Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

Issue date:  August 02, 2019

 

INTRODUCTION

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on July 12, 2019.

 

In a previous Office action(s) dated January 15 and 29, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following: Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with a registered mark and Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1) for descriptiveness. 

 

The trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in the summary of issues below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:

• Trademark Act Section 2(d) refusal—Class 42
• Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1) refusal—Class 35

LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION UNDER TRADEMARK ACT SECTION 2(d)—CLASS 42 

 

The refusal to register the proposed mark is made FINAL because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4799027.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration. 

Registration was refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(d), because the mark for which registration is sought so resembles the marks shown in U.S. Registration No. 4799027 that it is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake or to deceive when used on the goods. 

 

The examining attorney has considered the applicant’s arguments carefully, but has found them unpersuasive.  For the reasons below, the refusal under Section 2(d) is maintained and made FINAL.   

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

In this case, the following factors are the most relevant:  similarity of the marks, similarity and nature of the services, and similarity of the trade channels of the services.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1361-62, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.

 

The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

COMPARISON OF MARKS

  

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The test under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act is whether there is a likelihood of confusion. It is unnecessary to show actual confusion in establishing likelihood of confusion.  See Weiss Associates Inc. v. HRL Associates Inc., 902 F.2d 1546, 1549, 14 USPQ2d 1840, 1842-43 (Fed. Cir. 1990), and cases cited therein.

 

In this case, the applicant’s mark is the typed drawing “ASSESS.”  Registration no. 4799027 is for the mark “EZASSESS.”   Applicant’s mark is nearly identical with regard to appearance, sound, meaning, and commercial impression to the marks of cited registrant.  Although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.

 

Because the marks use the same primary term “ASSESS,” the marks convey the same overall commercial impression.  Based on the marks alone, there is a likelihood of confusion.  See:  In re Akzona Inc., 94 (TTAB 1983); In re Wm. E. Wright Co., 185 USPQ 445 (TTAB 1975). 

 

By using the same primary term as the already registered mark, applicant has appropriated the registrant’s mark in its entirety.  However, even if the deletion of matter distinguished the mark, the examining attorney must consider all circumstances surrounding the marks, including the degree of similarity between the services.  Industrial Nucleonic Corp. v. Hinde Engineering Co., 475 F.2d 1197, 177 USPQ 386 (CCPA 1973).   

 

If the services of the respective parties are “similar in kind and/or closely related,” the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as would be required with diverse services.  In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987); see Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1242, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TMEP §1207.01(b).  ).  In this case, the services are or could be identical, thus the degree of difference between the proposed mark, “ASSESS” and the already registered mark, “EZASSESS,” is not enough to avoid the likelihood of confusion. 

 

COMPARISON OF SERVICES

 

 If the marks of the respective parties are identical or highly similar, the examining attorney must consider the commercial relationship between the goods or services of the respective parties carefully to determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  In re Concordia International Forwarding Corp., 222 USPQ 355 (TTAB 1983).

 

The compared services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

In this case, the services are closely related or identical.  The applicant’s services are “Providing temporary use of on-line non-downloadable software for healthcare operations management; not for use with software for assessing and auditing healthcare document management, coding errors, and guideline compliance.”  Registration No.4799027 is for “Software as a service (SAAS) services featuring software for assessing and auditing healthcare document management, coding errors, and guideline compliance.”  Applicant’s services and registrant’s services are highly similar.

 

The presumption under Trademark Act Section 7(b) is that the registrant is the owner of the mark and that their use of the mark extends to all services identified in the registration.  15 U.S.C. §1057(b).  In the absence of limitations as to channels of trade or classes of purchasers in the services in the registration, the presumption is that the services move in all trade channels normal for such services and are available to all potential classes of ordinary consumers of such services.  See In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1737 (TTAB 2018); In re Melville Corp., 18 USPQ2d 1386, 1388 (TTAB 1991); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).

 

Applicant argues that its mark should register because the deletion of the term EZ from the registered mark differentiates its mark from the registered mark.  However, likelihood of confusion is not necessarily avoided between otherwise confusingly similar marks merely by adding or deleting other distinctive matter.  If an important portion of both marks is the same, then the marks may be confusingly similar notwithstanding some differences. See. e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1266, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding that, even though applicant's mark PACKARD TECHNOLOGIES, with “TECHNOLOGIES” disclaimed, does not incorporate every feature of opposer’s HEWLETT PACKARD marks, a similar overall commercial impression is created); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1271 (TTAB 2009) (holding VANTAGE TITAN for MRI diagnostic apparatus, and TITAN for medical ultrasound device, likely to cause confusion, noting that the marks are more similar than they are different and that the addition of applicant's “product mark,” VANTAGE, to the registered mark would not avoid confusion); In re U.S. Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985) (holding CAREER IMAGE (stylized) for clothing and retail women's clothing store services, and CREST CAREER IMAGES (stylized) for uniforms, likely to cause confusion, noting that CAREER IMAGE would be perceived by consumers as a shortened form of CREST CAREER IMAGES).  This case is similar in that EZ merely modifies or enhances the commercial impression engendered by the “ASSESS” portion of Registrant’s mark.  Applicant’s mark ASSESS and the registered mark EZASSESS, are substantially similar in appearance, sound and connotation and convey a substantially similar commercial impression due to the shared term “ASSESS.”

