To: | The University of Mississippi (mpaul@stites.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88271192 - FLYING CARE TO PEOPLE - 11637N160143 |
Sent: | October 11, 2019 11:17:32 AM |
Sent As: | ecom121@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88271192
Mark: FLYING CARE TO PEOPLE
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: The University of Mississippi
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Reference/Docket No. 11637N160143
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: October 11, 2019
This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on 10/3/19.
In a previous Office action dated 4/3/19, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following: Trademark Act Section 2(e)1 for being merely descriptive.
The trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal in the summary of issues below. See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.
SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:
SECTION 2(f) ACQUIRED DISTINCTIVENESS
Applicant’s claim of acquired distinctiveness is denied for the following reasons.
An applicant bears the burden of proving that a mark has acquired distinctiveness under Trademark Act Section 2(f). In re La. Fish Fry Prods., Ltd., 797 F.3d 1332, 1335, 116 USPQ2d 1262, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1212.01. “To show that a mark has acquired distinctiveness, an applicant must demonstrate that the relevant public understands the primary significance of the mark as identifying the source of a product or service rather than the product or service itself.” In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1297, 75 USPQ2d at 1422. In this case the applicant has not met their burden provided sufficient evidence that the mark has acquired distictivnessness.
Allegations of sales and advertising expenditures do not per se establish that a term has acquired significance as a mark. See TMEP §1212.06(b). An applicant must also provide the actual advertising material so that the examining attorney may determine how the term is used, the commercial impression created by such use, and the significance the term would have to prospective purchasers. TMEP §1212.06(b); see In re Boston Beer Co., 198 F.3d 1370, 1373, 53 USPQ2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Packaging Specialists, Inc., 221 USPQ 917, 920 (TTAB 1984).
The ultimate test in determining acquisition of distinctiveness under Section 2(f) is not applicant’s efforts, but applicant’s success in educating the public to associate the claimed mark with a single source. Apollo Med. Extrusion Techs., Inc. v. Med. Extrusion Techs., Inc., 123 USPQ2d 1844, 1856 (TTAB 2017) (citing In re Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1125, 227 USPQ 417, 422 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re LC Trademarks, Inc., 121 USPQ2d 1197, 1208 (TTAB 2016); In re Pennzoil Prods. Co., 20 USPQ2d 1753, 1760-61 (TTAB 1991)); TMEP §1212.06(b).
Applicant provided affidavits and declarations from applicant’s employees, officers, and/or attorney to support applicant’s claim that the applied-for mark acquired distinctiveness under Trademark Act Section 2(f). See 15 U.S.C. §1052(f). Although consumer affidavits and declarations that assert recognition of a mark as an indicator of source are relevant in establishing acquired distinctiveness, affidavits and declarations of an applicant’s employees, officers, and attorneys are usually self-serving and entitled to little weight. See In re David Crystal, Inc., 296 F.2d 771, 773, 132 USPQ 1, 2 (C.C.P.A. 1961); In re Gray Inc., 3 USPQ2d 1558, 1560 (TTAB 1987); In re Cent. Counties Bank, 209 USPQ 884, 888 (TTAB 1981); TMEP §1212.06(c). Applicant’s sole evidence of acquired distinctiveness is this self-serving evidence. Thus applicant has not met their burden of proving acquired distinctiveness.
An applicant bears the burden of proving that a mark has acquired distinctiveness under Trademark Act Section 2(f). In re La. Fish Fry Prods., Ltd., 797 F.3d 1332, 1335, 116 USPQ2d 1262, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1212.01. “To show that a mark has acquired distinctiveness, an applicant must demonstrate that the relevant public understands the primary significance of the mark as identifying the source of a product or service rather than the product or service itself.” In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1297, 75 USPQ2d at 1422.
In the present case, applicant’s evidence consists of the following: a declaration from applicant’s attorney. This evidence is insufficient to show acquired distinctiveness of the applied-for mark because the evidence is self-serving and does not demonstrate that the relevant public understands the primary significance of the mark as identifying the source of a product or service rather than the product or service itself.
To support the claim of acquired distinctiveness, applicant may respond by submitting additional evidence. See TMEP §1212.02(g). Such evidence may include “advertising expenditures, sales success, length and exclusivity of use, unsolicited media coverage, and consumer studies (linking the name to a source).” In re Change Wind Corp., 123 USPQ2d 1453, 1467 (TTAB 2017) (quoting In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1300, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). A showing of acquired distinctiveness need not consider all of these types of evidence; no single factor is determinative. In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1300, 75 USPQ2d at 1424; see TMEP §§1212.06 et seq. Rather, the determination involves assessing all of the circumstances involving the use of the mark. See In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1300, 75 USPQ2d at 1424 (citing Thompson Med. Co., Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 217, 225 USPQ2d 124, 131-32 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
Applicant may also respond to the refusal by arguing in support of registration and/or amending the application to seek registration on the Supplemental Register. See 15 U.S.C. §1091(a); 37 C.F.R. §§2.47, 2.75(a); TMEP §§801.02(b), 816. If applicant amends the application to the Supplemental Register, applicant is not precluded from submitting evidence and arguments against this refusal. TMEP §816.04.
SECTION 2(e)(1) REFUSAL - MERELY DESCRIPTIVE
Registration is refused because the applied-for mark merely describes a characteristic, purpose, function or use of applicant’s services. Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); see TMEP §§1209.01(b), 1209.03 et seq.
A mark is merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of an applicant’s goods and/or services. TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g. , In re TriVita, Inc. , 783 F.3d 872, 874, 114 USPQ2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP , 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); In re Steelbuilding.com , 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents , 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920)).
Applicant has applied for the mark FLYING CARE TO PEOPLE in standard characters for “Air transport services for sick or injured people”.
Generally, if the individual components of a mark retain their descriptive meaning in relation to the goods and/or services, the combination results in a composite mark that is itself descriptive and not registrable. In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC , 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1516 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Tower Tech, Inc. , 64 USPQ2d 1314, 1317-18 (TTAB (2002)); TMEP §1209.03(d); see, e.g. , Apollo Med. Extrusion Techs., Inc. v. Med. Extrusion Techs., Inc. , 123 USPQ2d 1844, 1851 (TTAB 2017) (holding MEDICAL EXTRUSION TECHNOLOGIES merely descriptive of medical extrusion goods produced by employing medical extrusion technologies); In re Cannon Safe, Inc. , 116 USPQ2d 1348, 1351 (TTAB 2015) (holding SMART SERIES merely descriptive of metal gun safes); In re King Koil Licensing Co. , 79 USPQ2d 1048, 1052 (TTAB 2006) (holding THE BREATHABLE MATTRESS merely descriptive of beds, mattresses, box springs, and pillows).
Only where the combination of descriptive terms creates a unitary mark with a unique, incongruous, or otherwise nondescriptive meaning in relation to the goods and/or services is the combined mark registrable. See In re Colonial Stores, Inc. , 394 F.2d 549, 551, 157 USPQ 382, 384 (C.C.P.A. 1968); In re Positec Grp. Ltd. , 108 USPQ2d 1161, 1162-63 (TTAB 2013).
In this case, both the individual components and the composite result are descriptive of applicant’s services and do not create a unique, incongruous, or nondescriptive meaning in relation to the services. Specifically, the term FLYING is defined as “moving or capable of moving in the air”. This term is descriptive of applicant’s transport services as they are performed “in the air”. Next, the term CARE is defined as “CHARGE, SUPERVISION”. This is descriptive of a characteristic of the air transport services, namely, they provide medical supervision during the transport. Finally, the term PEOPLE is defined as “HUMAN BEINGS, PERSONS”. See attached definitions from macmillandictionary.com and from the 4/3/19 Office Action. This term is descriptive of who the services are being provided for, namely, human beings. When taken together the terms retain their descriptive nature in relation to applicant’s air transport services for sick or injured people. Specifically, the services can be described as moving in the air transportation (FLYING) that provides medical supervision (CARE) TO human beings (PEOPLE).
Applicant has not asserted any arguments against the descriptiveness of their mark. Instead applicant has relied on acquired distictiveness which was denied for the reasons described above.
Therefore, the mark is refused for being merely descriptive.
(1) Use of the registration symbol ® with the registered mark in connection with the designated goods and/or services, which provides public notice of the registration and potentially deters third parties from using confusingly similar marks.
(2) Inclusion of the registered mark in the USPTO’s database of registered and pending marks, which will (a) make it easier for third parties to find it in trademark search reports, (b) provide public notice of the registration, and thus (c) potentially deter third parties from using confusingly similar marks.
(3) Use of the registration by a USPTO trademark examining attorney as a bar to registering confusingly similar marks in applications filed by third parties.
(4) Use of the registration as a basis to bring suit for trademark infringement in federal court, which, although more costly than state court, means judges with more trademark experience, often faster adjudications, and the opportunity to seek an injunction, actual damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs.
(5) Use of the registration as a filing basis for a trademark application for registration in certain foreign countries, in accordance with international treaties.
See 15 U.S.C. §§1052(d), 1091, 1094; J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair Competition §§19:33, 19:37 (rev. 4th ed. Supp. 2017).
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this final Office action and/or appeal it to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB)
Murray Jr., George
/George Murray/
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 121
(571) 270-5101
George.Murray@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE