To: | Cloud Water, LLC (greg@bormanlaw.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88201731 - CLOUD WATER - N/A |
Sent: | October 15, 2019 03:10:33 PM |
Sent As: | ecom126@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88201731
Mark: CLOUD WATER
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: Cloud Water, LLC
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Reference/Docket No. N/A
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: October 15, 2019
This responds to the applicant’s submission of September 6, 2019 in response to Office action issued March 7, 2019 in which the examining attorney refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d). For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No. 4770355. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).
The following requirement raised in the March 7, 2019 Office action has been withdrawn, obviated and/or satisfied: disclaimer required (satisfied). See TMEP §713.02.
TRADEMARK ACT SECTION 2(d) FINAL REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark was and remains refused due to a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4770355. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.
The examining attorney provided ample arguments and evidence to support the refusal in the prior Office action, and these are incorporated herein by reference. The examining attorney has summarized the refusal for the applicant’s convenience in addition to addressing applicant’s arguments below.
The applicant may review the March 7, 2019 Office action, and its accompanying evidence, at:
Type the Serial Number 88201731 in the white box, click “documents,” and click “Office Action Outgoing” next to the mail date of March 7, 2019, and again next to the mail date of March 7, 2019.
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
Applicant’s standard character mark is CLOUD WATER for the following goods:
“Bottled drinking water” in Class 32.
Registrant’s standard character mark is CLOUD JUICE for the following goods:
“Drinking water” in Class 32.
SIMILARITY OF THE MARKS
When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
As stated in the previous Office Action, the first word of applicant’s and registrant’s marks is the term “CLOUD”. As the applicant alludes to in its arguments, “CLOUD” is not a diluted term in relation to the goods at issue. There is only one registered mark that begins with the term “CLOUD” for drinking water, and that is the mark cited here, CLOUD JUICE. Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).
Applicant’s arguments in regard to the inapplicability of the foregoing cited cases is not persuasive.
Applicant further argues that the word “CLOUD” is not distinctive, and is in fact generic. The word “CLOUD” is not generic in the context of drinking water. “A mark is generic if its primary significance to the relevant public is the class or category of goods or services on or in connection with which it is used.” TMEP §1209.01(c)(i) (citing H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 989-90, 228 USPQ 528, 530 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re ActiveVideo Networks, Inc., 111 USPQ2d 1581, 1600 (TTAB 2014)). Determining whether wording in a mark is generic requires a two-step inquiry:
(1) What is the genus of goods and/or services at issue?
(2) Does the relevant public understand the designation primarily to refer to that genus of goods and/or services?
H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d at 989-90, 228 USPQ at 530; In re Meridian Rack & Pinion, 114 USPQ2d 1462, 1463 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re 1800Mattress.com IP, LLC, 586 F.3d 1359, 1363, 92 USPQ2d 1682, 1684 (Fed. Cir. 2009)); TMEP §1209.01(c)(i).
The second terms of applicant’s and registrant’s marks are words used to describe liquids and/or beverages, “WATER” and “JUICE”, respectively. Although there is no mechanical test to determine the dominant element of a mark, consumers would be more likely to perceive a distinctive term such as “CLOUD”, even if suggestive, rather than a generic or descriptive term as the source-identifying feature of the mark. Tao Licensing, LLC v. Bender Consulting Ltd., 125 USPQ2d 1043, 1059-60 (TTAB 2017) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406-07, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Binion, 93 USPQ2d 1531, 1534 (TTAB 2009)).
Applicant points out that “WATER” and “JUICE” are different substances; however, it is the distinctive first term “CLOUD” that is most likely to be remembered by a consumer. Further, where the goods of an applicant and registrant are identical or virtually identical, as they are here, the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding that confusion is likely declines. See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
As previously stated, even if potential purchasers realize the apparent differences between applicant’s mark and the registered mark, they could still reasonably assume, given the overall similarities in sound, appearance, connotation, and commercial impression in the respective marks, that applicant's goods provided under the CLOUD WATER mark constitute a new or additional line of goods from the same source as the goods sold under the CLOUD JUICE mark with which they may be acquainted or familiar, and that applicant’s mark is merely a variation of that mark. See, e.g., SMS, Inc. v. Byn-Mar Inc. 228 USPQ 219, 220 (TTAB 1985) (applicant’s marks ALSO ANDREA and ANDREA SPORT were “likely to evoke an association by consumers with opposer's preexisting mark [ANDREA SIMONE] for its established line of clothing.”).
If, as applicant suggests, consumers were unlikely to assume this mark is an extension of the registrant’s goods, confusion in the marketplace is not the only consideration. The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
The applicant’s and registrant’s marks are highly similar in appearance, commercial impression and connotation. Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.
SIMILARITY OF THE GOODS
Applicant does not argue that the goods are dissimilar.
As previously stated, the compared goods need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.” Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).
In this case, the registration uses broad wording to describe “drinking water,” which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including applicant’s more narrow “bottled drinking water.” The registrant’s identification is broad enough to include drinking water sold in bottles. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s drinking water are related.
Accordingly, with the contemporaneous use of sufficiently similar marks CLOUD WATER and CLOUD JUICE for drinking water, consumers are likely to conclude that the goods are related and originate from a single source. As such, refusal of registration is now made final under Trademark Act Section 2(d).
RESPONSE GUIDELINES
Applicant must respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action or the application will be abandoned. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a). Applicant may respond by providing one or both of the following:
(1) A request for reconsideration that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals; and/or
(2) An appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board with the required filing fees.
TMEP §715.01; see 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2).
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this final Office action and/or appeal it to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB)
/Cheryl Kluwe/
Cheryl Kluwe
Examining Attorney
Law Office 126
(571) 270-3839
cheryl.kluwe@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE