UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.  A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 4/21/2019

 

THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

INTRODUCTION

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on April 5, 2019.

 

In a previous Office action(s) dated February 27, 2019, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following: Trademark Act Section 2(d) for a likelihood of confusion with registered marks. In addition, applicant was required to satisfy the following requirement(s): amend the identification of services.

 

Further, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in the summary of issues below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:

 

·         Section 2(d) – Likelihood of Confusion Refusal

• Identification of Services Indefinite

 

Section 2(d) – Likelihood of Confusion Refusal

 

For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No(s). 3299757, 4669685, and 4981951.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 3299757, 4669685, and 4981951.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the services of the applicant and registrant(s).  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Determining likelihood of confusion is made on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  However, “[n]ot all of the [du Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1366, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601. F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir 2010)).  The USPTO may focus its analysis “on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the [services].”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see TMEP §1207.01. 

 

Applicant’s mark is “EMERALD” for “Offering expertise in Financial and Business Management in Entertainment Industry. EMERALD name will be used to identify me as an individual with a unique name whose line of business is Financial and Business Management in Entertainment Industry. EMERALD is one of the founders of RIVETING ENTERTAINMENT (a USPTO registered mark / name)”.[1]

 

Registrant’s mark in U.S. Reg. No. 3299757 is “E EMERALD WEALTH ADVISORS” and design for “Private wealth management and financial planning services”. 

 

Registrant’s mark in U.S. Reg. No. 4669685 is “EMERALD” for “Financial transaction services for fiduciaries, namely, secure online integrated banking services offered in conjunction with financial settlement services and related fund management services, not including debit and credit card services, money lending services, loan financing services, financing lines of credit, private wealth management services, or financial planning services”. 

 

Registrant’s mark in U.S. Reg. No. 4981951 is “EMERALD ADVISORS & CONSULTANTS, INC.” for “Business consulting in the field of business operation sustainability; business consulting, namely, providing business solutions and strategies to businesses to operate in a more socially and environmentally sustainable manner, and helping businesses create and implement business operation and sustainability plans; business consulting, namely, conducting water, waste and energy efficiency plans; business consulting, namely, creating business operation and environmental sustainability metrics; consulting in the fields of marketing and branding; business services, namely, creating business operation and environmental sustainability reports; business services, namely, monitoring, measuring, and verifying business operation and environmental sustainability initiatives and impacts”. 

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

In the present case, applicant’s mark is “EMERALD”.

 

Registrant’s mark in U.S. Reg. No. 3299757 is “E EMERALD WEALTH ADVISORS” and design.

 

Registrant’s mark in U.S. Reg. No. 4669685 is “EMERALD”.

 

Registrant’s mark in U.S. Reg. No. 4981951 is “EMERALD ADVISORS & CONSULTANTS, INC.”

 

Comparison of the Marks – U.S. Reg. No. 4669685

 

In the case of the applied-for mark and the mark in U.S. Reg. No. 4669685, the marks are identical.

 

Comparison of the Marks – U.S. Reg. No. 3299757

 

In the present case, applicant’s mark is “EMERALD” and registrant’s mark in U.S. Reg. No. 3299757 is “E EMERALD WEALTH ADVISORS” and design.

 

Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34).

 

When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

 

In the case of the registered mark, the dominant portion of the mark is the word “EMERALD”. Specifically, “EMERALD” appears arbitrary when viewed in relation to the services and is prominently featured in the mark. Alternatively, the letter “E” and design merely serves to reinforce the dominant wording, while the remaining wording “WEALTH ADVISORS” is merely descriptive and has been disclaimed. Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).

 

Thus, “EMERALD” is more likely to be impressed upon the minds of consumers and used when calling for the services.

 

In comparing the applied-for and registered marks, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Specifically, applicant has adopted the entirety of the dominant portion of the registered mark as the only wording in the applied-for mark. Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part.

 

Thus, the marks are similar in terms of appearance and sound.  In addition, the connotation and commercial impression of the marks do not differ when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective services.

 

Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar. 

 

Comparison of the Marks – U.S. Reg. No. 4981951

 

In the present case, applicant’s mark is “EMERALD” and registrant’s mark in U.S. Reg. No. 4981951 is “EMERALD ADVISORS & CONSULTANTS, INC.”

 

Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Greater weight is often given to this dominant feature when determining whether marks are confusingly similar.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d at 1305, 128 USPQ2d at 1050 (citing In re Dixie Rests., 105 F.3d at 1407, 41 USPQ2d at 1533-34).