 

Applicant argues that its services are not similar to the services in the registration because it has excepted “not for use with software for assessing and auditing healthcare document management, coding errors, and guideline compliance” from its software.  However, although applicant’s identification excludes software for assessing and auditing healthcare document management, coding errors, and guideline compliance, the services are otherwise broadly identified. As such, applicant’s services are not limited, and could include nearly identical software as the registrant’s.  Also, applicant’s website states the following with regard to its software, “This amazing command center will provide the foundation and technology needed to assess health system operations in real-time, to shine the light on bottlenecks before they occur, to predict and manage patient demand, and to proactively assign the right resources," said Fred Manchur, CEO of Kettering Health.” See, http://www.teletracking.com/services.  Because registrant’s identified services and applicant’s services are or could be legally identical in part, it is presumed that the channels of trade are the same for those services. See In re Viterra Inc., 101 USPQ2d at 1908 (finding Board entitled to rely on this legal presumption in determining likelihood of confusion); In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1518-19 (TTAB 2016).

Because applicant’s mark uses the same primary term ASSESS as the already registered mark and the services could be nearly identical, there is a likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d).  Based on the above reasons, a likelihood of confusion must be found to exist.  Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

The examining attorney also makes FINAL the refusal based on Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1).

REFUSAL BASED ON DESCRIPTIVENESS – TRADEMARK ACT SECTION 2(e)(1)—CLASS 35  

The examining attorney makes FINAL the refusal to register the mark on the Principal Register because the proposed mark is merely descriptive of the identified services.  Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(e)(1); TMEP section 1209 et seq.    

A mark is merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of an applicant’s services.  TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re TriVita, Inc., 783 F.3d 872, 874, 114 USPQ2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920)). 

In this case, applicant’s mark, “ASSESS” is a descriptive characteristic of the services.  The applicant’s services are “Consulting services for hospitals and healthcare facilities, namely, providing management consulting services for facilitating the optimization of operational efficiencies in hospitals and healthcare facilities.”  The applicant’s mark merely describes a feature, quality or characteristic of applicant’s services.  “ASSESS” is defined as “to determine the importance, size, or value of //assess a problem.”  www.merriamwebster.com.  In this case, the term ASSESS describes the consulting services, that they are providing assessment of management of hospitals to determine inefficiencies.  The proposed mark describes a characteristic of the consulting services, that they are providing assessments, thus the term ASSESS in the proposed mark is descriptive based on Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1).’

 “A mark may be merely descriptive even if it does not describe the ‘full scope and extent’ of the applicant’s goods or services.”  In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1346, 57 USPQ2d 1807, 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); TMEP §1209.01(b).  It is enough if a mark describes only one significant function, attribute, or property.  In re The Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §1209.01(b); see In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d at 1173, 71 USPQ2d at 1371.  The term ASSESS describes a characteristic of the services, thus the proposed mark is descriptive.

Finally, there is nothing incongruous or indefinite about the term “ASSESS.” Nothing requires the exercise of imagination, cogitation, mental processing or gathering of further information in order for a significant portion of the purchaser’s of applicant’s services to readily perceive the merely descriptive significance of the mark as it relates to “Consulting services for hospitals and healthcare facilities, namely, providing management consulting services for facilitating the optimization of operational efficiencies in hospitals and healthcare facilities.”  Such significance in regard to the proposed mark would be immediately apparent.  In re Gould Paper Corp., 5 USPQ2d 1110, 1112 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

Applicant argues that the term ASSESS has many definitions, and therefore the term is not descriptive.  However, the determination of whether a mark is merely descriptive is made in relation to an applicant’s services, not in the abstract.  DuoProSS Meditech Corp. v. Inviro Med. Devices, Ltd., 695 F.3d 1247, 1254, 103 USPQ2d 1753, 1757 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re The Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re Polo Int’l Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1061, 1062-63 (TTAB 1999) (finding DOC in DOC-CONTROL would refer to the “documents” managed by applicant’s software rather than the term “doctor” shown in a dictionary definition); In re Digital Research Inc., 4 USPQ2d 1242, 1243-44 (TTAB 1987) (finding CONCURRENT PC-DOS and CONCURRENT DOS merely descriptive of “computer programs recorded on disk” where the relevant trade used the denomination “concurrent” as a descriptor of a particular type of operating system).  In this case, it is clear that the proposed mark ASSESS refers to determining the importance, size, or value of //assess a problem with regard to “Consulting services for hospitals and healthcare facilities, namely, providing management consulting services for facilitating the optimization of operational efficiencies in hospitals and healthcare facilities.”  Thus, the proposed mark is descriptive. 

