To: | American Tuna, Inc. (docketing@procopio.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88216827 - FISHIN' FAMILIES - 12319805US03 |
Sent: | September 08, 2019 02:26:51 PM |
Sent As: | ecom101@uspto.gov |
Attachments: |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88216827
Mark: FISHIN' FAMILIES
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Correspondence Address: PROCOPIO, CORY, HARGREAVES & SAVITCH LLP
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Applicant: American Tuna, Inc.
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Reference/Docket No. 12319805US03
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: September 08, 2019
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
This responds to applicant’s communication dated July 12, 2019, wherein applicant submitted arguments in response the refusal under Trademark Act Sec. 2(d). For the reasons set forth below, the likelihood of confusion refusal is continued and made FINAL:
SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL MADE FINAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Applicant seeks registration of for the mark FISHIN’ FAMILIES for “seafood, not live.”
Registration was refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), on the ground that applicant’s mark, when used on or in connection with the identified goods, so resembles the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 3228852, 2978298, 3291829 and 4825626 as to be likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. The registered marks are:
1. Reg. No. 3228852 for FISHIN covering “fresh and frozen fish and seafood”.
2. Reg. No. 2978298 for FISHIN’ covering “frozen packaged fish”.
3. Reg. No. 3291829 for FISHIN’ covering “fresh and frozen fish and seafood”.
4. Reg. No. 4825626 for FISHIN and design covering “frozen fish and seafood; fresh fish and seafood, not live”.
The cited marks are commonly owned.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Comparison of the Marks
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
The applicant's mark FISHIN’ FAMILIES is similar to the cited mark visually and phonetically given the shared presences of the word “FISHIN’”. Applicant’s addition of “FAMILIES” is insufficient to distinguish the mark given the overall similarities of the marks and goods. Adding a term to a registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER and design confusingly similar); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1269 (TTAB 2009) (finding TITAN and VANTAGE TITAN confusingly similar); In re El Torito Rests., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 2002, 2004 (TTAB 1988) (finding MACHO and MACHO COMBOS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). In the present case, the marks are identical in part.
In the present case, the marks are identical in part to the extent the registered mark is entirely incorporated into the proposed mark. Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). In the present case, the marks are identical in part.
Applicant’s suggestion that the examining attorney has failed to consider its mark in its entirety is without merit. Marks must be compared in their entireties and should not be dissected; however, a trademark examining attorney may weigh the individual components of a mark to determine its overall commercial impression. In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[Regarding the issue of confusion,] there is nothing improper in stating that . . . more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties.” (quoting In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
A comparison of the marks also must take into account the similarity of the goods/services. The applicant’s identification of “seafood, not live” wholly encompasses the goods of the registrant, which are limited to various forms of fish and seafood that is not live. Where the goods and/or services of an applicant and registrant are identical or virtually identical, as here, the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding that confusion is likely declines. See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
Lastly, the presence of design elements in one of the cited marks fails to preclude a likelihood of consumer confusion. When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services. In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii). Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed. In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
In response to the foregoing, applicant argues first that the examining attorney’s analysis is erroneous because the registered mark has little or no source-identifying significance because it is descriptive in relation to registrant’s goods. According to applicant, the cited marks for “FISHIN’” are “descriptive of what Registrant does, that is, fish for and acquire fish for manufacture and distribution”. Applicant concludes that an amendment of its own application to disclaim exclusive rights to “FISHIN’” would be sufficient to overcome the descriptiveness refusal.
The examining attorney has considered applicant’s arguments that the registered mark has little or no source-identifying significance and finds them unpersuasive. Each of the cited marks resides on the Principal Register with no disclaimer or Sec. 2(f) claim to suggest a determination that any of the marks has been deemed descriptive by this Office. Trademark Act Section 7(b) provides that a certificate of registration on the Principal Register is prima facie evidence of the validity of a registered mark. 15 U.S.C. §1057(b). The validity of a cited registration “cannot be challenged in an ex parte proceeding.” In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1517 (TTAB 2016). Thus, applicant’s argument is not being considered because to do so would fail to give the cited registered mark the validity to which it is entitled. In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 USPQ2d at 1517 (citing In re Fiesta Palms LLC, 85 USPQ2d 1360, 1363 (TTAB 2007)).
As to applicant’s proposed disclaimer of the cited mark from its own, marks must be considered in their entireties. Such a disclaimer would not remove the disclaimed portion from the mark for the purposes of comparing marks in a likelihood of confusion determination. Midwestern Pet Foods, Inc. v. Societe des Produits Nestle S.A., 685 F.3d 1046, 1053, 103 USPQ2d 1435, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Iolo Techs., LLC, 95 USPQ2d 1498, 1499 (TTAB 2010). The public is generally not aware of disclaimers in trademark applications and registrations that reside only in the USPTO’s records. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel, Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1243, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1059, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). Thus, applicant’s proposed entry of a voluntary disclaimer would not alter the analysis of confusing similarity.
Applicant next argues that refusal is unwarranted because the shared term “FISHIN” in the marks is diluted and/or weak because “there are many other marks bearing the term.” Applicant contends that the cited marks are not “strong” and, thus, are “entitled to less protection than stronger marks”. In support of this argument, applicant cites results of a search of Trademark Office records disclosing six registered trademarks in Class 29 including the term “FISHIN”. Applicant goes on to discuss results of a broader search disclosing 47 “active trademarks” including the shared term.
