Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

 

 

 

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

 

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

 

 

Issue date:  February 26, 2020

 

INTRODUCTION

 

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on February 5, 2020.

 

In a previous Office action dated August 5, 2020, the trademark examining attorney refused registration of the applied-for mark based on the following:  SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION.  The examining attorney has considered applicant’s arguments in support of registration and has found them unpersuasive.

 

In addition, applicant was required to satisfy the following requirement:  APPLICANT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY A U.S.-LICENSED ATTORNEY.  Applicant did not appoint a U.S.-licensed attorney.

 

Thus, based on applicant’s response, the trademark examining attorney maintains and now makes FINAL the refusal and requirement in the summary of issues below.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §714.04.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:

• APPLICANT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY A U.S. LICENSED ATTORNEY
• SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

APPLICANT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY A U.S. LICENSED ATTORNEY

 

This requirement is continued and made FINAL.

 

In the present case, the application record indicates that applicant's domicile is outside of the United States in Mexico, and applicant's response filed on February 5, 2020 did not appoint a U.S.-licensed attorney.  In particular, applicant merely completed the attorney section of the response to office action form with information related to applicant’s corporate officer who does not appear to be a U.S.-licensed attorney.  This is particularly true given that “N/A” was provided for the attorney bar membership number.  In addition, an attorney search for attorneys in California does not list Mario Gallardo Preciado which is the state indicated in applicant’s response for the named attorney’s U.S. State of admission.  See attached information from http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/LicenseeSearch/QuickSearch?ResultType=0&SearchType=0&FreeText=Preciado&SoundsLike=False.

 

Applicant must be represented by a U.S.-licensed attorney.  An applicant whose domicile is located outside of the United States or its territories is foreign-domiciled and must be represented at the USPTO by an attorney who is an active member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a U.S. state or territory.  37 C.F.R. §§2.11(a), 11.14; Requirement of U.S.-Licensed Attorney for Foreign-Domiciled Trademark Applicants & Registrants, Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A. (Rev. Sept. 2019).  An individual applicant’s domicile is the place a person resides and intends to be the person’s principal home.  37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.  A juristic entity’s domicile is the principal place of business; i.e., headquarters, where a juristic entity applicant’s senior executives or officers ordinarily direct and control the entity’s activities.  37 C.F.R. §2.2(o); Examination Guide 4-19, at I.A.  Because applicant is foreign-domiciled, applicant must appoint such a U.S.-licensed attorney qualified to practice under 37 C.F.R. §11.14 as its representative before the application may proceed to registration.  37 C.F.R. §2.11(a).  See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information. 

 

Applicant has provided attorney information that appears to be invalid because it does not identify an individual qualified to practice before the USPTO under 37 C.F.R. §11.14.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(a).  Specifically, the application record lists applicant’s attorney as Mario Gallardo Preciado who is identified as a corporate officer of applicant in the response.  Because the name listed in the application record does not appear to be that of a qualified practitioner, the USPTO has removed any related correspondence information that includes this name and is issuing this Office action directly to applicant at the address in the initial application.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.18(a)(1); TMEP §609.01.

 

Applicant must appoint a U.S.-licensed attorney as its representative before the application may proceed to registration.  37 C.F.R. §§2.2(o), 2.11(a).  See Hiring a U.S.-licensed trademark attorney for more information.

 

To appoint a U.S.-licensed attorney.  To appoint an attorney, applicant should submit a completed Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) Change Address or Representation form.  The newly-appointed attorney must submit a TEAS Response to Examining Attorney Office Action form indicating that an appointment of attorney has been made and address all other refusals or requirements in this action, if any.  Alternatively, if applicant retains an attorney before filing the response, the attorney can respond to this Office action by using the appropriate TEAS response form and provide his or her attorney information in the form and sign it as applicant’s attorney.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(b)(1)(ii).

 

Attorney bar credentials required if listed individual is a U.S.-licensed attorney.  If Mario Gallardo Preciado identifies an individual qualified to practice before the USPTO under 37 C.F.R. §11.14, applicant must provide documentation establishing the attorney’s active bar membership in good standing of the bar of a U.S. state or territory, such as a certificate of good standing, an official letter from the bar, or if the bar’s online database lists a member’s standing and admission details, a printout from the website of the specified bar showing the URL and print date.  37 C.F.R. §§2.17(b)(3), 2.61(b).  If the documentation provided establishes that Marion Gallardo Preciado is qualified to practice before the USPTO under 37 C.F.R. §11.14, the requirement to appoint another U.S.-licensed attorney as applicant’s representative will be withdrawn.  Otherwise, applicant must appoint or designate an attorney who is qualified to practice before the USPTO under 37 C.F.R. §11.14.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.17(a).

 

Failure to comply with this requirement is grounds for refusing registration.  In re Harley, 119 USPQ2d 1755, 1757-58 (TTAB 2016); TMEP §814.  Merely stating that the attorney’s bar information is available on a state bar’s website is an insufficient response and will not make the relevant information of record.  See In re Planalytics, Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1453, 1457-58 (TTAB 2004).  Applicant also is advised that providing false statements or documentation concerning applicant’s domicile address or in response to this request for documentation is deemed submitting a paper for an improper purpose in violation of 37 C.F.R. §11.18(b), and subject to the sanctions and actions provided in 37 C.F.R. §11.18(c).  See 37 C.F.R. §2.11(e).

 

Thus, this requirement is continued and made FINAL.

 

SECTION 2(d) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No 4952425.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b).

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4952425.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registration.

 

Applicant has applied to register the mark “MAYA” stylized in the color black with three colorized expanding half circle patterns above the word “MAYA” for the goods fruits, namely, unprocessed avocados.

 

The standard character mark in U.S. Registration No. 4952425 is “MAYA” for goods including fresh fruit and organic fresh fruit, excluding, mango, watermelon and tomato.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the DuPont factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.”  In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01. 

 

COMPARISON OF THE MARKS

 

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

The primary definition of Maya is:  a member of a Mesoamerican Indian people inhabiting southeast Mexico, Guatemala, and Belize, whose civilization reached its height around AD 300-900.  See attached definition from http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=Maya. 

 

Applicant has applied to register the mark “MAYA” stylized in the color black with three colorized expanding half circle patterns above the word “MAYA”.

 

The standard character mark in U.S. Registration No. 4952425 is “MAYA”.

 

Applicant’s mark and registrant’s mark are similar in sound, connotation, and commercial impression because both marks use the identical word “MAYA”, and both marks convey a common commercial impression of “MAYA” particularly as primarily defined.

 

In addition, a mark in typed or standard characters may be displayed in any lettering style; the rights reside in the wording or other literal element and not in any particular display or rendition.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1363, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1909 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 37 C.F.R. §2.52(a); TMEP §1207.01(c)(iii).  Thus, a mark presented in stylized characters and/or with a design element generally will not avoid likelihood of confusion with a mark in typed or standard characters because the word portion could be presented in the same manner of display.  See, e.g., In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1363, 101 USPQ2d at 1909; Squirtco v. Tomy Corp., 697 F.2d 1038, 1041, 216 USPQ 937, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that “the argument concerning a difference in type style is not viable where one party asserts rights in no particular display”).  Thus, as registrant’s mark is a standard character mark for the identical word in applicant’s mark, namely, “MAYA”, registrant’s mark could be presented in the same manner of display as the word portion of applicant’s mark.

 

For this reason, the word portions of the marks are nearly identical in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression; therefore, the addition of a design element to applicant’s mark does not obviate the similarity of the marks in this case.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1206, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1688 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Furthermore, given the design element in the mark arguably resembles a Mayan headpiece, the design element seemingly reinforces the overall Maya commercial impression of applicant’s mark which is identical to that of registrant’s mark. 

 

For this reason, applicant should note that when evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods and/or services.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).  Although applicant’s mark contains a design element, it is the word portion of applicant’s mark, namely, “MAYA”, which is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods which is the only and identical word in registrant’s mark.

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 1373, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971)), aff’d per curiam, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).  Thus, although the marks can be differentiated in a side-by-side comparison given applicant’s use of a design element, the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression related to the use of the identical word “MAYA” that consumers who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties. 

