UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) ABOUT APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

 

 

OFFICE ACTION

 

STRICT DEADLINE TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT OF APPLICANT’S TRADEMARK APPLICATION, THE USPTO MUST RECEIVE APPLICANT’S COMPLETE RESPONSE TO THIS LETTER WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE BELOW.  A RESPONSE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE TRADEMARK ELECTRONIC APPLICATION SYSTEM (TEAS) MUST BE RECEIVED BEFORE MIDNIGHT EASTERN TIME OF THE LAST DAY OF THE RESPONSE PERIOD.

 

 

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 1/24/2019

 

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney.  Applicant must respond timely and completely to the issues below.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

 

SUMMARY OF ISSUES that applicant must address:

• Refusal – Section 2(d) – Likelihood of Confusion
• Refusal – Ornamental Use – Class 25
• Requirement – Amend Mark Description
• Requirement – Specimen
• Advisory – Response Guidelines

 

REFUSAL – SECTION 2(d) – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION

 

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the marks in U.S. Registration Nos. 3490714, 4920618, 5387604, and 5332961.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the attached registrations.

 

Applicant has applied for ZUNE (in design form) for “Computer bags; Computer carrying cases; Computer cases; Computer hardware; Computer hardware and computer peripheral devices; Computer hardware and computer peripherals; Computer memory devices; Computer peripheral devices; Computer peripheral equipment; Computer peripherals; Computer hardware and software for processing digital music files; Computer programs for processing digital music files; Computer software for processing digital music files; Digital music downloadable from the Internet; Downloadable music files; Downloadable computer software for creating music videos; Protective carrying cases for portable music players” in Class 9 and “Hats; Sweatshirts; T-shirts; Children's and infant's apparel, namely, jumpers, overall sleepwear, pajamas, rompers and one-piece garments; Hooded sweatshirts” in Class 25.

 

U.S. Registration No. 3490714, ZUNE (in standard character form), is for “software for connecting multimedia players to existing audiovisual systems in automobiles; computer software for use with multimedia player, entertainment and communications devices for recording, organizing, transmitting, manipulating and reviewing text, data, audio, image and video files; computer software for online accessing and purchasing of music, videos and other digital recordings” in Class 9.

 

U.S. Registration No. 4920618, ZUNYI (in standard character form), is for, in relevant part, “Batteries, electric; Chargers for electric batteries; Computer peripheral devices; Computers; Tablet computer” in Class 9.

 

U.S. Registration Nos. 5387604 and 5332961 are owned by the same registrant. No. 5387604, ZUNIE LOS ANGELES (in standard character form), and No. 5332961, ZUNIE (in standard character form), are both for “Apparel, namely, tank tops, cotton woven shirts, knit shirts, polo shirts, t-shirts, sweatshirts, cotton jackets, denim jackets, hats, caps, visors, hoods, headbands, socks, shorts, pants, vests, skirts, dresses, overalls, short pants, capri pants, blouses and sweaters” in Class 25.

 

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered.  M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018). 

 

Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis:  (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods.  See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

 

Comparison of the Marks

 

In a likelihood of confusion determination, the marks in their entireties are compared for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1323, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1748 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). 

 

In the present case, applicant’s mark is ZUNE and the literal element of No. 3490714 is ZUNE.  These marks are identical in appearance, sound, and meaning as to their literal elments, “and have the potential to be used . . . in exactly the same manner.”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  Additionally, because they are identical in their literal elements, these marks are likely to engender the same connotation and overall commercial impression when considered in connection with applicant’s and registrant’s respective goods.  Id.

 

Applicant’s mark ZUNE is highly similar to No. 4920618, ZUNYI, No. 5387604, ZUNIE LOS ANGELES, and No. 5332961, ZUNIE, because each mark contains the wording ZUN(E/YI/IE). That applicant’s mark ends in E while the registered marks end in YI and IE, respectively, does not obviate this finding, as E can be pronounced in the same manner as YI and IE; thus, the marks can all be pronounced the same. There is no correct pronunciation of a mark because it is impossible to predict how the public will pronounce a particular mark.  See Embarcadero Techs., Inc. v. RStudio, Inc., 105 USPQ2d 1825, 1835 (TTAB 2013) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1367, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1912 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re The Belgrade Shoe Co., 411 F.2d 1352, 1353, 162 USPQ 227, 227 (C.C.P.A. 1969)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).  The marks in question could clearly be pronounced the same; such similarity in sound alone may be sufficient to support a finding that the marks are confusingly similar.  In re White Swan Ltd., 8 USPQ2d 1534, 1535 (TTAB 1988); see In re 1st USA Realty Prof’ls, Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1581, 1586 (TTAB 2007); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iv).

 

That No. 5387604 also contains the wording LOS ANGELES does not obviate this finding, as registrant has disclaimed this wording, making ZUNIE the more dominant portion of the mark. Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression.  See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).

 

That applicant’s mark is in design form does not obviate this finding, as the literal element of the mark is dominant to its design element. When evaluating a composite mark consisting of words and a design, the word portion is normally accorded greater weight because it is likely to make a greater impression upon purchasers, be remembered by them, and be used by them to refer to or request the goods.  In re Aquitaine Wine USA, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1181, 1184 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(c)(ii).  Thus, although marks must be compared in their entireties, the word portion is often considered the dominant feature and is accorded greater weight in determining whether marks are confusingly similar, even where the word portion has been disclaimed.  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d at 1366-67, 101 USPQ2d at 1911 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1570-71, 218 USPQ2d 390, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

 

When comparing marks, “[t]he proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression such that [consumers] who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties.”  Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1368, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1721 (Fed. Cir. 2012)); TMEP §1207.01(b).  The proper focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser, who retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks.  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 750-51, 113 USPQ2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 169 USPQ 39, 40 (CCPA 1971)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

 

Therefore, the marks are confusingly similar.

 

Relatedness of the Goods

 

Generally, the greater degree of similarity between the applied-for mark and the registered mark, the lesser the degree of similarity between the goods of the parties is required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.  In re C.H. Hanson Co., 116 USPQ2d 1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001)); In re Thor Tech, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1636 (TTAB 2009). 

 

The goods of the parties are closely related. The goods of applicant, “computer peripheral devices” and “Sweatshirts; T-shirts” are identical to No. 4920618’s “computer peripheral devices” and Nos. 5387604 and 5332961’s “t-shirts, sweatshirts.” When analyzing an applicant’s and registrant’s goods for similarity and relatedness, that determination is based on the description of the goods in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1323, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Hous. Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937, 942, 16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). 

 

In this case, the goods in the application and registrations are identical.  Therefore, it is presumed that the channels of trade and classes of purchasers are the same for these goods.  See Cai v. Diamond Hong, Inc., __ F.3d __, 27 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.  

 

Further, applicant’s “computer peripherals; software for processing digital music files; Computer programs for processing digital music files; Computer software for processing digital music files” is broadly written and, as such, encompasses No. 3490714’s more narrowly identified “computer software for use with multimedia player, entertainment and communications devices for recording, organizing, transmitting, manipulating and reviewing text, data, audio, image and video files; computer software for online accessing and purchasing of music, videos and other digital recordings.” Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).  

 

In this case, the application uses broad wording to describe the above-noted goods, which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including registrant’s more narrowly identified goods, noted above.  See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are legally identical.  See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

 

Additionally, the goods of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.”  In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are related.

 

Applicant’s “Computer bags; Computer carrying cases; Computer cases; Computer hardware; Computer hardware and computer peripheral devices; Computer hardware and computer peripherals; Computer memory devices; Computer peripheral devices; Computer peripheral equipment; Computer peripherals; Computer hardware and software for processing digital music files; Computer programs for processing digital music files; Computer software for processing digital music files; Digital music downloadable from the Internet; Downloadable music files; Downloadable computer software for creating music videos; Protective carrying cases for portable music players” is closely related to No. 3490714’s “software for connecting multimedia players to existing audiovisual systems in automobiles; computer software for use with multimedia player, entertainment and communications devices for recording, organizing, transmitting, manipulating and reviewing text, data, audio, image and video files; computer software for online accessing and purchasing of music, videos and other digital recordings” and No. 4920618’s “Batteries, electric; Chargers for electric batteries; Computer peripheral devices; Computers; Tablet computer” because providers of computer equipment and software also commonly provide computers and digital music.

 

The attached Internet evidence, consisting of computer equipment, software, computers, and digital music, establishes that the same entity commonly provides the relevant goods and markets the goods under the same mark and through the same trade channels for use by the same classes of consumers in the same fields of use.  Thus, applicant’s and registrant’s goods are considered related for likelihood of confusion purposes.  See, e.g., In re Davey Prods. Pty Ltd., 92 USPQ2d 1198, 1202-04 (TTAB 2009); In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp., 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1268-69, 1271-72 (TTAB 2009).

 

The trademark examining attorney has attached evidence from the USPTO’s X-Search database consisting of a number of third-party marks registered for use in connection with the same or similar goods as those of both applicant and registrant in this case.  This evidence shows that the goods listed therein, namely computer equipment, software, computers, and digital music, are of a kind that may emanate from a single source under a single mark.  See In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1737 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 60 USPQ2d 1214, 1217-18 (TTAB 2001); In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co.,29 USPQ2d 1783, 1785-86 (TTAB 1993); In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467, 1470 n.6 (TTAB 1988)); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iii).

 

Thus, consumers familiar with No. 3490714’s “software for connecting multimedia players to existing audiovisual systems in automobiles; computer software for use with multimedia player, entertainment and communications devices for recording, organizing, transmitting, manipulating and reviewing text, data, audio, image and video files; computer software for online accessing and purchasing of music, videos and other digital recordings” in connection with the mark ZUNE, No. 4920618’s “Batteries, electric; Chargers for electric batteries; Computer peripheral devices; Computers; Tablet computer” in connection with the mark ZUNYI, and Nos. 5387604 and 5332961’s “Apparel, namely, tank tops, cotton woven shirts, knit shirts, polo shirts, t-shirts, sweatshirts, cotton jackets, denim jackets, hats, caps, visors, hoods, headbands, socks, shorts, pants, vests, skirts, dresses, overalls, short pants, capri pants, blouses and sweaters” in connection with the mark ZUNIE LOS ANGELES and ZUNIE, upon encountering applicant’s “Computer bags; Computer carrying cases; Computer cases; Computer hardware; Computer hardware and computer peripheral devices; Computer hardware and computer peripherals; Computer memory devices; Computer peripheral devices; Computer peripheral equipment; Computer peripherals; Computer hardware and software for processing digital music files; Computer programs for processing digital music files; Computer software for processing digital music files; Digital music downloadable from the Internet; Downloadable music files; Downloadable computer software for creating music videos; Protective carrying cases for portable music players” and “Hats; Sweatshirts; T-shirts; Children's and infant's apparel, namely, jumpers, overall sleepwear, pajamas, rompers and one-piece garments; Hooded sweatshirts” in connection with the mark ZUNE, are likely to be confused and believe that the goods originate with the same source. Registration on the Principal Register is, therefore, refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

 

Applicant should note the following additional ground for refusal.

 

REFUSAL – ORNAMENTAL USE – CLASS 25

 

Registration is refused because the applied-for mark as used on the specimen of record is merely a decorative or ornamental feature of applicant’s clothing and, thus, does not function as a trademark to indicate the source of applicant’s clothing and to identify and distinguish applicant’s clothing from others.  Trademark Act Sections 1, 2, and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1052, 1127; see In re Lululemon Athletica Can. Inc., 105 USPQ2d 1684, 1689 (TTAB 2013); In re Pro-Line Corp., 28 USPQ2d 1141, 1142 (TTAB 1993); TMEP §§904.07(b), 1202.03 et seq.

 

The size, location, dominance, and significance of the alleged mark as used on the goods are all relevant factors in determining the commercial impression of the applied-for mark.  See, e.g., In re Peace Love World Live, LLC, 127 USPQ2d 1400, 1403 (TTAB 2018) (quoting In re Hulting, 107 USPQ2d 1175, 1178 (TTAB 2013)); In re Lululemon Athletica Can. Inc., 105 USPQ2d at 1687 (quoting In re Right-On Co., 87 USPQ2d 1152, 1156 (TTAB 2008)); TMEP §1202.03(a).

 

With respect to clothing, consumers may recognize small designs or discrete wording as trademarks, rather than as merely ornamental features, when located, for example, on the pocket or breast area of a shirt.  See TMEP §1202.03(a).  Consumers may not, however, perceive larger designs or slogans as trademarks when such matter is prominently displayed across the front of a t-shirt.  See In re Pro-Line Corp., 28 USPQ2d at 1142; In re Dimitri’s Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1666, 1667-68 (TTAB 1988); TMEP §1202.03(a), (b), (f)(i), (f)(ii).

 

In this case, the submitted specimen shows the applied-for mark, ZUNE, located directly on the upper-center area of the front of the shirts and the front portion of the hats, where ornamental elements often appear.  See TMEP §1202.03(a), (b).  Furthermore, the mark is displayed in a relatively large size on the clothing such that it dominates the overall appearance of the goods.  Lastly, the applied-for mark appears to be a design element that is used in a merely decorative manner that would be perceived by consumers as having little or no particular source-identifying significance.

 

Therefore, consumers would view the applied-for mark as a decorative or ornamental feature of the goods, rather than as a trademark to indicate the source of applicant’s goods and to distinguish them from others.

 

In appropriate circumstances, applicant may overcome this refusal by satisfying one of the following options:

 

(1)       Submit a different specimen (a verified “substitute” specimen) that was in actual use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application and that shows proper trademark use for the identified goods in International Class 25.  Examples of acceptable specimens that show non-ornamental use on clothing include hang tags and labels used inside a garment.

 

(2)       Amend to the Supplemental Register, which is a second trademark register for marks not yet eligible for registration on the Principal Register, but which may become capable over time of functioning as source indicators.

 

(3)       Claim acquired distinctiveness under Trademark Act Section 2(f) by submitting evidence that the applied-for mark has become distinctive of applicant’s goods; that is, proof that applicant’s extensive use and promotion of the mark allowed consumers now directly to associate the mark with applicant as the source of the goods.

 

(4)       Submit evidence that the applied-for mark is an indicator of secondary source; that is, proof that the mark is already recognized as a source indicator for other goods or services that applicant sells/offers.    

 

(5)       Amend the filing basis to intent to use under Section 1(b).  This option will later necessitate additional fee(s) and filing requirements.

 

For an overview of the response options above and instructions on how to satisfy each option online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, see the Ornamental Refusal webpage.

 

Although applicant’s mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusals by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.  However, if applicant responds to the refusals, applicant must also respond to the requirements set forth below.

 

REQUIREMENT – AMEND MARK DESCRIPTION

 

Applicant must provide an amended description of the mark that includes all the literal and design elements and colors shown in the mark.  Specifically, the following elements and colors have been omitted: the “Z” formed by the geometric shapes and the claimed color gray.

 

A complete description must identify all the literal and design elements in the mark and specify where the colors appear in those elements.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.37, 2.52(b)(1); TMEP §§807.07(a) et seq. 

 

The following description is suggested, if accurate:

 

The mark consists of a “Z” formed by hexagonal shapes in orange and pink, followed by the wording “ZUNE” in a gray stylized font.

 

 

REQUIREMENT – SPECIMEN

 

Registration is refused because the webpage specimen in International Classes 9 and 25 is not an acceptable display associated with the goods and appears to be mere advertising material.  See TMEP §904.07(a).  The specimen, thus, fails to show the applied-for mark in use in commerce.  Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051, 1127; 37 C.F.R. §2.56(a). 

 

To be acceptable, a specimen of a webpage display must include (1) a picture or sufficient textual description of applicant’s goods that (2) shows the mark associated with the goods, and (3) a way of ordering the goods (e.g., a “shop online” or “shopping cart” button or link, an order form, or a telephone number for placing orders).  TMEP §904.03(i); see In re Sones, 590 F.3d 1282, 1286-89, 93 USPQ2d 1118, 1122-24 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Azteca Sys., Inc., 102 USPQ2d 1955, 1957-58 (TTAB 2012).  If applicant’s specimen includes a telephone number, internet address, and/or mailing address that appears only with corporate contact information, the specimen may not show sufficient means for ordering the goods.  See In re Genitope Corp., 78 USPQ2d 1819, 1822 (TTAB 2006); TMEP §904.03(i)(C)(2).  In that circumstance, the specimen may also need to include instructions on how to place an order or an offer to accept orders.  See In re Quantum Foods, Inc., 94 USPQ2d 1375, 1379 (TTAB 2010); TMEP §904.03(i)(C)(2).

 

In this case, for Class 9, the website shows the mark but does not show the identified goods for sale, i.e., shows the available identified goods along with prices and a means of ordering those goods. For Class 25, the specimen does not include a way of ordering the goods in that the specimen shows clothing items and prices, but no means of ordering those clothing items.  See In re Sones, 590 F.3d at 1286-89, 93 USPQ2d at 1122-24; In re Azteca Sys., Inc., 102 USPQ2d at 1957; TMEP §§904.03(i) et seq.  Without this feature, the specimen is mere advertising material, which is generally not acceptable as a specimen for showing use in commerce for goods.  See In re Kohr Bros., 121 USPQ2d 1793, 1794 (TTAB 2017) (quoting In re Quantum Foods, Inc., 94 USPQ2d at 1379); In re Genitope Corp., 78 USPQ2d at 1822; TMEP §904.04(b). 

 

An application based on Trademark Act Section 1(a) must include a specimen showing the applied-for mark in use in commerce for each international class of goods identified in the application.  15 U.S.C. §1051(a)(1); 37 C.F.R. §2.56(a). 

 

Examples of specimens for goods include tags, labels, instruction manuals, containers, photographs that show the mark on the actual goods or packaging, and displays associated with the actual goods at their point of sale.  See TMEP §§904.03 et seq.  As stated above, webpage displays may also be specimens for goods when they include a picture or textual description of the goods associated with the mark and the means to order the goods.  TMEP §904.03(i).

 

Applicant may respond to this refusal by satisfying one of the following for each applicable international class:

 

(1)       Submit a different specimen (a verified “substitute” specimen) that (a) was in actual use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application and (b) shows the mark in actual use in commerce for the goods identified in the application.  A “verified substitute specimen” is a specimen that is accompanied by the following statement made in a signed affidavit or supported by a declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20:  “The substitute (or new, or originally submitted, if appropriate) specimen(s) was/were in use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application or prior to the filing of the amendment to allege use.”  The substitute specimen cannot be accepted without this statement.

 

(2)       Amend the filing basis to intent to use under Section 1(b), for which no specimen is required.  This option will later necessitate additional fee(s) and filing requirements such as providing a specimen.

 

For an overview of both response options referenced above and instructions on how to satisfy either option online using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) form, please go to the Specimen webpage. 

 

Advisory – Response Guidelines

 

Response guidelines.  For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and requirement in this Office action.  For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above.  For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements.  Please see “Responding to Office Actions” and the informational video “Response to Office Action” for more information and tips on responding.

 

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

 

Assistance

 

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusals and requirements in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

 

 

/Joan Blazich/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 122

571-272-7810

joan.blazich@uspto.gov

 

TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER:  Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application.  For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.  For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned trademark examining attorney.  E-mail communications will not be accepted as responses to Office actions; therefore, do not respond to this Office action by e-mail.

 

All informal e-mail communications relevant to this application will be placed in the official application record.

 

WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE:  It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants).  If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response. 

 

PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION:  To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/.  Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen.  If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199.  For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.

 

TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS:  Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.

 

 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (USPTO)

 

 

IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING YOUR

U.S. TRADEMARK APPLICATION

 

USPTO OFFICE ACTION (OFFICIAL LETTER) HAS ISSUED

ON 1/24/2019 FOR U.S. APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 88153817

 

Your trademark application has been reviewed.  The trademark examining attorney assigned by the USPTO to your application has written an official letter to which you must respond.  Please follow these steps:

 

(1)  Read the LETTER by clicking on this link or going to http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/, entering your U.S. application serial number, and clicking on “Documents.”

 

The Office action may not be immediately viewable, to allow for necessary system updates of the application, but will be available within 24 hours of this e-mail notification. 

 

(2)  Respond within 6 months (or sooner if specified in the Office action), calculated from 1/24/2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) response form located at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp.  A response transmitted through TEAS must be received before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.

 

Do NOT hit “Reply” to this e-mail notification, or otherwise e-mail your response because the USPTO does NOT accept e-mails as responses to Office actions. 

 

(3)  Questions about the contents of the Office action itself should be directed to the trademark examining attorney who reviewed your application, identified below. 

 

/Joan Blazich/

Examining Attorney

Law Office 122

571-272-7810

joan.blazich@uspto.gov

 

WARNING

 

Failure to file the required response by the applicable response deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.  For more information regarding abandonment, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/basics/abandon.jsp. 

 

PRIVATE COMPANY SOLICITATIONS REGARDING YOUR APPLICATION:  Private companies not associated with the USPTO are using information provided in trademark applications to mail or e-mail trademark-related solicitations.  These companies often use names that closely resemble the USPTO and their solicitations may look like an official government document.  Many solicitations require that you pay “fees.” 

 

Please carefully review all correspondence you receive regarding this application to make sure that you are responding to an official document from the USPTO rather than a private company solicitation.  All official USPTO correspondence will be mailed only from the “United States Patent and Trademark Office” in Alexandria, VA; or sent by e-mail from the domain “@uspto.gov.”  For more information on how to handle private company solicitations, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/solicitation_warnings.jsp.