UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION
U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 88265015
MARK: UDEA
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: MISS HU; SHANGHAI LVSHENG INTELLECTUAL P |
CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp
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APPLICANT: Shanghai Youbao Information Technology C ETC.
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
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OFFICE ACTION
TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW. A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.
ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 3/14/2019
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SUMMARY OF ISSUES:
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Applicant’s applied-for mark is UDEA (in standard characters) for “Briefcases; Garment bags for travel; Pocket wallets; Rucksacks; Suitcases; Travelling trunks; Trunks being luggage; Wheeled shopping bags; Canvas shopping bags; Sports bags”.
U.S. Registration No. 5085824 is UOODEA (in standard characters) for “Umbrella rings; Umbrella or parasol ribs; Umbrella sticks; Frames for umbrellas or parasols; Umbrellas; Umbrella covers; Parasols; Umbrella handles; Handbags; Pocket wallets; School bags; Backpacks; Wheeled shopping bags; Reusable shopping bags; Unfitted vanity cases; Haversacks; Sport bags; Pouch baby carriers; Clutch bags; Slings for carrying infants”.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Similarity of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In this case, applicant’s mark UDEA (in standard characters) and registrant’s mark UOODEA (in standard characters) are similar in sound, appearance, connotation, and overall commercial impression.
Specifically, applicant’s mark UDEA and registrant’s mark UOODEA contain similar terms, and therefore, the marks are confusing similar for the likelihood of confusion analysis. In particular, because applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark contain similar terms, the marks appear confusingly similar and convey similar overall commercial impressions. As such, applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark are confusingly similar for the likelihood of confusion analysis. Indeed, marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). Accordingly, here, because applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark contain similar terms, the marks appear confusingly similar and convey similar overall commercial impressions. As such, applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark are confusingly similar for the likelihood of confusion analysis, and a consumer would likely mistakenly believe that applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark emanate from the same source.
In addition, the wording UDEA in applicant’s mark could be pronounced the same as the wording UOODEA in registrant’s mark. As such, applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark are essentially phonetically equivalent, and therefore, the marks are confusingly similar for the likelihood of confusion analysis. Indeed, the marks are essentially phonetic equivalents and thus sound similar. Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv). In addition, there is no correct pronunciation of a mark because it is impossible to predict how the public will pronounce a particular mark. See Embarcadero Techs., Inc. v. RStudio, Inc., 105 USPQ2d 1825, 1835 (TTAB 2013) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1367, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1912 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re The Belgrade Shoe Co., 411 F.2d 1352, 1353, 162 USPQ 227, 227 (C.C.P.A. 1969)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv). The marks in question could clearly be pronounced the same; such similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv). Furthermore, slight differences in the sound of similar marks will not avoid a likelihood of confusion. In re Energy Telecomm. & Elec. Ass’n, 222 USPQ 350, 351 (TTAB 1983); see In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1367, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1912 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Accordingly, here, because applicant’s mark UDEA could be pronounced the same as registrant’s mark UOODEA, applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark are essentially phonetically equivalent. As such, applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark are confusingly similar for the likelihood of confusion analysis.
Furthermore, because some of the goods of the parties are identical or closely related, the marks can be further apart in similarity for a finding of likelihood of confusion. As such, in this case, the differences between applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark will not obviate a likelihood of confusion between the marks. Therefore, applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark are confusingly similar for the likelihood of confusion analysis. Indeed, where the goods of an applicant and registrant are “similar in kind and/or closely related,” the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as in the case of diverse goods. In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987); see Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1242, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TMEP §1207.01(b). Accordingly, here, because some of applicant’s goods and registrant’s goods are identical and otherwise closely related as discussed further below in the Relatedness of Goods section, the marks can be further apart in similarity for a finding of likelihood of confusion. As such, the differences between applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark will not obviate a likelihood of confusion between the marks. Thus, applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark are confusingly similar for the likelihood of confusion analysis.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark are confusingly similar for the likelihood of confusion analysis.
