To: | Illustrated Syndicate, LLC (iptm@armstrongteasdale.com) |
Subject: | U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88121320 - HEIRESS - 32866-39 |
Sent: | July 28, 2019 07:51:21 PM |
Sent As: | ecom108@uspto.gov |
Attachments: |
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application
U.S. Application Serial No. 88121320
Mark: HEIRESS
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Correspondence Address: 7700 FORSYTH BLVD., SUITE 1800
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Applicant: Illustrated Syndicate, LLC
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Reference/Docket No. 32866-39
Correspondence Email Address: |
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The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned. Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.
Issue date: July 28, 2019
TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE: Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application. See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820. TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services. 37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04. However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.
How to respond. Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action
This Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on July 1, 2019.
Registration Refused - Mark Is Merely Descriptive - Maintained
The applicant’s mark is merely descriptive of the goods/services in the application. See TMEP §1209; In re TriVita, Inc., 783 F.3d 872, 874, 114 USPQ2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
The applicant has submitted a response to the mere descriptiveness refusal. Applicant’s arguments and evidence have been considered and found unpersuasive for the reason(s) set forth below. Therefore, the mere descriptiveness refusal is maintained.
It is settled law that a mark is merely descriptive if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose, or use of an applicant’s goods and/or services. TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re TriVita, Inc., 783 F.3d 872, 874, 114 USPQ2d 1574, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297, 75 USPQ2d 1420, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920)). The applicant’s claim that a mark must only describe a feature, and cannot have any other meaning, is simply incorrect.
“A mark may be merely descriptive even if it does not describe the ‘full scope and extent’ of the applicant’s goods or services.” In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1346, 57 USPQ2d 1807, 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); TMEP §1209.01(b). It is settled law that it is enough if a mark describes only one significant function, attribute, or property. See In re The Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012); TMEP §1209.01(b); see In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d at 1173, 71 USPQ2d at 1371.
A mark does not need to be merely descriptive of all the goods or services specified in an application. In re The Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d 1297, 1300, 102 USPQ2d 1217, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Franklin Cnty. Historical Soc'y, 104 USPQ2d 1085, 1089 (TTAB 2012). “A descriptiveness refusal is proper ‘if the mark is descriptive of ANY of the [goods or] services for which registration is sought.’” In re The Chamber of Commerce of the U.S., 675 F.3d at 1300, 102 USPQ2d at 1219 (quoting In re Stereotaxis Inc., 429 F.3d 1039, 1040, 77 USPQ2d 1087, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
Specifically, the term “HEIRESS” refers to “a woman who has received a large amount upon the death of a rich relative.” See the dictionary definition enclosed with the prior Office Action. The term “HEIRESS” merely describes a feature of the services, namely, a character in the films, visual recordings, sound recording, entertainment services, and other services in International Class 41.
Applicant’s Two Cited Third-Party Registrations Are De Minimis and Irrelevant
The applicant cites two registrations with marks completely dissimilar to the mark in applicant's application. It is settled law that this tiny number of third-party registrations is de minimis and therefore insufficient to be relevant to the likelihood of confusion analysis in this case. Furthermore, marks that are not similar, as in the present case, is generally entitled to little weight in determining the strength of a mark. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1328-29, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1751-52 (Fed. Cir. 2017); AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Products, Inc., 474 F.2d 1403, 1406, 177 USPQ 268, 269 (C.C.P.A. 1973). These few registrations are “not evidence of what happens in the market place or that customers are familiar with them.” AMF Inc. v. Am. Leisure Prods., Inc., 474 F.2d at 1406, 177 USPQ at 269; In re I-Coat Co., 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1735 (TTAB 2018).
It is settled law that the weakness or dilution of a particular mark is generally determined in the context of the number and nature of SIMILAR marks in use in the marketplace in connection with similar goods and/or services. See Nat’l Cable Tel. Ass’n, Inc. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1579-80, 19 USPQ2d 1424, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
In any case, the TTAB has emphasized that the existence of third-party registrations does not excuse a likelihood of confusion, averring, “[W]e will not compound the problem of the registration of a confusingly similar mark by permitting such a mark to register again.” In re Mark Thomas, 79 USPQ2d 1021 (TTAB 2006) (emphasis added).
It is settled law that each trademark application must be decided on its own merits. See, In re Nett Designs, 57 USPQ2d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The Board must decide each case on its own merits”); In re Perez, 21 USPQ2d 1075, 1077 (TTAB 1991) (“[W]e are, OF COURSE, not bound by an Examining Attorney’s prior determination as to registrability”) (emphasis added).
Each mark and application have their own unique set of facts and circumstances. It is well-settled that the mere existence of third-party registrations that have some facts and/or circumstances in common with the instant application is not and cannot be a reason to allow registration of the mark in the instant application.
See In re Omega SA, 494 F.3d 1362, 83 USPQ2d 1541 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (upholding examining attorney’s requirement for amendment of the term “chronographs” in the identification of goods, notwithstanding applicant’s ownership of several registrations in which this term appears without further qualification in the identification); In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 4 USPQ2d 1141 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (incontestable registration of CASH MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT for credit card services did not automatically entitle applicant to registration of the same mark for broader financial services); In re Loew’s Theatres, Inc., 769 F.2d 764, 226 USPQ 865 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (examining attorney could properly refuse registration on ground that DURANGO for chewing tobacco is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive, even though applicant owned incontestable registration of same mark for cigars); In re Rodale Inc., 80 USPQ2d 1696 (TTAB 2006) (NUTRITION BULLETIN generic for “providing information in the field of health and diet via a web site on the Internet,” notwithstanding applicant’s claims of ownership of six prior registrations on the Supplemental Register that included the term “bulletin” in the mark for related goods and services (e.g., “Weight-Loss Bulletin,” “Sex Bulletin,” “Muscle Bulletin,” and “Nutrition Bulletin”)); In re Best Software Inc., 58 USPQ2d 1314 (TTAB 2001) (applicant’s ownership of registration of BEST! did not preclude examining attorney from requiring disclaimer of “Best” in applications seeking registration of BEST! SUPPORTPLUS and BEST! SUPPORTPLUS PREMIER for the same and additional services); In re Sunmarks Inc., 32 USPQ2d 1470 (TTAB 1994) (examining attorney not precluded from refusing registration of ULTRA for “gasoline, motor oil, automotive grease, general purpose grease, machine grease and gear oil,” even though applicant owned registrations of same mark for “motor oil” and “gasoline for use as automotive fuel, sold only in applicant’s automotive service stations”); In re Medical Disposables Co., 25 USPQ2d 1801 (TTAB 1992) (disclaimer of the unitary term “MEDICAL DISPOSABLES” required, notwithstanding applicant’s ownership of a prior registration in which a piecemeal disclaimer of the words “MEDICAL” and “DISPOSABLES” was permitted); In re Perez, 21 USPQ2d 1075 (TTAB 1991) (likelihood of confusion between applicant’s EL GALLO for fresh tomatoes and peppers and the previously registered mark ROOSTER for fresh citrus fruit, notwithstanding applicant’s ownership of an expired registration of the same mark for the same goods); In re Lean Line, Inc., 229 USPQ 781 (TTAB 1986) (LEAN merely descriptive of low-calorie foods, even though applicant had registered the term for other goods and services and a third-party had registered the term “LEAN CUISINE” with no disclaimer); In re McDonald’s Corp., 229 USPQ 555 (TTAB 1985) (Board not bound to allow registration of APPLE PIE TREE for restaurant services merely because applicant had succeeded in registering the character and name as trademarks and the character as a service mark); In re Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 222 USPQ 820 (TTAB 1984) (LAW & BUSINESS incapable of distinguishing the services of arranging and conducting seminars in the field of business law, notwithstanding applicant’s ownership of a registration on the Supplemental Register for the same mark for books, pamphlets, and monographs); In re Local Trademarks, Inc., 220 USPQ 728 (TTAB 1983) (upholding refusal of registration on the ground that WHEN IT’S TIME TO ACT did not identify advertising services; Board not bound to allow registration simply because applicant owned registrations for identical services); In re Pilon, 195 USPQ 178 (TTAB 1977) (title of chapter or section of book not registrable, even though applicant owned prior registrations of marks comprising chapter titles). See also In re Wilson, 57 USPQ2d 1863 (TTAB 2001) (“reasoned decisionmaking” doctrine, which prohibits a federal agency from creating conflicting lines of precedent governing identical situations, did not entitle applicant to registration of PINE CONE BRAND for packaged fresh citrus fruit, even though USPTO issued registration for similar PINE CONE mark in 1933 despite then-existing registration for PINE CONE mark that was cited against applicant).
Conclusion
For all of the reasons listed above, applicant’s evidence and arguments are insufficient to rebut the examining attorney’s prima facie case of mere descriptiveness. The examining attorney includes even more arguments in this Office Action to complement the evidence and arguments submitted with the prior Office Action to corroborate the finding of mere descriptiveness. In contrast, the evidence and arguments the applicant has submitted are insufficient to overcome the examining attorney’s prima facie case of mere descriptiveness. Consequently, all of the evidence and arguments of record weighs very heavily in favor of a finding of mere descriptiveness.
Request for Information
(1) Explain whether the word “HEIRESS” in the mark has any meaning or significance in relation to the applicant’s goods.
(2) Explain whether a heiress is a subject or character of any of the applicant’s goods, e.g., one of the characters in the graphic novels, comic books, etc.]
See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); TMEP §814.
The applicant must also submit examples of the applicant’s goods/services, relevant parts of the applicant’s web sites, advertisements, or any other relevant examples as to how the applicant uses its goods/services with the “HEIRESS” mark.
If the applicant is not able at this point to submit any examples of the mark with its own goods/services, then the applicant must submit examples of third-party use which shows how the applicant intends to use its goods/services with the “HEIRESS” mark.
Failure to respond to a request for information is an additional ground for refusing registration. See In re DTI, 67 USPQ2d at 1701-02. Merely stating that information about the goods is available on applicant’s website is an inappropriate response to a request for additional information and is insufficient to make the relevant information of record. See In re Planalytics, Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1453, 1457-58 (TTAB 2004).
Only If Applicable - Examiner’s Amendment Recommended
Examiner’s Amendments cannot be issued for partial amendments. However, if all of the outstanding issues can be resolved through an Examiner’s Amendment, the applicant is encouraged to respond to this Office Action by amending the application in a telephone call with the examining attorney to expedite the processing of the application. Generally, only the submission of arguments to overcome a substantive refusal or an informal requirement, a requirement for the submission of specimens, a particular document or declaration, or the payment of a fee cannot be handled over the telephone.
Questions Regarding This Office Action
Responding to Office Action
The Trademark Act of 1946, as amended
The Trademark Rules of Practice, as amended
Precedential court and Trademark Trial and Appeal Board decisions
The USPTO’s Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP), as periodically updated
The USPTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure (TBMP), as periodically updated
See 15 U.S.C. §§1051 et seq.; 37 C.F.R. pts. 2, 3, 6, 7, 11; TMEP intro., §§101, 107, 110.
Official USPTO letters and notices sent to applicants generally refer to one or more of these legal resources. Both the Trademark Act and Trademark Rules of Practice can be viewed online at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/law/index.jsp. The TMEP is available online at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/resources/index.jsp and the TBMP and Trademark Trial and Appeal Board decisions are available online at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/appeal/index.jsp.
Please note that applicant must explicitly address all issues raised in this Office Action. If the issues are substantive refusals, the applicant may respond with arguments and evidence to overcome the refusal. To respond to requirements/informalities the applicant must specifically request that changes to the record be made.
There is no required format or form for responding to an Office Action. The Office recommends applicants use the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) to respond to Office Actions online at http://www.gov.uspto.report/teas/index.html. TO RESPOND TO THIS LETTER VIA TEAS: Go to http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/response_forms.jsp. Please wait 48-72 hours from the issue/mailing date before using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS), to allow for necessary system updates of the application. For technical assistance with online forms, e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov.
WHO MUST SIGN THE RESPONSE: It must be personally signed by an individual applicant or someone with legal authority to bind an applicant (i.e., a corporate officer, a general partner, all joint applicants). If an applicant is represented by an attorney, the attorney must sign the response.
The USPTO applies the following legal authority to a trademark application:
• The Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. §§1051 et seq.)
• The Trademark Rules of Practice (37 C.F.R. pts. 2, 3, 6, 7, 11)
• Precedential court and Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) decisions
• The Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP)
• The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure (TBMP)
If applicant responds on paper via regular mail, applicant should include the following information on all correspondence with the Office: (1) the name and law office number of the trademark examining attorney, (2) the serial number and filing date of the application, (3) the date of issuance of this Office action, (4) applicant’s name, address, telephone number and e-mail address (if applicable), and (5) the mark. 37 C.F.R. §2.194(b)(1); TMEP §302.03(a).
PERIODICALLY CHECK THE STATUS OF THE APPLICATION: To ensure that applicant does not miss crucial deadlines or official notices, check the status of the application every three to four months using the Trademark Status and Document Retrieval (TSDR) system at http://tsdr.gov.uspto.report/. Please keep a copy of the TSDR status screen. If the status shows no change for more than six months, contact the Trademark Assistance Center by e-mail at TrademarkAssistanceCenter@uspto.gov or call 1-800-786-9199. For more information on checking status, see http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/process/status/.
TO UPDATE CORRESPONDENCE/E-MAIL ADDRESS: Use the TEAS form at http://www.gov.uspto.report/trademarks/teas/correspondence.jsp.
/Michael A. Wiener/
Trademark Attorney
Law Office 108
(T): (571) 272-8836
E-Mail (unofficial correspondence only):
michael.wiener@uspto.gov
RESPONSE GUIDANCE