UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.  A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.

 

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 4/2/2019

 

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES:

• Section 2(d) Likelihood of Confusion Refusal
• Section 2(e)(4) Primarily Merely a Surname Refusal
• Identification of Services
• Advisory: All Joint Applicants Must Sign Response

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 4286464 and 5096472.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations.

 

Applicant’s mark WOOLWORTHS is for “Online retail department store services featuring in-store order pickup; retail on-line ordering services featuring general merchandise also accessible by telephone, facsimile and mail order; retail on-line ordering services featuring clothing also accessible by telephone, facsimile and mail order; retail store services in the field of general merchandise featuring a bonus incentive program for customers; retail store services in the field of clothing featuring a bonus incentive program for customers; retail discount store services in the field of general merchandise; retail discount store services in the field of clothing; wholesale and retail store services featuring general merchandise; wholesale and retail store services featuring clothing; on-line wholesale and retail store services featuring general merchandise; on-line wholesale and retail store services featuring clothing” in International Class 35.

 

Registrant’s mark WOOLWORTH is for “Clothing, namely, t-shirts” in International Class 25 (Reg. No. 4286464).

 

Further, registrant’s mark F.W. WOOLWORTH CO. is for “On-line retail store services featuring books, magazines, compact discs, audio and video cassettes, digital video discs, computer software, computer and video games, computer hardware and peripheral devices” in International Class 35 (Reg. No. 5096472).

 

Standard of Analysis for 2(d) Refusal

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours& Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Similarity of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In this case, the marks at issue feature highly similar terms, rendering the marks similar in appearance and overall commercial impression. Namely, the applied-for mark features the term WOOLWORTHS, as compared to the singular iterations WOOLWORTH featured in Reg. Nos. 4286464 and 5096472. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression.  See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

 

The distinctions in appearance and sound between the marks at issue do not obviate the comparison between the marks. Even if potential purchasers could discern the apparent differences between the applied-for and registered marks, purchasers could still reasonably assume, due to the overall similarities in sound, appearance, connotation, and commercial impression between the wording similar to the respective marks (i.e., WOOLWORTHS and WOOLWORTH), that applicant’s services offered under the WOOLWORTHS mark constitute a new or additional service line from the same source as the goods and services offered under registrant’s respective WOOLWORTH and F.W. WOOLOWRTH CO. marks with which they are acquainted or familiar, and that applicant’s mark is merely a variation of the registrant’s mark.  See, e.g., SMS, Inc. v. Byn-Mar Inc. 228 USPQ 219, 220 (TTAB 1985) (applicant’s marks ALSO ANDREA and ANDREA SPORT were “likely to evoke an association by consumers with opposer's preexisting mark [ANDREA SIMONE] for its established line of clothing.”).

 

For these reasons, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Relatedness of the Goods and Services 

 

The goods and services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

The compared goods and services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

 

In this case, the application uses broad wording to describe “retail on-line ordering services featuring general merchandise also accessible by telephone, facsimile and mail order,” “wholesale and retail store services featuring general merchandise,” and “on-line wholesale and retail store services featuring general merchandise,” which presumably encompasses retail of general merchandise of any kind, including registrant’s (Reg. No. 5096472) more narrow “on-line retail store services featuring books, magazines, compact discs, audio and video cassettes, digital video discs, computer software, computer and video games, computer hardware and peripheral devices.”  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Additionally, the services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are related.

 

Further, in this case, applicant offers “online retail department store services featuring in-store order pickup,” “retail on-line ordering services featuring clothing also accessible by telephone, facsimile and mail order,” “retail discount store services in the field of clothing,” “wholesale and retail store services featuring clothing,” and “on-line wholesale and retail store services featuring clothing” in connection with the applied-for mark, as compared to registrant’s (Reg. No. 4286464) Class 25 “clothing, namely, t-shirts” products. The use of similar marks on or in connection with both products and retail-store services has been held likely to cause confusion where the evidence showed that the retail-store services featured the same type of products.  See In re House Beer, LLC, 114 USPQ2d 1073, 1078 (TTAB 2015) In re Peebles, Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1795, 1796 (TTAB 1992) (holding the use of nearly identical marks for coats and for retail outlets featuring camping and mountain climbing equipment, including coats, likely to cause confusion, noting that “there is no question that store services and the goods which may be sold in that store are related goods and services for the purpose of determining likelihood of confusion”); TMEP §1207.01(a)(ii). In the instant case, applicant’s retail store services, on-line retail store, and wholesale store services services featuring clothing as offered by companies in commerce specifically feature the t-shirt goods set forth by registrant. See attached evidence from Nordstrom, Macy’s, J.Crew, 6PM, and Needen. The attached Internet evidence thus establishes that the retail-store services offered by applicant feature the same type of products offered by registrant. For these reasons, the goods and services of the parties are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

To the extent the evidence may not address all of the items in applicant’s identification, relatedness does not have to be established for every service.  It is sufficient for a finding of likelihood of confusion if relatedness is established for any or some items encompassed by the identification within a particular class in an application. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 648 F.2d 1335, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981).  In this case, relatedness has been established for many of the identified items, which is enough to show a likelihood of confusion.

