Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  October 03, 2019

 

 

SUMMARY OF REFUSALS AND REQUIREMENTS IN CURRENT ACTION TO WHICH APPLICANT MUST RESPOND:

·       New Refusal Under Section 2(d) – Prior-Pending Application Registered

·       Continued Refusal Under Section 2(d) – With Regard to Reg. No. 4085602 Only

 

SUMMARY OF REFUSALS AND/OR REQUIREMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN OBVIATED OR WITHDRAWN:

·       Refusal Under Section 2(d) With Regard to Reg. No. 4914274

·       Refusal Under Sections 1 and 45

 

NEW REFUSAL UNDER SECTION 2(d) – PRIOR-PENDING APPLICATION REGISTERED

 

Previously-referenced prior-pending Application Serial No. 87279544 has registered and therefore, a refusal under Section 2(d) is issued.  Specifically, registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 5770135.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Applicant seeks registration of the mark GPS (standard character mark) for “business project management.”  The already-registered mark is GPS ENTERPRISE (standard character mark, ENTERPRISE disclaimed) for, in relevant part, “Business consulting services in the field of automotive, travel, transportation, consumer, luxury, retail, e-commerce, customer service, food and beverage, restaurant, hospitality, home and garden, financial, insurance, entertainment, technology, telecommunications, energy, government, pharmaceutical, and sports industries; business data analysis; Compiling and analyzing data for business purposes, namely, business data, market research data, and statistical data; economic forecasting and analysis; statistical evaluations of marketing data; conducting business and marketing research; preparing business reports; business management consulting with relation to strategy, marketing, sales, operation, product design particularly specializing in the use of analytic and statistic models for the understanding and predicting of consumers, businesses, and market trends and actions; and consumer strategy business consulting in the fields of marketing, sales, operation, and product design particularly specializing in the use of analytic models for the understanding and predicting of consumer, business, and retail market trends and actions.”

 

COMPARISON OF MARKS

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

More specifically, the entirety of applicant’s mark, namely, GPS, is identical to the dominant (first and non-descriptive) element in the cited mark.  Thus, in each instance, it is the same term which creates the overall commercial impression of the mark and which consumers are likely to remember and use to identify the source of the services, i.e., here, the term GPS.  Accordingly, this feature, as the more significant element in each of the marks, may be given greater weight when determining whether the marks are confusingly similar.   See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). 

 

Furthermore, the additional element in the newly-registered mark does not detract from the confusing similarity created by the common term in both applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark.  Applicant’s mark is essentially encompassed within registrant’s mark, and case law has been clear that incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part.

 

Moreover, when comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  As discussed above, the overall commercial impression created by use of the identical term in both applicant’s and registrant’s marks is likely to lead to confusion as to the source of the services. 

 

Finally, the fact that both marks are in standard character format, means that each may use their respective mark in any manner – including in a stylization identical to that of the other.  A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii). 

 

Accordingly, applicant’s mark is confusingly similar in appearance, sound, connotation and overall commercial impression to registrant’s mark.

 

COMPARISON OF SERVICES

 

The compared services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

First, applicant’s “business project management” services simply refers to the management of business projects – which could include any number of areas or types of projects (see attached definition).  In other words, it is simply “project management” within the realm of business.  Registrant’s services feature various business services, including consulting, data analysis, analyzing data, market research services, business reporting, as well as business management consulting.  Any number of the services listed in the registration could fall within the purview of business project management. 

 

Second, because applicant has not identified a specific area in which its services are provided, it is presumed that they encompass the areas identified by registrant.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s are related for purposes of likelihood of confusion.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Furthermore, the attached material downloaded from the internet establishes that both the services of applicant and those of registrant are commonly provided by a single entity, and marketed through the same trade channels to the same class of purchasers.  Such material clearly establishes that these services are indeed related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).  And because neither the services of applicant nor of registrant have any restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers, they are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 

 

Thus, the services of applicant are sufficiently related to the services of registrant so that confusion is likely.

 

Therefore, applicant’s mark is refused registration under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

CONTINUED REFUSAL UNDER SECTION 2(d) – REG. NO.  4085602

 

Registration of the applied-for mark was refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4085602.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  For the reasons stated below, that refusal is continued.  

