United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
NONFINAL OFFICE
ACTION
The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System
(TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: November 09, 2020
The applicant’s amended identification of goods is accepted and the likelihood of confusion refusal with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 0795431 is hereby withdrawn by
the examining attorney.
On 7/30/19, action on this application was
suspended pending the disposition of U.S. Application Serial Nos. 87819919, 87819936, 87819949, 87819963. The referenced prior-pending applications have since registered. Therefore,
registration is refused as follows.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of
confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 5964467, 5964468, 5964469, 6108337. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP
§§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registrations.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is
so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth
in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Any evidence of record related to
those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.” In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533
(Fed. Cir. 1997)).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any
likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books,
Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29
(C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the
marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
COMPARISON OF MARKS
In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for
similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1323, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1748
(Fed. Cir. 2017); Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps.,
Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357,
1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).
In the present case, applicant’s mark is PYTHON and registrant’s mark is PYTHON. These marks are identical in
appearance, sound, and meaning, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d
1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Additionally, because they are identical, these marks are
likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods and/or services. Id.
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
The marks share the identical wording, PYTHON with PYTHON SPORTS and PYTHON RACQUETBALL. Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between
VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part
because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).
Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity
between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar);
In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084,
1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). In the present case, the marks are identical in part.
Although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s
mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark. See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94
USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)). Thus, merely omitting some of the wording
from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion. See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial
impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.
When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word
portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods
and/or services. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018)
(citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks
are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing
Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
COMPARISON OF GOODS/SERVICES
The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a
likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot,
Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some
manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v.
Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
The trademark examining attorney has attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database
consisting of a number of third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar goods and/or services as those of both applicant and registrant in this case. This evidence shows that the goods and/or services listed therein, namely carrying cases and bags for sports equipment and musical instruments and equipment, are of a kind that
may emanate from a single source under a single mark. See In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1737 (TTAB 2018) (citing
In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993);
In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).
The examining attorney has also attached Internet evidence of third party producers of sports cases and musical instrument and equipment cases.
Where the marks of the respective parties are identical or virtually identical, as in this case,
the degree of similarity or relatedness between the goods and/or services needed to support a finding of likelihood of confusion declines. See In re Country Oven, Inc., 2019 USPQ2d 443903, at *5 (TTAB
2019) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017)); TMEP
§1207.01(a); see also In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Since the marks are so identical/related and the goods are related, there is a likelihood that
purchasers would confuse the sources of the goods or believe they stemmed from a single source. Accordingly, registration is properly refused under Section 2(d) of
the Trademark Act due to a likelihood of confusion.
The Trademark Act not only guards against the misimpression that the
senior user is the source of a junior user’s goods and/or services, but it also protects against “reverse confusion,” where a significantly larger or prominent junior user is perceived as the source
of a smaller, senior user’s goods and/or services such that the “senior user may experience diminution or even loss of its mark’s identity and goodwill due to extensive use of a confusingly similar
mark by the junior user” for related goods and/or services. In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1329, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1752 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (quoting In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indust., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 474-75, 31 USPQ2d 1592, 1597-98 (3d Cir. 1994).
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the
source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See
In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is
resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to
the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.
Scott Bibb
/ScottBibb/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 109
571-272-5669
scott.bibb@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE
- Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the
application to abandon. A response or notice
of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period. TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely
respond.
