Offc Action Outgoing

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant’s Trademark Application

FINAL OFFICE ACTION

The USPTO must receive applicant’s response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be abandoned.  Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) and/or Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA).  A link to the appropriate TEAS response form and/or to ESTTA for an appeal appears at the end of this Office action. 

Issue date:  July 20, 2019

This FINAL Office action is in response to applicant’s communication filed on July 1, 2019.

In that response, applicant submitted a consent agreement relating to the Section 2(d) Likelihood of Confusion refusal for Registration No. 5167546; as a result of that consent agreement, the Section 2(d) refusal as to Registration No. 5167546 is hereby withdrawn.

In addition, applicant submitted arguments relating to the Section 2(d) Likelihood of Confusion refusal for Registration No. 4043950.  The examining attorney has carefully considered applicant’s arguments but does not find them to be persuasive; therefore, for the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made FINAL with respect to U.S. Registration No. 4043950.  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b). 

Applicant also submitted an amended identification of goods; however, because additional clarification is required, the requirement to provide a clear and definite identification of goods is continued and also now made FINAL.  See 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b); TMEP §1402.01.

SUMMARY OF ISSUES MADE FINAL that applicant must address:

• Section 2(d) Likelihood of Confusion Refusal
• Identification of Goods

Likelihood of Confusion – Section 2(d) Refusal

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 4043950.  Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq.  See the previously attached registration.

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely a consumer would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant(s).  See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d).  Determining likelihood of confusion is made on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017).  However, “[n]ot all of the [du Pont] factors are relevant to every case, and only factors of significance to the particular mark need be considered.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1366, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1719 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601. F.3d 1342, 1346, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir 2010)).  The USPTO may focus its analysis “on dispositive factors, such as similarity of the marks and relatedness of the goods [and/or services].”  In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); see TMEP §1207.01. 

Similarity of Marks

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression.  Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v).  “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks confusingly similar.”  In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing In re Davia, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)); TMEP §1207.01(b).

Applicant’s mark is “RENEGADE”. 

Registrant’s mark is “RENEGADE TARGETS”. 

The marks are similar because they both begin with or, in the case of applicant’s mark, consist entirely of the term “RENEGADE”. 

Although applicant’s mark does not contain the entirety of the registered mark, applicant’s mark is likely to appear to prospective purchasers as a shortened form of registrant’s mark.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 1348, 94 USPQ2d 1257, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting United States Shoe Corp., 229 USPQ 707, 709 (TTAB 1985)).  Thus, merely omitting some of the wording from a registered mark may not overcome a likelihood of confusion.  See In re Mighty Leaf Tea, 601 F.3d 1342, 94 USPQ2d 1257; In re Optica Int’l, 196 USPQ 775, 778 (TTAB 1977); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).  In this case, applicant’s mark does not create a distinct commercial impression from the registered mark because it contains some of the wording in the registered mark and does not add any wording that would distinguish it from that mark.

Furthermore, please note that the marks are compared in their entireties under a Trademark Act Section 2(d) analysis.  See TMEP §1207.01(b).  Nevertheless, one feature of a mark may be recognized as more significant in creating a commercial impression.  Greater weight is given to that dominant feature in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion.  In re Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Tektronix, Inc. v. Daktronics, Inc., 534 F.2d 915, 189 USPQ 693 (C.C.P.A. 1976); In re J.M. Originals Inc., 6 USPQ2d 1393 (TTAB 1987); see TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). 

In this case, the term “RENEGADE” in the marks is the only and/or most significant element in creating a commercial impression and will be the primary term impressed upon a purchaser's memory when calling for the goods. 

Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix, or syllable in any trademark or service mark.  See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding similarity between VEUVE ROYALE and two VEUVE CLICQUOT marks in part because “VEUVE . . . remains a ‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark and the first word to appear on the label”); Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 876, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed Cir. 1992) (finding similarity between CENTURY 21 and CENTURY LIFE OF AMERICA in part because “consumers must first notice th[e] identical lead word”); see also In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1303, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (finding “the identity of the marks’ two initial words is particularly significant because consumers typically notice those words first”).  In this case, the term “RENEGADE” is the first and/or only term in the marks and, as such, consumers are likely to focus thereon.