 

Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

COMPARISON OF THE GOODS

 

The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar, commercially related, or travel in the same trade channels.  See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369-71, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722-23 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1165, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

 

Applicant’s goods as amended on July 9, 2019 are fruits, namely, unprocessed avocados in International Class 31.

 

As previously noted, an avocado is a pulpy green- to purple-skinned nutty-flavored fruit.  See the attached definition from Merriam-Webster provided in the Office action dated February 4, 2019 and incorporated into this Office action by reference.  The nature of the avocado as a fruit is also supported by the attached dictionary definition from http://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=avocado. 

 

The goods in U.S. Registration No. 4952425 include fresh fruit and organic fresh fruit, excluding, mango, watermelon and tomato in International Class 31.

 

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

 

In this case, the registration uses broad wording to describe the goods, namely, fresh fruits and organic fresh fruit, excluding, mango, watermelon and tomato, which presumably encompasses all of the type described, including registrant’s more narrow goods which are fruits, namely, unprocessed avocados.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). 

 

Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Additionally, the goods and/or services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods and/or services are related.

 

APPLICANT’S ARGUMENTS

All applicant’s previous arguments addressed in the Office action dated August 5, 2019 are incorporated into this Office action by reference.  The examining attorney addresses applicant’s arguments set forth in the response to Office action filed on February 5, 2020 below.

 

Applicant argues that applicant’s mark has a very distinctive original design with color.  In addition, applicant notes that the design element is on the top and is the first element of the mark.  However, as noted above, although distinctive, the design element is less dominant given the identical word portions of the mark which consumers will use in calling for the goods.  Thus, despite the design element, the marks are similar based upon the identical word portion.

 

Applicant also makes the point that the word “MAYA” in the applied-for mark is used to identify applicant’s product of Mexican origin, namely, avocados.  In addition, applicant notes that the avocado is a fresh fruit, and is totally different to the other products in the cited registration.  However, this is not the case because the identifications in the application and registration are legally identical despite not using the same wording to identify the goods.  Moreover, registrant’s goods identified as fresh fruit and organic fresh fruit, excluding, mango, watermelon and tomato are broad enough to include applicant’s Mexican avocados or unprocessed avocadoes as set forth in the application.

 

Overall, the examining attorney has considered applicant’s arguments and has found them unpersuasive given that both marks use the identical word “MAYA” for legally identical goods.  Moreover, applicant should note the overriding concern is not only to prevent buyer confusion as to the source of the goods, but to protect the registrant from adverse commercial impact due to use of a similar mark by a newcomer.  See In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1208, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  This is particularly true given the identical wording used in the mark for legally identical goods.  Therefore, any doubt regarding a likelihood of confusion determination is resolved in favor of the registrant.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(i); see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1265, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Hyper Shoppes (Ohio), Inc., 837 F.2d 463, 464-65, 6 USPQ2d 1025, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1988).

 

CONCLUSION

 

In the present case, a likelihood of confusion exists because the marks are similar in commercial impression related to the identical use of the word “MAYA” and the goods are legally identical.

 

Thus, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No 4952425. 

 

RESPONSE TO THIS ACTION

 

Applicant must respond within six months of the date of issuance of this final Office action or the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond by providing one or both of the following:

 

(1)       A request for reconsideration that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals; and/or

 

(2)       An appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board with the required filing fees.

 

TMEP §715.01; see 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2)..

 

How to respond.  Click to file a request for reconsideration of this final Office action that fully resolves all outstanding requirements and refusals and/or click to file a timely appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) with the required filing fee(s).

 

 

/Brendan McCauley/

Brendan McCauley

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 114

571-272-9459

Brendan.McCauley@USPTO.GOV

 

 

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

 

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

 

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

 

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

 

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

 

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on February 26, 2020 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88169289

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

 

(1)  Read the official letter.

 

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

 

 

/Brendan McCauley/

Brendan McCauley

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 114

571-272-9459

Brendan.McCauley@USPTO.GOV

 

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

 

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from February 26, 2020, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond

 

 

 

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

 

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

 

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”