 

In the case of the registered mark, the dominant portion of the mark is the word “EMERALD”. Specifically, “EMERALD” appears arbitrary when viewed in relation to the services and is the first wording in the mark. Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).

 

Moreover, the only other wording in the mark is merely descriptive and has been disclaimed. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).

 

Thus, “EMERALD” is more likely to be impressed upon the minds of consumers and used when calling for the services.

 

In comparing the applied-for and registered marks, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Specifically, applicant has adopted the entirety of the dominant portion of the registered mark as the only wording in the applied-for mark. Incorporating the entirety of one mark within another does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).  See Wella Corp. v. Cal. Concept Corp., 558 F.2d 1019, 1022, 194 USPQ 419, 422 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding CALIFORNIA CONCEPT and surfer design and CONCEPT confusingly similar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (finding BENGAL LANCER and design and BENGAL confusingly similar); In re Integrated Embedded, 120 USPQ2d 1504, 1513 (TTAB 2016) (finding BARR GROUP and BARR confusingly similar); In re Mr. Recipe, LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1084, 1090 (TTAB 2016) (finding JAWS DEVOUR YOUR HUNGER and JAWS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii).  In the present case, the marks are identical in part.

 

Thus, the marks are similar in terms of appearance and sound.  In addition, the connotation and commercial impression of the marks do not differ when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective services.

 

Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar. 

 

In response to the Office action, applicant presented no argument with respect to the similarity of the marks. Applicant has merely stated it wants to register the mark so it may use the mark exclusively on social media. Applicant’s desire to exclude others from using a similar mark on social media is insufficient to demonstrate the marks are not similar.

 

In addition to the similarity of the marks themselves, the services of the registrant and applicant are also similar.

 

Comparison of Services

 

The compared services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

 

In the present case, applicant’s services are “Offering expertise in Financial and Business Management in Entertainment Industry. EMERALD name will be used to identify me as an individual with a unique name whose line of business is Financial and Business Management in Entertainment Industry. EMERALD is one of the founders of RIVETING ENTERTAINMENT (a USPTO registered mark / name)”. 

 

Registrant’s services in U.S. Reg. No. 3299757 are “Private wealth management and financial planning services”. 

 

Registrant’s services in U.S. Reg. No. 4669685 are “Financial transaction services for fiduciaries, namely, secure online integrated banking services offered in conjunction with financial settlement services and related fund management services, not including debit and credit card services, money lending services, loan financing services, financing lines of credit, private wealth management services, or financial planning services”. 

 

Registrant’s services in U.S. Reg. No. 4981951 are “Business consulting in the field of business operation sustainability; business consulting, namely, providing business solutions and strategies to businesses to operate in a more socially and environmentally sustainable manner, and helping businesses create and implement business operation and sustainability plans; business consulting, namely, conducting water, waste and energy efficiency plans; business consulting, namely, creating business operation and environmental sustainability metrics; consulting in the fields of marketing and branding; business services, namely, creating business operation and environmental sustainability reports; business services, namely, monitoring, measuring, and verifying business operation and environmental sustainability initiatives and impacts”. 

 

Thus, the services are highly related, and it is presumed that they move in all normal channels of trade and are available to all potential customers.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §1207.01, (a)(vi).

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

 

In this case, the application uses broad wording to describe the business and financial services, which presumably encompasses all services of the type described, including registrants’ more narrow business and financial services.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Additionally, the services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s services are related.

 

Moreover, although the services are highly-related, it is generally held that the greater degree of similarity between the applied-for mark and the registered mark, the lesser the degree of similarity between the services of the parties is required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.  In re C.H. Hanson Co., 116 USPQ2d 1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001)); In re Thor Tech, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1636 (TTAB 2009). Because the marks are so similar, any differences between the services become all the more attenuated.

 

Additionally, the attached web evidence from

 

• http://monarchbw.com/

 

• http://www.womackwealthmanagement.com/

 

• http://www.bcgroupinc.com/

 

• http://www.taxwarriors.com/business-consulting

 

• http://www.bluewateradvisory.com/business-consulting/

 

• http://www.bankeasy.com/wealth-management/financial-planning/

 

• http://www.mechanicsbank.com/Wealth-Management/Financial-Planning

 

demonstrates the relatedness of applicant’s and registrant’s services and that such services travel in the same channels of trade.  Specifically, the evidence shows it is common for business management, business consulting, and wealth management, and business management, specifically including those of applicant and registrant, to emanate from a single source. 

 

Additionally, the trademark examining attorney has attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of a number of third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar services as those of both applicant and registrant in this case.  This evidence shows that the services listed therein, namely business management, business consulting, and wealth management, and business management, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark.  See In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1737 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).