In addition, please noted disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks.  In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii).  In this case, the only term in the marks that is not identical, i.e. that is not the term “RENEGADE”, is the disclaimed term “TARGETS” in registrant’s mark; that term is generic for the registrant’s goods which are all types of targets.  See registrant’s identification of goods and disclaimer of “TARGETS”. As such, consumers will not look to the term “TARGETS” to determine source when encountering the mark. 

Applicant argues that the marks create a different commercial impression because of the term “TARGETS” in registrant’s mark.  However, for the reasons set forth above, the examining attorney respectfully disagrees with applicant’s conclusions in this regard.

Accordingly, the relevant marks are sufficiently similar to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.

Similarity of Goods

The compared goods and/or services need not be identical or even competitive to find a likelihood of confusion.  See On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1086, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).  They need only be “related in some manner and/or if the circumstances surrounding their marketing are such that they could give rise to the mistaken belief that [the goods and/or services] emanate from the same source.”  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1369, 101 USPQ2d 1713, 1722 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting 7-Eleven Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 USPQ2d 1715, 1724 (TTAB 2007)); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i).

In addition, please note that, generally, the greater degree of similarity between the applied-for mark and the registered mark, the lesser the degree of similarity between the goods and/or services of the parties is required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.  In re C.H. Hanson Co., 116 USPQ2d 1351, 1353 (TTAB 2015) (citing In re Opus One Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812, 1815 (TTAB 2001)); In re Thor Tech, Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1636 (TTAB 2009).  In this case, as discussed above, there is a high degree of similarity between the marks in that applicant’s mark is wholly encompassed by registrant’s mark and the only difference between the two marks is the inclusion of the generic term “TARGETS” in registrant’s mark.  As such, there is a lesser degree of similarity required between the goods in order to support a finding of likelihood of confusion.

Applicant’s goods are “Component parts for firearms, namely, bolt actions.” 

Registrant’s goods are “Archery targets; Firearm targets; Targets; Targets sold as collectibles.”

These goods are related in that they are likely to emanate from the same source and/or be provided, marketed and/or used in connection with one another.    See, e.g., attached webpages from www.browningcom, www.shopruger.com, www.shopwilsoncombat.com, barrett.net and www.sigsauer.com evidencing that (1) firearms components, such as applicant’s, and (2) targets, such as registrant’s, do, in fact, emanate from the same sources and/or are provided, marketed and/or used in connection with one another. 

Applicant argues that the trade channels and target markets for its products vis à vis registrant’s markets are different.  In particular, it states that

“[a]pplicant’s goods will largely be sold to gun manufacturers and individuals seeking high-end components for precision firearms.  Individuals confront Applicant’s brands on its website and gun retailers when seeking out component parts for their firearms.  Applicant’s bolt actions are not marketed specifically to shooting ranges or other retailers offering cheap, paper targets featuring ghoulish characters”

However, in so arguing, applicant is placing restrictions and limitations on its goods and registrant’s goods that are not contained within the identifications of goods in the application and/or registration.  Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods and/or services stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use and, in this case, the goods of the parties as identified in the application and registration have no restrictions as to nature, type, channels of trade, and/or classes of purchasers.  See In re Detroit Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).   

Applicant also argues that its consumers are sophisticated ones and, as such, will not be confused as to source when encountering the marks.  However, even assuming arguendo that applicant’s consumers are sophisticated, the fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion.  TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii); see, e.g., Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. 1317, 1325, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163-64 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Top Tobacco LP v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 101 USPQ2d 1163, 1170 (TTAB 2011).  Further, where the purchasers consist of both professionals and the public, the standard of care for purchasing the goods is that of the least sophisticated potential purchaser.  In re FCA US LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1214, 1222 (TTAB 2018) (citing Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d. at 1325, 110 USPQ2d at 1163).

Accordingly, based on the similarity of the marks and the relatedness of the goods, registration of the applicant’s mark is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

Identification of Goods Must Be Clarified

The identification of goods, as presently amended, is indefinite and must be clarified to further specify the nature/type of the bolt actions.  See TMEP §1402.01.  Applicant may adopt the following identification, if accurate.  Please note that bolded wording/punctuation indicates a suggested addition(s)/amendment(s) to applicant’s current identification. 