Relatedness of Goods
Applicant’s goods and registrant’s goods are also in effect legally identical and otherwise related.
In this case, the registration uses broad wording to describe the goods, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including those in applicant’s more narrow identification. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s goods and registrant’s goods are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, applicant’s goods and registrant’s goods are related.
Specifically, applicant’s identifications of “Pocket wallets”, “Wheeled shopping bags”, and “Sports bags” are identical to registrant’s identifications of “Pocket wallets”, “Wheeled shopping bags”, and “Sport bags”. Accordingly, applicant’s goods and registrant’s goods are legally identical, and therefore, closely related.
In addition, registrant’s broad identification of “Reusable shopping bags” encompasses all goods of the type described, including applicant’s more narrow identification of “Canvas shopping bags” as applicant’s goods are a type of reusable shopping bag. Accordingly, applicant’s goods and registrant’s goods are closely related.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, applicant’s goods and registrant’s goods are legally identical and otherwise related.
Accordingly, because applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark are confusingly similar and because applicant’s goods and registrant’s goods are related, applicant’s applied-for mark is refused registration pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.
SPECIMEN REFUSAL-DIGITALLY ALTERED SPECIMEN
Registration is refused because the specimen in International Class 18 appears to consist of a digitally altered image or a mock-up of the mark on the goods or their packaging and does not show the applied-for mark in actual use in commerce. Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a).
An image of a product or packaging that has been digitally created or otherwise altered to include the mark does not show actual use of the mark in commerce. See 15 U.S.C. §1127; TMEP §§904.04(a), 904.07(a); cf. In re Chica, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1845, 1848 (TTAB 2007) (holding that “a mere drawing of the goods with an illustration of how the mark may be displayed” was not an acceptable specimen because it did not show actual use in commerce); In re The Signal Cos., 228 USPQ 956, 957-58 n.4 (TTAB 1986) (noting that a printer’s proof of an advertisement would not be an acceptable specimen because it does not show actual use in commerce). In addition, a photo of the mark on a label, tag, or piece of paper that appears on applicant’s or a third party’s goods or packaging is generally not acceptable to show applicant’s use of the applied-for mark in commerce. See 15 U.S.C. §1127; TMEP §§904.03(a), 904.07(a). Applicant must show the mark on applicant’s own goods or packaging as it is seen by the purchasing public, with goods that have actually been sold or transported in commerce. See TMEP §904.07(a).
In this case, the specimen appears to be digitally altered or created in that the applied-for mark in the specimen appears to be in a digitally created font in the color bright white and placed on top of a label tag on a photograph or image of the goods such that the applied-for mark hovers over the label tag on the goods as opposed to being directly affixed to the label tag on the goods. As such, the specimen appears to be digitally altered or created. Accordingly, the specimen does not show the applied-for mark on applicant’s own goods or packaging as it is seen by the purchasing public, with goods that have actually been sold or transported in commerce. Therefore, the specimen does not show the applied-for mark in actual use in commerce.
An application based on Trademark Act Section 1(a) must include a specimen showing the applied-for mark in use in commerce for each international class of goods identified in the application or amendment to allege use. 15 U.S.C. §1051(a)(1); 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a). “Use in commerce” means (1) a bona fide use of the applied-for mark in the ordinary course of trade (and not merely to reserve a right in the mark), (2) the mark is placed in any manner on the goods, packaging, tags or labels, or displays of the goods, and (3) the goods are actually sold or transported in commerce. See 15 U.S.C. §1127.
In addition to the examples of specimens in (2) in the above paragraph, examples of specimens for goods also include instruction manuals, containers, and webpages that include a picture or textual description of the goods associated with the mark and the means to order the goods. See TMEP §§904.03 et seq.
Applicant may respond to this refusal by satisfying one of the following for each applicable international class:
(1) Submit a different specimen (a verified “substitute” specimen) that (a) was in actual use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of an amendment to allege use and (b) shows the mark in actual use in commerce for the goods identified in the application or amendment to allege use. A “verified substitute specimen” is a specimen that is accompanied by the following statement made in a signed affidavit or supported by a declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20: “The substitute (or new, or originally submitted, if appropriate) specimen(s) was/were in use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of the amendment to allege use.” The substitute specimen cannot be accepted without this statement.
(2) Amend the filing basis to intent to use under Section 1(b), for which no specimen is required. This option will later necessitate additional fee(s) and filing requirements such as providing a specimen.
For an overview of both response options referenced above and instructions on how to satisfy either option online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, see the Specimen webpage.
If applicant responds to the refusals, applicant must also respond to the requirement set forth below.
INFORMATION ABOUT SPECIMEN REQUIRED
A specimen must show the mark as used in commerce, which means use in the ordinary course of trade (not merely to reserve a right in the mark). 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1052, 1127. A specimen shows a mark used in commerce for goods only if it shows the mark placed on the goods, packaging, tags or labels affixed to the goods, or displays of the goods, and the goods are actually sold or transported for sale in commerce. 15 U.S.C. §1127. Because the specimen of record appears to be digitally created or altered, or is otherwise a mock-up, it does not appear to show the mark as actually used in commerce. Therefore, to permit proper examination of the application, applicant must submit additional information for the record about the specimen and how the mark as shown in the specimen is in use in commerce with applicant’s goods. See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §814.
Accordingly, applicant must respond to the following questions and requests for documentation to satisfy this request for information:
(1) How are applicant’s goods sold? Specify the retail, wholesale, or other sales environment in which the goods are sold.
(2) Please provide copies of invoices, bills of sale, or other documentation of sales of the goods.
(3) Was the specimen created for submission with this application?
(4) Does the specimen show applicant’s product as it is currently being sold to consumers?
(5) How do applicant’s goods appear in the actual sales environment? If sold in stores, provide photos showing the goods for sale in the stores. If sold online, identify the websites and provide copies of the webpages showing the goods for sale. And if sold in another type of sales environment, provide photos and/or documentation showing the goods for sale in that environment.
(6) If the information in question (5) about how the goods appear in the actual sales environment is not available to applicant, then please describe how applicant’s goods are transported for sale and provide photos and other documentation showing how applicant’s mark appears on the goods and/or its packaging when the goods are being transported for sale.
See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §814.
Failure to comply with a request for information is grounds for refusing registration. In re Harley, 119 USPQ2d 1755, 1757-58 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §814. Merely stating that information is available on applicant’s website is an insufficient response and will not make the relevant information of record. See In re Planalytics, Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1453, 1457-58 (TTAB 2004).
RESPONSE GUIDELINES
Response guidelines. For this application to proceed further, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. In addition, because applicant filed a TEAS Plus application, applicant must respond online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) to avoid incurring an additional fee. See 37 C.F.R. §2.22(b)(1), (c). Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.
For attorney referral information, applicant may consult the American Bar Association’s Consumers’ Guide to Legal Help or an online directory of legal professionals, such as FindLaw®. The USPTO, however, may not assist an applicant in the selection of a private attorney. 37 C.F.R. §2.11.
Please note that foreign attorneys, other than duly authorized Canadian attorneys, are not permitted to represent applicants before the USPTO. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(e), 11.14(c), (e); TMEP §602.03-.03(c). The only attorneys who may practice before the USPTO in trademark matters are (1) attorneys in good standing with a bar of the highest court of any U.S. state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. commonwealths/territories; and (2) duly authorized Canadian agents/attorneys. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.17(e), 11.14(a), (c); TMEP §602.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
/Rupali Shah/
Rupali Shah
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 125
(571) 272-2871
rupali.shah@uspto.gov
TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application. For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney. E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.
All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.
WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE: It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants). If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response.
PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION: To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/. Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen. If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199. For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.
TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS: Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.