To: | Arena Football One, LLC (trademarks@vos-ip.com) |
Subject: | U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 88250028 - LAS VEGAS STING - ARE01.3050 |
Sent: | 3/29/2019 1:46:49 PM |
Sent As: | ECOM126@USPTO.GOV |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 |
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION
U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 88250028
MARK: LAS VEGAS STING
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp
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APPLICANT: Arena Football One, LLC
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
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OFFICE ACTION
TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW. A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.
ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 3/29/2019
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL- LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION- CL 25
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4797143 and Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registration.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant(s). See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Determining likelihood of confusion is made on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). However, “[n]ot all of the [du Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1366, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601. F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir 2010)). The USPTO may focus its analysis “on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods [and/or services].” In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc. , 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see TMEP §1207.01.
SIMILARITY OF THE MARKS:
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007)); In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead ‘whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression’ such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” In re U.S. Warriors Ice Hockey Program, Inc., 122 USPQ2d 1790, 1795 (TTAB 2017) (citing Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Bay State Brewing Co., 117 USPQ2d 1958, 1960 (TTAB 2016) (citing Spoons Rests. Inc. v. Morrison Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1735, 1741 (TTAB 1991), aff’d per curiam, 972 F.2d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
In the present case, applicant’s mark is “LAS VEGAS STING” and registrant’s mark is “STING”.
Although applicant’s mark features the additional wording “LAS VEGAS”, this wording is merely geographically descriptive of the applied for goods and services and must be disclaimed. See the disclaimer section below. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).
The dominant portion of both marks is “STING” because “LAS VEGAS” must be disclaimed. Adding a term to a registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER and design confusingly similar); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1269 (TTAB 2009) (finding TITAN and VANTAGE TITAN confusingly similar); In re El Torito Rests., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002, 2004 (TTAB 1988) (finding MACHO and MACHO COMBOS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). In the present case, the marks are virtually identical in part for the wording STING. Although the applied-for mark includes the wording “LAS VEGAS”, the mark still maintains the same commercial impression as the registered marks, namely, STING.
Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); In re Corning Glass Works, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (finding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (finding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).
In sum, given the highly similar appearance, meaning, connotation, and commercial impression of the registered and applied-for marks it follows that consumers will confuse the marks.
Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
RELATEDNESS OF GOODS:
The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels. See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC , 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc. , 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).
The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc. , 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton , 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC , 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler , 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
The applicant’s goods for class 025 are “Men's, women's and children's clothing, namely, player uniforms, namely, footwear, jersey tops and pants; cheerleader uniforms; replica uniform shirts, coaches' caps, wool hats, painters' caps, baseball caps, visors, headbands, belts, t-shirts, tank tops, golf shirts, sweaters, sweatshirts, leather jackets, neckties, coats, shorts, sweatpants, pants, socks and underwear”.
The registrant’s goods for class 025 are also “Apparel, namely, t-shirts, shorts, underwear, gloves; athletic apparel, namely, shirts, pants, jackets; footwear; headwear; hats and caps; headbands; boxing shoes, boxing shorts, sports shoes; clothing, namely, base layers, tops, bottoms, shirts, cowls, drawers, halter tops; clothing, namely, arm warmers; articles of water-resistant clothing, namely, jackets, pants and footwear; articles of waterproof clothing, namely, jackets, pants, rainwear and footwear; articles of windproof clothing, namely, windsuits, wind coats, wind pants, wind shirts and wind vests; athletic clothing, namely, athletic uniforms; beach clothing, namely, beachwear; belts; clothing for surfing, namely, surfwear; casual clothing, namely, loungewear and leisure suits; clothing for infants, namely, infantwear and infants' one piece clothing; clothing for swimming, namely, bathing suits and swimwear; clothing for sports, namely, tennis wear, skiwear; clothing, not being protective clothing, incorporating reflective or fluorescent elements or material, namely, light-reflecting coats and jackets; thermal clothing, namely, thermal underwear and socks; cyclists' clothing, namely, jerseys and shorts; clothing for cycling, namely, shorts, cycling knicks in the nature of shorts, bibs in the nature of bib shorts, bib tights and bibs not of paper, socks, gloves, footwear, shoes, jackets, overshoes, hats and caps, mitts in the nature of gloves, jerseys, base layers, arm and leg warmers, tights and trousers, gilets and vests; clothing for martial arts, namely, uniforms, shorts, shirts, t-shirts, base layers, rash vests, gis, gi tops, gi bottoms, socks, shoes, hats, caps, pants, trousers; denim pants and jackets; ear muffs; gloves; jump suits; ladies' clothing, namely, nightwear, sleepwear, underwear, bras, lingerie; mittens; money belts; motorcyclists' clothing, namely, motorcycle jackets, boots, gloves and rain suits; play suits; ski gloves; thongs; wraps; wristbands; boots for sports; sports caps; sports footwear; sports headwear; sports hosiery; sports socks; studs for sports footwear; wrist bands for use in playing sports”.
The goods are both various types of clothing. They are the same types of goods and travel in the same trade channels.
Thus, applicant and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes. See, e.g. , In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd. , 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp. , 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).
In summary, the registered marks and the applied-for mark create the same commercial impression and the evidence shows that the goods are likely to be encountered together in the marketplace by the same consumers. Thus, consumers are likely to make the mistaken conclusion that the goods originate from the same source. Therefore, a likelihood of confusion exists and registration is refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d).
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration for class 025, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
In this case, applicant must disclaim the wording “LAS VEGAS” because it is not inherently distinctive. This unregistrable term is at best primarily geographically descriptive of the origin of applicant’s goods and/or services. See 15 U.S.C. §§1052(e)(2); In re Societe Generale des Eaux Minerales de Vittel S.A., 824 F.2d 957, 959, 3 USPQ2d 1450, 1451-52 (Fed. Cir. 1987); TMEP §§1210.01(a), 1210.06(a), 1213.03(a).
The attached evidence from the Wikipedia shows that the “LAS VEGAS STING” was an arena football team based in the city of LAS VEGAS. Furthermore, LAS VEGAS is a generally known geographic place or location because is a well-known place for gambling and bills itself as “The Entertainment Capital of the World”. See TMEP §§1210.02 et seq. The goods and/or services for which applicant seeks registration originate in this geographic place or location as shown by the attached evidence. See TMEP §1210.03. Because the goods and/or services originate in this place or location, a public association of the goods and/or services with the place is presumed. See In re Hollywood Lawyers Online, 110 USPQ2d 1852, 1858 (TTAB 2014) (citing In re Spirits of New Merced, LLC, 85 USPQ2d 1614, 1621 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §§1210.02(a) 1210.04.
Applicant may respond to this issue by submitting a disclaimer in the following format:
No claim is made to the exclusive right to use “LAS VEGAS” apart from the mark as shown.
For an overview of disclaimers and instructions on how to satisfy this issue using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), see the Disclaimer webpage.
IDENTIFICATION OF GOODS:
Particular indefinite wording in the identification of goods and services requires clarification. See TMEP §1402.01. Applicant must specify the common commercial or generic name for the goods. If there is no common commercial or generic name, applicant must describe the product and intended consumer as well as its main purpose and intended uses. Id.
The following is an amended version of applicant’s identification of goods and/or services that complies with the above-mentioned clarification requirements, with material additions and alterations in bold type. Applicant may adopt the following identification of goods and/or services, if accurate:
CLASS 009: Men's, women's and children's clothing, namely, player uniforms, namely, footwear, jersey tops and pants; cheerleader uniforms; replica uniform shirts, coaches' caps being headwear, wool hats, painters' caps being headwear, baseball caps, visors being headwear, headbands, belts, t-shirts, tank tops, golf shirts, sweaters, sweatshirts, leather jackets, neckties, coats, shorts, sweatpants, pants, socks and underwear
Applicant may amend the identification to clarify or limit the goods and/or services, but not to broaden or expand the goods and/or services beyond those in the original application or as acceptably amended. See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06. Generally, any deleted goods and/or services may not later be reinserted. See TMEP §1402.07(e).
For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual. See TMEP §1402.04.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
/Alexandra K. Chaffin/
Alexandra K. Chaffin
Law Office 126
(571).270.3077
Alexandra.Chaffin@USPTO.GOV
TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application. For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney. E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.
All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.
WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE: It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants). If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response.
PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION: To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/. Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen. If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199. For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.
TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS: Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.