 

“Whether consumers could guess what the product [or service] is from consideration of the mark alone is not the test.”  In re Am. Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985).  In this case, consumers would not need to guess the services from the proposed mark, it is clear that applicant is providing assessment of hospitals for facilitating operational efficiency.  Applicant’s own website states the following: “Is your health system meeting key operational performance metrics?

Let our experts come on-site to assess the operational performance of your organization;” “Our integrated solutions provide the foundation and technology needed to establish a robust Health System Command Center. Our real-time visibility shines the light on bottlenecks and pain-points, so you can assess your health system operations in real-time, predict and manage demand, and proactively assign the right resources. Insights for long-term strategic planning are gained, resulting in consistently exceptional patient experiences, improved staff satisfaction, and growth and sustainability for your health system.”  See, http://www.teletracking.com/services. 

 

Applicant argues that its mark should be allowed to register because more descriptive marks than its mark have been allowed.  However, prior decisions and actions of other trademark examining attorneys in registering other marks have little evidentiary value and are not binding upon the USPTO or the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(vi); see In re USA Warriors Ice Hockey Program, Inc., 122 USPQ2d 1790, 1793 n.10 (TTAB 2017).  Each case is decided on its own facts, and each mark stands on its own merits.  In re USA Warriors Ice Hockey Program, Inc., 122 USPQ2d at 1793 n.10 (quoting In re Boulevard Entm’t, 334 F.3d 1336, 1343, 67 USPQ2d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).  Thus, the applicant’s argument does not obviate the descriptiveness of the proposed mark.

Because the proposed mark is highly descriptive of the applicant’s services, the refusal based on Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1) is maintained and made FINAL. Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(e)(1); TMEP section 1209 et seq.  Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal(s) by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. 

SUPPLEMENTAL REGISTER ADVISORY

A mark in an application under Trademark Act Section 1(b) is not eligible for registration on the Supplemental Register until an acceptable amendment to allege use under 37 C.F.R. §2.76 has been filed.  37 C.F.R. §§2.47(d), 2.75(b); TMEP §§815.02, 1102.03.  When a Section 1(b) application is successfully amended to the Supplemental Register, the application effective filing date will be the date applicant met the minimum filing requirements under 37 C.F.R. §2.76(c) for the amendment to allege use.  TMEP §§816.02, 1102.03; see 37 C.F.R. §2.75(b).

 

To amend an intent-to-use application under Trademark Act Section 1(b) to use in commerce, an applicant must file, prior to approval of the mark for publication, an acceptable amendment to allege use.  See 15 U.S.C. §1051(c); 37 C.F.R. §2.76; TMEP §§806.01(b), 1103.  An amendment to allege use must satisfy the following requirements:

 

(1)        STATEMENTS:  The following statements:  “The applicant is the owner of the mark sought to be registered.” and “The applicant is using the mark in commerce on or in connection with all the goods/services in the application or notice of allowance, or as subsequently modified.”

 

(2)        DATES OF FIRST USE:  The date of first use of the mark anywhereon or in connection with the goods and/or services, and the date of first use of the mark in commerceas a trademark or service mark.  See more information about dates of use.

 

(3)        GOODS AND/OR SERVICES:  The goods and/or services specified in the application.

 

(4)        SPECIMEN:  A specimen showing how applicant uses the mark in commerce for each class of goods and/or services for which use is being asserted.  If a single specimen supports multiple classes, applicant should indicate which classes the specimen supports rather than providing multiple copies of the same specimen.  See more information about specimens.

 

(5)        FEE(S):  A filing fee for each international class of goods and/or services for which use is being asserted (find current fee information).

 

(6)        VERIFICATION:  Verification of (1) through (4) above in an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20.  See more information about verification.

 

See 37 C.F.R. §2.76(b); TMEP §1104.08.

 

An amendment to allege use may be filed online via the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  Filing an amendment to allege use is not considered a response to an Office action.  37 C.F.R. §2.76(h); TMEP §1104.  An applicant must file a separate response to any outstanding Office action.  TMEP §1104; see 37 C.F.R. §2.76(h). 

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

 

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this final Office action and/or appeal it to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB).

 

 

/Caroline E. Wood/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 110

U.S. Patent & Trademark Office

571-272-9243

Caroline.Wood@uspto.gov

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on August 02, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88220818

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Caroline E. Wood/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 110

U.S. Patent & Trademark Office

571-272-9243

Caroline.Wood@uspto.gov

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from August 02, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond.

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·         Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·         Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·         Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”