UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)
OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION
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U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 88232142
MARK: SOCIAL CLOUD COMPUTING
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CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: |
CLICK HERE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp
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APPLICANT: DISE Technologies, LLC
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CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: |
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OFFICE ACTION
TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW. A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.
ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 4/4/2019
The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4958078. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the enclosed registration.
The applicant seeks registration for the mark “SOCIAL CLOUD COMPUTING” for “electronic data storage.”
The registered mark is “SOCIALCLOUD” for “advertising and marketing services provided by means of indirect methods of marketing communications, namely, social media, search engine marketing, inquiry marketing, internet marketing, mobile marketing, blogging and other forms of passive, sharable or viral communications channels; Promoting and marketing the goods and services of others by providing search engine optimization through social media markups and hyperlinks; Promoting the goods and services of others by providing a website featuring search engine marketing services through social media markups and hyperlinks; Promoting the goods and services of others by providing search engine results through social media markups and hyperlinks; Promoting, advertising and marketing of the brands, products, services and online websites of individuals, businesses and nonprofit organizations; Promotion, advertising and marketing of on-line websites; Providing a searchable on-line advertising website and guide featuring the goods and services of other vendors via the Internet; Providing a searchable online advertising website and informational guide featuring the goods and services of other vendors via the internet in the field of search engine optimization; Providing business information in the field of social media; Providing marketing consulting in the field of social media; Social media strategy and marketing consultancy focusing on helping clients create and extend their product and brand strategies by building virally engaging marketing solutions.”
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a potential consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the services of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). A determination of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d) is made on a case-by case basis and the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) aid in this determination. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1349, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing On-Line Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1085, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1474 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Not all the du Pont factors, however, are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one of the factors may control in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d at 1355, 98 USPQ2d at 1260; In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567.
In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the services, and similarity of the trade channels of the services. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
Similarity of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar. In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b).
The marks are highly similar and share the terms “SOCIAL CLOUD.” The applicant’s use of the descriptive, if not generic, term “COMPUTING” does not obviate the similarity of the marks. Moreover, the registrant’s use of the terms as a single word does not distinguish his mark.
The question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but whether the marks will confuse people into believing that the services they identify come from the same source. In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 468 F.2d 200, 201, 175 USPQ 558, 558-59 (C.C.P.A. 1972); TMEP §1207.01(b). For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison. The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression. See Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.2d 1322, 1329-30, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1899 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Visual Info. Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc., 209 USPQ 179, 189 (TTAB 1980). The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co., 203 USPQ 537, 540-41 (TTAB 1979); Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Because the marks are highly similar and contain the terms “SOCIAL CLOUD,” they sound and look very similar and evoke similar commercial impressions, such that users of the services are likely to believe that applicant’s and registrant’s services may emanate from the same party. Thus, the marks are confusingly similar.
Relatedness of the Services
The respective services need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing [be] such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); Gen. Mills Inc. v. Fage Dairy Processing Indus. SA, 100 USPQ2d 1584, 1597 (TTAB 2011); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
The applicant offers “data storage services.” The registrant’s services include “advertising, marketing, providing business information in the field of social media, providing marketing consulting in the field of social media, social media strategy and marketing consultancy focusing on helping clients create and extend their product and brand strategies by building virally engaging marketing solutions.” As evidence that the applicant’s “data storage services” are related to the registrant’s “marketing” and “social media” services, note the attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of a number of third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar services as those of both applicant and registrant in this case. This evidence shows that the services listed therein are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark. See In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1737 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii). Also see the attached excerpt from the Software Consultancy website, sc.com, discussing the use of a “social cloud” in relation to social networking, marketing and related business services and the excerpt from Oracle that discusses how “social data makes marketing better.” The services of the parties are complimentary and may be offered by the same party.
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the services but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
The marks are highly similar and share the terms “SOCIAL CLOUD” and the applicant’s services are related to the registrant’s; thus, purchasers are likely to be confused as to the source of the applicant’s servcies. Accordingly, registration is refused pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. The applicant is advised of this second ground for refusal:
SECTION 2(e)(1) REFUSAL – MERELY DESCRIPTIVE
Registration is refused because the applied-for mark merely names the services and describes a feature and characteristic of applicant’s services. Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. §1052(e)(1); see TMEP §§1209.01(b), 1209.03 et seq.
A mark is merely descriptive if it describes a quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose or use of the specified services. TMEP §1209.01(b); see In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 1217-18, 3 USPQ2d 1009, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
The determination of whether a mark is merely descriptive is considered in relation to the identified services, not in the abstract. In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 814, 200 USPQ 215, 218 (C.C.P.A. 1978); TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re Polo Int’l Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1061 (TTAB 1999) (finding DOC in DOC-CONTROL would be understood to refer to the “documents” managed by applicant’s software, not “doctor” as shown in dictionary definition); In re Digital Research Inc., 4 USPQ2d 1242 (TTAB 1987) (finding CONCURRENT PC-DOS merely descriptive of “computer programs recorded on disk” where relevant trade used the denomination “concurrent” as a descriptor of a particular type of operating system). “Whether consumers could guess what the product is from consideration of the mark alone is not the test.” In re Am. Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985).
The applicant seeks registration for the mark “SOCIAL CLOUD COMPUTING” for “electronic data storage.”
“CLOUD COMPUTING” is defined by The Columbia Encyclopedia as “the delivery of shared computing resources over a network in a manner that makes accessing and configuring those resources convenient and largely independent of the use of a required location, device, and the like.” “SOCIAL” refers to a “SOCIAL” network, which is an “online service or website through which people create and maintain interpersonal relationship.” (See attached definition from the online Merriam Webster Dictionary) “SOCIAL CLOUD COMPUTING” refers to the sharing of computer resources in relation to such a “SOCIAL” network. (See attached excerpt from the Wikipedia.org website)
A mark that combines descriptive words may be registrable if the composite creates a unitary mark with a separate, nondescriptive meaning. In re Colonial Stores, Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 551, 157 USPQ 382, 384 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (holding SUGAR & SPICE not merely descriptive of bakery products because of the mark’s immediate association with the nursery rhyme “sugar and spice and everything nice”). However, the mere combination of descriptive words does not automatically create a new nondescriptive word or phrase. See, e.g., In re Associated Theatre Clubs Co., 9 USPQ2d 1660, 1662 (TTAB 1988) (holding GROUP SALES BOX OFFICE merely descriptive for theater ticket sales services).
Generally, if the individual components of a mark retain their descriptive meaning in relation to the services, the combination results in a composite mark that is itself descriptive and not registrable. In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1516 (TTAB 2016) (citing In re Tower Tech, Inc., 64 USPQ2d 1314, 1317-18 (TTAB (2002)); TMEP §1209.03(d); see, e.g., In re Cannon Safe, Inc., 116 USPQ2d 1348, 1351 (TTAB 2015) (holding SMART SERIES merely descriptive of metal gun safes, because “each component term retains its merely descriptive significance in relation to the goods, resulting in a mark that is also merely descriptive”); In re King Koil Licensing Co., 79 USPQ2d 1048, 1052 (TTAB 2006) (holding THE BREATHABLE MATTRESS merely descriptive of beds, mattresses, box springs, and pillows where the evidence showed that the term “BREATHABLE” retained its ordinary dictionary meaning when combined with the term “MATTRESS” and the resulting combination was used in the relevant industry in a descriptive sense); In re Associated Theatre Clubs Co., 9 USPQ2d 1660, 1663 (TTAB 1988) (holding GROUP SALES BOX OFFICE merely descriptive of theater ticket sales services, because such wording “is nothing more than a combination of the two common descriptive terms most applicable to applicant’s services which in combination achieve no different status but remain a common descriptive compound expression”). Only where the combination of descriptive terms creates a unitary mark with a unique, incongruous, or otherwise nondescriptive meaning in relation to the services is the combined mark registrable. See In re Colonial Stores, Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 551, 157 USPQ 382, 384 (C.C.P.A. 1968); In re Positec Grp. Ltd., 108 USPQ2d 1161, 1162-63 (TTAB 2013).
As evidence that the terms are commonly used in the marketplace in relation to related services, note the attached internet evidence obtained via the Google search engine.
For example, see the excerpt from the dl.acm.org website discussing the book, Social Cloud Computing: A Vision for Socially Motivated Resource Sharing by Kyle Chard or in the book, Mobile Cloud Computing: Architectures, Algorithms and Applications by Debashis De, which sets forth various aspects of “SOCIAL CLOUD COMPUTING” and how various social media platforms, as well as various online gaming and streaming are “using the concept of mobile SOCIAL CLOUD COMPUTING…” (emphasis added)
As evidence that this Office has treated the individual terms as descriptive, note the attached U.S. Registrations with the terms disclaimed.
In this case, the applicant’s mark is merely a combination of descriptive terms which does not create a new or unique, incongruous or nondescriptive meaning in relation to the services. Potential users would readily understand that the “data storage services” are in relation to “CLOUD COMPUTING” on “SOCIAL” networks. Accordingly, the mark is refused registration on the Principal Register under Section 2(e)(1).
Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
/Paula M. Mahoney/
Examining Attorney
Law Office 119
(571) 272-9191
paula.mahoney@uspto.gov
TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER: Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application. For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney. E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.
All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.
WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE: It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants). If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response.
PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION: To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/. Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen. If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199. For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.
TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS: Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.