 

Under such circumstances, the overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrants.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

In response to the Office action, applicant presented no argument with respect to the similarity of the services. Applicant has merely stated it wants to register the mark so it may use the mark exclusively on social media. Applicant’s desire to exclude others from using a similar mark on social media is insufficient to demonstrate the services are not similar.

 

Accordingly, because the marks are confusingly similar, and because the services of the applicant and registrant travel in the same channels of trade, the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 3299757, 4669685, and 4981951.

 

The refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No(s). 3299757, 4669685, and 4981951.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).

 

Identification of Services Indefinite

 

The following requirements are now made FINAL: identification of services indefinite.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).

 

The identification of goods is indefinite and must be clarified for the reasons set forth below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.32(a)(6); TMEP §1402.01. 

 

The wording “I would like to be able to own trademark for the name / mark EMERALD to limit / prohibit anyone else from using the name as a handle / account name ( @emerald ) on social media outlets such instagram, twitter, facebook, snapshot, etc. My real name is EMERALD and I would like to be the only one to be able to take advantage of using this name as my online identity before anyone else. The trademark certificate will enable me to file a claim for any existing accounts using EMERALD or @emerald. There is no existing logo or mark but this trademark application should only apply to being able to use EMERALD or E M E R A L D or @emerald as my personal and unique identity on social media platforms any commercial / marketing / branding purposes. This would not apply to any business names containing the word or name EMERALD” is unacceptable as indefinite. 

 

Specifically, applicant was required to identify the services using their common commercial name. Applicant has not done so.

 

Additionally, the wording appears beyond the scope of the initial identification of services.  Applicant was advised that the services may be clarified or limited, but may not be expanded beyond those originally itemized in the U.S. application or as acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Therefore, the original identification in the application, and any previously accepted amendments, remain operative for purposes of future amendment.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.07(d).

 

Again, applicant must identify the services using their common commercial name.

 

Suggested Identifications

 

Applicant’s goods and/or services may be clarified or limited, but may not be expanded beyond those originally itemized in the application or as acceptably amended.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.  Applicant may clarify or limit the identification by inserting qualifying language or deleting items to result in a more specific identification; however, applicant may not substitute different goods and/or services or add goods and/or services not found or encompassed by those in the original application or as acceptably amended.  See TMEP §1402.06(a)-(b).  The scope of the goods and/or services sets the outer limit for any changes to the identification and is generally determined by the ordinary meaning of the wording in the identification.  TMEP §§1402.06(b), 1402.07(a)-(b).  Any acceptable changes to the goods and/or services will further limit scope, and once goods and/or services are deleted, they are not permitted to be reinserted.  TMEP §1402.07(e).

 

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual.  See TMEP §1402.04.

 

Applicant may adopt the following identification, if acceptable:

 

Class 35

 

Business management in the entertainment industry

 

Class 36

 

Financial management in the entertainment industry

 

The following requirements are now made FINAL: identification of services indefinite.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).

 

Multiclass Advisory

 

The application identifies goods and/or services in more than one international class; therefore, applicant must satisfy all the requirements below for each international class based on Trademark Act Section 1(b):

 

(1)        List the goods and/or services by their international class number in consecutive numerical order, starting with the lowest numbered class.

 

(2)        Submit a filing fee for each international class not covered by the fee(s) already paid (view the USPTO’s current fee schedule).  The application identifies goods and/or services that are classified in at least two classes; however, applicant submitted a fee(s) sufficient for only one class.  Applicant must either submit the filing fees for the classes not covered by the submitted fees or restrict the application to the number of classes covered by the fees already paid.

 

See 15 U.S.C. §§1051(b), 1112, 1126(e); 37 C.F.R. §§2.32(a)(6)-(7), 2.34(a)(2)-(3), 2.86(a); TMEP §§1403.01, 1403.02(c).

 

See an overview of the requirements for a Section 1(b) multiple-class application and how to satisfy the requirements online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form.

 

Response Options

 

Applicant must respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action or the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond by providing one or both of the following:

 

(1)        a response filed using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements and/or resolves all outstanding refusals; and/or

 

(2)        an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board filed using the Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA) with the required filing fee of $200 per class.

 

37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.

 

In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues.  TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters).  There is a fee required for filing a petition.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

 

Assistance

 

If applicant has questions regarding this Office action, please telephone or e-mail the assigned trademark examining attorney.

 

/Daniel S. Stringer/

Trademark Examining Attorney

United States Patent and Trademark Office

Law Office 103

571.272.8975

daniel.stringer@uspto.g

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.