The examining attorney has considered this evidence carefully and finds it unpersuasive. Of the six FISHIN-formative marks registered in Class 29, five are owned by the cited registrant, including the four registrations cited against the applicant. The last is the proposed mark. Rather than support registrability of the proposed mark, such evidence serves to highlight the likelihood of consumer confusion. As applicant has shown, the only marks employing the shared term “FISHIN” in connection with packaged seafood are those of the applicant and cited registrant.
The remainder of applicant’s third-party evidence also fails to demonstrate alleged weakness or dilution of the cited marks. Third-party registrations are entitled to little weight on the issue of confusing similarity because the registrations are “not evidence that the registered marks are actually in use or that the public is familiar with them.” In re Midwest Gaming & Entm’t LLC, 106 USPQ2d 1163, 1167 n.5 (TTAB 2013) (citing In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2010)); see TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii). Moreover, the existence on the register of other seemingly similar marks does not provide a basis for registrability for the applied-for mark. AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Total Quality Grp., Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1474, 1477 (TTAB 1999).
It is noted that applicant has submitted a list of 46 registrations from the USPTO database but includes copies of registrations for only a portion. The mere submission of a list of registrations or a copy of a private company search report does not make such registrations part of the record. See In re Peace Love World Live, LLC, 127 USPQ2d 1400, 1405 n.17 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1583 (TTAB 2007); In re Duofold Inc., 184 USPQ 638, 640 (TTAB 1974)); TBMP §1208.02; TMEP §710.03.
To make third party registrations part of the record, an applicant must submit copies of the registrations, or the complete electronic equivalent from the USPTO’s automated systems, prior to appeal. In re Star Belly Stitcher, Inc., 107 USPQ2d 2059, 2064 (TTAB 2013); TBMP §1208.02; TMEP §710.03. Accordingly, the registrations included in the search results but not provided individually will not be considered.
With respect to evidence made of record, applicant has provided electronic copies of third-party registrations for marks containing the wording FISHIN to support the argument that this wording is weak, diluted, or so widely used that it should not be afforded a broad scope of protection. However, these registrations appear to be for goods that are predominantly different from or unrelated to those identified in applicant’s application. Specifically, the referenced registrations concern fishing related goods and services, e.g., fishing lures, fishing information, fishing boats. Applicant provides no arguments evidence to support the conclusion that such registrations demonstrate dilution of the term FISHIN in the context of packaged fish.
Although applicant makes reference to registrations for “food related goods,” these appear limited to the cited marks, the proposed mark and Reg. No. 4283783 for “GOIN’ FISHIN’” covering “cat food”. Clearly, such references fail to demonstrate weakness of the cited marks in the context of goods described in the proposed and cited registrations.
However, evidence comprising only a small number of third-party registrations for similar marks with similar goods and/or services, or none as in the present case, is generally entitled to little, if any, weight in determining the strength of a mark. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1328-29, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1751-52 (Fed. Cir. 2017); AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Products, Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973). These few registrations are “not evidence of what happens in the market place or that customers are familiar with them.” AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d at 1406, 177 USPQ at 269; In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1735 (TTAB 2018). Thus, the few similar third-party registrations submitted by applicant are insufficient to establish that the wording FISHIN’ is weak or diluted.
Further, evidence comprising third-party registrations for similar marks with different or unrelated goods and/or services, as in the present case, has “no bearing on the strength of the term in the context relevant to this case.” See Tao Licensing, LLC v. Bender Consulting Ltd., 125 USPQ2d 1043, 1058 (TTAB 2017) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1328, 123 USPQ2d at 1751). Thus, these third-party registrations submitted by applicant are insufficient to establish that the wording FISHIN’ is weak or diluted.
Given their overall similarities in appearance, pronunciation and meaning, a comparison of the marks must find in favor of confusing similarity.
Comparison of the Goods/Services
As previously discussed, the goods of the parties in this case are essentially identical or overlapping, with each mark employed as a source identifier for seafood. The application uses broad wording to describe “seafood, not live”, which encompasses or overlaps both the “seafood” and more narrowly described “fish” in the cited registrations. Indeed, cited Reg. No. 4825626 employs identification language identical to that of the applicant. See, e.g., Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015); In re N.A.D., Inc., 57 USPQ2d 1872, 1874 (TTAB 2000). Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
As such, the goods of the parties must be are likely to move in the same channels of trade to the same classes of purchasers. For example, both the applicant's and registrant's products would likely be marketed in grocery stores, meat markets, seafood stores and the like and could be used in combination with each other. In its response, applicant provide no arguments or evidence regarding a comparison of the goods of the parties.
Given the similarities of the marks and the goods, consumers are likely to conclude that the goods are somehow related or emanate from the same source. Accordingly, the refusal of registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d) based on a likelihood of confusion is continued and made FINAL.
RESPONDING TO A FINAL OFFICE ACTION
Applicant must respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action or the application will be abandoned. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a). Applicant may respond by providing one or both of the following:
(1) a response filed using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements and/or resolves all outstanding refusals; and/or
(2) an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board filed using the Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA) with the required filing fee of $200 per class.
37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.
In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues. TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters). There is a fee required for filing a petition. 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).
If the applicant has any questions or needs assistance in responding to this Office action, please e-mail or telephone the assigned examining attorney.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this final Office action and/or appeal it to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB)
/SMP/
Steven M. Perez
Trademark Attorney
Law Office 101
(571) 272-5888
steven.perez@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE