88279430-61040d46788c55161398d2bdbb
325b1653113f19aea6747be60b387b77e9ebc2df
2-N/A-N/A-20191004140843538404