To: | SAFE AI (bibhrajit@safeai.ai) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88130950 - SAFEROUTE - T2018-006 |
Sent: | July 30, 2019 09:55:05 PM |
Sent As: | ecom116@uspto.gov |
Attachments: | Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88130950
Mark: SAFEROUTE
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Correspondence Address:
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Applicant: SAFE AI
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Reference/Docket No. T2018-006
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: July 30, 2019
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action
This office action is in response to the applicant’s communication filed on 7/15/2019. The amended identification of goods submitted is accepted. However, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) with respect to cited U.S. Registration No. 4173924 is maintained and CONTINUED for the reasons previously stated. As previously indicated, there is an industry connection between autonomous avionic navigation and autonomous motor vehicle navigation rendering confusion likely in this instance. The applicant argues that the Section 2(d) refusal is unwarranted in this regard in that applicant’s business is actually focused on the heavy equipment industry, i.e. software therefor. The examiner finds this argument unpersuasive. The software identified herein is for use in the safe autonomous navigation of motor vehicles as opposed to heavy industrial equipment. Moreover, an expansion of the goods to include software for use in the safe autonomous navigation or routing of heavy industrial equipment would be an unacceptable amendment to the identification of goods. As previously indicated, an applicant’s goods may be limited, but not expanded, beyond those originally itemized in the application. See 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); TMEP §1402.06.
Moreover, Application Serial Number 87633444 has matured to registration and the following additional Section 2(d) refusal is now made. Furthermore, please see the new ownership issue addressed below.
I. SECTION 2(D) REFUSAL – LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION
Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5706843. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the attached registration.
Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods of the parties. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “du Pont factors”). In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Only those factors that are “relevant and of record” need be considered. M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns, Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 1382, 78 USPQ2d 1944, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1241, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1744 (TTAB 2018).
Although not all du Pont factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.
(1). Similarities between the compared marks.
Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.” In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).
The applicant’s proposed mark is SAFEROUTE in standard character form.
The registrant’s mark is SAFEROUTES in standard character form.
The respective marks are essentially identical in sound, appearance, and meaning rendering confusion highly likely in this instance. In this regard, please note that an applied-for mark that is the singular or plural form of a registered mark is essentially identical in sound, appearance, meaning, and commercial impression, and thus the marks are confusingly similar. Swiss Grill Ltd., v. Wolf Steel Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 2001, 2011 n.17 (TTAB 2015) (holding “it is obvious that the virtually identical marks [the singular and plural of SWISS GRILL] are confusingly similar”); Weider Publ’ns, LLC v. D & D Beauty Care Co., 109 USPQ2d 1347, 1355 (TTAB 2014) (finding the singular and plural forms of SHAPE to be essentially the same mark) (citing Wilson v. Delaunay, 245 F.2d 877, 878, 114 USPQ 339, 341 (C.C.P.A. 1957) (finding no material difference between the singular and plural forms of ZOMBIE such that the marks were considered the same mark).
(2). Relatedness of the compared goods.
The applicant’s goods are:
Computer software utilizing artificial intelligence for motor vehicle route planning and motor vehicle routing for the safe autonomous navigation of said vehicles and for statistical analysis related thereto, and computer hardware for use therewith in International Class 9.
The registrant’s goods include:
Computer application software for mobile electronic devices and downloadable mobile applications both for “navigation” in International Class 9.
The registrant’s broadly stated software for any type of “navigation”, presumably software utilizing artificial intelligence for the safe autonomous navigation or routing of motor vehicles, and the applicant’s software utilizing artificial intelligence for the safe autonomous navigation or routing of motor vehicles, are legally identical goods. It is where goods are identical that likelihood of confusion is greatest.
In this case, the registration uses broad wording to describe the goods which presumably encompass all software goods of the type described, including the applicant’s more specific software goods. See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, the applicant’s and the registrant’s goods are legally identical. See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v.Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd., 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).
Additionally, the goods and services of the parties have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, or classes of purchasers and, therefore, they are “presumed to travel in the same channels of trade to the same class of purchasers.” In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press, Inc., 281 F.3d 1261, 1268, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
Moreover, where the marks of the respective parties are essentially identical, as in this case, the degree of similarity or relatedness between the goods needed to support a finding of likelihood of confusion declines. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 116 USPQ2d 1406, 1411 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1207, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1993)), aff’d, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744 (Fed. Cir. 2017); TMEP §1207.01(a).
II. CHANGE IN OWNERSHIP
Applicant has requested that the applicant’s name be amended (i.e. from SAFE AI to SAFEAI); however, applicant has not provided or recorded in the USPTO database ownership transfer documentation or any other documentation showing transfer of title nor has applicant indicated whether the assignee is a successor to applicant’s business. An intent-to-use application is void if, prior to filing an allegation of use, the application is assigned to a party other than either a successor to the applicant’s business or to a portion of the applicant’s business to which the mark pertains, if that business is ongoing and existing. 15 U.S.C. §1060(a)(1); 37 C.F.R. §3.16; TMEP §501.01(a); see Cent. Garden & Pet Co. v. Doskocil Mfg. Co., 108 USPQ2d 1134, 1146 (TTAB 2013); Clorox Co. v. Chem. Bank, 40 USPQ2d 1098, 1105-06 (TTAB 1996). Accordingly, the request to amend the applicant name is denied until (1) clear chain of title to the new party has been established and (2) a statement that the assignee is a successor to applicant’s business is provided. 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §814.
To establish chain of title to the application, one of the following must be satisfied:
(1) The new owner must (a) record an assignment, name change, or other documentation affecting title with the USPTO’s Assignment Recordation Branch showing a clear chain of title to the mark in the new owner; and (b) promptly notify the trademark examining attorney that the documentation has been recorded.; OR
(2) The new owner must file either (a) a written statement, verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20, explaining in detail the chain of title to the new owner; or (b) documentation showing transfer of title to the new owner. However, the registration will not issue in the name of the new owner without recording chain of title documentation with the USPTO and notifying the trademark examining attorney, as specified in (1) above.
TMEP §502.01; see 15 U.S.C. §1060; 37 C.F.R. §§2.193(e)(1), 3.73(b)(1); TMEP §502.02(a).
Assignments and other documents affecting title may be filed electronically. There is a fee for recording ownership changes. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(b)(6), 3.41(a); TMEP §503.03(d). Recording an assignment or other ownership transfer document does not constitute a response to an Office action. TMEP §503.01(d). Applicant must still file a separate response to this Office action. See id.
III. RESPONSE TO A NON-FINAL ACTION
/Zhaleh Delaney/
Trademark Attorney
Trademark Law Office 116
(571) 272-9153
Zhaleh.Delaney@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE