UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.  A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.

 

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 5/3/2019

 

 

THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.

 

INTRODUCTION

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on 26 April 2019.

 

In a previous Office action dated 15 February 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following: Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark.  In addition, applicant was required to satisfy the following requirements: digitally-created/mock-up specimen, request for information, and amend mark description.

 

Based on applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney notes that the following requirements have been satisfied: digitally-created/mock-up specimen and request for information.  See TMEP §§713.02, 714.04. 

Further, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusals and requirement in the summary of issues below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:

• Refusal – Section 2(d) – Likelihood of Confusion
• Refusal – Mark Differs on Drawing and Specimen
• Requirement – Amend Mark Description
• Advisory – Response Guidelines
• Advisory – U.S. Counsel Rules Changes

 

REFUSAL – SECTION 2(d) – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

In the first Office Action, registration was refused because applicant’s mark and the registered mark, U.S. Registration No. 2552234, BSK, are similar in sound, appearance, and commercial impression, and because the goods that the marks identify are related. Applicant responded by providing arguments in favor of registration. The examining attorney has reviewed and considered applicant’s response carefully, but is not persuaded to withdraw the refusal based upon the arguments contained therein. Therefore, the refusal to register is maintained and made final for the reasons detailed below.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods  and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

As previously noted, applicant’s mark ANMBSK is closely related to registrant’s mark BSK because both marks contain the arbitrary lettering BSK. That applicant’s mark also contains the arbitrary lettering ANM does not obviate this finding, as applicant has merely added letters onto an already registered mark. Adding letters or terms to a registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER and design confusingly similar); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1269 (TTAB 2009) (finding TITAN and VANTAGE TITAN confusingly similar); In re El Torito Rests., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002, 2004 (TTAB 1988) (finding MACHO and MACHO COMBOS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part.

 

Further, it is well-established that when comparing marks that consist of a series of two or more letters, confusion may be likely even if the letters are not identical or in the same order.  It is more difficult to remember a series of arbitrarily arranged letters than to remember words or figures; that is, confusion is more likely between arbitrarily arranged letters than between other types of marks.  See, e.g., Weiss Assoc. v. HRL Assoc., 902 F.2d 1546, 14 USPQ2d 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding confusion between TMS and TMM); Dere v. Inst. for Scientific Info., Inc., 420 F.2d 1068, 164 USPQ 347 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (finding confusion between ISI and I.A.I.); cf. In re Infinity Broad. Corp. of Dallas, 60 USPQ2d 1214 (TTAB 2001) (finding confusion between registrant’s KING FM and KING-TV and applicant’s KYNG).

 

This principle was set forth in Crystal Corp. v. Manhattan Chem. Mfg. Co., 75 F.2d 506, 506, 25 USPQ 5, 6 (C.C.P.A. 1935), wherein the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals applied the following reasoning in holding Z.B.T., the dominate portion of the mark CRYSTAL Z.B.T., likely to be confused with T.Z.L.B. for talcum powder:  “We think it is well known that it is more difficult to remember a series of arbitrarily arranged letters than it is to remember figures, syllables, words or phrases.  The difficulty of remembering such lettered marks makes confusion between such marks, when similar, more likely.”

 

Even lettered marks having only two letters in common, used on identical or closely related goods, have been held likely to cause confusion.  See, e.g., Feed Serv. Corp. v. FS Servs., Inc., 432 F.2d 478, 167 USPQ 407 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (finding confusion between FSC and FS); Cluett, Peabody & Co. v. J.H. Bonck Co., 390 F.2d 754, 156 USPQ 401 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (finding confusion between TTM and T.M.T.); Edison Bros. Stores, Inc. v. Brutting E.B. Sport-Int’l GmbH, 230 USPQ 530 (TTAB 1986) (finding confusion between EB and EBS); see also TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

 

That applicant’s mark is in design form does not obviate this finding, as the literal element of the mark is dominant to its design element. When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

 

Applicant argues that there is no likelihood of confusion because the marks have different commercial impressions because “[o]ne is emphasis is on ‘ANM’, one is emphasis is on ‘BSK’.” The examining attorney is not persuaded for, and as noted above, applicant has merely added arbitrary letters onto a registered mark which consists of arbitrary letters. Further, and as previously stated, consumer confusion is more likely where two marks consist of a series of arbitrary letters, as is the case here.

 

Applicant also argues that there is no risk of confusion because its mark uses a rectangle around the letters “SK”. The examining respectfully disagrees for, and as noted above, the literal elements of the mark are dominant to its design element. Further, registrant’s mark is in standard character form and, as such, could be displayed in a manner identical to that of applicant. A mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii).  Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display.  See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).

 

Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Relatedness of the Goods

 

Generally, the greater degree of similarity between the applied-for mark and the registered mark, the lesser the degree of similarity between the goods of the parties is required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.  In re C.H. Hanson Co., 116 USPQ2d 1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001)); In re Thor Tech, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1636 (TTAB 2009). 

 

As previously noted in the 15 February 2019 Office Action, applicant’s “pillowcases” is identical to registrant’s “pillow cases.” When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

In this case, the goods in the application and registration are identical.  Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and classes of purchasers are the same for these goods.  See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 27 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.  

 

Further, and as noted in the 15 February 2019 Office Action, registrant’s “bath linen; curtains” is broadly written and, as such, encompasses a wide array of more narrowly identified types of bath linen and curtains, including applicant’s “net curtains; shower curtains of textile or plastic.” Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

 

In this case, the registration uses broad wording to describe the above-noted goods, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including applicant’s more narrowly identified goods, noted above.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.

 

Moreover, and as noted in the 15 February 2019 Office Action, applicant’s “Bed linen; Curtain holders of textile material; Door curtains; Net curtains; Pillow shams; Pillowcases; Shower curtains of textile or plastic; Coasters of textile; Curtains of textile or plastic; Fitted toilet lid covers; Flags of textile or plastic; Table linen, not of paper; Tablemats of textile; Textile place mats” are closely related to registrant’s “bed sheets, bath linen; cloth napkins, bed blankets; throws; comforters; bedspreads; kitchen and bath towels; handkerchiefs made of textiles; curtains; and pillow cases” because providers of linens and curtains commonly provide a wide array of different types of linens and curtains. The examining attorney attached to the 15 February 2019 Office Action Internet evidence and third-party registrations which show that providers of applicant’s goods also commonly provide registrant’s goods. Additional Internet evidence attached to this Final Action further demonstrates that providers of applicant’s “Bed linen; Curtain holders of textile material; Door curtains; Net curtains; Pillow shams; Pillowcases; Shower curtains of textile or plastic; Coasters of textile; Curtains of textile or plastic; Fitted toilet lid covers; Flags of textile or plastic; Table linen, not of paper; Tablemats of textile; Textile place mats” also commonly provide registrant’s “bed sheets, bath linen; cloth napkins, bed blankets; throws; comforters; bedspreads; kitchen and bath towels; handkerchiefs made of textiles; curtains; and pillow cases.”

 

Given the similarities of the marks, the relationship between the goods that the marks identify, the evidence of record, and the relevant case law, it is clear that a likelihood of confusion exists in this case. Therefore, the refusal to register based upon Trademark Act Section 2(d); 15 U.S.C. §1052(d) is maintained and made final.

 

Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.

 

 

REFUSAL – MARK DIFFERS ON DRAWING AND SPECIMEN

 

Applicant was previously refused registration in International Class 24 because the specimen was digitally-created/a mock-up.  Response options for overcoming that refusal, if any, were set forth in the prior Office action.  Applicant, however, responded to such refusal by submitting substitute specimens for each refused international class that does not show proper use of the applied-for mark in commerce for the reasons immediately stated below.  Thus, the refusal to register the applied-for mark in International Class 24 is now made final because applicant failed to provide evidence of use of the mark in commerce.  Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a), 2.63(b); TMEP §§904, 904.07, 1301.04(g)(i). 

 

Registration is refused because the specimen does not show the mark in the drawing in use in commerce in International Class 24, which is required in the application.  Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56(a); TMEP §§904, 904.07(a), 1301.04(g)(i).  The mark appearing on the specimen and in the drawing must match; that is, the mark in the drawing “must be a substantially exact representation of the mark” on the specimen.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.51(a)-(b); TMEP §807.12(a).

 

In this case, the specimen displays the mark as “ANMBSK” in standard character form.  However, the drawing displays the mark as “ANMBSK” in stylized font where “SK” is within a rectangle.  The mark on the specimen does not match the mark in the drawing because it lacks the stylized font and rectangle design shown in the drawing.  Applicant has thus failed to provide the required evidence of use of the mark in commerce.  See TMEP §807.12(a).

