To: | OFS Brands Inc. (ptodocket.us.dbg@dentons.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88179595 - STRAY - 619255100079 |
Sent: | July 02, 2020 09:23:02 PM |
Sent As: | ecom114@uspto.gov |
Attachments: |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88179595
Mark: STRAY
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Correspondence Address: |
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Applicant: OFS Brands Inc.
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Reference/Docket No. 619255100079
Correspondence Email Address: |
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Applicant’s Response Is Incomplete
Issue date: July 02, 2020
The application is abandoned because applicant’s response to the final Office action dated December 11, 2019 is not complete for the reason(s) stated below. See 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a); TMEP §§718.02, 718.03.
In this case, applicant did not (1) raise a new issue, (2) resolve all outstanding issue(s) in the final Office action, (3) provide any new or compelling evidence with regard to the outstanding issue(s), or (4) present analysis and arguments that were persuasive or shed new light on the outstanding issue(s). Additionally, applicant did not timely file a notice of appeal and no time remains in the response period.
Applicant has argued that the likelihood of confusion refusal should be withdrawn because the marks are dissimilar and its goods are different from the registrant’s goods and services. Applicant’s argument that its mark differs from the registered marks are based ona side by side comparison. When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.” Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b). The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b). The dictionary definition enclosed by the examining attorney shows that the wording ‘STRAY’ means “One that has strayed, especially a domestic animal wandering about.” This definition is essentially the same meaning as the registered marks.
Applicant argues that its limitation of the channels of trade for its goods sufficiently distinguishes its goods from the registrant’s goods. Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
In this case, the registrations use broad wording to describe its furniture items, which presumably encompasses all goods and/or services of the type described, including applicant’s more narrow commercial and institutional furniture items. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, the goods and/or services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are related.
The fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion. TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii); see, e.g., Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. 1317, 1325, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163-64 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Top Tobacco LP v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1170 (TTAB 2011). Further, where the purchasers consist of both professionals and the public, the standard of care for purchasing the goods is that of the least sophisticated potential purchaser. In re FCA US LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1214, 1222 (TTAB 2018) (citing Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. at 1325, 110 USPQ2d at 1163), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 375518 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
The overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods and/or services, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer. See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant. TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988). For the foregoing reasons, the likelihood of confusion refusal is maintained.
Applicant may file a Petition to the Director Under Trademark Rule 2.146 within two months of the issue date of this notice to request that the abandonment determination be reversed and the application be returned to active status. TMEP §§715.03(a)(ii)(D), 718.03(b), 1705.04, 1713.01-.02. However, the Director will grant the petition in rare cases if (1) the USPTO committed a clear procedural error or abuse of discretion, or (2) applicant can show substantial compliance with the response requirements. TMEP §§715.03(a)(ii)(D), 718.03(b), 1713.01-02.
/Won T. Oh/
Attorney Advisor
Law Office 114
(571) 272-9204
email: won.oh@uspto.gov