 

Applicant contends that the marks must be considered in their entireties – particularly the commercial impression created when viewing the entire marks.  However, the overall commercial impression created, when the marks are compared, are essentially the same.  That is, while applicant seeks registration for the acronym GPS alone in standard character format, registrant’s mark is GPS USA DIVISION – with the wording USA DIVISION is disclaimed since this it is geographically descriptive and highly descriptive of registrant’s services – as well as a globe design feature.  As such, the GPS portion of registrant’s mark is certainly the dominant element of that mark – the portion creating the overall commercial impression of the mark and most likely to remembered by consumers.  And case law is clear that, even while comparing the entire marks, a trademark examining attorney may weigh the individual components of a mark to determine its overall commercial impression.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[Regarding the issue of confusion,] there is nothing improper in stating that . . . more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties.” (quoting In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).  Furthermore, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the services, while disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Thus here, even when comparing applicant’s mark to the entirety of registrant’s mark, it is not improper to give more weight in the determination to the non-design/non-disclaimed element of that mark; and it cannot be ignored that the dominant element of registrant’s mark is identical to the entirety of applicant’s mark. 

 

It is also important to note that because applicant’s mark is in standard character format, it may be used in any manner – including in a stylization and with a design identical to that of registrant.  A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii).  Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display.  See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).

 

Applicant argues that because the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the TTAB) as well as other courts have permitted marks which share identical or nearly identical terms to register, that this demonstrates that there is no per se rule regarding identical terms used in connection with related goods or services.  In support of this, applicant cites a series of cases where similar marks were allowed.  Such material, without any explanation as to how those cases pertain to the situation at hand, has no bearing on the current determination.  That is, the fact that decisions regarding other marks (which may include similar or the same elements), when used in connection with various diverse goods and/or services were found not to be confusingly by a wide variety of courts, over a span of many years, does not support a finding that, in this particular instance, the marks, when used in connection with the listed services, are not confusingly similar. 

 

Applicant contends that its services are different from the services provided by registrant, and that they are not broad enough to include registrant’s services.  In support of this, applicant refers to a definition of “project management” but has failed to attach it or provide any additional support for the meaning of the wording.  Material attached to the current action shows that business project management can include many different activities and is simply a way of identifying the service of managing of internal business projects intended to further an entity’s strategy or objectives.  Registrant’s services feature various types of services which may easily fall within the scope of such services – including “business management,” “business management and planning,” “business organizational consulting,” “business planning,” “preparing business reports,” “providing business marketing information,” etc. 

 

Furthermore, material attached to both the current and prior actions, clearly demonstrates that a single entity commonly provides a variety of services – including those of both applicant and registrant.  And, it is axiomatic in the likelihood of confusion determination that the compared services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  Thus, here, the fact that the services are different is not dispositive since the attached evidentiary material demonstrates that they are indeed sufficiently related so that the circumstances surrounding their marketing could give rise to the mistaken belief that they are provided by a single source.

 

Accordingly, the refusal under Section 2(d) with regard to Reg. No. 4085602 is maintained.

 

RESPONSE GUIDELINES

 

For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action.  For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above.  For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements.  Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.

 

If applicant does not respond to this Office action within six months of the issue/mailing date, or responds by expressly abandoning the application, the application process will end and the trademark will fail to register.  See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.65(a), 2.68(a); TMEP §§718.01, 718.02.  Additionally, the USPTO will not refund the application filing fee, which is a required processing fee.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(i)-(iv), 2.209(a); TMEP §405.04.

 

When an application has abandoned for failure to respond to an Office action, an applicant may timely file a petition to revive the application, which, if granted, would allow the application to return to active status.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.66; TMEP §1714.  The petition must be filed within two months of the date of issuance of the notice of abandonment and may be filed online via the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) with a $100 fee.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(15)(ii), 2.66(a)(1), (b)(1).

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action  

 

 

/Susan K. Lawrence/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 116, USPTO

(571) 272-9186

sue.lawrence@uspto.gov

(informal communication only)

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on October 03, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88254793

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Susan K. Lawrence/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 116, USPTO

(571) 272-9186

sue.lawrence@uspto.gov

(informal communication only)

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from October 03, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond.

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”