Class 13:

“Component parts for firearms, namely, bolt actions in the nature of bolt action firing mechanisms and bolt action receivers.”

Identifications of goods and/or services can be amended only to clarify or limit the goods and/or services; adding to or broadening the scope of the goods and/or services is not permitted.  37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); see TMEP §§1402.06 et seq., 1402.07.  Therefore, applicant may not amend the identification to include goods and/or services that are not within the scope of the goods and/or services set forth in the present identification.

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and services in trademark applications, please see the USPTO’s online searchable U.S. Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual.  See TMEP §1402.04.

Responding to this FINAL Office Action

How to respond.  Click to file a response to this final Office action and/or appeal it to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB).

Applicant must respond within six months of the date of issuance of this FINAL Office action or the application will be abandoned.  15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a).  Applicant may respond by providing one or both of the following:

(1)       a response filed using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS) that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements and/or resolves all outstanding refusals; and/or

(2)       an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board filed using the Electronic System for Trademark Trials and Appeals (ESTTA) with the required filing fee of $200 per class.

37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(1)-(2); TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(18); TBMP ch. 1200.

In certain rare circumstances, an applicant may respond by filing a petition to the Director pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review procedural issues.  TMEP §714.04; see 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters).  There is a fee required for filing a petition.  37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

TEAS PLUS OR TEAS REDUCED FEE (TEAS RF) APPLICANTS – TO MAINTAIN LOWER FEE, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET, INCLUDING SUBMITTING DOCUMENTS ONLINE:  Applicants who filed their application online using the lower-fee TEAS Plus or TEAS RF application form must (1) file certain documents online using TEAS, including responses to Office actions (see TMEP §§819.02(b), 820.02(b) for a complete list of these documents); (2) maintain a valid e-mail correspondence address; and (3) agree to receive correspondence from the USPTO by e-mail throughout the prosecution of the application.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.22(b), 2.23(b); TMEP §§819, 820.  TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants who do not meet these requirements must submit an additional processing fee of $125 per class of goods and/or services.  37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(1)(v), 2.22(c), 2.23(c); TMEP §§819.04, 820.04.  However, in certain situations, TEAS Plus or TEAS RF applicants may respond to an Office action by authorizing an examiner’s amendment by telephone or e-mail without incurring this additional fee.  

Telephone/Email Suggested for Questions

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action.  Although the trademark examining attorney cannot provide legal advice or statements about applicant’s rights, the trademark examining attorney can provide applicant with additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action.  See TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.  Although the USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions, emails can be used for informal communications and will be included in the application record.  See 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05. 

/Meghan Reinhart/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 108

(571) 272-2943

meghan.reinhart@uspto.gov

RESPONSE GUIDANCE

• Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to abandon.  A response or notice of appeal must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  TEAS and ESTTA maintenance or unforeseen circumstances could affect an applicant’s ability to timely respond.  

• Responses signed by an unauthorized party are not accepted and can cause the application to abandon.  If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with legal authority to bind a juristic applicant.  If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

• If needed, find contact information for the supervisor of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued

on July 20, 2019 for

U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88112436

Your trademark application has been reviewed by a trademark examining attorney.  As part of that review, the assigned attorney has issued an official letter that you must respond to by the specified deadline or your application will be abandoned.  Please follow the steps below.

(1)  Read the official letter.

(2)  Direct questions about the contents of the Office action to the assigned attorney below. 

/Meghan Reinhart/

Trademark Examining Attorney

Law Office 108

(571) 272-2943

meghan.reinhart@uspto.gov

Direct questions about navigating USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO website, the application process, the status of your application, and/or whether there are outstanding deadlines or documents related to your file to the Trademark Assistance Center (TAC).

(3)  Respond within 6 months (or earlier, if required in the Office action) from July 20, 2019, using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS).  The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight Eastern Time of the last day of the response period.  See the Office action for more information about how to respond.

GENERAL GUIDANCE

·       Check the status of your application periodically in the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database to avoid missing critical deadlines.

·       Update your correspondence email address, if needed, to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.

·       Beware of misleading notices sent by private companies about your application.  Private companies not associated with the USPTO use public information available in trademark registrations to mail and email trademark-related offers and notices – most of which require fees.  All official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.”