 

Applicant may respond to this refusal by satisfying one of the following:

 

(1)       Submit a different specimen (a verified “substitute” specimen) for each applicable international class that (a) shows the mark in the drawing in actual use in commerce for the goods in the application, and (b) was in actual use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application.

 

Examples of specimens for goods include tags, labels, instruction manuals, containers, photographs that show the mark on the actual goods or packaging, and displays associated with the actual goods at their point of sale.  See TMEP §§904.03 et seq.  Webpages may also be specimens for goods when they include a picture or textual description of the goods associated with the mark and the means to order the goods.  TMEP §904.03(i). 

 

(2)       Submit a request to amend the filing basis to intent to use under Section 1(b), for which no specimen is required.  This option will later necessitate additional fee(s) and filing requirements such as providing a specimen.

 

The USPTO will not accept an amended drawing submitted in response to this refusal because the changes would materially alter the drawing of the mark in the original application or as previously acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.72(a)-(b); TMEP §807.14.  Specifically, amending the mark would be a material alteration because the rectangle design enclosing “SK” changes the visual and commercial impression created by the mark by adding a visual emphasis to these two letters.

 

For more information about drawings and instructions on how to satisfy these response options online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, see the Drawing webpage.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusals by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  However, if applicant responds to the refusals, applicant must also respond to the requirement set forth below.

 

REQUIREMENT – AMEND MARK DESCRIPTION

 

Applicant must submit an amended description of the mark because the current one is incomplete and does not describe all the significant aspects of the mark.  37 C.F.R. §2.37; see TMEP §§808.01, 808.02.  Descriptions must be accurate and identify all the literal and design elements in the mark.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.37; TMEP §§808 et seq. 

 

The following description is suggested, if accurate:  The mark consists of the wording “ANMBSK” in stylized font with “SK” within a rectangle.

 

Advisory – Response Guidelines

 

Applicant must respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action or the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond by providing one or both of the following:

 

(1)       a response filed using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements and resolves all outstanding refusals; and/or

 

(2)       an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board filed using the Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA) with the required filing fee of $200 per class.

 

37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.

 

In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues.  TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters).  There is a fee required for filing a petition.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

Advisory – U.S. Counsel Rules Changes

 

In spring 2019, the USPTO is likely to issue proposed changes to the federal trademark regulations to require trademark applicants, registrants, and parties to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board proceedings who are foreign-domiciled (have a permanent legal residence or a principal place of business outside of the United States), including Canadian filers, to have an attorney who is licensed to practice law in the United States represent them at the USPTO.  In addition, U.S.-licensed attorneys representing a trademark applicant, registrant, or party will generally be required to provide their bar membership information, a statement attesting to their good standing in that bar, and their postal/email addresses in trademark-related submissions.  All U.S.-licensed attorneys who practice before the USPTO are subject to the rules in 37 C.F.R. Part 11 governing representation of others, including the USPTO’s Rules of Professional Conduct. 

 

These changes are being made to increase customer compliance with federal trademark law, improve the accuracy of trademark submissions to the USPTO, and safeguard the integrity of the U.S. trademark register.  See the U.S. Counsel Rule change webpage for more information.

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

Assistance

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusals and requirement in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

 

 

/Joan Blazich/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 122

571-272-7810

joan.blazich@uspto.gov

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 5/3/2019 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 88238197

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed.  The trademark examining attorney assigned by the USPTO to your application has written an official letter to which you must respond.  Please follow these steps:

 

(1)  Read the LETTER by clicking on this link or going to http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/, entering your U.S. application serial number, and clicking on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification. 

 

(2)  Respond within 6 months (or sooner if specified in the Office action), calculated from 5/3/2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) response form located at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  A response transmitted through TEAS must be received before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise e-mail your response because the USPTO does NOT accept e-mails as responses to Office actions. 

 

(3)  Questions about the contents of the Office action itself should be directed to the trademark examining attorney who reviewed your application, identified below. 

 

/Joan Blazich/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 122

571-272-7810

joan.blazich@uspto.gov

 

WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable response deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.  For more information regarding abandonment, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/basics/abandon.jsp. 

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.