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrants.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

For the reasons stated above, registration of the applied-for mark is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.

 

SECTION 2(E)(4) PRIMARILY MERELY A SURNAME REFUSAL

 

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark is primarily merely a surname.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(4), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(4); see TMEP §1211. 

 

“The test for determining whether a mark is primarily merely a surname is the primary significance of the mark as a whole to the purchasing public.”  In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1505 (TTAB 2016) (quoting In re Hutchinson Tech. Inc., 852 F.2d 552, 554, 7 USPQ2d 1490, 1492 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see In re Kahan & Weisz Jewelry Mfg. Corp., 508 F.2d 831, 832, 184 USPQ 421, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1211.01.

 

The following five inquiries are often used to determine the public’s perception of a term’s primary significance:

 

(1)       Whether the surname is rare;

 

(2)       Whether anyone connected with applicant uses the term as a surname;

 

(3)       Whether the term has any recognized meaning other than as a surname;

 

(4)       Whether the term has the structure and pronunciation of a surname; and

 

(5)       Whether the term is sufficiently stylized to remove its primary significance from that of a surname.

 

In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1276, 1278 & n.2, 1282-83 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Benthin Mgmt. GmbH, 37 USPQ2d 1332, 1333-34 (TTAB 1995) for the Benthin inquiries/factors); TMEP §1211.01; see also In re Etablissements Darty et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 16-18, 225 USPQ 652, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 

 

These inquiries are not exclusive, and any of these circumstances – singly or in combination – and any other relevant circumstances may be considered when making this determination.  In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d at 1277-78; TMEP §1211.01.  For example, when the applied-for mark is not stylized, it is unnecessary to consider the fifth inquiry.  In re Yeley, 85 USPQ2d 1150, 1151 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1211.01.

 

Applicant has applied to register the mark WOOLWORTHS for “Online retail department store services featuring in-store order pickup; retail on-line ordering services featuring general merchandise also accessible by telephone, facsimile and mail order; retail on-line ordering services featuring clothing also accessible by telephone, facsimile and mail order; retail store services in the field of general merchandise featuring a bonus incentive program for customers; retail store services in the field of clothing featuring a bonus incentive program for customers; retail discount store services in the field of general merchandise; retail discount store services in the field of clothing; wholesale and retail store services featuring general merchandise; wholesale and retail store services featuring clothing; on-line wholesale and retail store services featuring general merchandise; on-line wholesale and retail store services featuring clothing” in International Class 35.

 

“Woolworth” is a common surname in the United States. Per the attached LexisNexis evidence, the applied-for mark appears 668 times as a surname in the LEXISNEXIS® surname database, which is a weekly updated directory of cell phone and other phone numbers (such as voice over IP) from various data providers. Such evidence therefore establishes the surname significance of Woolworth. This evidence also shows that the surname Woolworth is not rare.

 

The issue of determining whether a surname is common or rare is not determined solely by comparing the number of listings of the surname to the total number of listings in a computerized database, because even the most common surname would represent only a small fraction of the database.  In re Gregory, 70 USPQ2d 1792, 1795 (TTAB 2004).  Rather, if a surname appears routinely in news reports or articles and receives media publicity so as to be broadly exposed to the general public, then such surname is not rare and its primary significance to purchasers would be that of a surname, such as in this case.  See In re Beds & Bars Ltd., 122 USPQ2d 1546, 1551 (TTAB 2017); In re Gregory, 70 USPQ2d at 1795; TMEP §1211.01(a)(v). In the instant case, the applied-for wording is used as a surname in the United States to a significant degree. The examining attorney has attached evidence from Forbes, The New York Times, Newsday, and History.com, establishing that Frank Winfield Woolworth is a widely known figure in the United States commonly referenced in American media. See attached evidence. The attached evidence therefore establishes that the term “Woolworth” commonly receives media publicity as that of a surname, such that the primary significance of “Woolworth” to purchasers would be surname significance.

 

In addition, evidence that a term has no recognized meaning or significance other than as a surname is relevant to determining whether the term would be perceived as primarily merely a surname.  See In re Weiss Watch Co., 123 USPQ2d 1200, 1203 (TTAB 2017); In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1276, 1280 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §1211.02(b)(vi).  The attached evidence from Merriam-Webster shows that “Woolworth” is solely listed in the dictionary as that of a “biographical name,” but otherwise holds no meaning. Further, the attached evidence from The Columbia Gazetteer establishes that the wording “Woolworth” does not identify a geographic location. See attached evidence. Thus, this term appears to have no recognized meaning or significance other than as a surname, as to obviate refusal under Section 2(e)(4). 

 

Evidence that a term has the structure and pronunciation of a surname may contribute to a finding that the primary significance of the term is that of a surname.  In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d 1276, 1280 (TTAB 2016); see In re Giger, 78 USPQ2d 1405, 1409 (TTAB 2006); In re Gregory, 70 USPQ2d 1792, 1796 (TTAB 2004); TMEP §1211.01(a)(vi). In this case, the term “Woolworth” has the structure and pronunciation of a surname. As supported by the attached Lexis.com evidence, the applied-for mark has a similar structure and pronunciation to the surnames “Wool” and “Wentworth,” which are also common in the United States (see attached Lexis.com evidence of the surname “Wool” and “Wentworth”). The foregoing thus establishes that the term “Woolworth” has the structure and pronunciation of a surname and will likely be perceived as such by the purchasing public.

 

Further, the applied-for mark appears in standard characters and accordingly, is not sufficiently stylized to remove its primary significance from that of a surname. This factor also weighs in favor of the determination that the applied-for mark is primarily merely a surname.

 

Applicant’s inclusion of the letter “S” at the end of the term “Woolworth” does not obviate the surname significance of the wording, for the purposes of a Section 2(e)(4) determination. Presentation of a surname in its plural or possessive form does not diminish its surname significance.  TMEP §1211.01(b)(v); see, e.g., In re Bed & Bars Ltd., 122 USPQ2d 1546, 1551 (TTAB 2017); In re Binion, 93 USPQ2d 1531, 1537 (TTAB 2009).

 

Given the forgoing, registration of the applied-for mark on the Principal Register is refused under Section 2(e)(4) of the Trademark Act.

 

ADVISORY: SECTION 1(b) APPLICATION NOT YET ELIGIBLE FOR SUPPLEMENTAL REGISTER

 

A mark in an application under Trademark Act Section 1(b) is not eligible for registration on the Supplemental Register until an acceptable amendment to allege use under 37 C.F.R. §2.76 has been filed.  37 C.F.R. §§2.47(d), 2.75(b); TMEP §§815.02, 1102.03.  When a Section 1(b) application is successfully amended to the Supplemental Register, the application effective filing date will be the date applicant met the minimum filing requirements under 37 C.F.R. §2.76(c) for the amendment to allege use.  TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03; see 37 C.F.R. §2.75(b).

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusals by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  However, if applicant responds to the refusals, applicant must also respond to the requirement set forth below.

 

IDENTIFICATION OF SERVICES

 

The wording “retail on-line ordering services featuring general merchandise also accessible by telephone, facsimile and mail order,” “retail store services in the field of general merchandise featuring a bonus incentive program for customers,” “retail discount store services in the field of general merchandise,” “wholesale and retail store services featuring general merchandise,” and “on-line wholesale and retail store services featuring general merchandise” is indefinite and must be clarified because the specific nature of the services is unclear on the basis of the wording provided.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01. 

 

Applicant may adopt the following identification, if accurate:

 

International Class 35:

 

Online retail department store services featuring in-store order pickup; retail on-line ordering services featuring general consumer merchandise also accessible by telephone, facsimile and mail order; retail on-line ordering services featuring clothing also accessible by telephone, facsimile and mail order; retail store services in the field of general consumer merchandise featuring a bonus incentive program for customers; retail store services in the field of clothing featuring a bonus incentive program for customers; retail discount store services in the field of general consumer merchandise; retail discount store services in the field of clothing; wholesale and retail store services featuring general consumer merchandise; wholesale and retail store services featuring clothing; on-line wholesale and retail store services featuring general consumer merchandise; on-line wholesale and retail store services featuring clothing

 

Applicant’s services may be clarified or limited, but may not be expanded beyond those originally itemized in the application or as acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Applicant may clarify or limit the identification by inserting qualifying language or deleting items to result in a more specific identification; however, applicant may not substitute different services or add services not found or encompassed by those in the original application or as acceptably amended.  See TMEP §1402.06(a)-(b).  The scope of the services sets the outer limit for any changes to the identification and is generally determined by the ordinary meaning of the wording in the identification.  TMEP §§1402.06(b), 1402.07(a)-(b).  Any acceptable changes to the services will further limit scope, and once services are deleted, they are not permitted to be reinserted.  TMEP §1402.07(e).

 

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual.  See TMEP §1402.04.

 

ADVISORY: ALL JOINT APPLICANTS MUST SIGN RESPONSE

 

For applications with multiple individual applicants or joint applicants, all must sign the response.  37 C.F.R. §2.193(e)(2)(ii); TMEP §611.06(a).

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES:

 

For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action.  For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above.  For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements.  Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

 

/Amanda Galbo/

Amanda Galbo

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 125

(571) 272-5391

amanda.galbo@uspto.gov

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 4/2/2019 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 88270198

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed.  The trademark examining attorney assigned by the USPTO to your application has written an official letter to which you must respond.  Please follow these steps:

 

(1)  Read the LETTER by clicking on this link or going to http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/, entering your U.S. application serial number, and clicking on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification. 

 

(2)  Respond within 6 months (or sooner if specified in the Office action), calculated from 4/2/2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) response form located at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  A response transmitted through TEAS must be received before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise e-mail your response because the USPTO does NOT accept e-mails as responses to Office actions. 

 

(3)  Questions about the contents of the Office action itself should be directed to the trademark examining attorney who reviewed your application, identified below. 

 

/Amanda Galbo/

Amanda Galbo

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 125

(571) 272-5391

amanda.galbo@uspto.gov

 

WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable response deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.  For more information regarding abandonment, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/basics/abandon.jsp. 

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.